And in St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. State, 97 Ark. 473, 134 S. W. 970, we held (quoting syllabus): "The legislature has primarily the right to determine whether the public necessity and convenience require the establishment of a railway depot at a given point, and the courts will not disturb that determination unless it is clearly shown that such requirement is unreasonable and arbitrary."

be given to the legislative determination | be greatly increased; that if the station of the necessity for a station and the rea- was located, according to the order of the sonableness of requiring the company to Commission, on the branch line the engine erect and maintain one." would stand upon a 1 per cent grade, which would make it very difficult to handle long, heavy trains, whereas at the old station there was a straight track on the main line, and the grade of the branch line was of sufficient distance to permit the proper handling of trains. The testimony also tended to show that if the appellant undertook to straighten the curvature at the station under the order of the Commission, and to reduce the grade on the branch line In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. State, so as to enable it to properly handle the supra, the court had under consideration trains, it would cost about $55,000. It the power of the Railroad Commission, was shown that a larger number of passenunder this statute, to order the construc-ger trains passed through Benton than any tion of a spur track, and we said: "The legislature had the right to require the construction of this spur track, and, having it, could delegate the power to the Railroad Commission, as it has done by said act of 1907. . . If it had made the requirement directly by statute, instead of conferring the power upon the Railroad Commission to make it, its action would have been subject to judicial review only as being so arbitrary and unreasonable as to cause it to be void for want of power. . The order of the Railroad Commission, made under the authority delegated to it, is subject to like review for the same cause."

These principles doubtless were in the mind of the chancery court when passing upon the facts on the issue as to whether or not the order of the Commission was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to render the same void. The court was correct in its conclusion. It cannot be said that the order of the Commission was "arbitrary and without any foundation in reason and justice."

Appellant contends that the order was unreasonable because the testimony adduced by it showed that the location of the station under the order of the Commission was on a curve on the main line; that, being on a curve, there was difficulty in starting trains, in coupling the cars, and in seeing signals, all of which rendered the operation of trains far more difficult and dangerous than it would be on a straight track, like the one at the old station or place at which the appellant proposed to erect its new depot building. The undisputed testimony showed that the station under the order of the Commission would be located on a curve on the track of appellant's main line that was 1 degrees. There was much testimony on behalf of appellant tending to show that the difficulty, as well as the hazards, of operating the trains on this curve would

other town in the state except Little Rock. This was because of the numerous passengers to Hot Springs. It was shown that an effort was once before made before the Railroad Commission for the removal of the depot from its present location, which was unsuccessful, and likewise an unsuccessful effort was made to have the legislature pass a special act requiring the removal of the depot from its present location. On the other hand, there was testimony tending to show that the site where the station is now located and the site where it would be located under the order of the Commission were so nearly identical that either would make a good location; that the curve at the station of the Rock Island Railroad at Benton was greater than would be the curve at the station under the Commission's order; that a curve is objectionable if sharp, that is, if over 4 degrees; that while it is preferable always to have the stations located on a straight track, nevertheless appellant had quite a number of stations located on curves of 1 degrees. It was shown that the appellant owned sufficient land between the two tracks to make a straight track south for 500 or 600 feet; that it had room to straighten its tracks without getting off its right of way; that from the old station it had 522 feet of straight track; that it had plenty of room to carry the straight track 522 feet south of the new location. It was shown that the cost of erecting the depot building at the station ordered by the Commission and at the old station where the depot building had been burned would be approximately the same; and there was evidence tending to show that the convenience to the people of Benton as a whole would be far greater at the station ordered by the Commission than at the old station, and that the danger and difficulty in operating trains at the station as ordered by the Commission would be no greater than at the old location.

Without going into further detail concerning the facts, it suffices to say that it was shown that a majority of the Commission visited the location, heard the testimony pro and con, and, after making a thorough investigation and giving the parties full opportunity to be heard, made the order now challenged by the appellant. Under the principles already announced by this court as to the power delegated by the legislature to the Commission, we are of the opinion that the court was correct in holding that the order of the Commission, under the facts adduced, was not arbitrary and

unreasonable.

The decree, therefore, dismissing the appellant's complaint for want of equity, is in all things affirmed.

Petition for rehearing denied.

ALABAMA SUPREME COURT.

RAILROAD COMMISSION OF ALA-
BAMA, Appt.,

V.

ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN
ROAD COMPANY et al.

(185 Ala. 354, 64 So. 13.)

Public service commission effect in court.

RAIL

order

1. An order of a Railroad Commission requiring construction of a union railroad Note.

union station police power. 4. The police power extends to requiring railroad companies entering a particular city jointly to acquire the necessary property and construct and maintain a union passenger station.

Legislature delegation of authority arbitrary power.

5. Arbitrary power is not conferred upon a Railroad Commission by granting it authority to require railroad companies within a particular city to construct and maintain union stations when the necessities of

Power to require establishment ther providing that, on completion of the of union station.

As to power to compel change of location of railroad station, see note to St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Bellamy, ante, 91.

Power of court to determine location. The determination of the location of a union station has in one case been held with in the jurisdiction of the supreme court.

Thus, in Concord & M. R. Co. v. Boston

& M. R. Co. 67 N. H. 464, 41 Atl. 263, where all parties desired the erection of a union station, and conceded that the public good required it, but were unable to agree upon a location, in the absence of express legislation conferring the power of determining the question, it was held that the supreme court had common-law jurisdiction to determine the location.

Power of legislature to direct construction of union stations.

In Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co. 109 Mass. 103, the act of 1871, chap. 343, providing that several railroads should unite in a union passenger station to be located on one of two designated sites, the precise location to be selected by commissioners appointed by the supreme court, and fur

union station, two of the railroads should
discontinue their old locations, was held
to be a reasonable exercise of the power
reserved by the legislature to alter, repeal,
or amend the charters of the corporations.
And this right to alter or amend was held
absolute, and it was accordingly held imma-
terial whether or not the railroads consent-
As all the railroads con-
ed to the act.
cerned in Worcester v. Norwich & W. R.
Co. supra, had a terminus in the city, where
they were ordered to unite in a union sta-
tion, the court stated that it was unneces-
sary to consider the contention that the act
implied a power in the legislature to require
a railroad corporation to extend its track
to the state line in any direction.

Power of legislature to authorize Commission to direct construction of union depots.

Generally as to delegation by legislature of power to regulate carriers, see note to State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639.

It has been held that an act providing that where two or more railroads reach a city or town it shall be the duty of the Railroad Commission to ascertain whether it is practicable and feasible for such rail

Carrier

definiteness.

order fixing

the case, in its judgment, require it, so as Carrier - union station to make the statute unconstitutional. locality 9. An order of a Railroad Commission requiring the construction and maintenance of a union depot by several railroad companies is not invalid in not fixing the exact spot where it is to be located, if the general location is designated.

provision for union station effect of receivership. 6. That a railroad company is in possession of receivers does not take it out of the operation of a statute providing that railroad companies may be required, under penalty, to construct and maintain union stations, although the order must be executed by the receivers, and the statute is not made expressly applicable to them, where, by statute, a railroad company includes any person operating a railroad.

A

(June 30, 1913.)

PPEAL by the Commission from a judg ment of the City Court of Birmingham sustaining a demurrer to a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to unite in the construction of a union pas

senger station. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Estes, Jones, & Welch, for appellant:

Acts in pari materia are to be construed and read together as one act.

Territory ex rel. Hawkins v. Wingfield, 2 Ariz. 305, 15 Pac. 139; People ex rel. Frick v. Jackson, 30 Cal. 427; Chandler v. Lee, 1 Idaho, 349; Nazareth Literary & Ben. Inst. v. Com. 14 B. Mon. 266.

Acts passed at the same session, or even at different sessions, as to the same subjectmatter, should be construed together, and that it invests the Commission with power, at their option, to enforce or not to enforce the statute, since it merely places upon the Commission the duty of ascertaining whether or not such facts exist at any particular place as would authorize it to act. Ibid.

roads to use a union station, and that if the Commission finds, upon investigation, that it is practicable for them to join in the construction and use of such a station, to give notice, and after investigation and public hearing require them to construct and maintain such a station, but providing And it has been held within the legisla that it must appear to the Commission that tive power to enact a statute directing a the construction and maintenance of such a Corporation Commission to require, when station is just and reasonable to the rail- practicable and when the necessities of the road companies, and demanded by the pub-case in the judgment of the Commission delic interest, does not delegate to the Commission power to enact a law requiring railroads to build union depots, but merely leaves to the Commission the determination of the existence of facts upon which the law becomes applicable. State v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. 165 S. W. 491; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. State, Tex. Civ. App. 167 S. W. 192. And such act is not invalid on the ground that it deprives the railroads of their erty without due process of law, or that it denies them the equal protection of the law, since, before any action can be taken by the Commission after determining that it is practicable for the companies to use a joint station, it is made incumbent upon it to give notice to the companies, after which an investigation and public hearing follow. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. State, supra.

mand it, any two or more railroads entering a city or town to have a common or union station, and to unite in the joint expense of erecting, constructing, and maintaining such union station, and conferring the power of eminent domain on railroads ordered to construct such depots, but providing that the act should not be construed as authorizing the Commission to require the construction of union depots where the prop-companies have separate depots which, in the opinion of the Commission, are adequate and convenient, and offer suitable accommodation for the traveling public. Dewey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 142 N. C. 392, 55 S. E. 292.

Neither is the act invalid on the ground

The Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749, where the Constitution conferred the power on the legislature "of regulating railroad freight and passenger tariffs, the locating

the whole statutes and every part of them Southern R. Co. 173 Ala. 231, 55 So. 531, should be looked to.

26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 620-624; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 27 L. ed. 251, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; United States v. Walker, 22 How. 299, 16 L. ed. 382; Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550, 28 L. ed. 993, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 631; 36 Cyc. 1151; Lehman v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 219; Crawford v. Tyson, 46 Ala. 299; Barr v. Weaver, 132 Ala. 212, 31 So. 488.

It was proper to join the receivers and the railroad companies of which they were receivers, as parties defendant in the mandamus proceedings.

Ft. Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 87 Iowa, 389, 54 N. W. 243; Horton v.

or

Ann. Cas. 1914A, 685.

Receivers appointed by any United States court, or by the terms of the statutory laws of this state as to the regulation of transportation companies, are delivered into the hands and control of the Railroad Commission of the state; and as such, are bound to comply with all reasonable orders, regulations, and directions of the Railroad Commission.

Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 44 L. ed. 897, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819; Felton v. Ackerman, 9 C. C. A. 457, 22 U. S. App. 154, 61 Fed. 225; United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, 44 L. ed. 780, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609.

road Commission directing several railroads to acquire a site and erect a union station is based on a finding by the Commission that the situation was such as to justify the making of the order. Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749.

In determining the reasonableness of an order of the Railroad Commission requiring several railroads to construct a union station, the needs and accommodations of the public and the effect it will have upon the property rights of the railroads, while not the sole, are the paramount, questions for consideration. Ibid.

and building of passenger and freight de- |
pots," and the legislature had passed stat-
utes requiring railroads on the order of the
Railroad Commission, to provide, construct,
and maintain adequate depots, and also au-
thorizing the Commission to order the con-
struction and maintenance of union stations
when necessary, the court said: "It may be
that the Constitution does not in words
mention a union depot or provide for the
relocation of depots, but the right to locate
means the right to relocate or change an ex-
isting location to meet the necessities or
exigencies of business development,
changes in the tide and course of travel or
business centers. The right to locate also
carries the right to locate a passenger depoters
for different roads at the same place or
point, if the public convenience requires it;
the facilities required being in keeping with
the financial ability of the road to main-
tain them, so that the same is not an
unreasonable burden upon the railroads
affected thereby. Certainly the statutes in
question are not only sanctioned by the
Constitution, but would no doubt be within
the legislative province, if not expressly au-
thorized by the Constitution, as the Con-
stitution does not prohibit the exercise of
police regulation over public carriers, and
the legislature can do all things not pro-
hibited by state or Federal Constitutions."

In Railroad Commission V. Alabama Northern R. Co. supra, it was held that a part of a section authorizing railroad commissioners to apportion the cost of erecting upon passenger stations between the different roads, and to compel a joint ownership of the property regardless of the wishes of the roads, might be stricken out as unconstitutional, and still leave the remainder of the section, authorizing the commissioners to require the erection of union depots when practicable, valid.

Statutes granting railroad commission

power to require railroads to build union depots carry with them by implication every power necessary to the accomplishment of the object, including the power to select sites for union depots where the railroads fail or refuse to do so, and to make such changes in their lines and routes as are necessary to accomplish the purpose designed, etc. Dewey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 142 N. Č. 392, 55 S. E. 292: Griflin v. Southern R. Co. 150 N. C. 312, 64 S. E. 16; Missouri, O. & G. R. Co. v. State, 29 Okla. 640, 119 Pac. 117; State v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. -, 165 S. W. 491.

In Railroad Commission V. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749, it was held, under § 5543, of the Code of 1907, authorizing the commissioners to require railroads to maintain adequate depots and adequate buildings for the accommodation of passengers, that the commissioners had the power to designate the location of stations, and the right to say to different railroads entering a town that they should use the same point for their passenger stations, it being held that although union depots were not mentioned, yet the act authorized the Commission to require the maintenance of "adequate" depots, and depots not properly located would not be adequate.

Powers of commissioners generally. The legal presumption is that the orders of a board created for the purpose of carrying a law into execution are reasonable. In Dewey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. and that they were made upon proper evi- 142 N. C. 392, 55 S. E. 292, it was held dence and are valid; and it will accord- that the position that the Commission was ingly be presumed that an order of a Rail-only empowered by statute to order the use

of union stations when the railroads could connect on the right of way as already laid out was too restricted, and, the remedy. was held to apply to all the towns and cities in the state where, in the legal disorder. the,, exact location and construction cretion of the commissioners, the move was practicable, the convenience of the traveling public required it, and the existing facilities, in the judgment of the commissioners, were inadequate.