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TABLE OF SOUTH DAKOTA CASES CITED IN

OPINIONS.

Adams & W. Co. v. Deyette
Carter v. Frahm
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Sioux Falls
Ernster v. Christianson
Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Tinker
Houts v. Hoyne
Irwin v. Taubman
McCoy v. Handlin
Northwest Port Huron Co. v. Iverson
State v. Donaldson
Towle v. Bradley
Wasem v. Bellach
Whittaker v. Deadwood

xvii

8 S. D. 119 31 S. D. 379 28 S. D. 471 24 S. D. 103 22 S. D. 427 14 S. D. 176 26 S. D. 450 35 S. D. 487 22 S. D. 314 12 S. D. 259

2 S. D. 472 17 S. D. 506 23 S. D. 538

PAGE 547 509 573 310 337 610

553 622, 627

241 317 358 358 81

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GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation,

Nash Brothers, a Corporation, and Swift & Company, a Corporation, v. THE COUNTY OF GRAND FORKS, a Municipal Corporation, and the State of North Dakota, a Municipal Corporation

(164 N. W. 320.)

Assessments of lands description of - must be definite-certain.

1. Following Grand Forks County v. Frederick, 16 N. D. 118, the description of the land in the instant case is held so indefinite as to invalidate the assessment.

Assessments for taxes — lands — description of uncertain - indefinite

void for such reason.

2. Following Grand Forks County v. Frederick, supra, and State Finance Co. v. Bowdle, 16 N. D. 193, it is held that § 2201, Compiled Laws 1913, does not apply to assessments void by reason of failure to describe the land definitely.

Opinion filed August 22, 1917.

NOTE.-Authorities discussing the question as to whether elevators, warehouses, etc., and their sites, on railroad right of way, are separate subjects of taxation, are collated in a note in L.R.A.1916E, 413.

38 N. D.-1.

From a judgment of the District Court of Grand Forks County, Cooley, J.

Affirmed.
Geo. E. Wallace and O. B. Burtness, for appellants.

There is no allegation that the assessments are unfair, unjust, excessive, or inequitable. Even if they were, equity furnishes no relief or ground for restraining collection or securing cancelation of the assessments and taxes. Comp. Laws 1913, § 2240, subd. 5; Holland v. Baltimore, 69 Am. Dec. 199, note, and authorities cited; State v. Duluth Gas & Water Co. 76 Minn. 96, 57 L.R.A. 63, 78 N. W. 1032; Frost v. Flick, 1 Dak. 139, 46 N. W. 508.

If the tax is in itself a legal one, and the property on which it is levied subject to taxation, then it cannot be said that any injury could result from its taxation. A court of equity will not interfere with the taxing powers of the state. The presumption is that the tax is valid, and this presumption extends to every act upon which the tax in any measure depends. Farrington v. New England Invest. Co. 1 N. D. 102, 45 N. W. 191; Northern P. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. D. 310, 51 N. W. 386; Schaffner v. Young, 10 N. D. 252, 86 N. W. 733; Cooley, Taxn. p. 772 and cases in note 2; Clarke v. Ganz, 21 Minn, 387; Savings & L. Soc. v. Austin, 46 Cal. 417.

In tax cases the rule is settled that special facts must be inserted in the bill or complaint calling for equitable relief, and when there are no such averments, the suitor will be relegated to his legal remedies. 1 Spelling, Extr. Relief, § 658; 2 Desty, Taxn. p. 667, and cases cited in note 2; Wason v. Major, 10 Colo. App. 181, 50 Pac. 741; Linehan R. Transfer Co. v. Pendergrass, 16 C. C. A. 585, 36 U. S. App. 48, 70 Fed. 1; Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S. 594, 37 L. ed. 275, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646; Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 77, 21 L. ed. 63; Farrington v. New England Invest. Co.1 N. D. 102, 45 N. W. 191; St. Anthony & D. Elevator Co. v. Bottineau Co. (St. Anthony & D. Elevator R. Co. v. Soucie) 9 N. D. 346, 50 L.R.A. 262, 83 N. W. 212; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Dickey County, 11 N. D. 107, 90 N. W. 260.

In such cases the plaintiff must plead facts that will bring him within some recognized head of equity jurisprudence. Douglas v. Fargo, 13 N. D. 467, 101 N. W. 919; Bismarck Water Supply Co. v. Barnes, 30 N. D. 555, L.R.A.1916A, 965, 153 N. W. 454; Merchants' State Bank v. McHenry County, 31 N. D. 108, 153 N. W. 386; Barnum v. Rallihan, - Ind. App. — 112 N. E. 561; State Finance Co. v. Beck, 15 N. D. 374, 109 N. W. 357.

The statutes provide due process. The question of due process implies merely the right to be heard. In taxation matters including the meeting of the boards of review and boards of equalization, the law gives all the notice required. Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Bell's Gap. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 33 L. ed. 772, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. ed. 637, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750.

Plaintiffs claim that they are denied the equal protection of the law. This provision of the Federal Constitution is satisfied when the means and methods shall be applied impartially to all the constituents of each class, so that the law shall act equally and uniformly upon all persons and under similar circumstances. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 46 L. ed. 283, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Michigan R. Tax Cases, 138 Fed. 236; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 246, 50 L. ed. 744, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 459. The legislature has directed that any portion of the right of way

of a railroad company which is held under a lease for a term of years shall be taxed as the property of the lessee. Comp. Laws 1913, $ 2118; Douglas v. Fargo, 13 N. D. 467, 101 N. W. 919; Hackney v. Elliott, 23 N. D. 375, 137 N. W. 433; 37 Cyc. 1295; Doherty v. Real Estate Title, Ins. & T. Co. 85 Minn. 518, 89 N. W. 853; Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571, 163 S. W. 783; State ex rel. MacKenzie v. Casteel, 110 Ind. 174, 11 N. E. 219; Peckham v. Millikan, 99 Ind. 352; Sloan v. Sewell, 81 Ind. 180.

For assessment purposes the description is wholly sufficient. “An assessment of real estate need not describe the property with that cer

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