such seizure, the undervaluation as shown by the appraisal shall be presumptive evidence of fraud, and the burden of proof shall be on the claimant to rebut the same, and forfeiture shall be adjudged unless he shall rebut such presumption of fraudulent intent by sufficient evidence. * * * Provided further, That * * no forfeiture or disability of any kind incurred under the provisions of this section shall be remitted or mitigated by the Secretary of the Treasury." You state that the importers contend that, inasmuch as said section 5292 gives the Secretary authority to remit in cases where merchandise has become subject to seizure, and the act of 1909 does not mention seizure, the prohibition in section 5292 applies only after the forfeiture has been adjudged, pending which the Secretary has authority to remit a seizure. I agree with the Solicitor of the Treasury, whose opinion you transmit to me, that there is no merit in this contention. The importers are clearly in error in stating that the act of 1909 does not mention seizure; by that act the collector is expressly directed to seize the offending merchandise. Section 5292 of the Revised Statutes is taken from section 1 of the act of March 3, 1797. The Supreme Court early held that the authority of remission given by this statute existed from the doing of the act resulting in the liability until the fine or forfeiture was reduced to actual possession by the Government, and could be exercised both after as well as before the actual adjudication. (United States v. Morris, 10 Wheat. 246.) Upon careful examination of the act of 1909, I am clearly of the opinion that it was the intention of Congress that the authority of remission given in section 5292 should not apply in any way to the additional duties, forfeitures, and penalties therein imposed, but that when the statute emphatically prohibited the remission of any forfeiture or disability incurred thereunder it was understood that such liability was legally incurred from the moment of the doing of the fraudulent act. A brief consideration of the history of this act but strengthens my opinion. Section 7 of the customs administrative act of 1890 provided for an additional duty for undervaluation and for the forfeiture of the importation if the undervaluation exceeded 40 per cent. It was held by Attorney General Olney in 1893 (20 Op. 660) that this additional duty, as well as the forfeiture, was penal, and might, therefore, be remitted under section 5292 of the Revised Statutes. The act of July 24, 1897 (30 Stat. 211), amending this section in other particulars, contained the provisos, appearing in the present legislation, prohibiting the remission by the Secretary of the Treasury of the additional duty, and of any forfeiture or disability incurred thereunder. Attorney General Griggs, construing this act (22 Op. 491), held that such forfeiture could not be remitted either before or after the adjudication. I therefore advise you that you are without authority to remit or mitigate the seizure in question. Respectfully, GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM. THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS AND OF THE NAVYRELATIVE RANK. The Secretary of the Navy is without authority to make such a change in article 23 of the Navy Regulations, 1909, as to fix the relative rank of officers of the Marine Corps with officers of the Navy according to the length of service rather than by the date of commission. Paragraph 3 of article 25 of the Navy Regulations, 1909, may be amended in form so as to read: "When officers of the Army are associated jointly with officers of the Navy or Marine Corps their corresponding rank shall be determined according to the dates of their respective commissions, when of the same or of corresponding grades; and when of different rank, as set forth in the first paragraph of this article." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to reply to your letter of August 19, 1911, requesting my opinion on two questions. The first question is whether you may lawfully make such a change in article 23 of the Navy Regulations, 1909, as to fix the relative rank of officers of the Marine Corps with officers of the Navy according to the length of service rather than the date of commission, as it is now is. In so far as the question concerns the relative rank of officers of the Marine Corps with officers of the staff of the Navy, it seems to have been answered in the negative by the opinion of Mr. Acting Attorney General Hoyt, dated July 20, 1906 (26 Op. 16). In so far as the question concerns the relative rank of officers of the Marine Corps with officers of the line of the Navy, it seems also to have been answered in the negative by the prior opinion of Mr. Attorney General Moody, dated October 7, 1905 (25 Op. 517). In view of the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1603, by which the officers of the Marine Corps are placed "in relation to rank, on the same footing as officers of similar grades in the Army" (i. e., precedence by date of commission rather than by service), I see no escape from the conclusion stated in these two opinions. Probably only legislation can solve the various dilemmas which arise in cases of the association together of naval officers of the staff, naval officers of the line, and officers of the Marine Corps. The second question is whether paragraph 3 of article 25 of the Navy Regulations, 1909, which now reads as follows: "Officers in the same grade in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have relative rank and precedence among themselves according to the dates, respectively, of their commissions, the senior in commission ranking the junior." may be amended in form so as to read: 'When officers of the Army are associated jointly with officers of the Navy or Marine Corps, their corresponding rank shall be determined according to the dates of their respective commissions, when of the same or of corresponding grades; and when of different rank as set forth in the first paragraph of this article." There appears to be no legal objection to this change. The papers submitted are returned herewith. Very respectfully, WINFRED T. DENISON, Acting Attorney General. The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. POSTAL SAVINGS DEPOSITORIES-OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES. It is not essential, under the postal savings depositories act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 814), that the securities taken by the board of trustees for the payment of postal savings funds shall be the property of the bank. Where securities belonging to the directors or stockholders of a bank are pledged at their request with the board of trustees in behalf of the bank in consideration of the deposits of postal savings funds with the bank, the requirements of the act are satisfied. It would seem advisable that every deposit of securities with the board of trustees should be made by the bank itself, always assuming that it is accompanied by assurance from the owners admitting their consent to the pledge for the consideration running from the Government to themselves, namely, the deposit to be made by the Government at their request in the bank in which they are interested. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 4, 1911, requesting my opinion as to a question of the proper construction of section 9 of the postal savings depositories act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 814, 816), and as to the power of the board of trustees thereunder. The pertinent portion of this section is as follows: "That postal savings funds received under the provisions of this Act shall be deposited in solvent banks, whether organized under National or State laws, being subject to National or State supervision and examination. * * * The board of trustees shall take from such banks such security in public bonds or other securities, supported by the taxing power, as the board may prescribe, approve, and deem sufficient and necessary to insure the safety and prompt payment of such deposits on demand.” * * * From your letter it appears that under the laws of Michigan and Wisconsin, State banks, and under the laws of Massachusetts, trust companies, eligible, if solvent, to receive deposits of postal funds under the act of June 25, 1910, are prohibited from pledging their assets as collateral security for deposits, and are therefore unable to transfer to the board of trustees, under section 9 aforesaid, “public bonds or other securities" of their own. It appears, however, that they propose to have such public bonds or securities, being the property of their directors or stockholders, deposited by such directors or stockholders as individuals with the Treasurer of the United States as security for the deposit of postal savings funds with such banks, it being understood that the banking departments of these States have no objection to such a procedure. Your question is, specifically, whether the board of trustees is justified, under the act of June 25, 1910, in approving such a method of securing postal savings deposits. The first question involved is whether it is essential under the act that the securities taken by the board of trustees shall be the property of the bank itself. I am of opinion that it is not essential. The statute does not in its terms make any such requirement specifically; nor does it by any implication from its purpose, which is merely to secure the safety of the deposit, as is expressly stated: * * * "The board of trustees shall take from such banks such security in public bonds or other securities, supported by the taxing power, as the board may prescribe, approve, and deem sufficient and necessary to insure the safety and prompt payment of such deposits on demand." * * * If, then, a valid, effective title as pledgee is acquired by the board of trustees-in other words, if there is security— the statute in this respect is satisfied. The question whether such a title as pledgee would pass to the board in the cases in question depends substantially upon the same considerations which arise in the ordinary cases under the act. The only new element is the fact that the security is furnished, not by the indebted bank, but in its behalf by certain of its directors and stockholders. The legal consideration essential to the validity of the pledge exists quite as clearly as in the ordinary case under the act. It grows from the interest which these individual directors and stockholders of a bank have in its prosperity. (Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426; Zabriskie v. Cleveland, |