etc., R. R. Co., 23 How. 381, 399; Harrison v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. 13 Fed. 522.)

Also as to any effect of possible equities, the situation would be the same as in the ordinary case. The securities coming to the board are negotiable instruments (Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 10 Ex. Cases 337), and the board as pledgee for value would not be affected by any prior equities of which it has no notice any more than if it were an out-and-out purchaser. (Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239; American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U. S. 288, 294.)

If, then, the securities in question are pledged in consideration of the deposit of the funds with the bank at the request of the owners, I am of opinion that the requirements of the act would be satisfied.

The second question involved is one of detail. The proposal as stated is that the deposit of the securities is to be made by the individual directors or stockholders who own them. In view of sections 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, and 20 of the regulations of the board, and of the phrase used by the statute:

"The board of trustees shall take from such banks such security,'

it would seem advisable that every deposit should be made by the bank itself, always assuming that it is accompanied by assurance from the owners admitting their consent to the pledge for the consideration running from the Government to themselves, namely, the deposit to be made by the Government at their request in the bank in which they are interested.

With this qualification, I am of opinion that the board of trustees would be justified in approving the method proposed.

Very respectfully,

WINFRED T. DENISON,
Acting Attorney General.

The POSTMASTER GENERAL.

SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE COLON WHARF OF THE PANAMA RAILROAD CO.

A vessel loading at the Colon Wharf of the Panama Railroad Co. and subsequently entering a port of the United States should be regarded as coming from a "foreign port or place" within the meaning of section 36 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 111), and the Republic of Panama, for the purposes under consideration, should be treated as sovereign over such wharf.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
November 4, 1911.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th ultimo, requesting an opinion "as to whether the United States or the Republic of Panama is sovereign over the Colon Wharf of the Panama Railroad Co." This question, as your letter shows, arises from the claim made that vessels loading at this wharf and subsequently entering a port of the United States are not from a "foreign port or place" within the meaning of section 36 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 111), although the said wharf is within the boundaries of the city of Colon, Republic of Panama.

In the correspondence accompanying your letter it is argued that the United States, being the owner of all the capital stock of the Panama Railroad Co., and having succeeded to all the reversionary rights of the Republic of Panama, is, for that reason, in reality the owner of the property of the railroad company, including this wharf, and that the effect of such ownership is, in the nature of things, to make the United States sovereign over the said property, and hence to withdraw this wharf from the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama.

The consideration of this proposition does not seem to require any expression of opinion as to the relationship of the United States toward the property of the Panama Railroad Co.; for, assuming that the United States is the absolute owner of such property, as contended, it does not follow that it is sovereign over it in such a sense as to make the wharf any the less in a "foreign port or place" within the meaning of the act of August 5, 1909.

It is clear that it was the intention of the parties to the treaty of February 26, 1904, between the Republic of Panama and the United States (33 Stat. 2234) to leave Colon subject to the sovereignty of the Republic of Panama. Article II of the treaty, after granting to the United States the Canal Zone, provides "that the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included within the boundaries of the zone above described, shall not be included within this grant." Article III of the treaty deals specifically with the matter of sovereignty, but the grant thereof to the United States is expressly limited to the territory described in Article II. By Article VII a right of purchase and of eminent domain within the cities of Panama and Colon is granted to the United States for limited purposes; and the Republic grants the United States the right to enforce in Colon ordinances relating to sanitation, water supply, and public order, provided the Republic fails or is unable to enforce them itself. By Article IX Panama and Colon are made free ports for certain purposes, but for all other purposes customs duties may be levied there by the Republic of Panama.

These various provisions of the treaty are inconsistent with a grant to the United States of sovereignty over Colon or wharves located there except for specific limited purposes, and clearly disclose the intention to preserve Colon as a port of the Republic of Panama. (See 29 Op. 194.) Unless, therefore, the mere ownership of property by one sovereign in the territory of another carries sovereignty with it, ex necessitate, so as to override the plain stipulations of the treaty under which the property was acquired, the town of Colon and the wharves of the Panama Railroad Co. therein are part of the Republic of Panama and subject to its sovereignty. It may be assumed that a sovereign state can not acquire property anywhere without impressing it to some degree with its own attributes of sovereignty, from which a state can not wholly divorce itself. But when property is acquired by one state in another state by virtue of a treaty, any sov

ereignty which may attach to the property so acquired is limited by the terms on which, and the purposes for which, the property was acquired, and only displaces the plenary sovereignty of the dominant state to that limited extent. There seems to be nothing in reason or in law which prohibits such a situation. It occurs in, and is illustrated by, the cases in which the United States owns land in one of the States of the Union without cession by and consent of the State. (Commonwealth v. Young, Brightly's Rep. 302; People v. Godfrey, 17 John. (N. Y.) Rep. 225; Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 531, 539; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 158, 169; Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 525; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 89.) The State still remains sovereign to all practical intents and purposes over the land so acquired, though such sovereignty can not be exercised so as to embarrass the United States in the use of the property for the purposes for which it was obtained. So in Panama the United States may have some rights of sovereignty over the property of the Panama Railroad Co. in Colon and over property acquired by purchase or condemnation under Article VII of the treaty, and yet such property, for general purposes, is to be regarded as within the limits and jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. This, in my opinion, is the proper view to take of the situation with respect to the Colon Wharf of the Panama Railroad Co.

I have the honor to advise you, therefore, that, for the purposes of the question before your department, the Republic of Panama is to be treated as sovereign over such wharf, and a vessel loading there and subsequently entering a port of the United States as coming from a "foreign port or place" within the meaning of the statute imposing tonnage duties.

Respectfully,

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.

The SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND LABOR.

TRANSFER OF TITLE TO SCHOOL BUILDING FROM GOVERNMENT TO THE TOWN OF PETERSBURG, ALASKA.

The title to a school building in the town of Petersburg, Alaska, which was constructed out of the "Alaska fund" under section 5 of the act of January 27, 1905 (33 Stat. 617), can not be transferred from the Government to the town of Petersburg except by an act of Congress.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 7, 1911.

SIR: I have the honor to reply to the question raised by the governor of Alaska in his letter to you dated October 2, 1911, and transmitted to me by your direction on October 19, 1911.

The question is whether the title to a school building in the town of Petersburg, Alaska, can lawfully be transferred to the town. The building was constructed out of a sum of $1,000 provided by the governor from the "Alaska fund” (act of Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, sec. 5, 33 Stat. 617). After the construction the town was incorporated and the building continued to be used for school purposes by the municipal school board. The board now inquires through the governor whether the Government "is willing to give and transfer said school building to the town of Petersburg" and "upon what terms such transfer could be effected, and how soon legal title could be obtained by the town."

I am of opinion that an act of Congress would be required to make the transfer possible.

The title to the property is concededly and clearly in the Government. Neither by the act above cited providing for the Alaska fund, nor by the Civil Code of Alaska under which the incorporation of the town occurred, nor by any other law does there appear to be any provision for the automatic transfer of public property from the United States to the local authorities upon such an incorporation.

In the case of a school at Juneau a similar transfer was made by special act of Congress. (Act of Jan. 16, 1903, ch. 192, 32 Stat. 773.)

It is thoroughly settled that property of the United States can not be granted away except by act of Congress, which has absolute and exclusive power over such property. (Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee 117 U. S. 167; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 126;