tion, is retrospective, and covers all defaults of the officer, from the date of the commission; because it is recited, and part of the obligation, that Boyd had been appointed receiver for four years from the 27th day of December 1836. We have with much care considered this position, and think it can not be sustained. This court held, in Miller v. Stewart (9 Wheat. 680), that the liability of a surety is not to be extended, by implication, beyond the terms of his contract; that his undertaking is to receive a strict interpretation, and not to extend beyond the fair scope of its terms; and that the whole series of authorities proceeded on this ground. The principal ones relied on in that case have been relied on in the present; and we think the principles settled by them preclude the court from maintaining that the sureties are liable by implication, contrary to the plain prospective obligation of the bond, 'that the said Boyd shall faithfully execute and discharge the duties of his office.' In the language of the court, in Farrar v. United States, 'if intended to cover past dereliction, the bond should have been made retrospective in its language."" It may be suggested that the observations of the court in both of these cases were dicta on the point in question, as the bonds there referred to were held not to cover prior transactions; but however that may be, it is manifest the court perceived no impropriety in making the bond retrospective in its operation. If it had done so, it could have disposed of the question as to the construction of the language of the bond upon that ground. See also United States v. Boyd (5 How. 29, 47), where the ruling on the first appeal in this case is restated. There is a manifest difference between holding that a condition in a bond that an officer shall faithfully execute the duties of his office can not be held to operate retrospectively, and saying that like language in a statute requiring such a bond would prohibit a bond taken after the officer had entered upon his duties from being so worded as to cover his prior service. In the one case, justice to the surety requires that such language be held to be prospective only. In the latter case, where the bond is expressly worded so as to 89760°-VOL 29-13-3 operate retrospectively, to uphold it according to its terms. certainly can not be said to work any hardship upon the surety, while to annul it in this particular would be to compel the Government to go unprotected for the period of the service so covered, although the plain purpose and intent of the statute is that the Government shall be protected for the entire term of the officer. This case differs from that of United States v. Bradley, supra, in that the bond there in question extended, according to the contention of counsel, to other responsibilities than those required by the statute the bond enjoining that the principal should well and truly discharge all his duties as paymaster, while the law only required him to give bond to account, and he had many other duties. (10 Pet. *352.) The court did not decide that that bond exceeded the statute (ib. *358, *364), but whether it did so or not, it is clear in the present case that a bond covering the prior service of the officer is simply in line with the manifest purpose of the statute, that the Government shall be fully protected during his entire term. Answering your first question, therefore, I beg to advise you that, in my judgment, a bond voluntarily given by an assistant treasurer of the United States in the form now used would be good as to the retroactive feature. 2. You also ask whether, if the bond of the assistant treasurer were only prospective, a full account of the money on hand would be necessary in order to fix the liability of the respective bonds in the event of defalcation. In view of what has been said in answer to the first question, it is perhaps unnecessary to say anything on this point. This is really a matter of evidence, and it would seem that, whether the new bond is retrospective or not, such a count should always be made. (United States v. Boyd, 5 How. 29, 49; United States v. Eckford's Executors, 1 How. 250, 260-263.) It appears from your letter that the regulations prescribed by the Comptroller of the Treasury under your direction, as authorized by section 5 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 206), are to this effect, and that such has been the practice of the Treasury Department in order to avoid any dispute between the sureties as to which bond is liable in the event of default. It is also to be observed that the new bond is merely cumulative, the former bond remaining in full force throughout the term of his office. (26 Op. 70; Throop on Public Officers, sec. 215.) This being so, it would seem advisable to adhere to the present practice. Respectfully, GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. PURCHASE OF TORPEDOES FROM COMBINATION OR MONOPOLY-CONSTRUCTION OF COLLIERS-EIGHT-HOUR LAW. The purchase of Whitehead torpedoes, to be paid for from the appropriation "Torpedoes and appliances" in the naval appropriation act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1271), can not be made, by a provision in the same act, from a company that has combined or conspired to monopolize the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States, provided torpedoes and appliances are properly classified under the head of "armor, armament or machinery," but this is a question of fact, rather than one of law, to be determined by the Secretary of the Navy. The provision in the act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1288), under the head of "Construction and machinery," establishing an eight-hour workday, has reference to the construction of battleships and not colliers, and the fact that a contractor for one of the battleships may also contract for one or more colliers would not require the work on the colliers to be carried on on an eight-hour-a-day basis. The word "herein" when employed in an act of Congress ordinarily and unless the context makes necessary a different construction means "in this act." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have to acknowledge receipt of your favor of the 4th instant, in which you advise me that your department has before it for signature, in accordance with an award recently made, a contract with the Whitehead Torpedo Works, of Weymouth, England, for 180 Whitehead torpedoes, to be paid for from the appropriation "Torpedoes and appliances: For the purchase and manufacture of torpedoes and appliances," in the naval appropriation act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1271), under the heading "Bureau of Ordnance." 1. You call my attention to the provision in the same act under the heading "Increase of the Navy," as follows: "That no part of any sum herein appropriated shall be expended for the purchase of structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament or machinery from any persons, firms or corporations who have combined or conspired to monopolize the interstate or foreign commerce or trade of the United States, or the commerce or trade between the States and any Territory or the District of Columbia, in any of the articles aforesaid, and no purchase of structural steel, ship plates or machinery shall be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture. But this limitation shall in no case apply to any existing contract." You say that the department is in doubt as to whether the word "herein" as used in the paragraph last quoted should be construed as meaning "in this act," or should be restricted as applying only to the part of the act embodied under the heading "Increase of the Navy," wherein specific appropriations for several items are made. You therefore ask my opinion as to whether, if the proposed contract for Whitehead torpedoes were entered into, your department would be forbidden to expend any of the appropriation "Torpedoes and appliances," referred to above for the purchase of such armament until satisfied that the Whitehead company has not combined or conspired to monopolize foreign or domestic commerce or trade of the United States as provided in the provision quoted above under the heading "Increase of the Navy." The word "herein" when employed in an act of Congress ordinarily and unless the context makes necessary a different construction means "in this act." The act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1912, and for other purposes, appropriates various sums of money "for the purchase of structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament, or machinery." Some of the sums so appropriated are found under the heading "Bureau of Ordnance," some under the heading "Bureau of Steam Engineering," but principally under the heading of "Increase of the Navy." But wherever found in the act the language of the proviso is explicit that no part of any sum "herein," i. e., "in this act" appropriated shall be expended for the purchase of such structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament, or machinery from the class of persons designated. The appropriation for the purchase and manufacture of torpedoes and appliances is found under the head of “Bureau of Ordnance," under which there is appropriated a sum of money "for procuring, producing, preserving, and handling ordnance material; for the armament of ships * * * etc. Clearly the part of the sum appropriated under that heading is a portion of "any sum herein appropriated" for the purchase of armament within the meaning of the proviso above quoted, and if torpedoes and appliances are properly classified as "armament or machinery," then the provision in the proviso is applicable to and a restriction upon the expenditure of the moneys appropriated under the head of "Torpedoes and appliances. Whether or not torpedoes and appliances are properly classified under the head of " armor, armament, or machinery," is a question of fact, rather than one of law, which your department is better qualified to determine than is this one. If torpedoes are properly so classified, then, in my opinion, the Navy Department is by the act under consideration forbidden to expend any of the appropriation for the purchase and manufacture of torpedoes and appliances proposed to be purchased from the Whitehead company until satisfied that that company has not combined or conspired to monopolize the interstate or foreign commerce or trade of the United States, or the commerce or trade between the States and any Territory or the District of Columbia in "structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament, or machinery;" and no purchase of the same can be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture, unless such purchase be made under any contract existing on March 4, 1911— the date of the passage of the act. 2. You further invite my attention to a provision in the said act under the head of "Increase of the Navy,' "Construction and machinery," viz, the third proviso |