by libel and seizure. (The Queen, supra; The Missouri, supra.) Where, however, the vessel is so used by common carriers, and the owner or master thereof is not a consenting party to the illegal act or privy thereto, the only remedy appears to be an action against the master. Respectfully, GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM-ORGANIZATION OF BANKS. A bank is "organized under National or State laws" within the meaning of section 9 of the postal savings depositories act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 816), when it is incorporated, or clothed with the essential attributes of a corporation by virtue of legislative sanction. The mere authority to transact a banking business, although granted in pursuance of State laws, carries with it no implication of organization under the State laws, irrespective of whether such authority is or is not exercised subject to State supervision and examination. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, March 12, 1912. SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of the 5th instant wherein you present a question for my consideration, as follows: 66 Section 9 of the postal savings act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 816), provides in part as follows: "That postal savings funds received under the provisions of this act shall be deposited in solvent banks, whether organized under National or State laws, being subject to National or State supervision and examination.' "Under the laws of several States private banking firms are required to obtain authority from the State banking commissioner to engage in business and are made subject to State supervision and examination. Applications to qualify for deposits of postal savings funds have been received from numerous institutions of this character. As an illustrative case I inclose correspondence in regard to the application of Messrs. John Steneck & Sons of Ho boken, N. J., together with the State laws on the subject, and beg to request your opinion whether that firm may be regarded as organized under * * * State laws' within the meaning of the act of June 25, 1910." By the act of the General Assembly of New Jersey, approved March 28, 1895 (chap. 368, Session Laws of 1895), it was provided that individuals, associations of individuals, partnerships, or joint-stock associations, should not thereafter engage in the business of banking unless authorized so to do by the commissioner of banking and insurance by his official certificate to that effect, which should issue only after preliminary examination showing the applicant to be solvent and possessed of unincumbered assets of at least $20,000 in excess of outstanding liabilities, and that such individuals, associations of individuals, partnerships, or joint-stock associations engaged in the business of banking should thereafter be subject to the same control, supervision, inspection, and examination to which incorporated banks were then subject. By the act of the general assembly, approved April 25, 1907 (chap. 106, Session Laws of 1907), it was provided that no person or corporation should thereafter engage in the business of transmitting money to foreign countries, or buying or selling foreign money or receiving money on deposit to be transmitted to foreign countries, without a certificate of authority to transact such business granted by the commissioner of banking and insurance, and that before such certificate should issue the applicant should execute a bond to the commissioner in the sum of $20,000, conditional upon the faithful performance of the obligations imposed by the act. It appears that John Steneck & Sons, of Hoboken, N. J., is a firm or partnership of individuals, which has complied with these provisions, together with the other laws of the State relating to banks, and has been duly authorized to transact the business of banking in pursuance thereof. It is my judgment, however, that this does not satisfy the requirements of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 814), supra. 89760°-VOL 29-13-24 The mere authority to transact a banking business, although granted in pursuance of State laws, carries with it no implication of organization under the State laws, irrespective of whether such authority is or is not exercised subject to State supervision and examination. In Eliot v. Freeman (220 U. S. 178, 186) the Supreme Court used the following language in construing the corporation-tax law: * * "The language of the act* now or hereafter organized under the laws of the United States,' etc., imports an organization deriving power from statutory enactment. The statute does not say under the law of the United States, or a State, or lawful in the United States or in any State, but is made applicable to such as are organized under the laws of the United States, etc. The description of the corporation or joint-stock association as · one organized under the laws of a State at once suggests that they are such as are the creation of statutory law, from which they derive their powers and are qualified to carry on their operations." The question before the court in that case was quite different from the question which is here presented for determination, but I think that it is the plain purport of the language quoted that organization, in its legal sense, must be taken to imply statutory organization. It follows that a bank "organized under National or State laws" within the meaning of the postal-savings act must be a bank which is the creature of statute law. I am of the opinion that it is necessary that a bank should be incorporated, or clothed with the essential attributes of a corporation by virtue of legislative sanction, in order to come within the intention of the act. The applicant can not, therefore, properly qualify to receive postal savings funds. Respectfully, GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM. The POSTMASTER GENERAL. EIGHT-HOUR LAW-CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS. The provision in the naval appropriation act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1287), requiring the person, firm, or corporation constructing any of the vessels therein specified to establish an eight-hour workday for all its employees, does not authorize the establishment of a schedule by which the employees work more than eight hours in any one day. A schedule by which employees work 8 or 8 hours on five days in the week and 4 or 5 hours on Saturday, making a total of 48 hours in each week, is prohibited by the eight-hour workday restriction in said act of 1911. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, inclosing letters from the Fore River Shipbuilding Co. and the New York Shipbuilding Co., contractors with your department for the construction of certain battleships. From the correspondence it appears that these companies have been heretofore in the habit of working their employees 10 to 10 hours per day on five days in the week and 5 hours on Saturday, thus permitting a half holiday on Saturday. They now desire, adhering to this same general plan, to work 8 or 83 hours on five days in the week and 4 or 5 hours on Saturday, making a total of 48 hours in each week, and allowing their employees the half holiday on Saturday as before. They state that their employees would be greatly dissatisfied, if, by reason of working only 8 hours in each calendar day, they lost their half holiday on Saturday. In view of these circumstances, you wish to be informed whether the establishment of such a working basis would meet the requirements of the act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1265, 1287), which prohibits payment for these battleships to any person or corporation which has not established for all its employees engaged in their construction" an eight-hour workday." The general, broad policy of statutes restricting the hours of labor of employees, as pointed out in my opinion. to you of December 21 (29 Op. 279), last, and in Averill's Case (14 Ct. Cls. 200, 207), is "that eight hours' labor is enough to be performed in any one day, and that the condi tion of laboring people would be greatly improved and elevated if their physical work were restricted to that extent, and they were afforded more time to devote to mental culture and improvement." The accomplishment of this large purpose should not be made to turn upon a doubtful construction of slightly varying phraseology, or upon the argument that these same ends can be as well, if not better, attained by other methods. Congress has passed several acts relating to this subject, and, though the terms used vary somewhat, the purpose of their enactment must, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be taken to be the same. The act of June 25, 1868 (15 Stat. 77), R. S. 3738, provided that "eight hours shall constitute a day's work." The act of May 24, 1888 (25 Stat. 157), relating to letter carriers, used the same language and added "if any letter carrier is employed a greater number of hours per day than eight he shall be paid extra for the same." The act of March 30, 1888 (25 Stat. 57), provided "and the Public Printer is hereby directed to rigidly enforce the provisions of the eight-hour law." The act of August 1, 1892 (27 Stat. 340), which was clearly passed merely to extend the act of 1868 to contractors and subcontractors and to provide a penalty for violations of its restrictions (House Report No. 267, 52d Cong., 1st sess., Senate Report No. 948, ibid, 20 Op. 459, 462), and not to change its general meaning, provided "that the service and employment of all laborers and mechanics * is hereby limited and restricted to eight * hours in any one calendar day." The act of June 2, 1900 (31 Stat. 252, 257), provided "That letter carriers may be required to work as nearly as practicable only eight hours on each working day, but not in any event exceeding fortyeight hours during the six working days of each week; and such number of hours on Sunday, not exceeding eight, as may be required by the needs of the service; and if a legal holiday shall occur on any working day, the service performed on said day, if less than eight hours, shall be counted as eight hours without regard to the time actually employed." The act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 389), relating to reclamation of arid lands, contained the proviso "that in all construction work eight hours shall constitute a day's work." The naval appropriation act of June 24, |