in a sense, would become members of the corporation, and the corporation and its officers would be mere trustees for their benefit." There are other authorities giving the same description of a savings bank of the pure type and the relation of the depositors thereto, and the textbooks generally express the same view. While I regret that I have been able to find no decisions of the Indiana courts construing the savings-bank act of that State in regard to the permissible legal relation of depositors therein (nor is there, as I am informed, any departmental decision on the subject), so that I am obliged to construe this statute without the aid of authoritative exposition, nevertheless I conceive it to be reasonably certain that a savings bank deriving its sole powers from an enactment of the character of this Indiana statute has no legal right to pay a stipulated, fixed rate of interest on deposits. In construing a statute relating to organizations of a quasi-public character like savings banks, it is important that they be not permitted to travel beyond the plain path marked out by the law creating them. Confessedly the Indiana statute gives no express power to savings banks to pay interest on deposits. More than that, the existence of such power seems contrary, if not to the express provisions of the act, at any rate to its whole spirit. They are given power to receive deposits, but, when once received and invested, the only power granted is to "declare, credit, and pay dividends thereon, as herein authorized, and not otherwise." The manner in which dividends are "herein authorized" is that " it shall be the duty of the * to divide * * all the remaining profits ratably among the depositors." trustees * * * It is plain that the Indiana statute recognizes one kind of depositor and one only. Equality of treatment and the absence of commercial features are the distinguishing characteristics of this legislation. The equity of each depositor prevents a discrimination by which one shall be placed in a position of security while the others bear the burden of the losses of the institution. The most important idea in the scheme as portrayed in the Indiana statute is that each depositor shall be equally interested in the association and shall be equally the coowner of its assets and the profits arising therefrom. It is true that the depositors are, in a certain sense, creditors, yet, under such legislation as that of Indiana, they are also, in a way, partners. who agree to combine their savings for investment in certain designated securities, sharing ratably in the profits therefrom, and it is not contemplated that the common stock shall be invested in what is, in effect, a loan to the depositors themselves with the payment of a stipulated rate of interest thereon. It is true that certain decisions have the appearance of sustaining the right of savings banks to have depositors of a special class, not jointly interested in the association and, in some cases, receiving interest on their deposits, but these decisions will be found to be based either on the language of the charters which were construed to grant the right, or on the doctrine of estoppel as applied to ultra vires acts, and these decisions, in pointing out the entire distinction between depositors who receive a stipulated interest and those who do not, really sustain the conclusion I have stated above. In Cogswell v. The Bank, 59 N. H. 43, 45, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said: "In the present case Davis and Fernald do not belong to the class of general depositors. Their deposits were special. They had no share or interest in the profits or earnings of the bank. The bank received their money and used it, and it went into the general fund. The transaction was in the nature of a loan. * * * Whether they received interest upon their deposits is not material. If they were allowed interest, it was compensation, for the use of their money; and if none was allowed, the bank had the use of their money for taking care of it. In either case the money when deposited became the money of the bank, and they became its creditors." "But it is contended that the receiving of deposits of this character, to be paid out on call, was not within the authorized business of the bank. Admitting this to be so, the bank, having received the money and converted it to its use as a part of the general fund, must be held to account for it, and the claims of Davis and Fernald are debts to be paid in full.” In Heironimus v. Sweeney, 83 Md. 146, 156, the by-laws of a savings bank expressly provided for a class of depositors who received dividends and special depositors who received interest. The point was made that the bank had no power to pay interest on deposits, but the court held that after insolvency the bank was estopped to set up the defense of ultra vires. Of the former class of depositors the court said: “*** They are in fact and substance the stockholders who own the assets of the company." Of the latter: 66* * Here we see that money was loaned, to be repaid with interest when required by the lender." The same distinction is emphasized in Bank v. Evans, -12 Col. Apps. 334, 340; in Ackenhausen v. Savings Bank, 110 Mich. 175, 179, 180; and in other cases. There being this clear line of distinction between the status of depositors who receive interest and those who receive dividends, the Indiana statute, which recognizes only one kind of depositor and that the latter, can hardly be taken to authorize the former, and in my best judgment does not do so. It is possible that the board of trustees of the Saint Joseph County Savings Bank have adopted a by-law providing for the payment of interest on deposits under the authority granted by section 3357 of the Indiana revision of 1908, in which case this by-law might be invoked as avoiding the conclusions reached above. But the by-laws so adopted must be "consistent with the laws of this State," and in my opinion the creation of a class of special depositors whose relation to the other depositors and to the bank would be entirely different from that of the general depositors, the only kind recognized in the Indiana statute, would not be consistent with the laws of that State. It also seems clear that, even if the savings banks of Indiana have authority to pay interest on deposits, they have no power to establish a class of depositors who shall re ceive both interest and dividends. This would be to confuse established legal distinctions, to put one set of depositors in a position so advantageous with respect to the others as to go beyond any fair construction of the Indiana statutes. These views render it unnecessary to consider whether the acceptance of the dividend mentioned would be inconsistent with the requirement of section 9 of the postal savings act that the rate of interest on deposits shall be uniform. Respectfully, The POSTMASTER GENERAL. WILLIAM R. HARR, NATURALIZATION OF ALIENS-DISTRICT COURT OF PORTO RICO-MIGUEL ROSES ARTAU AND ELIAS A. WOLFF. A judgment of naturalization obtained in the District Court of Porto Rico under section 2165 of the Revised Statutes, which has since been repealed by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596), can not properly at this time be questioned on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over the naturalization of aliens. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, August 26, 1912. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, requesting my opinion as to the legality of the naturalization of Miguel Roses Artau and Elias A. Wolff. It appears that the former was born at Baleares Islands, Spain, August 9, 1874; emigrated November 11, 1900; resided between the years 1900 and 1912 in Porto Rico and the United States; and obtained naturalization as a citizen of the United States in the district court of the United States for Porto Rico at San Juan, August 2, 1906; and that the latter was born at St. Croix, Danish West Indies, August 26, 1862; emigrated to the United States May 10, 1881; resided in the United States from 1881 to 1884; and obtained naturalization as a citizen of the United States before the district court of Porto Rico at San Juan, April 17, 1903. As both of these persons were naturalized prior to the time when the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596), went into effect, their cases are governed by section 2165 of the Revised Statutes, which provides, in so far as relevant to this case, as follows: "SEC. 2165. An alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following manner, and not otherwise: * * * 66 First. He shall declare on oath, before a circuit or district court of the United States, or a district or supreme court of the Territories, two years, at least, prior to his admission, that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States * * *99 * By the Porto Rican organic act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 77, 84, sec. 34), it is provided in part as follows: "SEC. 34. That Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial district to be called 'the district of Porto Rico.' The district court for said district shall be called the district court of the United States for Porto Rico * * * and shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court. Section 35 provides in part as follows: may "SEC. 35. That writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the district court of the United States shall be allowed and be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner and under the same regulations and in the same cases as from the supreme courts of the Territories of the United States; * * It appears that the district court of Porto Rico, construing section 2165, Revised Statutes, supra, in connection with the organic law establishing the court, has always held that the district courts of Porto Rico had jurisdiction, in proper cases, to naturalize aliens, either because said court was a circuit or district court of the United States, or because it was a district court of a Territory, within the meaning of these words in section 2165. |