commerce, and also the principles sustaining their coverage, is the same as in the case of restaurants and gasoline stations. Here, again, decisions under the National Labor Relations Act provide exact precedents. National Labor Relations Board v. Combined Sentry Theatres, Inc., 278 F. 2d 306 (C.A. 2). See, also, Labor Board v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117; Balaban & Katz, 87 NLRB 1071; Fox Midwest Amusement Corp., 98 NLRB 699.

Second, discriminatory practices in places of entertainment artificially restrict the demand for films and performers from out-of-State sources, and thus lessen the flow of commerce. The Senate Committee on Commerce reported (S. Rep. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 20)

discriminatory practices in places of entertainment or amusement not only artificially restrict the demand for entertainment

but that a number of orchestras and companies of actors were unwilling to visit cities in which theatre facilities were segregated. The Committee cited specifically the refusal of the New York Metropolitan Opera Company to go to Birmingham, where it had previously had an annual season, and the rules of Actor's Equity and American Guild of Variety Artists sanctioning the refusal of their members to perform in places where the audience was segregated. Ibid.

The power of Congress to deal with artificial obstructions affecting the interstate movement of films and entertainers has been recognized in a variety of decisions under the Sherman Act. In Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 219, the Court

* * * "9

noted that the effect of a conspiracy among distributors imposing restraints upon the exhibition of motion pictures was to cause some exhibitors to "increase their admission price, * * * and to abandon double billing of all such pictures, and causing the other subsequent-run exhibitors, who were either unable or unwilling to accept the restrictions, to be deprived of any opportunity to exhibit the restricted pictures, which were the best and most popular of all new feature pictures In turn, "the effect of the restrictions upon 'low-income members of the community' patronizing the theatres of these exhibitors was to withhold from them altogether the 'best entertainment furnished by the motion picture industry' The widespread exclusion of Negroes from motion picture theatres and similar places of entertainment has the same effect upon interstate commerce and upon the public interest. For other cases sustaining the power of Congress over the entertainment industry, including the exhibitors, see Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208; White Bear Theatre v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F. 2d 600 (C.A. 8); Youngclause v. Omaha Film Board, 60 F. 2d 538 (D. Neb.); IPC Distributors v. Chicago Union, 132 F. Supp. 294 (C.A.D.C.), or stage attractions, United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, or professional boxing matches, United States v. I.B.C., 348 U.S. 236, or football games, Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, although these activities are ordinarily thought of as "local affair[s]." United States v. I.B.C., supra at 241.

Related Establishments. Sections 201(a) and (b) extend the guarantee of equal service and accommodations to all establishments which either (i) are physically within the premises of a covered establishment or (ii) include within their premises a covered establishment and hold themselves out as serving its patrons. There is no need to discuss, in the instant case, the exact scope of these provisions. Both arise from the departmentalization of many enterprises, especially department stores, and of leasing to different operators portions of a single physical establishment which operates largely as a functional unit and serves much the same clientele. Thus, the news stand or flower shop in a covered hotel, from the standpoint of those staying at the hotel, is in substance part of the one enterprise. The two are also intimately associated from the standpoint of both the hotel management and the operators of the news stand or flower shop. Similarly, the ownership of a restaurant or lunch counter located in a bowladrome may be different from the ownership of the alleys, but the operators present them as a functional unit and they serve a common clientele which rarely distinguishes the management of one from the management of the other.

The constitutional basis for the coverage of such "related establishments" is the same as that which sustains the federal regulation of the establishment giving rise to the expanded coverage. No further problems would seem to be involved. Congress has ample power to take account of the physical and funetional interrelationships, especially where the prac

tices of one are bound to affect the patronage and practices of the other. The drawing of such lines is an essential part of the legislative function. Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121. See, also, Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192; Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545.

It may be argued that Congress could have found other methods of dealing with the obstructions to interstate commerce such as outlawing the demonstrations resulting from racial discrimination. How an obstruction to commerce shall be removed-what means are "necessary and proper" to remove it-is a question for legislative discretion, provided that the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the permissible end. Here, Congress determined to end the offensive and immoral practices of racism in places. of public accommodations having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Its action is consonant with our entire constitutional history since 1865. Attempts to suppress the aspirations of the victims of discrimination would have been an affront to civilization. It is an understatement to say that the choice was reasonable, although the Constitution requires

no more.

B.

DISCRIMINATION IN HOTELS AND MOTELS SERVING TRANSIENT GUESTS IMPOSES BURDENS UPON INTERSTATE TRAVEL OF A KIND WHICH CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ELIMINATE

1. Racial discrimination in hotels and motels, in fact, burdens interstate travel

Congress had before it overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate

travel by Negroes, and interstate travel is, of course, a form of interstate commerce. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160.30 The plain truth is that in many places lodging is simply not available to Negro travelers. For example, a report of the Senate Commerce Committee describes evidence that "a Negro traveling by car from Washington, D.C., to New Orleans must travel an average of 174 miles between establishments that will provide him with suitable lodging." 99 31 Senate Commerce Report, at 18. Even then he has little assurance of finding lodging. "Many of these establishments are small and there is often no vacancy for the traveler who seeks accommodations in the latter part of the day." Id. at 18.

Testimony presented to the Senate Commerce Committee by Under-Secretary of Commerce Roosevelt elaborates on the point. For a trip between Washington, D.C., and Miami, the average distance between accommodations of "reasonable" quality which were open to Negroes was found to be 141 miles, or several hours of driving. Moreover, since the motels and hotels that will take Negroes have, on an average, only about fifteen units, it is "quite obvious that a traveling family might find that they had finally reached one of the accommodations but only to find

30 See n. 12, p. 18, supra.

31 This information had been originally prepared by the publisher of a special guidebook for Negroes, and presented to the Committee by Under-Secretary of Commerce Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. As the Under-Secretary remarked, the "very existence” of such a special guidebook is "dramatic testimony to the difficulties" a Negro traveler encounters. Senate Commerce Hearings, at 693-694.