In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. 515

HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC., APPELLANT

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ROBERT F. KENNEDY, AS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEES

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the three-judge district court (R. 74) is reported at 231 F. Supp. 393.

JURISDICTION

The order of the district court granting a permanent injunction (R. 78-80) was entered on July 23, 1964. Notice of appeal to this Court was filed on July 30, 1964 (R. 81). Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. 1253, and by section 206(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 245.

(1)

Although probable jurisdiction has not yet been formally noted, the case is obviously one of national importance and warrants full consideration. As the Court is aware, the parties have agreed, in order to expedite a hearing of the cause, to file full briefs in advance of the notation of jurisdiction.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Sections 201 (a), (b) (1), and (c) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit racial discrimination in any inn, motel, hotel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, constitute a lawful exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States.

2. Whether the statute deprives the appellant corporation of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Sections 201 and 206 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 245, provide in pertinent part as follows:

SEC. 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimi

nation or segregation by it is supported by State action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his resi dence;

(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b);

*

*

SEC. 206. (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described.

(b) In any such proceeding the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such a court

a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case. *** An appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT

On July 2, 1964, the President of the United States signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. On the same day appellant, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the Act and seeking damages, declaratory relief, and an injunction against the United States of America and Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General of the United States (R. 5), on the ground of injuries to appellant which allegedly would result from enforcement of the Act.

The facts stipulated before the district court (R. 17, 32) show that appellant corporation owns and operates a motel in Atlanta, Georgia, with 216 rooms for lease to transient guests. Approximately 75 percent of its guests come from outside Georgia, and appellant accepts convention trade from outside the State. Besides maintaining over fifty billboards and highway signs advertising the motel on highways in Georgia, appellant solicits patronage for the motel from outside the State through various national advertising media, including magazines having a national circulation.

The complaint as amended' alleged that sections 201(a), (b)(1), and (c)(1) of the 1964 Act, which

1

1 An amendment to the complaint was filed on July 15, 1964 (R. 13).