no less essential to interstate travelers than adequate restaurants. It has been said that "interstate passengers have to eat" (Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. at 463); it need hardly be added that they also have to sleep. In Boynton, regulation under the commerce power was particularly appropriate because the terminal restaurant "was primarily or partly for the service of the passengers of the Trailways bus" and was "geared to the service of bus companies and their passengers, even though local people who might happen to come into the terminal or its restaurant might also be accommodated" (id. at 461, 462). Similarly, hotels and motels are in business largely, if not exclusively, to satisfy the needs of travelers. Seventyfive percent of appellant's patrons are travelers from outside Georgia. The effect of inadequate transient accommodations upon interstate travel has already been held sufficient to sustain federal regulation of the labor relations of hotels and motels. Discrimination by an employer against a hotel employee on the basis of union membership can be prohibited by federal law because it may lead to work stoppages at the hotel, and because this in turn (despite the existence of competing hotels) may deter interstate travel. Indeed in Hotel Employees Local No. 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958), this Court ruled that the Labor Board could not lawfully follow a general policy of refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over unfair labor practices and other labor disputes in hotels and motels. Since 1958, the Board has repeatedly proceeded against such establishments despite arguments that it lacked constitutional authority." While the Board's jurisdiction is established if even a small amount of a hotel's purchases are made in interstate channels (see, e.g., Labor Board v. Baker Hotel, 311 F. 2d 528, 529 (C.A. 5)—on the theory that a labor dispute in a hotel might disrupt the flow of goods in commerce-hotels are also regulated by the Board on the more obvious ground that a labor dispute in a hotel or motel would directly affect interstate travel. Thus in Labor Board V. Holiday Hotel Management Co., Inc., 311 F. 2d 380 (C.A. 10), the court of appeals, rejecting a challenge to the agency's authority, stated (p. 381): In the case at bar jurisdiction rests on a more firm basis because the relationship to interstate commerce is direct rather than indirect. The respondent here received more than $1,500 worth of goods, equipment, and supplies which were shipped directly to it from out-of-State points. While this amount is not impressive, it must be considered together with the obvious fact that "hotels which serve a transient trade play an important role in furthering travel and in fostering commercial relation47 See, eg., Labor Board v. Citizens Hotel Co., 313 F. 2d 708 (C.A. 5); Labor Board v. Baker Hotel, 311 F. 2d 528 (C.A. 5); Labor Board v. Holiday Hotel Management Co., Inc., 311 F. 2d 380 (C.A. 10); Samoff v. Hotel, Motel, & Club Employees Union, 199 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa.); Sperry v. Local Joint Board, 216 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Mo.), affirmed, 323 F. 2d 75 (C.A. 8); Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 261; Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 364; Tulsa Hotel Management Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 968; Trade Winds Motor Hotel, 140 N.L.R.B. 567; Canal St. Hotel, 127 N.L.R.B. 880; Lamar Hotel, 127 N.L.R.B. 885; Southwest Hotels, 126 N.L.R.B. 1151. ships between the inhabitants of the several 49 Similarly, in Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 261, the Board, asserting its jurisdiction, noted that the hotel "provides necessary services to members of the traveling public who travel in interstate commerce," and that "[w]hether the Board has jurisdiction * * * is not to be determined by confining judgment to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board in this case." The "primary function" of the $2,400,000,000 hotel industry being "to furnish lodging facilities ** and other services to the traveling public," it followed, in the Board's view, that "the operations of the industry facilitate the movement of persons in this country * *," thus subjecting the hotel to Board regulation. 124 N.L.R.B. at 262-263. To the same effect, see Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 364, 367; Southwest Hotels, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1151, 1154. * The decisions applying the commerce power specifically to hotels and motels amply demonstrate that there is no novelty, from a constitutional standpoint, 48 Quoting Southwest Hotels, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1151, 1154. Quoting Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 261. 49 in the present legislation. The evidence we have summarized is underscored by the "common-sense view that hotels which serve a transient trade play an important role in furthering travel and in fostering commercial relationships between the inhabitants of the several states." Southwest Hotels, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1151, 1154. 3. Congress may constitutionally extend its regulation of hotels and motels to the prohibition of discrimination against all guests whether or not traveling in interstate commerce It is no objection to the constitutionality of sections 201 (b) (1) and (c)(1) of the Act that they prohibit discrimination by motels against all travelers, whether they be on interstate or intrastate journies. It has long been settled that Congress may regulate intrastate activity where such regulation is necessary to effectuate fully its regulation of interstate commerce. Congress may "choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121; see, also, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1; Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414; Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342; Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20. A mere prohibition of the denial of accommodations to Negroes traveling in interstate commerce would not eliminate, even though it might curtail, the burden on interstate travel resulting from racial discrimination. Senate Commerce Hearings, at 207. First, such a limited prohibition would subject Negro travelers to the risks and burdens of being required to prove 49a that they were engaged in an interstate journey." Interstate travelers do not carry passports; commonly, they lack proof that they are on an interstate trip. Even if some evidence of that fact could be furnished to a motel in one State by travelers from another State, it could rarely be furnished by residents of the State where the motel was located even though they were stopping over on either the beginning or the final leg of an interstate trip. Congress thus had good reason to spare interstate travelers the risk of being unable to prove that they were on an interstate trip and the burden of carrying some form of "passport" which would establish that fact. Compare Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1.50 More fundamental, requiring a Negro to prove that he was travelling in interstate commerce before furnishing equal accommodations would itself be a form of humiliating discrimination, which would burden interstate travel scarcely less than the sort of racial discrimination which the Act seeks to eliminate. Obviously, white travelers would not be required to carry and produce a proof of itinerary. As stated in Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F. 2d 750, 759 (C.A. 5), a case involving segregated waiting rooms in a railroad terminal: * * * whenever a complaint is received reporting that a Negro is sitting in the "Interstate 49a See remarks of Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, 110 Cong. Rec. 7177 (daily ed.). 50 Moreover, the possibility for evasion by hotels which might refuse to accept the traveler's evidence that he was on an interstate trip would alone constitute a sufficient basis for upholding the statute. See Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545. |