article in terms provided for elsewhere. The plain cotton underwear with lace added thereto of the importation does not fall within the named proviso. Altman & Co. v. U. S. (1914) 5 Ct. Cust. App. 170.

"Materials" means that from which an article is made up. "Goods" has a broader signification and includes the material upon which some work has been performed, and applies so long as these retain their character of not being manufactured into an article. Id. The importations consisting of parasols of cotton, linen or silk embroidered or appliquéd were made, some under Act 1897 and the remainder under the act of 1909. The question raised is whether the proviso to paragraph 339 of the first act and the provisos to paragraphs 349 and 402 of the last act may be construed to exclude from their operation, respectively, paragraph 462, Act 1897, and paragraph 478, Act 1909, and so affect the duty on the parasols of the importation. There seems to be nothing in the language of the provisos that would limit their operation, and a fair interpretation requires that they should be held to cover the goods here. They were properly applied in making the assessment. Claflin Co. v. U. S. (1912) 3 Ct. Cust. App. 401. See, also, U. S. v. Harper (1911) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 101.

The proviso to paragraph 402, Act 1909, "That tamboured, embroidered, or appliquéd articles or fabrics shall pay no less rate of duty than that imposed upon the material if not so tamboured, embroidered, or appliquéd," is operative only when it appears that the duty on the articles or fabrics with the appliqué removed would under paragraph 399 of that act exceed the duty. at sixty per centum provided by paragraph 402. U. S. v. Vietor (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 297.

26. "Scalloped by hand or machinery." -"Scalloped by hand or machinery for any purpose," as these words appear in paragraph 349, Act 1909, must be taken to provide that if an article in other respects within the provisions of the paragraph has been in fact scalloped by hand or machinery it is dutiable thereunder regardless of the purpose for which the scalloping was done, and it is not necessary that the article should be otherwise ornamented or embroidered. Gardner & Co. v. U. S. (1912) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 477.

sidered "screens of wood," but rather as articles in chief value of silk. They are accordingly dutiable as such under paragraph 402, Act 1909. Vantine & Co. v. U. S. (1913) 3 Ct. Cust. App. 488.

On a review of the statutes and the decisions founded on the statutes, it is held that screens with panels of cotton, ornamented with embroidered designs or with figures appliquéd thereon, were not dutiable as furniture or as a manufacture of cotton under Act 1897, but were dutiable under paragraph 339 of that act at 60 per cent. as "other articles" embroidered or appliquéd. Morimura Bros. v. U. S. (1911) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 181.

28. Tamboured articles.-Tamboured pillow shams, consisting of a fine cotton fabric, ornamented with figures and designs in tambour work, in general appearance very like embroidery, held dutiable under Act 1890, par. 373, as "other similar tamboured articles," and not under paragraph 355. Lahey v. U. S. (1896) 71 Fed. 870, 18 C. C. A. 341, appeal dismissed U. S. v. Lahey (1897) 89 Fed. 1020, 32 C. C. A. 612.

29. Trimmings. Astrachan trimmings held dutiable as pile fabrics. See paragraph 309.

Bands of cotton woven in widths held not dutiable as trimmings. See paragraph 266.

Garnitures and hussar sets held not dutiable as trimmings. See paragraph 318.

Ribbons held not dutiable as trimmings. See paragraphs 316, 318.

Tunics, motifs, garnitures, and gimps of bead held not dutiable as trimmings. See paragraph 333.

Under Act 1883, ribbons made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, and which the jury found are commonly and principally used in trimming hats, held dutiable at 20 per cent. ad valorem, as "hat trimmings," under Schedule N, and not at 50 per cent., under Schedule L, as unenumerated silk merchandise. Walker v. Seeberger (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 983, 149 U. S. 541, 37 L. Ed. 839; Robertson v. Edelhoff (1890) 10 Sup. Ct. 186, 132 U. S. 614, 33 L. Ed. 477; Hartranft v. Langfeld (1888) 8 Sup. Ct. 732, 125 U. S. 128, 31 L. Ed. 672; Cadwalader v. Wanamaker (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 979, 983, 149 U. S. 532, 37 L. Ed. 837; Hartranft v. Meyer (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 982, 983, 149 U. S. 544, 37 L. Ed. 840.

Under Act 1883, goods composed, some entirely of silk, some chiefly of silk, and some chiefly of metal, and known by the general name of "trimmings," though they have specific names to distinguish one from the other, and some of which are used exclusively, and the others chiefly, for the making and ornamenting of hats, bonnets, and hoods, were dutiable at 20 per cent., under Schedule N, as trimmings for hats, etc., and not at 50 per

cent. for the goods composed wholly or chiefly of silk, and 45 per cent. for those composed chiefly of metal, under Schedules L and C, respectively. Walker v. Seeberger (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 981, 982, 149 U. S. 541, 37 L. Ed. 839; Id. (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 983, 149 U. S. 532, 541, 544, 37 L. Ed. 839, reversing Walker v. Seeberger (D. C. 1889) 38 Fed. 724, and following Cadwalader v. Wanamaker (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 979, 149 U. S. 532, 37 L. Ed. 837.

Under Act March 3, 1883, piece goods composed of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, which are bought and sold under the commercial designation of "chinas" and "marcelines," and which the jury finds are "trimmings," chiefly used in making hats and bonnets, were dutiable at 20 per cent., as trimmings used in making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods, and not at 50 per cent., under Schedule L, as unenumerated silk merchandise. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Brown, dissenting, on the ground that these articles are not "trimmings." Hartranft v. Meyer (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 982, 149 U. S. 544, 37 L. Ed. 840, following Cadwalader Wanamaker (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 979, 149 U. S. 532, 37 L. Ed. 837.

V.

Ribbons composed of silk and cotton, silk being the component material of chief value, which are used exclusively for ornamenting hats and bonnets, not being specifically named in Act March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. 510), are dutiable as "trimmings" for hats, under Schedule N, "Sundries," of the act, which provides the duty for "hats, and so forth, materials for [naming eight articles, including 'trimmings'], used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods, composed of straw, chip, grass, palm leaf, willow, hair, whalebone, or any other substance or material, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act," as the words, "composed of" and "not specially enumerated," refer to the eight articles previously specified; and such ribbons are not dutiable under Schedule L, "Silk and Silk Goods," of the act, which provides the duty for "all goods, wares, and merchandise not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value." Robertson v. Edelhoff (1890) 10 Sup. Ct. 186, 132 U. S. 614, 33 L. Ed. 477.

A charge to the jury, where all the evidence showed that the goods were "trimmings," that it is the use to which articles are chiefly adapted, and for which they are used, which determines their character within the meaning of the act; that they will therefore determine to which use the articles are chiefly devoted; if they are hat trimmings, and used for making and ornamenting hats, then the rate of duty imposed was excessive, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover; if they are

chiefly used for other purposes, the defendants must recover-fairly presents the question, under 22 St. 512, which provides for a duty on trimmings used for making or ornamenting hats. Hartranft v. Langfeld (1888) 8 Sup. Ct. 732, 733, 125 U. S. 128, 31 L. Ed. 672.

Ornaments, loops, etc., manufactured separately, but temporarily stitched together in six-yard lengths for convenience and economy in handling and carding, and used singly in decorating garments, held not "trimmings or galloons," within the meaning of Act 1897, U. S. v. Hilbert (1909) 171 Fed. 69, 96 C. C. A. 173.

par. 390.

In Act 1897, par. 390, the term "trimmings" is used in a commercial, rather than a descriptive sense. Naday & Fleischer v. U. S. (1908) 164 Fed. 44, 90 C. C. A. 462, affirming judgment (C. C. 1907) 155 Fed. 303.

Certain woven cotton articles, from 1 to 21⁄2 inches wide, chiefly used as hat bands for trimming men's hats, held to be dutiable as "trimmings" of cotton, under paragraph 276, Act 1894, and not as "galloons," under paragraph 263 of said act, nor as "manufactures of cotton * * * not specially provided for," under paragraph 264 of said act. U. S. v. Walter H. Graef & Co. (1904) 127 Fed. 688, 62 C. C. A. 414, reversing judgment Walter H. Graef & Co. v. U. S. (C. C. 1903) 120 Fed. 1015.

Silk and cotton trimmings, silk chief value, and cotton more than 25 per cent. in value, used for making or ornamenting hats, and commercially known as hat bands, hat trimmings, bands, and bindings, held dutiable under R. S. § 2504, schedule M (Heyl, par. 1300), as hat trimmings not otherwise provided for, and not under schedule H (Heyl, par. 1113), as manufactures of which silk is the component of chief value, not otherwise provided for; the former paragraph being the more specific. Rob. ertson v. Edelhoff (1899) 91 Fed. 642, 34 C. C. A. 34.

While ribbons that must be made up into bows, rosettes, and the like before being used for purposes of trimming or ornamentation held not dutiable as "trimmings," under Act 1897, par. 390, goods are so dutiable which are manufactured with ornamentation and characteristic design to be used as a trimming, and intended to be so used without anything further being done to them. Naday & Fleischer v. U. S. (C. C. 1907) 155 Fed. 303, judgment affirmed (1908) 164 Fed. 44, 90 C. C. A. 462.

So-called mourning crapes, consisting of all silk fabrics in the piece, of the width known as "4/4," held not dutiable as "woven fabrics in the piece not specially provided for," under paragraph 387 of Act 1897, but as "trimmings * * * made of silk, ✶ ✶ not specially provided for," under paragraph 390 of said act. Robinson v. U. S. (C. C. 1900) 122 Fed. 970.

When the use of an article is the criterion of its classification, as in the case of "trimmings * * used for making or ornamenting hats" (Act March 3, 1883, § 7), it is its chief use which is controlling. Meyer v. Cadwalader (C. C. 1891) 49 Fed. 26.

In assumpsit to recover an excess of duty alleged to have been paid on imported goods, which plaintiffs claim should have been classified under the clause of Act 1883 providing for a duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on "braids, plats, flats, laces, trimmings, tissues, willow sheets, and squares used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods, composed of straw," etc., when the goods are acknowledged to be "trimmings," it must be further shown by plaintiffs that they are chiefly used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods. Id.

The fact that the articles are imported by the piece, and must be cut up before they are actually applied to use in making or ornamenting hats, does not exclude them from the class of trimmings, if they are distinctly adapted and chiefly used for trimming hats, bonnets, and hoods, and are not specially enumerated or provided for in the act. Meyer v. Cadwalader (C. C. 1891) 49 Fed. 19.

Hat trimmings held dutiable under the hat-trimming clause of Act 1883, and not under the silk Act Feb. 8, 1875, notwithstanding that silk is their component material of chief value, and that they contain less than 25 per cent. in value of cotton. Id.

The mere fact that chinas and marcelines are bought and sold by those particular names, and are called "linings," does not necessarily exclude them from the class of trimmings if they are in fact trimmings chiefly used either for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods.

Id.

Clause 448 of Heyl's Index of the New Tariff does not require that trimmings for hats, in order to be strictly dutiable at 20 per cent. ad valorem, shall be composed of any particular material. It is the use for which they are intended, and to which they are applied, that furnishes the criterion by which the duty is to be assessed. Marsh v. Seeberger (C. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 422. Artificial fruits, with artificial stems and leaves, used only for trimming and ornamenting ladies' hats and bonnets, are "trimmings for hats, bonnets, and hoods," within clause 448 of Heyl's Index of the New Tariff, and subject to duty at 20 per cent. ad valorem. Id.

Though goods are made expressly to be used by milliners in making and ornamenting hats, bonnets, etc., yet, if

they have become adapted to other uses to such an extent that the jury can say their chief and principal use is not in the making and ornamenting of hats, etc., there is a failure to show that they ought to have been classed as hat ornaments merely. Fisk v. Seeberger (D. C. 1889) 38 Fed. 718.

Ornaments, known variously to the trade as "drop ornaments," "trimmings," "tassels," "cords and tassels," and "silk tassels," which are composed chiefly of silk cords and threads but partly of other materials, including soutache braid and wood or pasteboard molds, and which are fashioned by knotting the cords into designs so elaborate that they lose their continuity and identity as cords, are not dutiable under paragraph 316, Act 1913, as "cords," or as "cords and tassels." They are tassels, but there being no provision in paragraph 316 for "tassels" as such, they are dutiable as ornaments or trimmings, within those provisions of paragraph 358. Willenborg & Co. v. U. S. (1915) 6 Ct. Cust. App. 451.

The

Trimmings were provided for eo nomine, in paragraph 390, Act 1897. testimony shows that silk fabrics such as those imported, 2 to 14 inches in width, with original designs thereon, are known commercially as trimmings; and they fell within the eo nomine description, although the term is a comprehensive one and may include articles that are sometimes designated by a name more restricted in meaning. The importation was dutiable under paragraph 390, Act 1897. Loewenthal v. U. S. (1911) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 43. See, also, Sidenberg v. Robertson (C. C. 1890) 41 Fed. 763.

30. Veils.-Crape veils held not dutiable as silk veils, but as manufactures of silk. See paragraph 318.

Veils are within Act 1890, par. 349, relating to "articles of wearing apparel of every description." In re Spielman (C. C. 1894) 66 Fed. 724.

Crape veils, made of silk, are presumptively embraced within the term "silk veils," unless commercially known as distinctive articles. Morrison V. Arthur (C. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 9,842.

31. White frilled muslins.-Cotton muslin, in pieces 30 yards by 30 inches, known to the trade as "white frilled muslins," and not as "ruffled flouncings or embroideries," held dutiable under Act 1890, par. 373, as "articles embroidered by hand or machinery," and not under paragraph 355, as "manufactures of cotton not especially provided for." Field v. U. S. (1896) 73 Fed. 808, 20 C. C. A. 19.

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