Court of Claims, December, 1921. [Vol. 117. the conditions and circumstances here existing, it may not fairly be assumed that congress would arbitrarily or capriciously withhold its consent to the construction of a dam, or that the secretary of war or chief of engineers would impose unreasonable or destructive conditions or stipulations, yet the fact that the power granted by the statutes exists and might be exercised in such manner as to molest, disturb or restrict the free enjoyment of the property would, with reason, considered by a prospective purchaser as an element of influence calculated to reduce its market value. be We have considered these facts and conditions in fixing the value of claimant's lands and rights appropriated by the state and have reached the conclusion that the fair and reasonable value of such lands and rights at the time of the appropriation was $250,000. The lands and flowage rights owned by claimant and appropriated by the state, together with the franchise granted to claimant by chapter 164, Laws of 1901, constituted one entire property whose most beneficial and valuable use was its employment as a whole for the development of water power. This entire property has been appropriated by the state by a series of appropriations, twenty-two in number, the first March 17, 1910, and the last on June 30, 1913. It is not practicable to assign to each of the appropriated parcels a numerical proportion of the value of the entire property, for its value depended upon its use as an entirety. And while twenty-two several appro; priations have been made by the state, their practical on effect, so far as they affect value, is as of one single appropriation consummated on June 30, 1913, the date of the last appropriation. It does not appear that possession of any parcel was actually taken by the state prior to June 30, 1913, and only three appropria tions were made prior to June 25, 1913. In the circum Misc.] County Court, Bronx County, December, 1921. stances of this case, it seems just and reasonable to consider claimant's property as one parcel appropriated by one appropriation consummated on June 30, 1913, and that an award in the amount of $250,000, with interest from June 30, 1913, will fully compensate claimant for the property so appropriated. Claimant is entitled to judgment herein in the amount of $250,000, with interest thereon from June 30, 1913. ACKERSON, P. J., concurs. Award accordingly. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK on the Complaint of CORNELIUS J. CURTIN v. CHARLES LORING, Defendant, Appellant. (County Court, Bronx County, December, 1921.) Traffic regulations-city of New York. Article 5 of the traffic regulations of the city of New York provides: "⚫ Section 2. A vehicle's driver when about Sec to turn either from a standstill or while in motion, shall give One blast Two blasts Defendant was proceeding north with his vehicle and upon one blast of the traffic officer's whistle did not stop but turned into a cross street and proceeded east, contending that the signal was to stop north and south traffic and not to prohibit a driver going north from joining in the east and west traffic. Held, that upon one blast of the traffic officer's whistle north and south traffic must stop at foot crossings of the street and not proceed until the officer has signaled that such traffic may continue. One desiring to turn into cross street should convey his intention to do so to officer before proceeding. County Court, Bronx County, December, 1921. [Vol. 117. APPEAL from conviction for violation of city ordinance. Johnson & Galston, for appellant. Edward J. Glennon, district attorney (Frank Oliver, assistant district attorney, of counsel), for People. GIBBS, J. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by the City Magistrates' Court, borough of The Bronx, eighth district, finding him guilty of violating section 42, article 3, chapter 24 of the Code of Ordinances of the city of New York, in that he failed to stop the vehicle which he was driving, on signal. The record discloses that defendant was proceeding north on the Grand Concourse in an automobile. As he approached Fordham road, the police officer in charge of the traffic at the intersection of Grand Concourse and Fordham road signaled with his whistle and with his hand for north and south traffic to stop and for east and west traffic to proceed. Defendant, however, did not stop, but turned into Fordham road and drove his automobile east. He was overtaken by the police officer, charged with failing to observe the signals of the officer and thereafter convicted by the magistrate. Appellant bases his appeal to this court on the construction of the traffic rules and regulations made by the police commissioner of the city of New York. The police commissioner, by section 315 of the Greater New York charter, is authorized to make such rules and regulations for vehicular traffic as may be necessary. Section 42 of article 3, chapter 24 of the Code of Ordinances of New York city, gives exclusive control of the management of this traffic to the commissioner. In accordance with this power, the police commis Misc.] County Court, Bronx County, December, 1921. sioner has prescribed regulations for street traffic in New York city. Article V of these regulations provides the manner in which signals shall be conveyed to vehicle drivers by a traffic officer. This article is as follows: “ * Section 2. A vehicle's driver when about to turn either from a standstill or while in motion, shall give timely signal by hand or whip or in some other unmistakable manner to indicate the direction of the Section 4. Police Whistle signals shall indicate: One blast- N. and S. traffic stops and E. and W. proceeds. Two blasts - E. and W. traffic stops and N. and S. proceeds. Three or more blasts The approach of fire apparatus or other dan turn. ger. In the case at bar, the officer in charge of traffic gave one blast on his whistle. Defendant did not stop, but turned into the crossing street and proceeded east. He now contends that although the signal given by the officer is to stop north and south traffic, it does not prohibit a driver going north or south from joining in the east and west traffic. In the present day, since motor driven vehicles are so numerous in New York city, it becomes necessary for the protection of pedestrians that there be a strict compliance with the traffic rules and regulations prescribed by the police commissioner. To hold otherwise would be detrimental to public safety. The construction I place upon article V of these rules is, that upon the officer giving one blast on his whistle, north and south traffic must stop at the foot crossings of the street and not proceed until the officer has signaled that such traffic may continue. At that time a driver desiring to turn into the crossing street either east or west should convey his intention to do so to the traffic officer. It is obvious that if one proceeding north were Surrogate's Court, Westchester County, December, 1921. [Vol. 117. permitted to turn into the cross street and continue east or west, as the case may be, after receiving the signal to stop, and for east and west traffic to proceed, injury might easily be sustained by a pedestrian going east or west. Article V of the traffic regulations was created to avoid such an occurrence. Accordingly, I find that the defendant was guilty of the violation charged. Judgment of conviction affirmed. In the Matter of the Final Judicial Settlement of the Accounting of Proceedings of the Estate of George E. NEIL, Deceased. (Surrogate's Court, Westchester County, December, 1921.) Wills — construction of — when legacies abate — general legacies usually abate ratably when assets insufficient for full payment, in absence of intention to prefer-trust for education of infant children preferred when other provision insufficient. Where general legacies are of pure bounty and there is no expression or inference to be drawn therefrom manifesting an intention to make a preferred gift, the general rule is that in the event of a deficiency of assets to pay them in full, the legacies abate ratably though in some circumstances the courts have found an intention to prefer without express words on the part of the testator. A testator who left no real estate and whose personal estate was largely insufficient to pay general legacies in full bequeathed $50,000 to his executor in trust, to keep the same invested and pay the income thereof for the use and education of his three infant children, with direction that if said income was not so used, then to accumulate and add it to the principal which testator directed to be equally divided among his children when they attained the age of twenty-five years. Held, that while it is the law that if a legatee is otherwise provided for the legacy will abate, yet where the "other provision" is |