to consider the contentions pertaining to the regularity of the original tax deed, or the evidence presented in the case in which the title was attempted to be quieted, for the reason that the decree, etc., in the quieting title action were matters of evidence upon which the trial court evidently acted in the registration suit. In this we find no error. It is not claimed that the proceedings were irregular in the registration suit, or that the plaintiffs in error were not made parties thereto in the manner provided by the act. The substance of this contention is, that the evidence upon which the court sustained the McKibben title was insufficient to justify that finding because the previous decree quieting the title in Ainsworth was void; in other words, the the proceedings and evidence in the first suit to quiet title were insufficient to support the decree; that for that reason the court, in the registration suit was wrong in giving effect and recognizing as valid the decree in the quieting title action, and for this reason that the trial court in this suit should have held that the decree in the registration suit was void, because, in the trial it received in evidence and recognized as valid a former decree in a former suit, because the proceedings and evidence in the former suit were insufficient to justify the decree rendered. We find no error in this respect. The evidence upon which the court acted in the registration suit was not a matter for consideration by the trial court in this suit. The proceedings therein being regular, the decree was binding upon the court in this action and it was not at liberty to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the other decree was rendered. This question was under consideration in Steinhauer v. Colmar, 11 Colo. App. 494, wherein at page 499, 55 Pac. 293, the court uses the following language:

"The first averment was that the judgment against the Mutual Aid Association was void, because there was

no evidence to sustain it, and because the complaint upon which it was rendered did not state a cause of action. In the argument no notice is taken of this allegation, and we shall not notice it except to say that a judgment is not void merely because it was rendered without evidence, or upon an insufficient complaint; and further, that the question whether it was rightfully or wrongfully rendered, cannot be raised in this suit."

To the same effect is Harter v. Shull, 17 Colo. App. 162, 67 Pac. 911; also Long v. Long, (Colo.), 162 Pac. 146; Homer v. Fish, 18 Mass. 435, is a leading case upon this proposition; at page 439 the court says:

"It certainly is a principle admitted by all courts in the abstract, that a matter of controversy, which has been inquired into and settled by a court having jurisdiction of the subject, cannot be drawn into question again, in another suit between the same parties, for the purpose of defeating or avoiding the effects of a judgment of the court to which it has been submitted."

In this respect we are not overlooking counsel's claim of lack of jurisdiction in the quieting title suit because Mrs. White was dead at the time the decree was rendered, and her minor heirs were not parties to it; but these were matters for consideration in the registration suit; they were evidence of facts, which if true, might properly have defeated the finding in McKibben's favor in the registration action, but these facts cannot change the rules of evidence in the cases last cited, nor allow the trial court in this action to decide the sufficiency of the testimony upon which the decree was based in the registration suit. This would simply lead to another trial of the facts involved in the former action, which is not permissible.

It is claimed that the registration act was not intended to apply to minors nor take away from them the right to redeem from any tax sale or tax deed, as pro

vided by statute, and that any decree purporting to so do is absolutely void. A part of this contention is answered in response to the previous one, viz., that the evidence upon which the court acted in the registration suit is not a subject of consideration in this suit, for this reason the question of the right of minors to redeem from a tax sale, where raised in the proper method and at the proper time, is not before us, but we cannot agree with counsel that it was not intended by the registration act to allow titles to be quieted where the alleged interest of minors was involved. Section 27 of the act, in part, reads:

"Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet the title thereto, except as herein otherwise provided, and shall be forever binding and conclusive upon all persons, whether mentioned by name in the application,or included in 'all other persons or parties unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in, to, or upon the real estate described in the application herein' and such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding at law or in equity for reversing judgments or decrees, except as herein especially provided. An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court within the same time, upon like notice, terms and conditions as are now provided for the taking of appeals from the District Court to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court in civil actions."

It will be observed this section specifically states that such decree shall not be opened by reason of infancy or other disability of any person affected thereby. There is no escape from this language, or that it was intended by the act to allow titles to be quieted wherein the interest of minors was affected. To say that it was not intended to apply to minors, would be to ignore its express declarations to the contrary. Other sections in

dicate that it was intended to apply to every one and settle at one time all questions concerning the title of the applicant to the property involved. To give it any other interpretation, would be doing violence to the language used.

The judgment is affirmed.

Decision en banc.

Mr. JUSTICE TELLER not participating.

Affirmed.

1.

[No. 8486.]

LIVINGSTON V. BARNEY.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Directing Verdict.

Where the negligence of the plaintiff was the proximate cause of his injury, and the facts are not in dispute, the court should direct a verdict for defendant.

2. -Traveller Upon Highway. One driving a motorcycle upon the highways enters an intersecting street, and without looking to right or left, collides with a passing auto car, which, if he had looked he must have seen. Held, his own negligence was the cause of his injury.

Error to Denver District Court. Hon. JOHN H. DENISON, Judge.

Mr. HORACE G. BENSON, Mr. ALBERT G. CRAIG, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. WARWICK M. DOWNING, for defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE BAILEY delivered the opinion of the court.

This action is for damages resulting from a collision between a motorcycle driven by plaintiff, and an automobile driven by defendant, at the intersection of Twenty-sixth Avenue and Downing Street, in the City of Denver. The western continuation of Twenty-sixth Ave

nue intersects Downing Street, on the west, at a point north of where said avenue enters it from the east, forming a jog, so that anyone traveling west on Twenty-sixth Avenue is obliged to turn obliquely to the north, or right, to continue westward along the avenue. Barney, the defendant in error, was driving his automobile south on Downing Street, towards Twenty-sixth Avenue. Livingston, on a motorcycle, entered Downing from Twentysixth Avenue, on the east, and at some point in the intersection, the exact location of which is not clearly shown on the record, collided with defendant's automobile. At the close of plaintiff's testimony defendant moved a nonsuit, which was granted, and judgment of dismissal entered accordingly. This is the error assigned.

From the testimony it appears the accident occurred in the evening-it was dark at the corner, and that the defendant's automobile was a little to the left of the center of the street, and had no headlight burning, although the side lamps of the machine were lighted. It also appears from plaintiff's testimony that when he entered Downing Street from Twenty-sixth Avenue he neither looked or turned to the right, as it was his duty to do if he desired to continue westward along Twenty-sixth Avenue, but that he looked straight ahead, without turning either to the right or left. Although the accident occurred between six and seven o'clock in the evening, the plaintiff testifies that he could have seen an automobile seventy-five feet away, but that he did not look to the north, until the automobile was within five feet of him. Another witness testifies that he himself saw the automobile a block away from the point where the collision occurred.

In Colorado Springs v. Allen, 55 Colo. 391, 135 Pac. 790, it is held that contributory negligence is not a sufficient defense unless it appears that the contributory act was the proximate cause of the injury. When, how