Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. fications to practice chiropractic in the State of Ohio." The petition continues, pleading as evidence certain declarations of the secretary of the board as to the general purpose of the board, which is wholly irrelevant in this case. The petition further complains, by way of discrimination on the part of the medical board: "By the construction given to Section 1274-1 et seq., of the General Code of Ohio naming certain businesses as limited branches of medicine and surgery, the said State Medical Board have arbitrarily and capriciously assumed to define and describe said business as follows, to-wit: 'Chiropractic is hereby understood to be the detecting and adjusting by hand only, of vertebral subluxations,' and have caused said definition to be published and disseminated in and among the rules and regulations adopted by said Ohio State Medical Board under date of January 4th, 1916.” So far as the petition is quoted in plaintiff in errors' brief, there is no averment that such definition is unfair, incorrect, or in any wise a misrepresentation of chiropractic, except by the remotest inference, quite insufficient in an application for injunction. Indeed it is difficult to see how that definition essentially differs from the definition announced to the world through the official catalogue of The Palmer School of Chiropractic, which must be considered as an authoritative definition, the same as if it were in the dictionary: Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. "Chiropractic (pronounced ki-ro-prak-tik), is the philosophy, science, and art of things natural, and a system of adjusting the subluxated vertebrae of the spinal column by hand, for the restoration of health." We must admit that the syllables used in the definition charged against the Ohio state medical board are different from the syllables used by The Palmer School of Chiropractic, but we are clear that there is no essential difference in substance between the two, so far at least as affecting the merits of this case. We will now consider the major complaint of discrimination on the part of the Ohio state medical board. The facts touching this charge of unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious discrimination. against the schools, colleges and institutions of chiropractic were submitted to the court of appeals, whose judgment is here under review. That court, dealing with the evidence appearing in the record, found squarely against the plaintiffs in error. They found in fact that the schools of chiropractic refused to permit the state medical board to investigate and examine their course of study, equipment, and the efficiency of their training for the students, so far as appropriate under the then Limited Practice Act, as provided in Section 1274 et seq., and especially as required by Section 1270. For, no matter what the preliminary educational qualifications may be as prescribed by a school of chiropractic, they may consist of a common Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. school education merely, which as a rule means no educational requirements whatsoever, — still it must be remembered that the general assembly of Ohio has defined by Section 1270, supra, what those qualifications must be to be admitted to the practice of the art of healing in Ohio. The general and professional requirements, not only to enter a school of chiropractic, but to receive a degree from that school, may be the equivalent of the educational requirements defined in the Ohio statutes, but the final decision of that question lies within the discretion of the Ohio state medical board, and is not reviewable, except for gross abuse of that discretion, or a plain violation of the statutes. Upon the question of discrimination the court of appeals in its opinion says: "The evidence also discloses that efforts have been made by the State Board of Medical Registration and Examination to investigate these schools. Numerous exhibits are in this record, indicating an apparent reluctance on the part of the schools to be investigated by the State Board, and definite refusals of such investigation, unless the State Board would put itself in an attitude of sympathy with the work of the chiropractic schools." It is rather a novel claim to make, that before one can be fair and impartial as to the standing of a school or college he must first put himself in a mental attitude of sympathy with the school. Ordinarily the courts advise juries against all considerations of sympathy in the determination of a fair and impartial verdict. Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. The record abundantly sustains this finding of the court of appeals, and it might indeed be made much stronger. If there be any need of a sympathetic attitude, it would seem that the schools should put themselves in an attitude of sympathy toward the Ohio statutes, rather than that the statutes and the administrative boards under them should be put in an attitude of sympathy toward the schools. We have given unusual research and consideration to the questions herein involved. So far as they have merit we have discussed and decided them. We find nothing of prejudicial error in the judgment of the court below as disclosed by the record. The judgment therefore will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MARSHALL, C. J., JOHNSON, HOUGH, ROBINSON, JONES and MATTHIAS, JJ., concur. Statement of the Case. IN RE APPLICATION OF REUBEN NUNLEY FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Criminal law-Suspended sentence-Sections 13711 and 13714, General Code - Revocation and termination-After expiration of maximum term-Habeas corpus. (No. 16665-Decided April 19, 1921.) CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.* Reuben Nunley was arrested for the violation of an ordinance of the city of Cleveland and duly convicted in the municipal court, wherein he was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment, that being the maximum period for which sentence could be imposed under the ordinance. On the same day the court suspended the sentence and placed Nunley on probation for a period of one year, in charge of a probation officer. Some time thereafter, more than thirty days, and less than one year, a complaint was filed against Nunley, alleging a violation of his parole. Whereupon, the municipal court revoked the order suspending said sentence and ordered that Nunley be imprisoned for thirty days, that being the extent of the original sentence. Thereupon Nunley brought an action for writ of habeas corpus in the court of common pleas. The writ was refused. Error was prosecuted to the court of appeals, where the judgment of the court * Certified as being in conflict with In re Pontius, 6 Ohio App., 249.-REPORTER. |