decision conforming to the view thus expressed, Professor Antieau interpreted the holding in the Coleman case to be as follows: "Whether a state has ratified or rejected an amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question for Congress to decide, and the federal courts will not determine the same. *** What rules Congress will adopt is not yet obvious." Antieau: Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, Section 12:178, pages 485486. By his statement "what rules Congress will adopt is not yet obvious," Professor Antieau asserts, in effect, that there is nothing whatever to indicate what Congress will decide in respect to a previous rejection of a proposed amendment or an attempted withdrawal of a previous ratification. Hence, he declares, in essence, that there is no foundation for the claim of the supporters of ERA in the event the Supreme Court should adhere to the ruling that the question is a political question for Congress and not a judicial question for the court. Professor Pritchett said that "in Coleman v. Miller the Supreme Court said" that the action of the state legislature in respect to a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution "should be regarded as a political matter with the ultimate authority of decision in Congress." C. Herman Pritchett: The American Constitution, page 40. Professor Corwin said: "From the opinions filed in the case of Coleman v. Miller, in 1939, in which certain questions were raised concerning the status of the proposed Child Labor Amendment (pending since 1924) it would seem that the Court today regards all questions relating to the interpretation" of Article V of the Constitution of the United States "as political questions, and hence addressed exclusively to Congress." Edward S. Corwin: The Constitution And What It Means Today, page 219. After giving the correct interpretation to the Coleman case that the Supreme Court decided nothing in it except that whether the Kansas Legislature could ratify the Child Labor Amendment after rejecting it, Professor Corwin made this contradictory and confusing statement: "If a state legislature ratifies a proposed amendment may it later reconsider its vote, the amendment not having yet been received the favorable vote of threefourths of the legislatures? In Coleman v. Miller this question was answered 'No' on the basis of Congressional Rulings in connection with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. May a legislature, after rejecting a proposed amendment, reconsider and ratify it? On the same basis, this question was answered 'Yes' in Coleman v. Miller.” Edward S. Corwin: The Constitution and What It Means Today, page 220. This contradictory and confusing statement is the only authority I have been able to find for the whimsically strange assertion of the ERA supporters that a state which has rejected can ratify whereas a state which has ratified cannot rescind its ratification. In addition to being irreconcilable with his own interpretation of the Coleman case, Professor Corwin's second statement is without merit for these reasons: 1. The court did not answer "No" or anything else in the Coleman case to the question whether a state which has ratified a proposed amendment can change its mind and rescind or withdraw its ratification. The court did not and could not answer that question in the Coleman case because it did not arise in that case. In the portion of his opinion quoted by Professor Antieau and set forth above, Chief Justice Hughes alluded to the question by way of dicta when he said, in effect, that the question of the afficacy of an "attempted withdrawal" of a previous ratification as well as the question of the efficacy of a subsequent ratification after a “previous rejection" were political questions for Congress and not judicial questions for the courts. 2. The court did not answer "yes" or anything else in the Coleman case to the question whether a state which has rejected a proposed amendment can change its mind and ratify it. Although the Kansas Supreme Court had based its decision upholding the vote of the Kansas legislature ratifying the Child Labor Amendment after a previous rejection upon the view that "a state legislature which has rejected an amendment proposed by Congress may later ratify", the Supreme Court refused to make any such ruling on the ground that the question of the efficacy of the action of the Kansas legislature was a political question for the determination of Congress and not a judicial question for the decision of the Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court even refused to endorse the basis on which the Kansas Supreme Court made its ruling. As appears by the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in the Coleman case (307 U.S. 433, 456), the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court upon the grounds stated by Chief Justice Hughes and not for the reasons given by the Kansas Supreme Court. Professor Corwin's "Yes" and "No" aberration is traceable to the concurrent resolution which Congress adopted on July 21, 1868, and which Chief Justice Hughes cited for precendential support for the unprecedended judicial ruling in the Coleman case that the question whether the Kansas legislature had the power to ratify the Child Labor Amendment after previously rejecting it was a political question for Congress and not a judicial question for the Courts. To understand why Professor Corwin deemed this resolution a precedent for his "Yes" and "No" proposition, we must know some facts not disclosed by it. In 1868, Congress was dominated by huge majorities of radicals, who had passed notorious Reconstruction Acts over President Andrew Johnson's vetoes, and who were bent above all things in putting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment into effect without delay to better their prospects in the approaching fall election. All of the Southern States except Tennessee had previously rejected the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. An irritated Congress decreed that these states would have no representation in the United States Congress until they adopted new state constitutions conforming to the Reconstruction Acts and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the states then numbered 37, ratification of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by three-fourths of them, i.e., 28, was required by Article V to make the Amendment a part of the Constitution. As a result of the congressional coercion, the number of ratifying states had risen to 29 by early July, 1868. Two of them, Ohio and New Jersey, however, had voted to rescind or withdraw their ratifications. An inpatient Congress ignored the action of Ohio and New Jersey and adopted its concurrent resolution of July 21, 1868, declaring that 29 states, including Ohio and New Jersey, had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and made it a part of the Constitution. At least two of the states, North Carolina and South Carolina, which were enumerated by the resolution among the 29 ratifying states, had previously rejected the Amendment. While an impatient Congress was taking this precipitate action on the day stated, another state, Georgia, ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and thus made the question of the constitutionality of the ignoring of the rescissions or withdrawals of Ohio and New Jersey moot. This is the shaky basis on which Professor Corwin's "Yes" and "No" aberration rested. An inpatient Congress merely ignored what had happened. I did not adjudge that Ohio and New Jersey lacked the power to rescind or withdraw their ratifications. And even if Congress had done so, its action would be destitute of precedential force under the well established constitutional principle that one Congress cannot tie the hands of a succeeding Congress. Reichelderfer v. Quinn (1932), 287 U.S. 315, 77 L.Ed 331, 53 S. Ct. 177, 38 A.L.R. 1429. Professor Corwin inserted his "Yes" and "No" aberration in the first revision of his book appearing after the decision in the Coleman case. It was repeated without change in subsequent revisions. Fortunately for the triumph of truth, Professor Corwin made it clear that his "Yes" and "No" aberration did not constitute any part of the decision in the Coleman case when he subsequently compiled and edited the Constitution of the United States of America, Revised and Annotated, for the Congress. I quote his words: "Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court had taken cognizance of a number of diverse objections to the validity of specific amendments. Apart from holding that official notice of ratification by the several states was conclusive upon the courts, it had treated the questions as justiciable, although it had uniformly rejected them on the merits. In that year, however, the whole subject was thrown into confusion by the inconclusive decision in Coleman v. Miller. This case came up on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kansas to review the denial of a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement on a resolution ratifying the proposed child labor amendment to the Constitution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Kansas State Senate. The attempted ratification was assailed on three grounds: (1) that the amendment had been previously rejected by the state legislature; (2) that it was no longer open to ratification because an unreasonable period of time, thirteen years, had elapsed since its submission to the states; and (3) that the Lieutenant Governor had no right to cast the deciding vote in the Kansas Senate in favor of ratification. "Four opinions were written in the Supreme Court, no one of which commanded the support of more than four members of the Court. The majority ruled that the plaintiffs, members of the Kansas States Senate, had a sufficient interest in the controversy to give the federal courts jurisdiction to review the case. Without agreement with regard to the grounds for their decision, a different majority affirmed the judgment of the Kansas Court denying the relief sought. Four members who concurred in the result had voted to dismiss the writ on the ground that the amending process is 'political in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes a part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control, or interference at any point.' Whether the contention that the Lieutenant Governor should have been permitted to cast the deciding vote in favor of ratification presented a justiciable controversy was left undecided, the Court being equally divided on the point. In an opinion reported as 'the opinion of the Court', but in which it appears that only three Justices concurred, Chief Justice Hughes declared that the writ of mandamus was properly denied because the question as to the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and the lapse of time since it was submitted to the states were political questions which should be left to Congress." Constitution of the United States, Revised and Annotated, 1972, pages 860-861. Hence, Professor Corwin's own words reveal that his final interpretation of the Coleman case is identical with that placed upon it by me in section 2 of this statement. (4). The only reasonable interpretation of Article V of the Constitution, which governs the amendatory process, is that it authorizes a state which has rejected a proposed amendment to change its mind and vote to ratify the same and permits a state which has ratified a proposed amendment to change its mind and rescind or withdraw its ratification at any time before three-fourths of the states have voted to ratify the proposed amendment and thus made it a part of the Constitution. This view rejects the unfair and illogical claim of the advocates of ERA, and permits the states to continue the search for truth until the amendatory process is consummated. And this is so regardless of whether the resultant questions are political questions for Congress or judicial questions for the courts. I have called attention in other sections of this statement to the bizarre claim of advocates of ERA that a state legislature which has rejected the Amendment may change its mind and vote to ratify it, but a state legislature which has ratified the Amendment cannot change its mind and vote to rescind or withdraw its ratification. They cannot explain in a rational manner why they think the Constitution of the United States grants freedom to some legislative bodies, and imprisons others in mental jails. They invoke their bizarre claim because they understandably fear that if state legislatures which ratified ERA in haste and under their pressure are permitted to exercise their intelligence and re-examine and reappraise ERA, they may decide to repent in wisdom of what they did in folly and vote to correct their mistake. Other Americans, who cannot accept the arbitrary, unfair, illogical, and tyrannical view of advocates of ERA, have advanced two other views in respect to the power state legislatures may exercise in the amendatory process under Article V of the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress and the states to amend the Constitution and prescribes the process by which they must act to exercise this awesome power. For ease of statement, I shall call one of these views the Kentucky view, and the other the view shared by multitudes of other Americans and me. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky expressed the Kentucky view in Wise v. Chandler, (1937), 270 Kv. 1, 108 S.W.2d 1024, which held that if a state reiects a proposed amendment it cannot later ratify the same, unless it is resubmitted by Congress. The Kentucky Court justified its ruling in this way: "We think the conclusion is inescapable that a state can act but once, either by convention or through its legislature, upon a proposed amendment; and whether its vote be in the affirma tive or the negative, having acted, it has exhausted its power further to consider the question without a resubmission by Congress." Chester J. Antieau: Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, Section 12:178. The view shared by multitudes of other Americans and we may be stated in this fashion: A state legislature does not forfeit its liberty of thought or action as long as the amendatory process is incomplete by either ratifying or rejecting a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Hence, a state legislature which has rejected a proposed amendment may change its mind and ratify it, and a state legislature which has ratified a proposed amendment may change its mind and rescind or withdraw its ratification at any time before three-fourths of the states have ratified the amendment and thus made it a part of the Constitution. Chester J. Antieau: Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, Section 12:178; C. Herman Pritchett: The American Constitution, pages, 39–40. On the day of its unprecedented decision in the Coleman Case, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a seven to two vote of the Justices, dismissed without decision the writ of certiorari previously granted by it to review the ruling of the Kentucky Court in Wise v. Chandler on the ground that it no longer presented a justiciable controversy susceptible of judicial determination. Chandler v. Wise, (1939), 207 U.S. 474, 83 L.Ed 1407. If we are to appraise aright the role of state legislatures in the amendatory process, we must read Article V of the United States Constitution in the light of the rules devised by experience, reason, and law to enable state legislatures to perform their function in civil government. Article V proclaims: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of threefourths of the several states or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first Article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." No intelligent American will gainsay the proposition that voting to amend the Constitution of the United States is the most crucial task a state legislator can perform. This is true because an amendment to the Federal Constitution will control the lives of all generations of Americans as long as time shall last unless it is sooner removed from that instrument by another Amendment. With the exception of the proviso making secure the right of each state to equal suffrage in the Senate, there is not a syllable in Article V which undertakes to put any limitation whatever upon what state legislatures can do in their amendatory role except the implied limitation that they can not effectively act after a proposed amendment has been ratified by three-fourths of the states and made a part of the Constitution. On the contrary, except for the provision stated, every word of Article V is in complete harmony with these conclusions: (1) A state legislature does not forfeit its liberty of thought or action as long as the amendatory process is incomplete by either ratifying or rejecting a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and (2) hence, a state legislature which has rejected a proposed amendment may change its mind and ratify it, and a state legislature which has ratified a proposed amendment can change its mind and rescind or withdraw its ratification. These conclusions are inescapable. Moreover, they are inseparable from the spirit and puropse of Article V, which clearly contemplates that state legislators shall act with complete liberty of spirit and complete freedom of mind as long as state legislatures are participating in the amendatory process. The rules devised by experience, reason, and law to enable state legislatures in America to perform their functions in civil government are well established in all areas of our land. They are two-fold in nature, and may be stated with simplicity as follows: 1. A state legislature may do what the state and federal Constitutions do not forbid it to do. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 228. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Sections 40, 41. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, Section 33. Giozza v. Tiernan (1893), 148 U.S. 657, 37 L. Ed. 599 13 S.Ct. 721. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. County of Otoe (1873), 16 Wall, (U.S.) 667, 21 L.Ed. 375. Ware v. Hylton (1796), 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (1948), 248 U.S. N.C. 102, 102 S.E. 2d 853, affirmed 360 US. 45, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072, 79 S.Ct. 985 Village of North Atlanta v. Cook, (1963), 219 Ga. 316, 133 S.E.2d 585, 589. 2. A state legislature cannot restrict or limit the right of a succeeding legislature to exercise its constitutional power in its own way. In other words, it cannot tie the hands of its successors. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Section 40. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, Section 34. Stone v. Mississippi (1880), 101 U.S. 814, 25 L.Ed. 1079. Newton v. Mahoning County (1880) 100 U.S. 548, 25 L.Ed. 710. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (1878), 97 U.S. 25, 24 L.Ed. 989. Bank of Columbia v. Okely (1819), 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 235, 4 L.Ed. 557. Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 3 L.Ed. 162. State v. Wall (1967) 271 N.C. 675, 683, 157 S.E.2d 363. Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro (1920), 180 N.C. 441, 105 S.E. 187. Village of North Atlanta v. Cook (1963), 219 Ga 316, 133 S.E.2d 585, 589. What has been said makes these things plain : 1. The claim of ERA supporters that a state which has ratified the Amendment cannot rescind or withdraw its ratification is totally repugnant to Article V and the rules devised by experience, reason, and law to enable state legislatures to perform their functions in civil government. 2. Although it is impartial and logical, the Kentucky view is inconsistent with Article V because it prohibits further activity by ratifying and rejecting states while the amendatory process is still going on. 3. The view shared by multitudes of other Americans and me is in complete harmony with Article V and the rules devised by experience, reason, and law to enable state legislatures to perform their functions in civil government. Hence, this view is the sound one. (5). If the Supreme Court should adhere to its unprecedented ruling in the Coleman Case, Congress will be obligated to judge the question of whether ERA has been ratified by the true meaning of Article V, which is that a state legislature has power to ratify ERA after having previously rejected it and that a state legislature has power to rescind or withdraw its ratification of ERA after having previously ratified it. Since reason, the Constitution and prior Supreme Court decisions compel the conclusion that whether a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has been ratified in conformity with Article V is rightly a judicial question, and since subsequent Supreme Court decisions disclose the existing tendency of the Supreme Court to narrow the “political-question doctrine", it seems probable that the Supreme Court will return to its former position and hold that whether ERA has been ratified is a judicial question for its ultimate decision. The Coleman case is unprecedented. Moreover, it is contrary to six prior decisions of the Supreme Court, which covered the first 150 years of the nation's history, and which recognized and applied the sound constitutional principle that the question whether a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been raified in conformity to Article V is a judicial question for the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court itself. I cite these six cases below. United States v. Sprague (1931), 282 U.S. 716, 75 L.Ed. 640, 51 S.Ct. 220, 71 A.L.R. 1381. Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 130, 66 L.Ed. 606, 43 S.Ct. 217. National Prohibition cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350 64 L.Ed. 946, 40 S.Ct. 486 (Note: Reported as Rhode Island v. Palmer) Hollingsworth v. Virginia, (1798) 3 Dall. 378, 1 L.Ed. 644. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction in these cases after the Secretary of State had proclaimed that the Amendment assailed had been ratified by three-fourths of the states. This simple ministerial function has |