agreed in writing to sell a 'lot on the right hand side of S. street going towards the river, being twenty feet wide, and running back to Stewart Street,' and it appears that the vendor owned sixty feet on the right hand side of S. street, the description was too indefinite to prevent the operation of the statute of frauds." Holthouse vs. Rynd, 9 Sadler, 193. The bill in the case last cited sought to supplement the words of description contained in the written contract, by alleging that the lot to be conveyed was on the East side of the 60 foot lot-but such an addition to the description contained in the contract was held to be unavailing. Without that aid, the terms of description used in the writing could be applied to any part of the 60 foot lot-and, therefore, the lot to be conveyed was left indefinite.

According to the agreement annexed to the bill in this case, the Millers did "covenant and agree to grant, bargain and sell to the said second party his heirs and assigns all the coal of the Pittsburg seam in and underlying a certain tract of land situate in the Township of Sewickley, County of Westmoreland, and State of Pennsylvania, adjoining lands of Wheyel Coke Company, Mathias heirs, Philip Keller, Westmoreland Coal Company, and other lands of the parties of the first part, containing six acres, more or less." While there is provision made in the agreement for the granting of certain mining rights in the surface, yet the thing to be conveyed is "all the coal of the Pittsburg seam, in and underlying" a tract of land located by the adjoiners above named containing six acres, more or less." From this description of the subject-matter, we should have no hesitancy in concluding that the subject-matter of the contract was six acres, more or less, of the Pittsburg. seam, immediately underlying a surface of no greater area. That the area described by adjoiners is a surface area, but the stratum to be conveyed is only the coal of the Pittsburg seam immediately underlying that surface area. That is a very common way of describing a seam of coal about to be conveyed. But what seems to be a perfectly plain construction of the foregoing description is brought into some degree of doubt, when we reach the later clause of the agreement which deals with the consideration to be paid, wherein it appears that $5000.00 is

to be paid for the Pittsburg seam or vein of coal underlying the aforesaid tract, but that "in addition to a deed being executed for the coal and mining rights as hereinbefore stated as part consideration for the price or sum above stated, which is to be paid to the parties of the first part, the said parties of the first part hereby agree to incorporate in the deed for the coal unto the party of the second part, the right to open a mine or mines on the land of the parties of the first part, with the full and complete right to build a tramway or tramroads, or railroad or railroads, across any part of the balance of the tract of land now owned by the parties of the first part, which contains, including the coal above described, fifty-seven acres and one hundred fourteen and twenty-four hundredths perches (57 A. 114.24 Perches), for the purpose of operation and removing the coal from these premises, etc.

The first description had mentioned as an adjoiner "other land of parties of the first part," and the provision last quoted above from the later paragraph of the agreement seems to show that the six acres overlying the coal that is to be conveyed is not in any way dissevered from a larger body of surface, and that they together make 57 acres and 114.24 perches. But the second paragraph of the bill shows us that the adjoiners, where we had supposed the six acres of surface immediately overlying the coal to be conveyed were definitely located, are not the adjoiners of the six acres alone, but are the adjoiners of the 57 acres, and therefore, that somewhere under 57 acres and 114.24 perches of surface so adjoined, there lies these six acres, more or less, of coal which is to be the subject matter of a conveyance. If that be true, the six acres of the Pittsburg seam of coal which is to be conveyed is no more definitely fixed than that it lies under some undefined 6 acres of the 57 acres of surface. The second paragraph of the bill, after averring that the Millers were the owners in fee of 57 acres 114.24 perches of land in Sewickley Township adjoining lands of Whyel Coke Company, Mathias Heirs, Philip Kellar, Westmoreland Coal Company and other lands of the defendants, avers that they agreed to convey "all the coal of the Pittsburg seam underlying the said tract of land, supposed to be about six acres of coal, more or less." The notice of acceptance, as

given in the 7th paragraph of the bill, also describes the coal as being "all the Pittsburg vein or seam of coal underlying a certain tract of land of fifty-seven acres and one hundred and fourteen and twenty-four hundredths perches," etc. At one place in the agreement, it speaks of "the balance of that tract of land now owned by the parties of the first part which contains, including the coal above described, fifty-seven acres and one hundred fourteen and twenty-four hundredths perches," etc.

The statute of frauds deals with contracts for the conveyance of lands. The land to be conveyed here is not all the strata of either six acres, or of 57 acres-but only "all the coal of the Pittsburg seam in and underlying a certain tract of land *** containing six acres, more or less." The other strata are not to be conveyed-although the retained title to the surface is to be subjected to the burden of certain mining rights ancillary to the utilizing of this and other coal. To specifically enforce a conveyance of real estate, we must have a definite description of that real estate, and we must find that description in the writing. Where is it in this writing? What is it? We might believe from one part of the agreement that the six acres of the Pittsburg seam of coal to be conveyed was located somewhere under 57 acres of surface-but it would have to be located very near to the center of the earth if an area of 57 acres defined by surface lines would be reduced to an area of six acres when the coal seam would be reached. Would it be supposed that six acres of coal lying somewhere under one thousand acres of surface would be sufficiently described for the purpose of conveyance if only the adjoiners of the overlying one thousand acres were given, and only the six acres of the stratum of coal was to be the subject-matter of the conveyance? It is not likely that any one would so contend. Then why should it be so contended here? On the theory of the construction now being considered, we do not know that a single adjoiner mentioned in the description in the writing is an adjoiner of the portion of the coal seam that is to be conveyed-the adjoiners named only being used to locate the 57 acres of surface. We do not know whether the six acres of coal is under the Eastern, Western, Northern, Southern, or central part of the 57 acres. We do not know whether the Pittsburg seam

underlies the whole 57 acres or whether only six acres of the 57 acres is underlaid with coal. In short, we do not have the thing that is to be conveyed definitely located at all.

We have seen that another part of the agreement, when considered by itself, is capable of a construction that would make the adjoiners mentioned be the adjoiners of six acres of surface lying immediately over the six acres of coal, which is the thing to be conveyed. But even if we were permitted to ignore other parts of the agreement, and consider that alone as defining the subject-matter, it would, nevertheless, appear therefrom that other lands of the grantors were one of the adjoiners, without any definite fixing of the line of severance therefrom. On the whole, the agreement is vague and uncertain in identifying what is to be conveyed. "Specific execution of a contract will not be enforced, unless parties have described and identified the particular tract, or unless the contract furnishes the means of identifying, with certainty. the land to be conveyed.' Parrish vs. Koons, 1 Pars. Sel. Cases, 79. The uncertainties about this agreement could only be removed by the aid of parol evidence and that is inadmissible. "A contract for the sale of lands is within the statute of frauds, and, therefore, void and unenforceable, if parol testimony be required to establish any essential part of it." Mellon vs. Dawson, 123 Pa. 298. In Holthouse vs. Rynd, 9 Sad. 193, a very full description was given in the writing of the lot that was to be conveyed, except that it was not possible to tell from it from what part of a larger lot the part to be sold was to be taken-and the court there held that the description was altogether too undefinite for a decree of specific performance. "A designation of the land as a certain quantity out of a larger described tract, as of so many acres out of a specified tract is insufficient, where the boundaries of the part are not stated, or the part has not been carved out." 36 Cyc. 592. "A contract for the sale of land in which the description lacks the certainty necessary to locate it is void. Words intended to be descriptive, but which do not in fact describe so that the parties themselves or the courts can certainly determine from the instrument itself the tract of land to be conveyed, or its location, are not sufficient to base a decree for

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specific performance." Per Elkin, J., in Barnes vs. Rea, No. 219 Pa. 296.

This is not a case in which contemporaneously with the making of the writing a vendee has been put in possession of a definite property. This is a case in which an alleged vendee is out of possession, and a description of the property is to be found wholly in the terms of the writing. Whatever redress the plaintiff might or might not find in a court of law, the description is too vague to warrant a chancellor to decree specific performance.

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Another executory right which this writing purports to give to the plaintiff is "the right to purchase any part of the land now owned by the first parties for the purpose of building houses or other buildings which may be necessary for the operation of the coal, and for this land upon which houses are to be constructed the parties of the first part agree with the party of the second part to sell and convey the same by general warranty deed free of all incumbrances, to the party of the second part for the price or sum of one hundred ($100.00) dollars per acre. The 4th paragraph of the bill recites this provision and the prayers for relief do not seem to exclude a prayer for relief with respect to the right secured by this provision. Of course, it is not possible for the court to generally decree a conveyance of land that "may be necessary, " for the purpose named. That provision would confer on the plaintiff the right to make choice of the necessary lands, but until it has been specifically alleged that he has done so, no case is stated which is enforceable by equitable decree. The contract must be complete the court cannot complete it. "The contract must be complete in all its parts; that is to say, it must contain all the material terms and none of these terms must be left to be settled by future negotiations." 36 Cyc. 587. "A chancellor can only enforce an agreement specifically where the parties have agreed definitely on all its terms and left nothing to the future but mere performance." Agnew vs. Land Co. 204 Pa. 192. It is entirely clear that, at the time of making Exhibit "A," something was left open for future determination-that is to say, it was to be thereafter determined whether it would be necessary to secure land for the purpose mentioned, and, if so, how much, and where it be located, and what its area and