ing, in that connection: "The responsibility which is incurred by the receipt and disbursement of money is a legitimate ground of compensation, and an unvarying rate per cent., without regard to the magnitude of the sum, will always be a just measure of it, because the responsibility increases in proportion to the amount. It is consequently susceptible of a uniform measure, which, we think, may be reasonably put at two and one-half per cent. Not so, the compensation of trouble. The settlement of a very large estate may be the business of a few days, while that of a very small one may occupy as many years; and the compensation for all beyond responsibility ought to be graduated to the circumstances.”

The estate in judgment there amounted to $356,075.93; and the executor was allowed 22 per cent. for responsibility, and 12 per cent. for his trouble in the settlement of the estate. The rule there established, for compensation for responsibility, has been followed since; and was applied so lately as 1902 by Judge Penrose, in Sunderland's Estate (No. 1) 203 Pa. 156. Upon that established standard, the accountant here is entitled to an allowance of $3,130.59 for responsibility.

The exceptant contends that the allowance to be made to the executor here for his trouble should not exceed one-half per cent., and in support of his contention, refers to the fact that there was no litigation in the collection of the assets, and that they were converted into money by simple and ordinary sales, without more trouble than is usual in the settlement of estates generally. He maintains that the legal duties of the executor here were simple, and required nothing more of him than conversion and an account, at the end of a year, for distribution. He asserts that the voluminous correspondence which the executor had with the beneficiaries was mainly unnecessary, for the reason that the executor owed the beneficiaries no legal duties, but to convert the assets, and bring them into court for distribution. In short, it is claimed by the exceptant, that as the legal duty of the executor was conversion and accounting, his voluminous correspondence, and the trouble incident to it, was not necessary to the legal settlement of the estate, and is, therefore, no ground for an allowance of compensation for trouble.

A great many cases have been cited to the Court by the exceptant and the accountant; and it must be confessed that in none of them does this feature of administration appear as a substantive ground for compensation. The cases cited by the exceptant begin with that of Pusey & Clemson, 9 S. & R. 209, decided in 1822. The amount of the estate was $100,000, and 3 per cent. was allowed to cover both responsibility and trouble. In that case, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson said: "And in the cases which generally occur, it appears to me, after considerable research, that the common opinion and understanding in this country has fixed 5 per cent. as a reasonable allowance. But to this rule there must be exceptions. There are estates where the total amount is small, and that, too, collected in driblets. In such, 5 per cent. would be insufficient. On the contrary, there are others where the total being very large, and made up of sums collected and paid away in large masses, 5 per cent. would be too much." Adopting the standard subsequently established in Stevenson's Estate, supra, for responsibility, the Court, in Pusey vs. Clemson, allowed 2 per cent. for trouble.

Whelen's Estate, 70 Pa. 410, is next cited by the exceptant. The estate there amounted to $163,000, and a total allowance of 3 per cent. was made to the executors, as compensation for responsibility and trouble. That case, as appears at the foot of p. 431, was very unlike this one. It consisted of interest-bearing securities which were not converted into money, but were distributed in kind to four children, in equal parts, a little over two months after the decedent's death. The trouble there could not have been less, in an estate of that simple character; and here the trouble could not have been more, in one of its character; so that the percentage allowed there does not apply here.

In Lloyd's Estate, 82 Pa. 143, the case next cited, the whole estate amounted to $67,036.18, and is was held, in reversing the case, that a charge of 5 per cent. in that case was excessive. It appears from the opinion of Mr. Justice Woodward, at p. 149, that there had been some conduct on the part of the accountant of which the Supreme Court did not approve, and it cannot be accepted as a strict authority for this case.

The next case cited is Stewart's Appeal, 110 Pa. 410. The estate there amounted to $127,387.07. The accountant claimed $4,500.00 compensation, and the court below reduced it to $4,000.00. Mr. Justice Green, of the Supreme Court, said: "The accountant's compensation was fixed at $4,000.00 by the auditor and the court below. The debtor side of the account, as determined by the final decree of the court below, amounts to $127,387.07, and the credit side to $74,821.16. The estate was a very complicated one; the settlement of it extended through a number of years, and it is not yet closed; the account itself is of extraordinary length, containing a vast number of items. Very great responsibility was cast upon the accountant, and the compensation allowed is but a little over three per cent. We do not think this at all excessive; and the sixth assignment is therefore not sustained."

The exceptant next cites Barhite's Appeal, 126 Pa. 404, an estate of $80,000, and there were but three heirs. The executor was allowed 5 per cent., of which allowance Mr. Chief Justice Paxson said: "Under all the circumstances, this was liberal." The grasping spirit of the executor, in that case, is shown by his charging commission on $5,000 of advancements, and on his personal debt to the decedent, of $4,337.27; and its natural effect upon the court, would have been, and doubtless was, to prompt the Chief Justice to remark, that the allowance of 5 per cent. made by the court below "was liberal."

The next case cited by the exceptant is Semple's Estate, 189 Pa. 385 (1899). There the widow of the decedent was his executor. The settlement of the estate covered the period of eight years, and involved much litigation and incessant trouble to the executrix during the entire period. At the death of the decedent, his estate was insolvent. By careful nursing of the estate, the executrix paid the debts of the decedent, amounting to $247,644.11. Her pecuniary transactions during the settlement, amounting to $2,006,758.51, and her actual disbursements, to $357,916.46, upon which latter sum she charged a commission of 5 per cent., or $17,895.82. Inasmuch as she had, by the most adroit and diligent management, during a period of eight years, retrieved the whole estate from the insolvent condition in which the

decedent had left it, her commission of 5 per cent. was allowed. The case was a remarkable one, and shows, inter alia, that the male sex does not have a monopoly of ability and courage. At p. 400 of the report, Mr. Justice Green, of the Supreme Court, said: "Finally, after eight years of constant efforts, struggles, persevering contentions, distinguished by the most careful and prudent management in all respects, a great success was accomplished. The real estate was loaded with $65,000 of mortgages. The whole of the vast debt of $247,000 was extinguished. All the mortgages, except $14,000 were paid off, and the overburdened estate which, when it came into accountant's hands, was utterly insolvent, was saved and redeemed for the devisees and legatees named in the will, to the extent, as is alleged on behalf of the appellant, and not denied by the appellee, of several hundreds of thousands of dollars."

Wistar's Estate, 192 Pa. 289 (1899) is next cited. The condition and amount of that estate is thus described by the court, at p. 290: "There were upwards of fifty different pieces of real estate sold by the accountant. In almost every instance the properties were incumbered with mortgages, arrears of taxes, municipal liens, etc. This increased the labors of the accountant, as well as his responsibility, as it necessitated the paying off the mortgages as well as the other encumbrances in each case, and, of course, involved making settlements, not only with different purchasers, but also with mortgagees, the City of Philadelphia and other lien creditors. The amount of money that thus went through the hands of the accountant was considerably over $1,000,000.” It was held that the accountant was entitled to 32 per cent., or $35,000 compensation, for responsibility and trouble, or 1 per cent. for trouble.

The next case cited by the exceptant is Sunderland's Estate, 203 Pa. 155 (1902). The estate there amounted to $114,035.38-$50,000 of which consisted of an unconverted mortgage. The estate was given by the testator to his seven children. The court there allowed 22 per cent. for responsibility, and 1 per cent. for trouble, on the whole amount of the estate. The character of the estate, and the measure of compensation, are shown in the opinion of Judge Penrose, at p. 156, where he said: "But

it is further objected that upon an estate so large as this, $114,035.38, composed of the mortgage referred to, and a few items collected in cash, an allowance of commissions at 5 per cent. is excessive, the estate being free from debt or complication, and, as the account shows, there being but eleven items of credit, including cost of filing account, commissions and counsel fees. This objection appears to be well founded: Pusey vs. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 204; Walker's Estate, 9 S. & R. 225; Whelen's Estate, 20 P. F. Smith, 410; Lang's Estate, 15 Philada. 593. Allowing, under Stevenson's Estate, 4 Wharton, 98, two and one-half per cent. for responsibility, an additional one per cent. will amply compensate the services rendered by the accountants as executors."

The next case cited by the exceptant is Young's Estate, 204 Pa. 32 (1902). In that case it appears that the personal estate amounted to $263,136.77. There was also about 1,700 acres of real esate. Under an agreement with the heirs, in whom the real estate had vested, the administrator carried on the business of farming. In his account, which was prepared under the advice of counsel, he mingled administration items with matters relating to the farming. This necessitated the appointment of an auditor. The auditor allowed commissions at the rate of 5 per cent. Upon exceptions, the court below reduced the commissions to 42 per cent. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court the allowance was reduced to 3 per cent. At pp. 35-6, Mr. Justice Potter, speaking of the condition of the estate and the character of the administration, said: "In the present case, no unusual services were required of the administrator in connection with the personalty. In fact, the attention here bestowed was very slight. The investments in stocks and bonds, with few exceptions, remained unchanged and were distributed in kind. The time and labor spent in the discharge of what was properly the work of administration, was insignificant in comparison with that bestowed upon the conduct of the farms, which was carried on under the agreement with the heirs, and for which ample compensation was allowed by the auditor. Under the circumstances of the case, an allowance of 3 per cent. upon the amount of personal property will be ample remuneration for the services rendered by the adminis