No. 13, NEW SERIES.-Vol. I. No. 952, OLD SERIES.-Vol. XIX. APRIL 7, 1855. FREEHOLDS IN THE CITY FOR ABSOLUTE SALE. PRICE 18. This day is published. 8vo., 10s. cloth, MR. ALFRED GWILT will SELL by AUCTION, at THE LAW of BLOCKADE, as contained in the Judg the Mart, on WEDNESDAY, the 18th April, at 12 for 1, without reserve, in one Lot, all that FREEHOLD ESTATE of Five Houses, being Nos. 15, Friar-street, and 4, 5, 6, and 7, Ireland-yard, Blackfriars. Particulars and conditions of sale may be had of the Auctioneer, No. 7, Union-street, Southwark; of S. T. M. Westall, Esq., Solicitor, No. 5, New-inn, Strand; at the Mart; and of Mr. Goodwin, on the premises, No. 7, Ireland-yard. Just published, price Is., ON THE ECONOMY OF THE LAW, especially in relation to the Court of Chancery. By GEORGE COCHRANE, Esq., Barrister at Law. "On the word law' rests the destiny of empires." ments of Dr. LUSHINGTON and the Cases on Blockade decided during 1854. By J. P. DEANE, D. C. L., Advocate in Doctors' Commons. London: Butterworths, 7, Fleet-street, Law Publishers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty. Sweet, 2, Chancery-lane, Fleet-street; Effingham Wilson, Royal Ex- THE LAW LIST for 1855. By WILLIAM POWELL, change; and B. W. Gardiner, Princes-street, Cavendish-square. THE LAW OF LETTERS-PATENT. This day is published, in 1 vol. 8vo., price 18s., in cloth bds., A TREATISE on the LAW of LETTERS-PATENT for the SOLE USE of INVENTIONS in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ircland, including the Practice connected with the Grant. To which is added, a Summary of the Patent Laws in force in the principal Foreign States; with an Appendix of Statutes, Rules, Practical Forms, &c. By JOHN CORYTON, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister at Law. H. Sweet, 3, Chancery-lane, Fleet-street. THE LAW OF ELECTIONS. This day is published, in 1 vol. royal 12mo., price 10s. 6d. cloth bds., PRACTICAL TREATISE on the LAW of ELECTIONS A of the United Kingdom, and "The CORRUPT PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT, 1854," with an Appendix of Statutes. By JOHN CLERK, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. Also, by the same Author, price 12s. cloth, The LAW and PRACTICE of ELECTION COM- NEW SEWERAGE DISTRICTS. PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS for the FORMATION of SEWERAGE DISTRICTS, and for the Conduct of Sewerage Boards, in the Neighbourhood of the Metropolis, under the Statute 17 & 18 Vict. c. 111; with the necessary Forms, and an Abstract of all the Metropolitan Sewers Acts. By TOULMIN SMITH, Esq., Barrister at Law; Author of "The Parish: its Obligations and Powers," &c. S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane. LAW OF MERCHANT SHIPPING. In 1 vol. 8vo., price 20s. in cloth boards, A COMPENDIUM of the LAW of MERCHANT SHIPPING, with an Appendix, containing all the Statutes of practical utility. By FREDERIC PHILIP MAUDE and CHARLES EDWARD POLLOCK, Esqrs., of the Inner Temple, Barristers at Law. S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane. S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane. Recently published, much enlarged, price 25s., THE NEW CHANCERY PRACTICE; containing all the Decisions on the late Acts and Orders to the present Time, with the Practice at Judges' Chambers, and with Forms of Decrees, Orders, Pleadings, Affidavits, Costs, &c.; being intended as a Supplement to the Books of Practice already published. By F. S. WILLIAMS, Esq., of the Chancery Bar. 8. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane, Fleet-street. THE NEW LAW OF EVIDENCE. A TREATISE on the POWER of the COURTS of COM No. 13, VOL. I., NEW SERIES. of the Inland Revenue Office, Registrar of Certificates. FINLASON'S COMMON-LAW ACTS. Recently published, in 12mo., price 148. cloth, THE COMMON-LAW PROCEDURE ACTS of 1852 and 1854; with Notes, containing all the Cases either already expressly decided on or tending to elucidate them. With an Appendix, containing the Common-law Procedure Act of Will. 4, the recent Acts on Evidence, the New Rules to Michaelmas Vacation, 1854, and an Introduction. By W. F. FINLASON, Esq., Barrister at Law. "This is, in our judgment, a most excellent and carefully written book. The equity powers given to the Common-law Courts are admirably done. The views taken by Mr. Finlason of the practical gestive. Such men, and their editions of statutes, tend very greatly to bearing and operation of these acts are remarkably shrewd and sugimprove the laws they expound, and powerfully assist the objects of the Legislature."-Law Magazine, Feb. 1855. "We have now before us the work of Mr. Finlason, whose previous labours in expounding other statutes entitle him to the favourable consideration of the Profession. The notes to the various new enactments are very full and valuable."-Legal Observer, Jan. 6, 1855. "This work is well done."-Law Times, Jan. 6, 1855. A Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. STARKIE'S LAW OF EVIDENCE.-NEW EDITION. PRACTICAL TREATISE of the LAW of EVIDENCE. BY THOMAS STARKIE, Esq. Fourth Edition, with very considerable alterations and additions; incorporating the Statutes and reported Cases to the time of publication. By G. M. DOWDESWELL and J. G. MALCOLM, Esqrs., Barristers at Law. Just published, in 1 vol. royal 8vo., price 1. 168. cloth. 64 Fortunately for the Profession, the new edition has been intrusted to gentlemen, of whom one is well known, not only as a ripe and accomplished lawyer, (doctrinâ malidus), but as a judicious editor, knowing how to withhold as well as how to apply his hand. Amid the present plague of reports mere industry is not sufficient to qualify even a secondrate editor. . . . . It is evident that the editors have not been blinded. by their respect for the author, but have altered, corrected, and amended wherever they have seen occasion. Such a course could not be pursued safely upon a small stock of learning or of judgment; and in our opinion it has been pursued, not only with safety, but with manifest advantage to the book; so that the fourth edition of Starkie is to the existing law what the first edition was to the law in 1824. . . . . We wish we had some means of identifying Mr. Malcolm's portions of the work. As it is, being hitherto unknown in authorship, he must be content with the praise of having borne a part where all was good."-Jurist. "It is also the only work of which a new edition has been brought out at such a time as to render it possible that it should apply to prac tice, with any degree of consideration and accuracy, the modern changes in the law. .. .. We think the editors will have gone far towards restoring the admirable work of Mr. Starkie to its original character of the best work on the law of evidence which has yet been produced."Legal Observer. Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. THRING'S SUCCESSION DUTY ACT. THE SUCCESSION DUTY ACT, (16 & 17 Vict. c. 51), for granting to her Majesty Duties on Succession to Property, and for altering certain Provisions of the Acts charging Duties on Legacies and Shares of Personal Estates. With an Introduction and Notes. By HENRY THRING, Esq., Barrister at Law. In 12mo., price 5s. 6d. cloth. Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. PAPER.-The cheapest, largest, and best assorted Stock, suitable for the use of the Legal Profession will be found at MATTHEWS & DREW'S, Paper Manufacturers and Stationers to the High Court of Chancery, 38, High Holborn, opposite Chancery-lane -Samples, with prices, will be forwarded on application, and orders to the amount of 21. carriage-free to the country. NEWSPAPER Lazonby v. Rawson.-(Will, construction of— Ad- Duncan v. Cannan.-(Domicil, effect of change of- 291 Construc ...... 294 A QUESTION of considerable interest in a commercial point of view has been lately decided, not, however, without the dissent of one learned judge, in the Court of Exchequer. The case to which we allude is Gibson and Another v.. Sturge and Another, (1 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 259), which decides that freight is payable upon a cargo according to the quantity shipped, and not according to the quantity delivered, where the cargo has increased in bulk during the voyage, and there has been no agreement between the parties upon the subject. The facts were briefly these:-A cargo of wheat had been shipped at Odessa for Gloucester. The material part of the bill of lading was as follows:-"Shipped in The Prompt, now riding at Odessa, and bound for the United Kingdom, 3700 chetworts of wheat in bulk, to be delivered at the port of destination unto A. B. and C. D., or their assignees, paying freight for the goods as per charterparty." By a memorandum in the bill of lading it was declared that the quantity and quality were unknown to the master. The provision in the charterparty as to the freight was, that it was to be according to the London, Baltic, printed rates, which is a certain well-known rate per quarter. The wheat was accepted at Gloucester by the defendants as assignees of the bill of lading, and was EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. Mayhew v. Suttle.-(Agreement-Sale of beer on premises-Occupation as servant) ...... COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. 303 304 By G. J. P. SMITH and W. B. BRETT, Barristers at Law. Mackenzie v. The Sligo and Shannon Railway Company. (Joint-stock company-Winding-up Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45-Fund in court-CreditorExecution against shareholder)....... Purchas, App., The Overseers of the Parish of the Holy Sepulchre, Cambridge, Resps.-(Poor rateCambridge Philosophical Society-Reading-room -Exemption-6 & 7 Vict. c. 36-Purposes of institution-Purposes of occupation) ...... .... Reg. v. Bedwell.-(Master and servant-Payment of wages-Order of justices-Appeal-20 Geo. 2, c. 19, ss. 1, 5-4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 5) Griffenhoofe v. Daubuz.-(Landlord and tenantTithe rent-charge, covenant by tenant to payTithe rent-charge due after end of tenancy-6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71, ss. 67, 80, 81) Taylor v. Nesfield.-( Trespass-Two counts: verdict on one for plaintiff, on the other for defendant— Summons taken out by defendant-Postea delivered to defendant-Judgment signed by defendant for plaintiff) COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. By W. PATERSON and W. MILLS, Barristers at Law. Wilson v. Morrell.-(Practice-Rescinding order of reference-Reference without the consent of a third 304 It then measured by the Custom-house authorities. measured 2785 quarters, instead of 2664 quarters, (the latter being the amount in quarters of the 3700 chetworts mentioned in the bill of lading, and which was found as a fact to have been the quantity shipped). The plaintiffs claimed freight on the larger quantity. There was no evidence to shew the cause of the increased bulk, whether it arose from heat, or water, or the bad condition of the wheat when shipped, or from defective stowage, or the negligence of the master and crew during the voyage. There was no evidence of any usage controlling the point in dispute, and it was admitted on all sides that there was not any contract affecting it, either in the bill of lading or the charterparty. Although a similar state of facts must have often existed, it appeared to be a case of the first impression; and there being, therefore, no direct authority upon the subject, the learned judges discussed it upon general grounds of analogy, convenience, and justice. Martin, B., differing from the rest of the Court, was of opinion that freight was payable upon the quantity delivered. His Lordship said" Freight is to be paid upon the wheat shipped and the wheat delivered. The wheat must be delivered to entitle the plaintiffs to freight; but they have delivered the entire quantity which was shipped. So far as appeared at the trial, every grain of wheat shipped on board at Odessa was delivered to the defendants at Gloucester. It was argued, that the bulk which was deli .... vered beyond the bulk shipped was water, and not wheat; but there was no evidence that any water ever came in contact with the wheat at all, and I believe there are causes which increase the size of grain other than contact with water. . . . The valuable part of the grain is that which produces the flour; but in the grain there is the husk, and I believe always a certain quantity of moisture or water, which can only be removed by kiln or artificial drying. . . . . The circumstance of the wheat being damaged does not at all affect the right of the plaintiffs to freight. It has been decided, that where the entire quantity was delivered the shipowner was entitled to the full freight, notwithstanding it was proved that the goods conveyed had been damaged by the negligence of the captain and crew, and that the remedy for the merchant was by a cross action for negligence. (Davidson v. Gwynne, 12 East, 381)." The learned judge then rested his judgment upon the following grounds-first, it was just and reasonable that the measurement of the largest space occupied by the cargo during the voyage should be the test for ascertaining the payment of freight; secondly, by analogy to the case above stated, that freight is payable upon the delivery of the entire quantity shipped and accepted, irrespective of its condition; and, thirdly, upon the ground of convenience, as it was often impossible to measure the cargo when shipped, (sometimes, as in the principal case, out of barges in an open roadstead), while, upon its arrival in this country, it is by law to be measured under the supervision of the Custom-house authorities. Were the delivery of the cargo and the payment of the freight to be held in suspense until a communication could be made to Odessa, in order to ascertain whether the quantity mentioned in the bill of lading was correct? If, on the one hand, the making the freight payable on the quantity delivered would hold out a temptation to shipmasters to wet the cargo, and so increase its bulk; on the other, a contrary rule would enable a dishonest consignee to delay the payment of freight, which he might be desirous of doing when the article on its arrival was low in the market. The other learned judges, (Pollock, C. B., and Alderson and Platt, BB.), however, held that the shipment was to determine the amount payable as freight. The definition of "freight," they said, was the price payable for the carriage of goods from the port of loading to the port of discharge; it was not earned unless they were carried from the beginning to the end of the voyage; and the increase in bulk of this cargo arose ex confesso after the shipment. The case was analogous to that of the pregnant females mentioned in Molloy, (1 De Jure Maritimo, 374, 9th ed.), where no freight is payable for the infants of which they are delivered during the voyage; so, where animals have been shipped, and some die during the voyage, freight is payable only for those which arrive; and again, where goods, as in the case of molasses, have wasted in bulk during the voyage, freight is payable only for the residue. These admitted cases could be explained only on the ground that freight was to be calculated and paid on that amount only which was put on board, carried throughout the whole voyage, and delivered at the end to the merchant. It is the duty of the master to ascertain the quantity he receives at the time of loading, and this may be done without difficulty, as he must be aware of the number of cubic feet which his vessel is competent to afford to the stowage of grain, and the cubic bulk of such a commodity as grain when stowed. There was not a real, but only an apparent increase in the commodity; it may be that during the last two or three days of the voyage the wheat imbibed a quantity of water, which made it occupy a larger space, and the shipowners claim freight for the water so imbibed, as well as for the wheat that was shipped and carried the whole voyage; if the water could be separated, the defendants would be entitled to reject it, and be liable for freight only on the wheat freed from this injurious addition. Suppose a cargo of sponge shipped dry, and to be paid for by weight at the end of the voyage, the consignee might surely squeeze out all the water imbibed during the voyage, and pay for sponge only. The mere difficulty of separation cannot, however, affect the question. "It is manifest," said Pollock, C. B., " that a cargo of wheat may be increased in bulk (and to the great injury of the cargo) by the fraud or negligence of the captain and crew; and I think that laws ought to be framed, and the decisions of Courts of law (as far as possible) ought to be founded, on the same principles as prevail in the moral government of the universe-that, as far as possible, duty and interest should not be opposed to each other. I think it would be dangerous and mischievous to give a shipowner a right to charge more freight for an injurious alteration in the commodity carried, which he or his agents have always the means in their own hands of producing." Reviews. A Treatise on the Law of Letters-patent for the sole Use of Inventions in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including the Practice connected with the Grant. To which is added a Summary of the Patent Laws in force in the principal Foreign States, with an Appendix of Statutes, Rules, Practical Forms, &c. By JOHN CORYTON, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-atLaw. [H. Sweet, 1855.] some able authorities THE law of patents, after having continued unaltered from the passing of the Statute of Monopolies to the year 1834, has of late years been the subject of much learned and scientific discussion, which has led difference of opinion; to great having even gone so far as to assert that the entire system is wrong in principle, and positively injurious to those whom it is intended to benefit. We have already discussed this interesting question at some length, (16 Jur., part 2, p. 102); but while we maintain the principle of patent monopolies to be in the main right, we do not dispute that the law still requires considerable amendment, not only in the practice connected with the grant, but in the application of the principle itself. The importance to a commercial nation of settling on a right basis the office of Government with respect to trade, and the unsatisfactory state of the existing law of patents, render any suggestions for the improvement of the latter of great interest to the public. Mr. Coryton has ably discussed, in an introductory chapter, the chief questions connected with the policy of patents, and the defects of the present law, making some useful suggestions for its improvement. We recommend the perusal of this chapter to every person interested in patents, as the observations it contains evidently proceed from a careful thinker. In expounding the principles of the existing law of patents, Mr. Coryton has treated the subject in a manner materially differing from that of former writers. "Hitherto," says the author, "this subject has been treated as a branch of royal franchises conferred through the instrumentality of letters-patent, at the 'mere motion of the Crown, the grant in this instance 'flowing from it in its character of patron of industry, 'ingenuity, and skill. "An entirely different hypothesis has been here as'sumed to underlie the structure of patent law-one 'which admits of its leading questions being discussed ' on broad general principles, instead of by reference to rules framed for purposes alien to inventions, and but 'imperfectly applicable to the contingencies of modern trade. It places the grant on the footing of a privilege, resulting from a contract in restraint of trade, between the Crown (as representative of the public) and the patentee, and considers its de facto character as a royal grant to influence the question (as will be seen by the decided cases) to a very inconsiderable 6 extent. A Treatise on the Law of Costs in Actions and other COSTS form a considerable item in the results of an action, and are often the principal, sometimes the only, object of litigation. Questions connected with them occur at every stage, of the suit-questions frequently of a subtle and complicated character, which must be considered and solved by the practitioner. There are costs interlocutory and costs final, the general costs of the cause and the costs of specific issues; which, again, are subdivided into the costs of distributive issues. There is the power of depriving of costs altogether, and the power of giving them by certificate or order, under the County Courts Acts. Such are only some of the numerous forms in which this subject presents itself. Notwithstanding the constant necessity of referring to this branch of our law, no distinct treatise had been published upon it since the work of Mr. Baron Hullock, some forty years ago, until the appearance of Mr. Gray's book. It might be supposed, à priori, that "costs," however interesting to attornies and a large portion of their clients, would make but a dry sort of book-a compilation of statutes, rules of court, and cases, without affording much opportunity for logical arrangement, or for the deduction of general rules. Far different, however, is the result under the skilful treatment of Mr. Gray, who has reduced the "chaotic mass" into order, and, by the aid of great industry and learning, has sought out the principles upon which the decisions on the subject ought to rest, reconciling and discarding as authorities those cases and dicta which conflict with or deviate from such principles. In his own words, "it must not be imagined questions of costs are decided upon mere abstract arbitrary provisions, without reference to general principles. Formerly, indeed, principles were in some degree lost sight of, and considerable confusion was caused by the conflicting and erroneous decisions which 'ensued; but the Courts of late years, assisted by the Legislature, have done much to restore order and congruity. An endeavour has been accordingly made to give this work a character for something more than a repository of statutes and cases, by keeping principles ever in view; and while placing the foundation of the ' decisions of the Courts in an intelligible light, pointing out unreservedly where those principles appear to have "If simplicity of arrangement be any criterion of the true solution, the supposition here proceeded on 'would appear to be of solid foundation. Referred 'to it, the 'subject-matter,' (or invention,' the terms being interchangeable), elsewhere so minutely yet variously described, admits of a definition at once comprehensive and concise-as the material result of an unpublished improvement in the manufacture of 'articles for public use.' It is this which forms the leading feature in the scheme. The person of the patentee becomes in comparison with it a subordinate idea-as the first publisher by means of a specifica-that tion of the invention.' It furnishes, moreover, the key to the questions which have arisen on the sufficiency of the specification and other points, and which, as hither discussed, can hardly be said to have been satisfactorily disposed of. . "The theory is no new one. As the compromise of a 'great contest between sovereign and people, the law was settled, on the issue of that contest, with regard to the great principles it involved-principles which, with scarcely any exceptions, have regulated the 'administration of the grant from the passing of the 'Statute of Monopolies to the present day." The advantage to patentees from considering ques-been departed from." (Pref., p. iv). tions relating to patents upon this hypothesis (which appears to us the correct one) is obvious, as it tends to remove some of the antiquated opinions which have operated to the injury of owners of patents, and it is with pleasure that we remark the adoption by modern judges of more liberal principles in deciding the cases which are brought before them. (See p. 39). The practical part of Mr. Coryton's book will, we think, find favour with the public on account of the simplicity of its arrangement, and the clearness with which the law is stated. The second chapter, on the subject-matter of a patent, is particularly worthy of notice. Most of the recent cases are referred to, and the alterations effected by the last statute (15 & 16 Vict. c. 83) are, with some slight exceptions, carefully noticed. The last chapter, containing concise notices of the law of patents in every foreign state of importance, is novel, and probably not the least useful part of the work. The clear and untechnical style in which Mr. Coryton's book is written, and the practical suggestions contained in it, make it one which may be consulted with advantage as well by the inventor as the lawyer. The learned author has succeeded in his endeavour, and has also set an example of the spirit in which treatises upon legal subjects should be conceived and executed. We have said that points of some nicety are not unfrequently raised with regard to costs. As an illustration, we may refer to a series of decisions tending to shew that a plaintiff is sometimes better off by not recovering any damages than by recovering some damages; that is, by failing altogether than by success. Thus, the statutes passed with a view of preventing frivolous actions, enact that a plaintiff shall not be entitled to any costs if he recover by verdict less damages than a certain sum-e. g. 40s. (3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, s. 2). Where, therefore, in an action of libel, the defendant pleaded not guilty, and several pleas of justification, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict upon all the issues, damages three farthings, it was held that he was not entitled to any costs. (Newton v. Rowe, 1 C. B. 187; Sharland v. Loaring, 1 Exch. 375). But where one of the issues, going to the whole cause of action, was found against him, and so no damages were assessed, he was held entitled to the costs of the other issues which were found for him. (Skinner v. Shopper, 6 Bing. N. C. 131). The action in the latter case was for slander, to which were pleaded a plea of not guilty and a justification; at the trial a verdict was found for the defendant on not guilty, but for the plaintiff on the justification. Tindal, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, said-" The statute intended only to provide for the case of frivolous actions of slander, where the jury, after hearing the merits, have decided affirmatively, by their verdict, that the plaintiff is entitled to less damages than 40s. on account of the words spoken. In this case, however, the jury have made no estimate at all of the damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's excuse for speaking the words; so that it cannot be said that the damages might not far exceed the sum of 40s., if that question had come before the jury.” Correspondence. TO THE EDITOR OF "THE JURIST." SIR,-The case of Russell v. M'Culloch, reported in one of your recent numbers, (1 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 157), induces me to call the attention of your readers to the extremely anomalous state of the law with reference to the point raised in that case-the effect, namely, of a judgment, as a charge upon a charge, giving a mortgagee's or chargee's judgment creditor an equitable lien upon the land in mortgage, or subject to the original charge. "With respect to the apparent anomaly," says Mr. 4 Vict. c. 105, ss. 19, 22) are precisely the same as Now, the words of the corresponding Irish act (3 & Gray, (p. 23), "assumed to be caused by the stat. those of the English act, (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, ss. 11, 3 & 4 Vict., namely, of placing an unsuccessful plain-13), even to the extent of including copyholds, altiff in a better position than a successful one, it may though the statute is confined to Ireland. But be observed, that the statute has not, in fact, any the same point as to the lien upon a mortgagee's or 'such general effect, for it is only under a particular 'state of circumstances that an unsuccessful plaintiff chargee's interest in the land in mortgage, or subject to would be in a better position than if he succeeded in while to pass a declaratory act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 29, the charge, having arisen there, it was thought worth 'obtaining damages under 40s.; for it must not be "forgotten, that if unsuccessful, he is liable to the S. 12) to negative the interpretation contended for, so far as Ireland is concerned, but leaving the English 'general costs of the cause. For example, in the case of Newton v. Rowe, (1 C. B. 187), it is incorrect to act untouched, although it must have been obvious 'assume that the plaintiff would have been better off be raised here, and thus leading to the absurd result, that the same question would come, sooner or later, to 'if the defendant had obtained a verdict on the plea of not guilty; for in that case the plaintiff would have that the Legislature has declared the same words to had to pay the general costs of the cause, which in mean one thing in Ireland, which the judicature in ordinary cases would outweigh the costs of the issues England has declared to mean the very reverse here. Will some one get a declaratory act passed to extend the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 29, s. 12, to England, and let us have a consistent interpretation of the same words? I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, "found for him." As an illustration of Mr, Gray's method of treating the various branches of his subject, we may refer especially to his chapter on security for costs. (Chap. 32, p. 324). Almost all the decisions upon this head are shewn to range themselves under two principal classes -namely, first, where the plaintiff resides abroad; and, secondly, where he is in insolvent circumstances, and is suing as the mere nominee or for the benefit of a third party. There are numerous exceptions and distinctions ingrafted upon this fruitful stem*; for instance, reference to arbitration upon the usual terms; award for a sum less than 20%.; costs of the cause will be taxed upon the lower scale, but costs of the reference upon the higher. (Holland v. Vincent, 9 Exch. 274). The City of London Small Debts Act, being different in its provisions from the General Small Debts Act, has produced corresponding distinctions in the cases which have proceeded upon the two. (See Chaplin v. Levy, 9 Exch. 673; Borrodaile v. Nelson, 14 C. B. 655; Castrique v. Page, 13 C. B. 458). Mr. Gray's book comprehends not only the subject of costs in an action, with its numerous ramifications, but also costs on awards, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, indictments, and other proceedings removed by certiorari, criminal information, and of rules and motions. He also treats of the taxation of costs, of setting off and deducting costs of issues, and of the modes of recovering costs. It should also be mentioned that the law relating to costs, under the County Courts Acts and the Commonlaw Procedure Act, 1852, is fully discussed in the pages now under review. We can with pleasure recommend Mr. Gray's work as a very able treatise upon a subject of great practical utility. * Pardon the expression: we do but follow Lord Coke, soaring from the low regions of law to the nubila of fancy. PROSPECTUS OF THE LECTURES C. B. To be delivered during the ensuing Trinity Educational CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY. The Public Lectures to be delivered by the Reader on Constitutional Law and Legal History will comprise the following subjects: Close of the Reign of William III-Improvements in the Constitution during that period-Law of Treason-Law of the Press-Exclusion of Placemen from Parliament-Independence of the Judges-Triennial Act-Condition of the Dissenters-Parliamentary Infrom the time of William to the close of the American quiries into the Mismanagement of Military Affairs War-Place Bill of 1743-Secret Corruption-Aylesbury Election-Kentish Petition-Termination of the direct Struggle between the Crown and the House of Commons-Renewal of the Contest under the Administration of Lord Bute-Increased Power of the Middle Class-Reigns of the Tudors-Progress of the Constitution during the Reign of Elizabeth-Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity-Statute of 1562-Persecution of Puritans and Catholics-Views, Character, and Eloquence of Cartwright-Reasons why his Writings have been neglected-Protection of the Subject's LibertyPrivileges of the House of Commons-Influence of that body at the Accession of James I, compared with its Influence at the Accession of Henry VII-Reasons why there is no good History of England since the Revolution. In his Private Lectures the Reader will pursue the History of England to the Death of William III, and from that period to the Accession of George III. He |