147 337 338 339 In our last number we drew attention to some recent cases upon the personal liability of agents to be sued upon contracts in which both the principal and agent are named. We propose now to consider under what circumstances persons, who have described themselves in contracts as agents for third persons, may or may not shew themselves to be in fact the real principals, and sue as such. The distinction appears to be between cases in which the plaintiff has described himself as agent for an unnamed principal, and there is nothing to shew that the defendant contracted on the faith of his being such agent only, and would not have contracted with him as principal if he had known him to be so; and those in which the supposed principal is named in the contract. In the former class of cases, the defendant having been unacquainted with the name of the supposed principal, and not having thought it necessary to inquire who he was, it is impossible that he can have been induced to enter into the contract by any reliance on the character, skill, or solvency of the supposed principal; and the mere possibility that the defendant may have been contented to contract with any person as principal, provided it was not the plaintiff, and that he may have relied on the contract as indicating that the plaintiff was an agent only, will not prevent the plaintiff from suing as principal; at least, the Courts will not in such a case assume that the defendant relied on the plaintiff being an agent only, and would not have contracted with him as principal, in the absence of other evidence to that effect. But where the supposed principal is expressly named in the contract, the defendant has a right to the benefit he may have contemplated from the character, skill, or substance of the supposed principal. The above appears to be the rule by which the Court were guided in their judgment (delivered by Patteson, J., after time taken to consider) in Schmalz v. Avery, (15 Jur., part 1, p. 291; 16 Q. B. 655). There the VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. By MATTHEW B. BEGBIE, Barrister at Law. Pollard v. Clayton.-(Vendor and purchaser-Specific performance-Contract to supply goods by instalments-Laches) ...... 342 COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. By G. J. P. SMITH and W. B. BRETT, Barristers at Law. The Mayor, &c. of Norwich v. The Norfolk Railway Company. (Railway company-Navigable river -Indictable nuisance-Covenant to pay money on failure to erect certain works - Plea in excuse of performance - Illegality of covenant -Nonprosecution of indictment-Covenant ultra vires of the directors-Replications) COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. By W. PATERSON and W. MILLS, Barristers at Law. Towns v. Mead.-(Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, ss. 3, 7-4 & 5 Ann. c. 16, s. 19-Absence abroad of one of two joint contractors).. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. 344 355 By W. M. BEST, Barrister at Law. Taylor v. The Crowland Gas and Coke Company.— (County court-Quasi corporation under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110-Costs-15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, s. 4) .. 358 plaintiff sued for the breach of a charterparty not under seal, purporting to be made "between the defendant, the owner of the ship, &c., of the one part, and the plaintiff, as agent of the freighter, of the other part," and containing a stipulation that "this charter being concluded on behalf of another party, it is agreed that all responsibility on the part of Schmalz & Co." (the plaintiffs) cease as soon as the cargo is shipped." It appeared in evidence at the trial that the plaintiff was himself the only party interested as freighter; no objection was taken at the trial to the admissibility of this evidence, but at the close of the plaintiff's case it was objected that he was concluded by the terms of the charterparty, and fixed with the character of agent only. Patteson, J., in delivering judgment, said, "It is conceded, that if there had been a third party who was the real freighter, such third party might have sued, although his name was not disclosed in the charterparty." (Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 844; Skinner v. Stocks, 4 B. & Al. 437; Garrett v. Handley, 4 B. & Cr. 664; Cothay v. Fennell, 10 B. & Cr. 671). "But the question is, whether the plaintiff can fill both characters of agent and principal, or rather whether he can repudiate that of agent and adopt that of principal, both characters being referred to in the charterparty, but the name of the principal not being therein mentioned." And after commenting on Bickerton v. Burrell, (5 Mau. & S. 383); Rayner v. Grote, (15 M. & W.359); and Humble v. Hunter, (12 Q. B. 310; 12 Jur., part 1, p. 1021), proceeded—“ A distinction was taken in the argument in the present case, by the defendant's counsel, between an executed and an executory contract; and it was said, that whatever might be the rule in the former class of cases, where the defendant has received the benefit of the contract, and it is probably immaterial to him whom he pays, yet that in the latter class the defendant cannot be held answerable to B., having expressly contracted with A.; and a passage in the judgment of the Court in Rayner v. Grote was much relied on, which is this If, indeed, the contract had been wholly unperformed, and one which the plaintiff, by merely proving himself to From the portion of the judgment just stated, and judgment in Schmalz v. Avery, it will be seen that the the passage cited therefrom by Patteson, J., in his Court inclined to the opinion, that but for the acceptance of part of the goods, with notice that the plaintiff was the real principal, the plaintiff could not have sued; and that the judgment was founded upon the consideration that both parties at the time of the part acceptance treated the contract as one made with the plaintiff as principal, and that what then took place amounted to a new and substituted agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff as principal. be the real principal, was seeking to enforce, the ques-perly say the defendant cannot refuse to complete that tion might admit of some doubt. In many cases-such contract." as, for instance, the case of contracts, in which the skill or solvency of the person who is named as the principal may reasonably be considered as a material ingredient in the contract-it is clear that the agent cannot then shew himself to be the real principal, and sue in his own name; and it may be fairly urged that this, in all executory contracts, if wholly unperformed, or if partly performed, without the knowledge of who is the real principal, may be the general rule.' With this passage we entirely agree; but it is clear that it is applicable only to cases where the supposed principal is named in the contract; if he be not named, it is impossible that the other party can have been in any way induced to enter into the contract by any of the reasons suggested. In the present case, the names of the supposed freighters not being inserted, no inducement to enter into the contract, from the supposed solvency of the freighters, can be surmised. Any one who could prove himself to have been the real freighter and principal, whether solvent or not, might most unquestionably have been sued on this charterparty. The defendant cannot have been in any way prejudiced in respect of any supposed reliance on the solvency of the freighter, since the freighter is admitted to have been unknown to him, and he did not think it necessary to inquire who he was. It is, indeed, possible that he may have been contented to take any freighter and principal, provided it was not the present plaintiff; and he may have relied on the terms of the charterparty indicating that the plaintiff was an agent only, being willing to accept of any one else, be he who he might, as principal. After all, therefore, the question is reduced to this whether we are to assume that the defendant did so rely on the character of the plaintiff as agent only, and would not have contracted with him as principal if he had known him so to be, and are to lay it down as a broad rule, that a person, contracting as agent for an unknown and unnamed principal, is precluded from saying, "I am myself that principal.' Doubtless his saying so does in some measure contradict the written contract, especially the concluding clause, which says, "This charterparty being concluded on behalf of another party,' &c.; for there was no such party." Rayner v. Grote and Bickerton v. Burrell were both cases in which the supposed principal was expressly named. In Rayner v. Grote the plaintiff had made a written contract for the sale of goods to the defendant, in which he described himself as the agent of A., and the defendant had accepted and paid for a portion of the goods, and evidence was given at the trial that the defendant at the time of such acceptance had notice that the plaintiff was the real principal in the transaction, and not the agent of A. Alderson, B., delivering the judgment of the Court, said, "We think that it was properly left to the jury to infer from the evidence, that the defendant, with the full knowledge of the facts, had received a portion of the goods, and that all parties then treated the contract as one made with the plaintiff as the principal in the transaction. . . . The jury must be taken to have found that this contract has been in part performed, and that part performance accepted by the defendant with full knowledge that the plaintiff was not the agent, but the real principal. If so, we think the plaintiff may, after that, very pro The decision, coupled with the facts of the case, in Bickerton v. Burrell, does not support the general proit support the proposition for which the case has been position stated in the marginal note thereto; nor does frequently cited, that after notice that he is the real principal, a party who has made a contract, describing himself as an agent for a supposed principal named therein, may sue on such contract as principal. The plaintiff had purchased 'some ground-rents of the dehimself as agent of R., and paid a deposit of 1207., for fendant by a written contract, in which he described which he took a receipt, in which the money was stated to have been received from the plaintiff as agent for R. The action was, not to enforce the contract for the purchase of the rents, but to recover back the deposit so paid to the defendant; and it was sought to be shewn that the plaintiff was in fact the real principal in the purchase, and that the money was his, and not R.'s; and although a doubt was expressed by Lord Ellenborough, whether, where a person has described himself as agent to another, whom he names, he could afterwards shift his position, and shew himself to be the real principal, his Lordship decided the case on the ground of the want of any notice to the defendant, before action, of the plaintiff's real character. And Bailey, J., expressly held that the plaintiff might, under the circumstances, by giving notice to the defendant of the real nature of the transaction, and tendering him an have indemnity against any claim by R. to the money, entitled himself to sue. And the whole Court decided against the plaintiff's right to sue as principal, on the ground of the want of any previous notice to the defendant. This decision will be found on examination not to conflict with the principle laid down by Patteson, J., in Schmalz v. Avery. The action was not brought to enforce performance of the executory contract made by the plaintiff as agent for R., but appears, as observed by Alderson, B., in Rayner v. Grote, to have been for money had and received, and was, in fact, founded upon a new implied contract arising out of the circumstance that the money received by the defendant was the plaintiff's money; and if the defendant had had notice of the real circumstances, the plaintiff might, consistently with the above principle, have maintained an action on such new implied contract. (See The Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy, 1 Camp. 338). The Court, however, thought that the money having been paid by the plaintiff to and received by the defendant as the money of R., and the defendant not having any reason to suppose, or any means of knowing, that the money was in fact the plaintiff's, it would be unjust to the defendant, and he would be unfairly prejudiced, if he were subjected to an action at the suit of the plaintiff without any previous notice of the real facts, so as to enable him to pay or tender the amount without being subjected to the costs of an action. And notwithstanding the doubt expressed by Alderson, B., in Rayner v. Grote, whether the case was well decided on that ground, it is apprehended, that upon the sound and reasonable principle that the right of the party really interested to come in and sue, is limited to with the plaintiff as principal, can by its mere execution become a contract with him so as to entitle him to sue on such express contract. In Humble v. Hunter the contract appears to have been executed, but the plaintiff had declared on the charterparty itself; and Patteson, J., observed, "The plaintiff here must be taken to have allowed her agent to contract in this form, (i. e. as owner), and must be bound by his act.” cases in which the defendant will not be unfairly pre- | in its origin, and before execution, was not a contract judiced thereby, the judgment of the Court was correct, and is in accordance with the rule laid down in Schmalz v. Avery and Rayner v. Grote. Humble v. Hunter (12 Q. B. 310; 12 Jur., part 1, p. 1021) is a case somewhat analogous, in the principle on which it was decided, to those already commented upon. In that case A., an agent, had executed a charterparty, and described himself therein as "owner" of the ship; and in an action on the charterparty for freight, demurrage, &c., the plaintiff, who was the real owner, sought to give evidence at the trial that she was the owner, and that A. had executed the charterparty as her agent only. The evidence was objected to, but received; and upon motion for a new trial, the Court, referring to Lucas v. De la Cour, (1 Mau. & S. 249), held that the plaintiff must be taken to have allowed A. to enter into the contract describing himself as owner, and that she was bound thereby. And per Lord Denman, C. J., "You have a right to the benefit you contemplate from the character, credit, and substance of the party with whom you contract." The result of the above cases appears to be, that in contracts where the plaintiff has described himself as an agent, but has not named his supposed principal, the plaintiff may shew that he is the real principal, and may sue as such on the contract, and this whether it be executed or executory; subject, perhaps, to the defendant shewing affirmatively that he declined to deal with the plaintiff except as an agent only, and would not have dealt with him as principal: and that in such cases parol evidence, that the party describing himself as agent is the real principal, is not inadmissible on the ground that it contradicts the written contract; for inasmuch as the defendant contracted with an unnamed principal, he contracted with that principal whoever he might eventually prove to be; and the evidence is not admitted to discharge the plaintiff from any liability he might have incurred as agent, but to enable him to shew who is the party really interested, without any unfair prejudice to the defendant. (See Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 844; and the observations of Patteson, J., upon this point in Schmalz v. Avery). But where a person describes himself as agent for a supposed principal, whom he names, he cannot declare himself to be the real principal, and sue as such; for to allow such a course might be to the prejudice of the defendant, who may have relied on the character or skill of the supposed principal; and would also be, in the case of a written contract, to contradict the written agreement by parol evidence. A question may arise whether the plaintiff can sue, where the supposed principal in whose name he contracted is a non-existent and purely fictitious person: in such a case the defendant cannot be supposed to have relied on the character, skill, or credit of the supposed principal, and could, therefore, scarcely be prejudiced by the introduction of the plaintiff as the real principal; but in the case of a written contract, it is apprehended that the parol testimony, that the plaintiff was the real principal, would be open to the objection that it tends to contradict the written instrument. It will be observed that a distinction was drawn by Alderson, B., in Rayner v. Grote, between executed and executory contracts, in cases in which the supposed principal is named in the contract; and he was of opinion, that as in the former it would be immaterial to the defendant whom he paid, the supposed agent might declare himself to be the principal, and sue as such on the executed contract. But it is apprehended that this right must be confined to cases in which the execution of the contract has raised a new implied contract, which entitles the plaintiff to sue thereon for a remuneration, in the nature of a quantum meruit, for the benefit conferred; inasmuch as it is difficult to see how an express contract, which NOTES OF THE WEEK. last term) on Tuesday moved the Court of Queen's Sir Fitzroy Kelly (pursuant to special appointment Fitzroy observed that he had been induced to render his assistance in the cause solely from a full conviction of its entire justice; and that after the most minute investigation, he had satisfied himself that the previous difficulties had arisen from the complication of circumstances and an imperfect knowledge of the actual facts. He then reviewed the elaborate judgment of 1850, and contended that the new evidence completely explained away and removed the grounds upon which that judgment was based. The recently discovered private instructions to his solicitor by Sanders (Fletcher's principal confederate in the frauds) was a most remarkable revelation, and threw a flood of light upon points of vital importance to the applicant. A further statement of Mrs. Dorey had also been discovered; and both of these narratives, especially that of Sanders, fully confirmed the statements which years before had been conception that such a means of testing his veracity made by Mr. Barber, when he could have had no could ever be supplied. "I have," said Sir Fitzroy Kelly, thoroughly analysed and sifted the voluminous documents in this matter, and if it can be shewn that Mr. Barber has in any single instance wilfully peared that Fletcher had for twenty years been more made one misstatement, I give up his case." It apor less actively employed in tracing owners to unclaimed dividends; in some cases helping parties to their rights; but when he could not find the true owners, he and his confederates obtained the fund by his introduction to Mr. Barber's office, Fletcher had personation and forgery. In the sixteen years prior to not only in numerous instances imposed upon solicitors, proctors, brokers, and the Bank officials, but also upon the solicitors and counsel for the Crown. In one instance, where the Bank of England had refused to pay over the money, from an avowed mistrust of the claim, Fletcher had the audacity to file a bill in Chancery; and the story which he fabricated, and supported for the Crown, that they consented to the application by false affidavits, so effectually deceived the counsel without argument, and the Bank, under an order from the Court of Chancery, paid the money-upwards of Bench for the renewal of Mr. Barber's certificate. Sir 40007. 66 At the conclusion of Sir Fitzroy Kelly's argument, which occupied seven hours, the Court said, future day whether or not a rule nisi will be granted.” "We will read all the affidavits, and intimate on a AN INTELLIGENT JURY.-In an action tried at Taunton last week to recover possession of some land, Mr. Justice Crowder, in directing the jury that the plaintiff's case had been clearly proved, spoke of Mr. Serjeant Kinglake, the plaintiff's counsel, as his "Brother Kinglake." The jury, however, had determined upon giving their verdict the other way, and, as a reason for disregarding the summing up of the learned judge, one of them was heard to address a fellow-juror thus"Didst thee hear the judge call that counsel brother?" Dost thee think it is likely he was going to say anything against his own brother?" RECENT CASES ON COMMERCIAL LAW. 1. TINDALL . TAYLOR.-2. EDWARD v. TREVELLICK. In a recent number we offered some comments upon the case of Gibson v. Sturge, and we now call attention to a decision of somewhat kindred character, namely, Tindall v. Taylor, (1 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 112). The question involved in it refers to the right of a consignor of goods to demand their redelivery to himself, as against the owner of the ship, after they have been once shipped. Upon the pleadings these facts were admitted:―The defendant had shipped goods on board a vessel about to proceed from London to Port Philip, in Australia, and was to pay freight in advance two months after the vessel should have set sail. After a reasonable time had elapsed for the sailing of the ship, and within a reasonable time before she sailed, he demanded a redelivery of the goods; but before such demand the captain had signed the bills of lading, making the goods deliverable to consignees at Port Philip, one of which bills the defendant had transmitted to the consignees, who, however, were his agents, of which the shipowners had notice at the time of the demand. The action was for the freight for carrying the goods to Port Philip after such demand, and the Court of Queen's Bench decided that it was recoverable under the circumstances. They recognised the doctrine laid down in Abb. Ship. 595, 596, 7th ed., that "a merchant who has laden goods cannot insist upon having them relanded, and delivered to him, without paying the freight that might become due for the carriage of them, and indemnifying the master against the consequences of any bill of lading signed by him." In answer to the argument that there could be no lien on the goods for freight not yet earned or due, the Court said, that when the goods were laden to be carried on a voyage, there was a contract that the master should carry them in the ship upon that voyage for freight, and, like other contracts, it could not be dissolved, except by the consent of both parties. It was conceded, however, that, by the usage of trade, the merchant, if he demands the goods in a reasonable time before the ship sails, is entitled to have them delivered back to him on paying the freight that might become due for the carriage of them, and indemnifying the master against the consequences of the bills of lading. The Court did not decide the question, whether wilful and unjustifiable delay in commencing the voyage would entitle the consignor to rescind the contract, or only entitle him to a cross action. With regard to the consignees being mere agents of the consignor, the Court said, that às such agents they might have had authority to indorse the bill of lading to a purchaser of the goods, who, as assignee of the bill of lading for valuable consideration, would have become proprietor of the goods, and entitled to demand them from the master. Although an action of contract could not have been maintained by the indorsee, (Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 403), yet he might sue the master for detaining or converting them, and the latter would be estopped by his declaration in the bill of lading from denying that he had the goods. Besides a contingent power of sale, the consignees, as the Court observed, under the Factors Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, s. 1, though only agents, would have had a right to pledge the goods, and to indorse the bill of lading to the pawnee, who would have a remedy against the master. The Court saw no objection to the goods having been carried all the distance to Port Philip after they had been demanded back, saying it had not been suggested what the master ought to have done with them if he did not deliver them back when demanded, and that the contract remained in full force. We may here notice the case of Edward v. Trevel 66 lick, (1 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 110), which was an action by a seaman for his wages. The defence was, that the plaintiff had engaged to serve on board a British merchant ship from Liverpool to San Francisco, and that he deserted after the passing of the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, which makes desertion from such ships a penal offence. The plaintiff replied, that the captain and officers flogged him with unreasonable cruelty and severity, although he had not been guilty of mutinous or improper conduct, and in order to escape from such cruelty he deserted. This replication was held good on demurrer, as setting forth facts which shewed that the plaintiff had not deserted," within the technical meaning of that word. The Court adopted this as a test-whether on these facts the plaintiff could have been found guilty of the offence of desertion? Erle, J., in answer to the argument that there ought to have been such misconduct of the captain as endangered the plaintiff's life or limbs, said "There is no law which obliges a sailor to remain in the ship, and submit to any treatment short of danger to his life." In the course of the argument his Lordship also said "The contract between master and servant is for the mutual performance of a series of acts; and if an act is done by one party which breaks his part of the contract, it entitles the other party to consider the contract broken, and to put an end to it." A second replication stated these facts-that the plaintiff was a negro; that negroes were bought and sold as slaves in divers of the United States; that the captain threatened to sell the plaintiff as a slave to certain citizens of the United States; that San Francisco is situated in one of them; and the plaintiff having just and reasonable grounds for believing that the threat would be carried into execution, and in order to prevent it, deserted. This replication was held to be bad, upon the ground that it did not shew that the place where the threat of the captain to sell the plaintiff was to take effect was one where slaves could be bought and sold. SIR,-The following extract is taken from an account lately sent by a correspondent of a highly respectable paper, and may, I believe, be relied upon for its accuracy. It will doubtless amuse some among your readers: "The Division or County Courts in Upper Canada were established some few years ago for the trial of civil causes in which the amounts at issue do not exceed the sum of 251. They are presided over by a barrister, who is also chairman of the quarter sessions, and generally termed judge, and who makes the circuit of the different townships in which the courts are held about once in every two months. . . . . The cases are decided in a manner truly patriarchal: the judge hears the evidence, and gives his judgment accordingly; and as this decision is guided more by justice than by the strict letter of the law, and the cost is very trifling, the parties generally return to their homes perfectly satisfied. "A short time ago I accompanied a young barrister, who was about to plead a cause before one of these courts in one of the remotest parts of the county of Limcoe. . . . . The apartment in which the court was held had been principal room in a log shanty, and had been divided along one side by a strong wooden bar, to keep the crowd at a respectful distance from the judge and the bar. . . . . The judge availed himself on this ... occasion of a power which he possesses, of summoning a jury of five to take the responsibility of the decision off his shoulders. "The jury having stowed themselves in a corner of the room, the plaintiff, an artful fellow, commenced pleading his own cause, and after cross-examination of witnesses and a little perjury, my friend replied in a most powerful speech, demolishing his adversary in a manner which established his fame in that region. When the case was closed, a difficulty presented itself in the fact of there being no room to which the jury could retire to consult upon their verdict. The judge, however, soon arranged this, by telling the jury to betake themselves to some quiet spot out of doors, charging them on their honour not to speak to any one until their return. The jury accordingly went out, and after looking about them, they with one consent, and with wonderful foresight and sagacity, betook themselves to the orchard, and squatted down under an apple tree, to combine mastication with argument. In about the time required to eat half-a-dozen apples a-piece and to cram their pockets, they returned, and, as was fully expected, gave a verdict for the defendant. "The crest-fallen plaintiff applied for a new trial, and vowed that next time he would not be beaten for want of a lawyer." 66 TO THE EDITOR OF THE JURIST." SIR,-With reference to the article which appeared in a recent number of THE JURIST, (ante, p. 104), I beg to offer the following suggestion:-Let special jurors be summoned to try, not merely questions of pounds, shillings, and pence, but the more vital ones which affect the life of individuals and the safety of the public; or let a verdict returned by a majority of eight of the jury, and sanctioned by the judge, be equivalent to an unanimous finding. There is no practical difficulty. The judge might deliver to the officer of the court a sealed paper containing his opinion: if the jury are unanimous, let it be destroyed unopened; if not, let the verdict of eight jurymen, coinciding with that of the judge, be a legal finding; if the judge and the eight jurymen disagree, let them be discharged. W. J. A. Saturday Yours truly, Friday ...... .... ... Appeals. 20 [Petitions in Lunacy and Bankruptcy, and Appeal Petitions. 21 Appeals. 23 Appeal Motions. 24 25 Appeals. 30 Appeal Motions. 26 27 Petitions in Lunacy and Bankruptcy, and Appeal Petitions. 28 Appeals. May 1 2 Appeals. 3 Petitions in Lunacy and Bankruptcy, and Appeal Petitions. ECCENTRICITIES OF THE BAR.-During the late Somerset Sessions, held at Wells, a young woman was indicted for stealing a 107. bank-note, the property of a clergyman, in whose service she had been living. Mr. L., solicitor for the defence, had prepared a brief, which he had given to Mr. C., barrister; but the learned counsel was suddenly called to the Cornwall Assizes; he therefore handed his brief over to Mr. P., the brief | Monday..... April 16 Motions. being indorsed, "For the prisoner." When the case was called, however, Mr. P. opened the case for the prosecution, and proceeded to examine the witnesses with all the vigour of forensic skill, in order to insure a conviction. The Court then asked the prisoner if she had any one to defend her. Oh, yes," she said; "Mr. L." But Mr. L.'s brief was in Mr. P.'s hands, who was prosecuting. What was to be done? The learned counsel, in some confusion, amid general laughter, looked at his brief, and found he had been making every effort to procure the conviction of the prisoner he was engaged to defend. His self-possession, however, never left him, and after apologising to the Court, he "hammered" into the jury such a plausible defence, begging they would take no notice of what he had been saying before, that at the end of the case the jury acquitted the prisoner. 20 Tuesday.. 23 Motions. ...... 24 25 ..... 26 27 ....... 28 ........ .... Pleas, Demurrers, Causes, Claims, 30 Motions. May 17 ..... |