To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on or before the Day of Meeting.

Henry Peaty, Bristol, grocer, Sept. 3 at 11, Bristol.George Bell, Holland-street, North Brixton, tailor, Aug. 24 at 12, London.-Robert Todd the elder, Westbourne-parkvillas, Paddington, wine merchant, Aug. 25 at 12, London.— Benjamin Kent, Norfolk-street, Strand, hotel keeper, Aug. 24 at 11, London.-Henry Beatley, Ely, Cambridgeshire, ironmonger, Aug. 25 at half-past 11, London.--Frederick Tallis, Upper Chadwell-street, Clerkenwell, and Crane-court, Fleetstreet, printer, Aug. 27 at 2, London.-Thos. Morse, Northterrace, South-street, Grosvenor-square, wine merchant, Aug. 27 at half-past 1, London.

To be granted, unless an Appeal be duly entered. James Wilson, Princes-street, Hanover-square, tailor.John Buchanan, Moorgate-street, upholsterer.-J. Williams, St. Asaph, Flintshire, and Llandudno, Carnarvonshire, joiner. -Thomas Hewitt, Ormskirk, Lancashire, grocer.-Samuel Oldfield, John Allan, and Edward J. S. Couzens, Huddersfield, cloth merchants.-William Jenkinson, Ecclesfield and Sheffield, paper manufacturer. Henry Watson, Sheffield, common brewer.-Joah Carver and Wm. Carver, Halifax, machine makers.-John Bradbury, Sheffield, joiner.-F. W. linendraper. Holmes, Leeds, wine merchant.-Henry F. Newell, Bradford,

and joint and separate assets are to be distributed in like manner as in bankruptcy.

The chief question which has arisen under these sections is, whether the deed, in order to be valid, must provide for the distribution of the whole of the trader's property, or whether the six-sevenths are not to exercise a discretion in this respect that shall bind the remaining creditors. After conflicting decisions, (Drew v. Collins, 6 Exch. 670; Tetley v. Taylor, 1 El. & Bl. 521; Phillips v. Surridge, 1 Lownd., M., & P. 458), it was decided by the Court of Exchequer Chamber that the deed must provide for the distribution of the whole of the trader's estate, as in bankruptcy. (Tetley v. Taylor, 1 El. & Bl. 521, 532; and see Cooper v. Thornton, Id. 544, and Fisher v. Bell, 12 C. B. 363). This question was also raised in the House of Lords, but it became unnecessary to decide it. Parke, B., however, said that there was some difference of opinion among the learned judges with regard to it, "although it was not at all unlikely that on further consideration they might all be of the same opinion."

Upon another question submitted to the judges they were unanimous, viz. that a deed of arrangement be tween a trader and his creditors, which had been completed in all respects, and under which his property had been conveyed before the Bankrupt-law Consoli dation Act, 1849, came into operation, (11th October, 1849), was not a deed of arrangement within the meaning of the 224th section, nor could it be pleaded as a defence to an action brought by a creditor who had not signed it. That section, it was said, applied only to deeds executed after the act came into force, and perhaps also to deeds which were then in an inchoate state, as was intimated in Waugh v. Middleton, (8 Exch. 352). See also, as to the statute not being retrospective, Marsh v. Higgins, (1 Lownd., M., & P. 253)..

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distribution of the estate among the creditors parties to the deed. "But," his Lordship added, "if we cannot take notice of that, as probably we ought not, the deed is void on that account also."

It may be observed with reference to this part of the case, that a deed under the statute binds those who do not sign it, while an ordinary composition deed has a binding effect only on those who execute it. In the former case, therefore, there are strong reasons for saying that the distribution should be amongst all the creditors.

With reference to other points in the case his Lordship added, "It is unnecessary to say whether the notice of the deed simply, or notice of its having been executed by six-sevenths of the creditors, is requisite, or to decide upon the other objections to the plea, which are, however, probably unfounded."

We cannot have expressed our meaning so clearly as for a correspondent asks us whether that case may not we intended in our observations on Watts v. Porter, be reconciled with Whitworth v. Gaugain by the consideration that notice is necessary to perfect a title to a chose in action by assignment, which was not done in Watts v. Porter, while in Whitworth v. Gaugain the equitable title of the mortgagee was perfect. The contention in Whitworth v. Gaugain was between a mortgagee who had an equitable title and a subsequent judgment creditor who had a legal title to whatever his judgment covered, which would prevail over the mortgagee's equitable title if it covered the mortgaged property. Lord Cottenham at first thought that the judgment and the mortgagee's title were in conflict; and if that had been so, of course the judgment would have prevailed; but that view was ultimately corrected, and it was held that the judgment only bound It was suggested by the learned judges as being the what the debtor had at the time, namely, the equity of true construction, that the word "now" in the section redemption. In Watts v. Porter the contention was applies only to the words "memorandum of arrange between a mortgagee of a chose in action who had not ment," and not to the word "deeds." But, at all given notice to the trustees, and a subsequent judgment events, it was said not to apply to a deed so far acted creditor who obtained a charging order, and by giving upon that a creditor, after the act came into operation, notice to the trustees acquired a title which would precould not be put on an equal footing with those who vail over that of the mortgagee, so far as they were inhad signed the deed, if he chose to come in under it; and consistent. The only question was, did the judgment or it did not appear in the case before the House of Lords the charging order bind more than that which belonged that the creditor, against whom the deed was set up, to the debtor at the time, namely, the equity of recould then be placed in a position of equality. The demption. Whitworth v. Gaugain decided that it did deed bore date in 1847, and provided for the pay-not-Watts v. Porter decided that it did; and the two ment of a dividend in March, 1848; the material points in it were these:-It recited a meeting of the cre ditors held in the preceding October, at which it had been resolved that a deed of arrangement should be entered into; and then stated, that in pursuance of such resolution each of the partners in the debtors' firm covenanted that they would carry on business under the superintendence of certain inspectors appointed by the creditors. It then provided that the debtors should proceed to get in their estate and effects," and that the monies should be held by them in trust, in the first place, to pay the salaries of the clerks and other servants; secondly, to defray the expenses connected with the trust; and, thirdly, to pay dividends to creditors who had signed; and there was also a provision that those creditors who should subsequently come in under the deed should also receive dividends out of the estate, but so as not to disturb any previous dividends. Another important question was raised in the case, viz. whether the deed was void as making the estate distributable among, not all the creditors, but those only who should execute the deed. The learned judges expressed a doubt on this point, Parke, B., stating that they should clearly have thought it void, except that such a deed is in practice common, and that in all cases of a conveyance for the benefit of creditors it is for the

cases are, therefore, in conflict. The Court expressly stated that they put the same construction on the 13th as on the 14th section of the act. The mistake of the Court of Queen's Bench consisted rather in supposing that the judgment and charging order had the same effect that an express charge of the property as unincumbered would have had, than in a misapprehension of the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall, &c. Lord Campbell's remarks on the impropriety of interpolating the word honestly" in the act of Parliament are as inconsistent with the doctrine of Whitworth v. Gaugain as they are startling to the moral instincts of common men. The Court did not deny that the mortgagee obtained a title without giving notice, but said that his title would be postponed to a subsequent title to the same thing perfected by notice; all of which was undeniable elementary law; but they added, overruling Whitworth v. Gaugain, that the judgment and charging order gave a title to a thing which did not at the time belong to the mortgagor. When the Courts speak of perfecting a title to a chose in action by giving notice, they merely mean making it safe against a subsequent assignee who bargains for the same thing. When the statute gives a judgment creditor a charge on the debtor's property, it is generally thought not to mean property which he has previously sold to another.

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After the above remarks were written we received the letter which we print below. Our correspondent will see that we dissent from his first proposition. The case he puts of a mortgage to A., who gives no notice, followed by a judgment and charging order in favour of B. duly notified, and that followed by an actual mortgage to C., who takes without notice of A.'s title, and gives notice to the trustee, seems to us to present no difficulty. Suppose A.'s mortgage to be for 1000l., and C.'s 8007.: in that case C. would stand in the place of A. to the extent of 800%., and A. would come next for the remaining 2007.; after which the judgment creditor would come in; and if C.'s charge were the larger-say 1200.-then C. would stand in A.'s place to the extent of A.'s charge, and as to the remaining 2007., would come after the judgment creditor. We repeat that the whole question is, whether the statute is intended honestly to charge only what belongs to the debtor, or, as Lord Campbell prefers to read it, dishonestly to charge what belongs to another.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE JURIST.'

SIR, I venture to dissent from your article in the last JURIST (ante, p. 313) on the case of Watts v. Porter. The following reasons seem to me to establish | the correctness of the decision pronounced by the majority of the judges.

The stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 14, empowers a judge to order that stock standing in the name of a judgment debtor in his own right, or in the name of any person in trust for him, shall stand charged with the amount of the judgment recovered against him; and having thus provided for the creation of a charge, it goes on to declare the remedies incident to it, viz. all such remedies as the creditor would have been entitled to if the charge had been made by the debtor in person. The latter of these provisions seems to me to be of minor importance; it merely furnishes the means by which the benefit of the charge is to be obtained. It is the former provision which creates the charge itself.

to the trustee, and one of which no such notice has been given. In the former case the judgment creditor has obtained his charge subject to a mortgage, the priority of which is fixed and indefeasible. In the latter case he takes subject to a mortgage which is liable to be postponed (by act subsequent) in favour of a new chargee using greater diligence than the mortgagee. This would clearly be the case in favour of an actual chargee under the hand of the judgment debtor, and I am at a loss to see why it should be otherwise with reference to the statutory chargee; nor can I discover how the priorities of the parties could possibly be settled if the third incumbrancer could claim to stand above the first, while the second was postponed to the first, but not to the third.

The real question is not so much one of construction of a statute, as a question of equity applied to the new circumstances created by the statute. A statutory charge being created, is it or is it not according to equity that this new charge should be subject to the same rules as to diligence and priority as other charges? Are not the same reasons applicable to both? and would it not be most inconvenient to act upon a new rule? Surely it would be very dangerous to exempt the judg ment creditor from the necessity of giving notice of his charge in order to secure his priority over a subsequent incumbrancer; and if so, he could not in fairness be deprived of a corresponding advantage as against an A BARRISTER. earlier incumbrancer.

MR. TIDD PRATT has written the following letter, dated the 27th July, to the editor of The Times upon the new statute relating to friendly societies:

"Sir,-Through the medium of your columns I would call the particular attention of the members of friendly societies to some of the provisions of the new Friendly Society Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, which received the royal assent on the 23rd inst., and is to come into operation on the 1st August.

"By the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, all the previous acts relating to these societies are repealed, except as to subsisting societies, although nearly the whole of the sections are made applicable to such societies.

"Friendly societies in future can only be established"1. For insuring a sum of money to be paid on the birth of a member's child, or on the death of a member, or for the funeral expenses of the wife or child of a member.

"2. For the relief or maintenance of the members, their husbands, wives, children, brothers or sisters, nephews or nieces, in old age, sickness, or widowhood, or the endowment of members, or nominees of members, at any age.

"3. For any purpose which shall be authorised by one of her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, or in Scotland by the Lord Advocate, as a purpose to which the powers and facilities of the act ought to be extended; and the sum to be assured on any contingency is increased to 2007., but no annuity is to exceed 30l. per annum.

"No money is to be paid for the funeral expenses of a child except upon production of a copy of the entry on the register of deaths; and if such entry shall not state that the cause of death has been certified by a qualified medical practitioner, then a certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner, stating the probable cause of death, shall be required; and the sum payable for the funeral expenses of a child under five not to exceed 67., and of a child between five and ten not to exceed 101.

Now, when a charging order has been made, a de facto charge is constituted. Upon what? Upon the stock. So says the act. But suppose the judgment debtor, being cestui que trust of the stock, has mortgaged it, what does the charge take effect upon? Still, say, upon the stock, but upon stock which is subject to a mortgage. It is not merely a charge upon so much stock as might remain after deducting the amount of the mortgage. The mortgage might be paid off, and then the charge would clearly affect the whole fund. "By sect. 16 the trustees of a friendly society may Thus far, I believe, we shall agree-at least, in sub-purchase, build, hire, or take on lease any building for stance. But then observe the distinction between the the purpose of holding the meetings of the society. two cases, of a mortgage of which notice has been given "By sect. 24 a remedy is given, by application to

justices, against any officer, &c. who shall wilfully apply any part of the funds to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the rules.

"A provision is made against circulating copies of rules or alterations as being certified by the registrar, when they have not been so certified.

"By sect. 32 further facilities (than those in the former acts) of investing the funds of friendly societies are given, as well as, by sect. 33, extended powers to the registrar to order the transfer of stock and money in savings banks when a trustee is absent from England, &c., or has been removed from office, &c.

"With respect to the settlement of disputes, considerable alteration has been made in the law. The rules may direct the manner in which disputes between a member, or person claiming on account of a member, or under the rules, shall be decided; and the mode of enforcing the decision of the arbitrators, or of deciding disputes if no award is made &c., is by application to the county court; and after the 1st August next the power of justices to decide disputes, under rules which referred the decision to them, is taken away; and such disputes must, after that day, be referred to and decided by the county courts.

"By sect. 45 every society already or hereafter established is once in every year, in the month of January, February, or March, to transmit to the registrar a general statement of the funds and effects of such society during the past twelve months, or a copy of their last annual report.

"This provision supersedes the necessity of the annual return, required under the repealed acts, being sent to the registrar.

"In the case of a member in the militia serving out of the United Kingdom, the society have power in certain cases to demand an extra contribution during such service. (Sect. 47).

"There are no fees payable to the registrar for his certificate to rules or alterations after the 1st August next; and I am preparing a form of those rules required by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, s. 25, which may shortly be obtained on application to me by letter prepaid. "The importance of the subject must be my excuse for the length of this letter.

"JOHN TIDD PRATT."

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But assuming that the case were one in which the plaintiff could best attain his object of vindicating his character by a trial at the assizes, the judge would have no difficulty in granting a certificate, and thus the anticipated evil would fall to the ground.

For these reasons I think that the above objections to the plan are untenable, and I am not aware that any others have been urged.

Concurrent Jurisdiction of Superior Courts and County Courts where Parties live more than twenty Miles apart, &c.]-The Report, (see ante, p. 264), after recommending that the rule depriving plaintiffs of costs in the superior courts should be extended to judgments by default, proceeds thus:

"This deprivation of costs, however, we propose should be subject to the exceptions contained in sect. 128 of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, where the parties reside more than twenty miles apart, or the other circumstances contemplated by the section exist."

retain the law as laid down in sect. 128 of the County The above passage contains an indirect proposal to Court Act. From that proposal I dissent.

When the county courts were first established, it bein what district the trials should be held. Several came a question of no trifling importance to determine alternatives were suggested. The cause might be heard either where the plaintiff lived or where the defendant lived, or the plaintiff might be the dominus litis, as in the superior courts, and be entitled to bring his action in whatever county court he thought fit, the defendant being at liberty to change the venue on sufficient grounds. After much deliberation, it was deemed exshould issue in the district in which the defendant dwelt pedient to enact, as a general rule, that the summons or carried on his business; but as it was felt that this

rule would operate prejudicially to creditors who might either happen to reside at a great distance from their debtors, or who might have sold their goods in some district other than that in which their debtors live, an attempt was made to palliate the inconvenience by enacting, in sect. 128, that "where the plaintiff dwells more than twenty miles from the defendant, or where the cause of action did not arise wholly or in some material point within the jurisdiction of the court within which the defendant dwells or carries on his business, the action may be brought in the superior court, as if

FIRST REPORT OF THE COUNTY COURTS the act had not been passed."

COMMISSION.

(Continued from p. 316).

This objection is open to several satisfactory answers. First, the cases are extremely rare in which character is sought to be vindicated in any form of action for tort over which the county court has jurisdiction.

Next, it may reasonably be urged that a trial in a county court affords in general as good an opportunity for vindicating character as a trial at the assizes.

The town in which the county court is held is usually nearer to the residence of the parties than the assize town is; the trial takes place sooner after the injury was inflicted; and the audience, especially in "small disputes," is more likely to consist of the personal friends and acquaintances of the litigants. In all these points, therefore, the county court has an advantage over the Court of Nisi Prius.

The effect of this enactment is to confer on the superior courts a concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts in all cases where the parties dwell more than twenty miles apart, or where the cause of action arose district in which the defendant lives or conducts his either wholly or in part out of the jurisdiction of the business. In other words, the plaintiff who sues under these circumstances in any superior court will be entitled to his costs, although he recovers less than 20. in an action on contract, or less than 57. in an action on tort. Now, it appears to me that this is a very serious evil. So far as sect. 128 operates, it perpetuates the abuses which the establishment of the county courts was intended to remedy. The object of the county court system was to relieve suitors from the heavy costs of litigation in the superior courts where the matter in by the enactment in question. The inconvenience dispute was of small amount. That object is defeated which it was intended to meet may, in my opinion, be obviated without any of this costly machinery. My plan is as follows:-I propose to repeal so much of sect. 128 as is cited above, and in lieu thereof to enact, that in the cases there suggested the plaintiff shall have the option of suing in whatever county court he thinks fit, but that the court in which he elects to sue shall be empowered to change the venue at the instance of the defendant on special grounds.

(To be continued).