52, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON) pill also SUBSCRIBED CAPITAL, ONE MILLION. The attention of the Profession is invited to the advantages offered by this Office to Solicitors and their Clients, which will be found to be greater than in most other Life Offices. ADVANTAGES TO THE ASSURED. 1. Four-fifths of the Profits are divided triennially amongst the Assured. In some Offices the Assured may not be entitled to a Bonus until the expiration of ten years from the time of effecting the Policy, whilst in this Office three years is the utmost limit. 2. At the first division of Profits in May, 1853, a Reversionary Bonus, averaging 451. per cent., was declared on all Participating Policies. In some cases the Bonus exceeded 617. per cent. on the premiums paid. On reference to the Prospectuses of some of the principal Offices, it will be found that the Bonus on their first division was much less, viz. 291. per cent. 3. The next division of Profits will be declared in May, 1856, when all Policies effected in 1855 will participate. In most Offices Assurers do not participate in the Profits until after payment of from three to five annual premiums, but in this Office they may participate on payment of a single premium. LAW-TO COUNTRY SOLICITORS. A CLERK used to the entire working of a London Office wishes for an ENGAGEMENT to CONDUCT the TOWN BUSINESS of a COUNTRY FIRM. He has good offices and furniture of his own, and can give fifteen years' character from two employers, and security. A moderate salary will suffice. Apply to R. T., Mr. Salter's, 168, Strand. MORTGAGE. WANTED, 26,000l., on transfer of secu rities to that amount upon a Freehold Estate of ample value situate in the best part of Ireland, near a town and railway station. The securities have existed fourteen years, and the interest (41. 10s. per cent.) citors, Margaret-street, Cavendish-square, London. In a few days will be ready, THE LIMITED LIABILITY ACT of 1855, and the London: Henry Sweet, 3, Chancery-lane; V. & R. Stevens & G. S. has been punctually paid. Apply to Messrs. Browne & Williams, Soli-A LIMITED LIABILITY ACT, 1855.-INFORMATION as to the operation and mode of procedure to incorporate new or to bring existing Companies under this Act may be obtained, WITHOUT CHARGE, of Messrs. C. & A. DOUBBLE, Joint-stock Companies' Agents, Publishers of authorised Forms, Law and Public Companies' Stationers, &c., at the Original Agency Office, No. 14, Serjeant's Inn, Recently published, in 12mo., price 10s. 6d. cloth, MANUAL of the LAW of MARITIME WARFARE; embodying the Decisions of Lord Stowell and other English Judges, and of the American Courts, and the Opinions of the most eminent Jurists. With an Appendix of the Official Documents and Correspondence in relation to the present War. By WILLIAM HAZLITT and HENRY PHILIP ROCHE, Esqrs., Barristers at Law. Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. JARMAN ON WILLS. Just published, in 2 vols. royal 8vo., price 31. 38. cloth boards, Fleet-street, London, (next door to the Office for the Registration of A TREATISE on WILLS. BY THOMAS JARMAN, Joint-stock Companies). N. B.-The above Act, (Q. P. copy), with Index, post-free, 13 stamps; ar bound with the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, and 10 & 11 Vict. c. 78, and Indices, post-free, 78. 6d. A FINLASON'S LEADING CASES ON PLEADING. In royal 8vo., price 68. boards, Esq. The Second Edition. By E. P. WOLSTENHOLME, H. Sweet, 3, Chancery-lane, Fleet-street. SELECTION of LEADING CASES on PLEADING, A PRACTICAL TREATISE on the LAW of CON and PARTIES to ACTIONS; with Practical Notes, elucidating the Principles of Pleading, (as exemplified in Cases of most frequent occurrence in Practice), by a reference to the earliest Authorities; and designed to assist both the Practitioner and Student. By W. FINLASON, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Special Pleader. Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. WINGROVE COOKE ON INCLOSURES AND RIGHTS OF THE ACTS for facilitating the INCLOSURE of COM MONS in England and Wales; with a Treatise on the LAW of RIGHTS of COMMONS in reference to these Acts; and FORMS as settled by the Commissioners, &c. Second Edition, with Alterations and Additions. And a Supplement, containing the Consolidation of Tithe and Inclosure Commission, 1851; and the Inclosure Amendment Act, 12mo., 1852. By GEORGE WINGROVE COOKE, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law. The Supplement is sold separately, price 3s. sewed. No. 33, VOL. I., NEW SERIES. TRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL, and upon the usual Defences to THE PRACTICE of the COUNTY COURTS; in Eight Parts:-1. Proceedings in Plaints.-2. Jurisdiction under Friendly and Industrial and Provident Societies Acts.-3. Jurisdiction under Joint-stock Companies Winding-up Act.-4. Jurisdiction as to Insolvent Debtors.-5. Jurisdiction under Protection Acts.-6. Proceedings against Judgment Debtors.-7. Arrest of Absconding Debtors.-8. Administration of Charitable Trusts. With the Decisions of the Superior Courts, and Table of Fees. Also an Appendix, containing all the Statutes, a List of the Court Towns, Districts, and Parishes, and the Rules of Practice and Forms. By CHARLES EDWARD POLLOCK, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. The Second Edition, much enlarged. H. Sweet, 3, Chancery-lane, Fleet-street. GG GAZETTES.-FRIDAY, Aug. 17. BANKRUPTS. CERTIFICATES. 25 To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on or before the Day of Meeting. John Divers, Talbot-court, Eastcheap, licensed victualler, Sept. 8 at 11, London.-Benjamin Bouch, Williams-terrace, Hawley-road, Kentish-town, licensed victualler, Sept. 7 at place, Pimlico, stone merchant, Sept. 11 at half-past 12, Lonhalf-past 1, London.-Robert Daniel, Victoria-wharf, Uniondon.-Wm. Bennett, Portishead, Somersetshire, carpenter, Sept. 25 at 11, Bristol.-John P. Hall the younger, Liver pool, drysalter, Sept. 11 at 11, Liverpool.-George Newey, Birmingham, grocer, Sept. 10 at half-past 10, Birmingham.— Harriet Swindell, Ashborne, Derbyshire, wine merchant, Sept. 11 at 10, Birmingham.-Wm. Comeley the elder, Tipton, brickmaker, Nov. 5 at half-past 10, Birmingham.-John Walley, Derby, boiler maker, Sept. 11 at 10, Nottingham.James Tomlinson, Nottingham, timber merchant, Sept. 11 at half-past 11, Birmingham.-Samuel Thraves and Wm. HarNottingham, upholsterers, Sept. 11 at 10, Nottingham. To be granted, unless an Appeal be duly entered. Henry Chatteris, Lothbury, merchant.-John R. Hobern and Stephen Froud, Orchard-street, Alfred-road, Harrowroad, Paddington, builders.-Samuel Clay, Wakefield, millowner.-John Biddle, Leicester, glove manufacturer.-John Parkinson the elder and John Parkinson the younger, Leicester, hosiers.-Samuel Lowe, Derby, silk manufacturer.-S. Dudley, Tipton, Staffordshire, tailor.-Joseph Asher, Old Dalby, Leicestershire, miller.-James Power, Wolverhampton, mason.-William Davies, Birmingham, shoe manufac turer.-John M'Carthy, Aston, near Birmingham, publican. Horton and J. Horton, Wednesbury, Staffordshire, timber merchants.-Thomas Evans Partridge and Samuel Partridge, Darlaston, Staffordshire, screw bolt manufacturers. JAMES CARTER DALTON, Coleman-street, dealer and JOSEPH WHITTLE, St. Helen's, Lancashire, provision EDWIN LATHAM and WILFRID LATHAM, Liverpool, WILLIAM BACKHOUSE, Lathom, (not Latham, as before CHARLES HENRY WALL and CHRISTOPHER HOLT, GEORGE WHARTON, Manchester, dealer and chapman, MEETINGS. John Roper and William Mitchell, Keighley, Yorkshire, worsted spinners, Aug. 28 at 11, Leeds, pr. d.-Newyear Lawly Dyson, Macclesfield, grocer, Sept. 4 at 12, Manchester, last ex.-John Taylor, Manchester, chemist, Aug. 29 at 12, Manchester, last ex.- William Baker, Cumberlandmarket, licensed victualler, Aug. 28 at 12, London, aud. ac.Patrick Hayes, Widnes, Lancashire, oil manufacturer, Aug. 28 at 11, Liverpool, aud. ac.-Richard Chamberlain, Uttoxe ter, Staffordshire, draper, Aug. 27 at half-past 10, Birming ham, div. TUESDAY, Aug. 21. ANTHONY GIBSON, Lloyd's Coffee-house, Royal Ex- THOMAS YOUNGER the elder, Sunderland, dealer and MEETINGS. Thomas Ramsden and William Bradford Baxter, Bailiffe Bridge, Yorkshire, worsted spinners, Sept. 14 at 11, Leeds, last ex.-John Brooks, Weston-super-Mare, Somersetshire, wine merchant, Sept. 13 at 11, Bristol, aud. ac.; Sept. 17 at 11, div.-John Parker Marsh, Salvadore House, Bishopsgatest., woolbroker, Sept. 17 at 11, London, div.-Thos. Bothell Lawford and Edwin Maitland, George-yard, Lombard-street, wine merchants, Sept. 18 at 1, London, div. joint and sep. ests.-John Stevens, Fetter-lane, cheesemonger, Sept. 18 at 12, London, div.-John Wilson Davis, Deptford, grocer, Sept. 18 at 12, London, div. [For continuation of Gazette, see p. 345]. 25 Prospectus of Lectures in Michaelmas Educational Term 343 COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Oldaker v. Hunt.—(Injunction-Construction of stat. By T. F. MORSE, Barrister at Law. Marshall v. Bentley.-(Marriage settlement-Election by widow and second husband, right to compelClaim against the widow's second husband for dividends received by her during widowhood-WillConstruction-“ Household furniture and effects" -Reversionary interest in Consols not includedShares of money in the funds, whether vested or contingent) Stanger v. Nelson.-(Will 46 'all my cousins") Construction Gift to VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. 785 786 789 COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH-(continued). The Midland Railway Company v. The Chesterfield Lighting Commissioners.—(Lighting rate-Line of railway-"Houses, buildings, works, and hereditaments" ." Land" — 6 Geo. 4, c. lxxvii, 88. 34, 36)....... Brewin v. Short.—(Bankruptcy-Goods in possession, Reg. v. Rose.-(Public Health Act, 11 & 12 Vict. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. By W. PATERSON and W. MILLS, Barristers at Law. Abbott v. Rogers.-(Joint-stock Companies Registration Act, 7 & 8 Vict, e. 110, s. 24-10 & 11 Vict. c. 78, s. 7-Railway companies—Provisionally registering-Illegality) ...... 797 798 800 802 804 806 808 those attempts failed, or offer any comment on the plain words of the 14th section of the Dower Act"And be it further enacted, that this act shall not extend to the dower of any widow who shall have been or shall be married on or before the 1st January, 1834; and shall not give to any will, deed, contract, engagement, or charge executed, entered into, or created before the said 1st January, 1834, the effect of defeating or prejudicing any right of dower." SOON after the passing of the collection of acts which were the fruit of the first Real Property Commission, including the Dower Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, several questions were raised as to the condition of married women under the new law with reference to dower; and two of them, Mr. Hayes informs us*, were seriously After this, it was to be expected that some adventuagitated. The first was, whether a woman married on rous conveyancer would contend that the dower of a or before the 1st January, 1834, could extinguish her widow who had been married after the 1st January, title to dower by a deed acknowledged according to the 1834, was defeated by an expression of intention to Fines and Recoveries Act, and, indeed, whether that exclude dower contained in an instrument executed act extended to dower in its inchoate state. That doubt before that day, by virtue of the 6th section of the was, as Mr. Hayes says, not deserving of serious refuta- Dower Act, which (passed in August, 1833) enacted, tion, whether it was founded on any supposed inade-"that a widow shall not be entitled to dower out of quacy of the word "estate" in the Fines and Recoveries Act, as extended by the glossary clause to any interest in lands, or on an imaginary repugnancy between the Fines and Recoveries Act and the Dower Act. The other serious question was, whether the dower of a woman married on or before the 1st January, 1834, out of lands purchased by the husband after that day, might be excluded by a declaration (and, as a consequence, by alienation, &c.) under the Dower Act; and we are told that attempts were made, under the sanction of respectable advisers, to enforce the adoption of that interpretation in practice. We need not say that * Introduction to Conveyancing, vol. 1, p. 306. any land of her husband when in the deed by which such land was conveyed to him, or by any deed executed by him, it shall be declared that his widow shall not be entitled to dower out of such land." The question was seriously argued before the Master of the Rolls in the case of Fry v. Noble, (1 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 767), upon these facts:-In 1827 a freehold estate was conveyed, in favour of Mr. Fry, to the ordinary uses to exclude dower, and the limitations were introduced by the declaration that the estate was so limited "to the intent that the then present or any future wife of the said T. W. Fry might not be entitled to dower." After that conveyance the first wife of Mr. Fry died, and in 1838 he married the lady who, as his widow, fund subject to a trust for investment in land, as in the analogous case of curtesy. There is some ambiguity in the language of the 5th section, which enacts that all "debts, incumbrances, contracts, and engagements to which his [the husband's] land shall be subject or liable shall be valid and effectual as against the right of his widow to dower." The object of the enactment seems to be merely to give validity as against dower to such charges as attach on the land in the husband's lifetime, so as now claimed dower out of the land comprised in the conveyance of 1827. The question, as we have said, was seriously argued, and it was as seriously and deliberately considered and disposed of by the very able judge who had to decide it. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to her dower; and after taking time to consider the question, the Court allowed her her costs, observing, that it was not one of the cases in which, upon an undisputed question, the plaintiff comes merely for partition or having the award set out by metes and bounds, but it was, in truth, a dis-to postpone the widow's claim to the claims of judgputed right to dower, resisted upon grounds which failed-grounds which, in the opinion of the Court, anybody would have advised the defendant to contest it upon, for it was a question of considerable nicety. ment creditors, but not to subject dower to the claims of creditors by bond or simple contract, who have no right in respect of the land until after the husband's death, and with whose claims even then the land is not charged, but only the heir or devisee personally in respect of the land. (See Horn v. Horn, 2 Sim. & S. 448; Spackman v. Timbrell, 8 Sim. 200; Townsend v. Westacott, 2 Beav. 240; 4 Beav. 58; Richardson v. Horton, 7 Beav. 124). Before the statute, dower was subject only to such specific charges and incumbrances as actually attached on the land before the marriage. The provision in the 14th section, upon which Fry v. Noble was decided, has not the words "debts" and "incumbrances," though it has the words "contracts" and engagements," which seem sufficient to include debts. The decision of course proceeded upon a literal adherence to the words of the act, which entitles widows married after the 1st January, 1834, to dower out of equitable estates, and declares that it does "not give to any will, deed, &c. executed before the 1st January, 1834, the effect of defeating or prejudicing any right of dower," the sole reason offered for rejecting that literal construction being, that it gives to an act intended to place dower entirely within the husband's control the effect of subjecting an estate to dower which but for the act would have been exempt from it, and which the husband had declared he intended to exempt from The 4th section negatives the widow's right to it. But it was clearly impossible to control the posi- dower out of estates which shall have been absolutely tive provisions of the act-first, that a widow within disposed of by the husband; and the 6th, 7th, 8th, and the act should be entitled to dower out of equitable 9th sections enable the husband to qualify, abridge, or estates, if not excluded in the way pointed out by the extinguish his widow's title to dower by various means. act; and, secondly, that no instrument executed before But with respect to partial estates and interests, charges, the day named should be capable of so operating to ex&c. created by the husband, it is merely provided clude her; and when it is considered that the decision (sect. 5) that such partial estates and interests, charges, either way could neither shock nor gratify any moral &c. shall be "valid and effectual" as against the instinct, the question under discussion being one which widow's right to dower. The question remains, whecould not be decided upon any general notions of jus- ther, after satisfaction of such partial estates and intice or morality, but related to the application of rules terests, charges, &c., if necessary, out of the widow's purely arbitrary in their origin and accidental in their interest, she can claim to be indemnified out of her operation, it is only surprising that so much trouble husband's assets, real and personal, as against the heir, was taken to refute the arguments on the losing side. next of kin, legatees, (not entitled to a charge on the We may here notice some other points on the applica- real estate), and creditors, or any of them, and (in the tion of the Dower Act. The 4th and 5th sections post-case of a will made before 1834, and not subsequently pone the wife's dower to the title of any devisee or republished) as against devisees. With respect to legatee claiming under any absolute or partial disposi- partial estates, and also charges which are not secution or charge by the husband's will; and the 7th sec-rities for debts personally owing by the husband, this tion enacts, that she "shall not be entitled to dower out of any land of which her husband shall die wholly or partially intestate, when by his will duly executed for the devise of freehold estate he shall declare his intention that she shall not be entitled to dower out of such land, or out of any of his land." The question upon this clause is, whether it contemplates exclusively land devisable by the testator, or extends to estates tail. Such a limitation of the expressed meaning would be purely conjectural; and it is probable that if the question were raised, it would be decided, after the example of Fry v. Noble, upon a literal construction of the act. The bar as to all the testator's lands, effected under the 9th section by a devise to the widow of an interest in any lands of which she would have been dowable, clearly extends to the testator's estates tail. The act, by extending dower to equitable interests, seems to entitle the widow to dower out of a money question must be answered in the negative. The widow can have no claim upon any person for indemnity against such estates or charges. But charges of debts, for which the husband is personally liable, stand on a different footing; and though the act makes such charges effectual against dower, it does not seem to interfere with the ordinary rules which govern the application of assets to the payment of debts, but rather to place the widow in the same position with respect to such charges as a widow married before 1834 would stand in under the old law with respect to mortgages or other charges for securing her husband's debts in which she had expressly joined for the purpose of binding her dower. In either case the debts so secured must be paid in the first instance out of the assets of the husband-that is to say, his personal estate, and so much of his real estate as passed by his will or descended to his heir. After exhausting the assets, 25 Review. The Case of Luigi Buranelli Medico-legally considered. By FORBES WINSLOW, M. D., D. C. L., late President of the Medical Society of London. 300., Churchill.] 69*. 66 so much of the estate as has not already been applied in the character of assets will be applied by virtue of the charges. The clause under consideration clearly does not subject the widow's dower to debts as assets; and the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, which expressly gives to simple contract creditors a remedy against the heir or devisee, without mentioning the widow, does WHEN Brummell's valet was met carrying away a not seem to subject dower to the payment of the hus- huge pile of clean but crumpled cravats, he explained, band's debts. If it should be held that dower is made choose his aims wisely, but he had the sense to know "These are our failures." The poor Beau did not assets by the enactments referred to, or either of them, when he had missed them. If the State would take it would then become a question in what order of prio- a lesson from him, and candidly label, not only the rity it stands. Now, it is clear that under the old law cravats which its last functionary adjusts, but the a debt by judgment or on mortgage for years, incurred whole of its criminal and civil process in action, as before marriage, (and therefore binding the widow), livered from the importunities of the class of " psycho"Our failures," we might in the course of time be dewould be thrown on the bequeathed personalty in logical" humanitarians to which Dr. Winslow has atexoneration of the widow's dower; and there seems to be tached himself. If they who would shield a criminal nothing in the new law to place the dowress in a worse from punishment on the ground of "irresistible imposition. If this be so, as legatees are entitled to exone-pulse" could acquire the habit of regarding as a ration out of the descended realty, and, according to failure of the law every case in which it is called into Tombs v. Roch, (2 Coll. 490), to contribution out of action with a view to punish a criminal or to redress a the devised realty, it follows that the dowress is at wrong, they might see that no crime is ever committed or wrong done otherwise than under irresistible imleast entitled to have priority over the heir. But the pulse, and that if the crime of an intelligent lunatic better conclusion seems to be, that where a widow is ought to go unpunished, the infliction of punishment entitled to dower out of lands which are charged as a cannot be justified in any case. The only kind of security for her husband's debt, she is entitled to have mental incapacity or insanity that our law admits to an unincumbered life interest in one-third of such lands, crime is incapacity to understand that the act is forbe an excuse for an act which would otherwise be a if the real and personal assets, after deducting the value bidden by law. Thus, on the trial of Bellingham for of the dower, are sufficient for payment of the debts. the murder of Mr. Percival, Lord Mansfield said, "The This right of marshalling the charge would clearly be single question is, whether at the time this act was available against devisees under a will made before committed he possessed a sufficient degree of under1834, and not subsequently republished. Whether it standing to distinguish good from evil, right from would also be available against devisees of other land wrong, and whether murder was a crime not only against the laws of God, but against the law of his than that charged with dower under a will made after country." This principle of the common law has been 1833 is more doubtful. The 4th section of the Dower perfectly settled and understood from a very remote Act merely deprives the widow of dower out of land period, but it involves a distinction which, though just absolutely devised away, but does not seem to affect and of immense importance, would probably escape the liability as assets of other lands absolutely devised; it will be found that the framers of the French penal the perception of a mere law-maker; and accordingly and even the 5th section, which declares that all partial code have not taken it, for their statement of the exestates and interests and charges created by the hus- cuse from insanity is thus expressed-"Il n'y a ni band's will shall be valid and effectual as against the crime ni délit lorsque le prévenu était en état de déright of his widow to dower, seems merely to refer to mence au temps de l'action." (Art. 64). Now, this dower out of the very land which is the subject of such article is at once vague and inaccurate, and it has maestate, interest, or charge. Either this interpretation incident to adjudication on the plea of insanity. terially added in France to the difficulties which are must be adopted, or the enactment must be read so as to deprive the widow of her right of marshalling mortgage debts, &c. on the personal estate, even as against mere pecuniary legatees. Another question of great difficulty is, whether in the case of a mortgage of the lands subject to dower, and a deficiency of assets, the general creditors have a right of marshalling the mortgage debt on the mortgaged estate to the prejudice of the widow's dower. As the widow is not a volunteer, it should seem that they have no such right. When in 1843 Dr. Winslow published his "Plea of Insanity in Criminal Cases," we founded on the following passage some hope that he would ultimately arrive at just conclusions on this important subject, and give to the stern and salutary but unpopular rule of law the sanction it would gain by the secession from the ranks of the psychological humanitarians of so respectable and able a champion. Dr. Winslow then said, "I am not prepared to give an unqualified assent to the dogma, that in every case of mental derangement, without any reference to its degree or character, ought the person to be screened from the penalty awarded by the laws for criminal offences. I am ready to admit that if insanity be clearly established to exist, a primâ facie case is made out in favour of the prisoner; but that because a person may be proved to be strange and wayward in his character, to fancy himself a beggar when he may have the wealth of Croesus, or to be ill when he is in the buoyancy of health-to believe that such a person ought of necessity to be exonerated from all responsibility is a doctrine as unphilosophical and untenable as it is opposed to the |