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CONTENTS. London Gazettes..

328 fee to the heir-at-law of my heir-at-law now in Leading Article

329 America''_Heir-at-law'' used in a popular and Notes of the Week ..

330 not in a technical sense - Alien - Right of the Correspondence.

330 Crown-Claim by a trustee --Unsuccessful claimFirst Report of the County Courts Commission. 332 ants, costs of, not allowed )...


Vice-CHANCELLOR Wood's Court.

By MATTHEW B. BEGBIE, Barrister at Law.
By T. EDWARDS, Barrister at Law.

Powell 0. The South Wales Railway Company.-(VenThe Incorporated Church Building Society o. Coles.

dor and purchaser-Compensation in respect of (Mortmain—43 Geo. 3, c. 108, construction of).. 761 rent-charge issuing out of lands, a small portion of COURT OF APPEAL IN ChanceRY.

which is sold - Costs)

773 By F. FISHER, Barrister at Law.

Webb o. Ledsam.-(Trustee and cestui que trustThe Attorney-General 0. The Corporation of Beverley.

Payment to one of several trustees)

775 --(Charitable gift to corporation-Increased rents,

COURT OF QUEEN's Bench. right to surplus of).


By G. J. P. Smith and W. B. Brett, Barristers at Law. ROLLS COURT.

Price v. Barker.-(Principal and surety-ReleaseBy G. Y. Robson, Barrister at Law.

Covenant not to sue— Reservation of remedy). 775 Armstrong 0. Burnet.-(Will - Specific bequest of In re Bradley 0. The Local Board of Health of Southshares in public company-Future calls).


ampton.-(Local board of health-11 & 12 Vict. Fry v. Noble.-(Dower Aci, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105).. 767 c. 63, s. 123—Compensation-Arbitration).. 778 VICE-CHANCELLOR KINDERSLEY's Court.

Thompson v. Gillespy.-(Charterparty Action for By C. MARETT, Barrister at Law.

freight- Plea to avoid circuity of action-Ad. Beeching v. Lloyd.-(Company-Fraud - Director

vance of freight - Sailing of ship - Subsequent Parties) 769 mismanagement)

779 Hope v. Hope.-(Conversion - Leaseholds)


COURT OF Common Pleas.

By W. Paterson and W. Mills, Barristers at Law.
By T. F. MORSE, Barrister at Law.

Hayward v. Parke.—(Agreement, construction of Rittson v. Stordy.-(Will-Construction-Devise in

Reasonable time for granting lease)


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judge has power to order execution to issue for the

return of the goods, without giving the defendant the LONDON, AUGUST 18, 1855.

option of retaining them upon paying the value as

sessed; and this rule may be enforced by process in The practical result of the famous clauses in the the nature of a distress infinite. (See Common-law Common-law Procedure Act, 1854, allowing equitable Procedure Act, 1854, sect. 78). In replevin also it is defences to be pleaded in actions at law, appears at pre- part of the judgment for the defendant that he should sent to be this:—The Courts of Queen's Bench and have a return of the goods replevied. It would not be Exchequer require that the facts set forth in the plea departing very far from these precedents were the should be such as would entitle the defendant to an Courts to introduce into their judgments certain conunconditional and perpetual injunction in the Courts ditions to be performed-e. g. the execution of a deed of Chancery, otherwise they will not allow the plea, or the reformation of a contract-before the successful The Court of Common Pleas, however, does not go so party should be entitled to the full benefit of the verfar as to disallow a plea shewing grounds only for a dict in his favour. If the learned judges feel that they conditional injunction, but permits it to be placed upon have no power to mould their procedure for this purthe record, for the purpose of having the construction pose, a short act of Parliament would very soon obviate

the manner. The question is one of considerable dificulty, We propose now briefly to consider the cases hitherto as well as of great importance. The language of the decided upon the subject, which will shew the views enstatute throws little light upon the point; it mentions tertained with regard to it by our common-law as well as neither conditional nor unconditional injunctions, but equity judges. In The Mincs Royal Society v. Magnay allows a defendant to plead facts, which, if judgment (10 Exch. 489) a plea to an action for rent, shewing were obtained in the action, would entitle him to “re- an agreement for a surrender of the lease, was dislief against such judgment on equitable grounds,” (sect. allowed, upon the ground that a Court of equity would 83); and while, on the one hand, to hold that the re- have required the defendant to execute an actual surlief must be unconditional tends to narrow the opera- render. Parke, B., there said, “In my opinion the tion of the statute, on the other it is difficult to see equitable defence allowed to be pleaded by this statute how the Courts of common law, with their present means such a defence as would in a court of equity be system of procedure, can introduce conditions into their a complete answer to the plaintiff's claim, and would, judgments which must be performed before the abso- as such, afford sufficient ground for a perpetual injunclute reinedy sought by the action can be attained, or tion, granted absolutely, and without any conditions. the defence set up be rendered complete. Analogous But according to the statement in the plea, a Court of proceedings, however, do exist in our common-law equity would not interfere, except upon the condition system : rules of court and writs of mandamus com- of the execution of a valid surrender by the defendmand acts to be performed, and impose conditions ant. We have no machinery by which we can compel which may be enforced by attachment; the judg- the execution of a surrender.” The defendant therement in detinue is for the recovery of the goods upon filed his bill, and moved for an injunction to claimed, or for their value; and now the court or a restrain the action, upon the same grounds as those

. 18


contained in his plea. The injunction was granted

NOTES OF THE WEEK. upon the terms of his paying into court the amount claimed by the plaintiffs until the hearing of the

The royal assent was given on Tuesday, the 14th cause. (Magnay v. The Mines Royal Society, 24 L. J., inst., to the following (among many other) bills :Ch., 413).

Limited Liability. In accordance with their former holding, the Court Criminal Justice. of Exchequer allowed an equitable defence to be pleaded, Metropolitan Local Management. with other pleas, (upon an affidavit of their truth),

Dispatch of Business (Chancery).

Bills of Lading. upon the ground that the facts alleged would entitle

Merchant Shipping Amendment. the defendant to an unconditional injunction in equity, Youthful Offenders, (Steele v. Haddock, 10 Exch. 643). The Court of Lunatic Asylums Amendment. Queen's Bench have expressed an opinion similar to, Coal Mines Inspection. that of the Court of Exchequer, and decided, on de

Sale of Beer.

Charitable Trust. murrer, 'that a plea shewing grounds only for a tempo

Public Health. rary or conditional injunction was bad. Lord Campbell,

Dwellings for the Labouring Classes. C. J., said, “If the injunction is to be temporary or Burials. conditional in equity, at common law, we have no

Lord St, Leonards, Lord Campbell, and the Lord such judgment; and as we have no analogous judge Chancellor stated in the House of Lords on the 13th ment, we could not attempt to do justice between the inst. that they dissented from the opinion expressed parties without pronouncing, instead of a common-law by the Solicitor-General in the House of Commons, judgment, an equitable decree; but we have no warrant that the House of Lords was an incompetent tribunal

as a court of appellate jurisdiction. to pronounce such a decree. .... We cannot enter into equities and cross equities; we should, therefore, be unable to determine the fit conditions on which relief

Correspondence. should be given. No power is conferred on us to pronounce a conditional judgment, and no process is provided by which we could enforce performance of this condi

WATTS v. PORTER. tion.” (Woodhouse v. Farebrother, June 19, 1855; 25

THE JURIST." Law T. 197). But in the Court of Common Pleas, Sir,-I hope you will be able to find room in Tax Crowder, J., intimated that this was a narrow construc-1 JURIST for the following observations in support of my tion of the act; and the Court allowed a plea, open to view of Watts v. Porter. If not, I must be content

with submitting them to your private consideration. this objection, to be placed upon the record, without ex

My proposition is, that the charging order creates a pressing any opinion as to its ultimate fate upon de charge upon the stock, but subject to the existing mortmurrer, or in a court of error. (Chilton v. Carrington, gate. It is upon the whole stock, viz. a specific property 16 C. B. 206). To these may be added the case of Fare of which the mortgagor is the “ owner in equity," and brother v. Welchman, (24 L. J., Ch., 410), before Sir R.

as to which the mortgagee has only a security, and not T. Kindersley, V.C. There an action had been brought to the mortgagor at the time” of the charging order

an ownership. The thing, therefore, which“ belonged by the executor of a lunatic against an auctioneer to was stock, but stock in a particular predicament. recover the proceeds of a sale of the lunatic's property, This is in exact accordance with Whitworth v. Gaugain. which the auctioneer had been employed to sell by the But I apprehend that neither that case nor any other agent of the committee. The defendant pleaded equi. supports the idea that a mortgagor, quoad the thing table pleas of set-off, (shewing payments to and for the mortgaged, is owner of only a part of it, either definite committee), and then filed a bill for an injunction, useful conventional expression, but is more descriptive

or indefinite. The term “ equity of redemption” is a setting up the same case as in his pleas, and alleging of the rights of the mortgagor with reference to procomplicated accounts. The Vice-Chancellor held, how-perty than a definition of the property itself. It never ever, that there was nothing to shew that the se accounts was understood as referring to “the thing mortgaged, could not be taken at law, and that the pleas must be minus the amount of the mortgage money, or an equi

valent to it.” taken as shewing a good equitable defence to the action;

Whether the mortgagor makes a subsequent charge, and he refused the injunction, with costs.

or a judge makes it for him, appears to me to make Before quitting this subject, reference should be made no difference with regard to the question, what is the to a decision closely connected with it. The Common- subject of charge ? Even in the former case I conceive law Procedure Act, 1852, enacted, that in ejectment it would be quite correct to say, that the mortgagor an issue might be made up at once, “without any time." As soon as he has charged it, (call it what you

could only charge “that which belonged to him at the pleadings,” (sect. 178); but by the Common-law Pro- will-whether equity of redemption or anything else), cedure Act, 1854, sect. 83, it was enacted that it should the effect is, that the new charge at once stands puisne be lawful for the defendant “in any cause” to plead to the antecedent mortgage. But if the new chargee an equitable defence. A defendant in ejectment ap- afterwards gives notice to the trustee before the prior plied for leave to plead an equitable defence, but the mortgagee has done so, the Court of Chancery will act Court of Common Pleas held that the former statute had at the time of the charge possessed, not an incum

against the fund in the same manner as if the mortgagor had abolished all pleadings in such an action, and that, bered fund or equity of redemption, but a free fund or it was not affected by the subsequent statute. (Neave mere sum of stock.' Whichever form of language you v. Avery, June 8, 1855; 1 Jur., N.S., part 1, p. 575). prefer, the effect is the same, and that effect is to give

priority to the later incumbrancer. It is the act subsequent, and not the charge, that occasions the trans

mutation. What I demand is, that the like rules of | rule applied by Lord Cottenham in Whitworth v. equity should be applied to the statutory charge as to Gaugain to an equity of redemption of land :-“A the personal charge, both being at first puisne charges, judgment has relation to the time when it is entered but rendered 'paramount by the superior diligence of those who have obtained them.

up. It will not affect any bona fide conveyance made I cannot think you rightly appreciate Whitworth v. for value before that time, for it only attaches upon Gaugain. In that case the creditor, in his character of what was then, or afterwards becomes, the property of chargee, was subsequent in date to the mortgagee, both the debtor. But the rule is not confined to what was securities being equitable, and no question of notice in- his property at law. If it is charged in equity before volved. So far, therefore, priority of date of course the entry of the judgment, the judgment will not affect prevailed. The important question there decided (upon such charge. It can only attach upon the interest the stat. 1 & 2 Viet. c. 110) was, that the judgment creditor in respect of his elegit should stand in the same which remains in the debtor, viz. the legal estate subposition as before the statute. No such question aroseject to the charge.” So far the cases were identical, in Watts v. Porter, nor did any question of notice arise : and the only difference between them was this, that in Whitworth v. Gaugain. The materials and principles the one mortgagee neglected to secure himself by getting of those cases were different from each other. One word as to the “honesty.” This scruple seems

in the legal estate, while the other neglected to secure to have arisen from the fact that the statute gives the himself by giving notice; either of which omissions is same “remedies” as if the debtor himself had executed sufficient to disentitle the party guilty of it to the assistthe charge; whence it is inferred that the Legislature ance of a Court of equity against a subsequent pur. must have referred to such a charge as the debtor could chaser for value without notice who is not equally execute without fraud. But I maintain that the word remiss. In Whitworth v. Gaugain it was held that a “remedies” relates merely to modes of proceeding for redress, e. g. filing a bill for foreclosure-a point quite judgment creditor getting in the legal estate was not a collateral to the question of priority. If so, the argu- purchaser for value without notice, within the rule; ment from which it is attempted to raise a prejudice, by in other words, that he was a purchaser subject to the identifying the moral position of the Legislature with mortgage, in the same manner as if he had had notice that of the debtor, is entirely displaced. As I observed of it. In Watts v. Porter it was held that he was a in my former letter, it is the Legislature which makes the charge by its own independent authority, and in a purchaser for value without notice, within the rule. different and earlier paragraph. I can see nothing more We repeat that the cases are in conflict; and if it is immoral in giving to a diligent judgment creditor an asked which is right, we think that a very simple test advantage over a prior negligent mortgagee, than in will give the answer. The statute says nothing about giving the like advantage to assignees in bankruptcy: notice of the prior charge to the creditor; and so far The negligence of the mortgagee is the cause of his from giving him a charge on condition of his giving disaster in each case. The statute of Elizabeth as to fraudulent possession effects a precisely similar enact- notice to the trustee, it says expressly, that after notice ment for the benefit of individual creditors. This was of the charge to the trustee, the trustee shall be liable to never considered a dishonest statute; on the contrary, the creditor; and in the meantime (i.e. after the charging it is a statute in abatement of fraud, and has operated order, and before notice the trustee) no disposition accordingly.

by the debtor shall be valid as against the judgment Your answer to my supposed case of irreconcileable priorities would be perfect if it could be maintained creditor. The extent of the charge, therefore, is in. that the judgment creditor obtained a charge upon such dependent of notice to be given by the creditor. It a sum of stock only as would remain after positively is also, so far as the enactment, either in words or in deducting the amount of the prior mortgage; for in- spirit, is concerned, independent of notice of the prior stance, upon 30001. stock out of 40001., the former charge to the creditor. Notice or no notice of the mortgage being for 10001., and the stock at par. But first charge is vital in a question of priority claimed by I cannot conceive how the process you suggest could be virtue of the legal estate or of the doctrine in Dearle justified upon any other principle*. The judgment creditor, having obtained his charge and given notice, has v. Hall. If the debtor had given the judgment creditor a right to be satisfied every penny due upon it before a an express charge on the stock, the creditor previously third incumbrancer can rightfully touch a penny of the knowing that the former charge existed, the second fund charged.

charge, though expressly extending to all the stock, After all, I suppose the House of Lords must settle

ttle would be postponed to the first charge. But how can the question between us; and the true moral to be this apply to a charge under the act? It will not be drawn from the discussion is, that bills in Parliament' said that if the creditor had notice of the charge when relating to matters of great practical importance should he obtained his charging order he would be postponed, be subjected to more judicious incubation.

though not postponed if he obtained the order without

A BARRISTER. notice, nothing being said or implied in the act con[When we have replied to our ingenious correspondent, cerning notice. The construction in Watts v. Porter if not before, our readers will probably think that this must apply equally to the one case as to the other, unless

we make a much more extensive and violent interpodiscussion has reached the point at which it should lation than that which was rejected by Lord Campbell. terminate, by ceasing to interest the lookers-on. We But we trust that no one is prepared to say that a are not, any more than our correspondent, realists; and judgment creditor, having notice of the charge when by an “equity of redemption" we understand the cluster he gives the credit, or when he obtains judgment, or of rights commonly understood by that expression-in when he applies for the charging order, or when he short, the rights of ownership, subject to the charge;: one event is just as pertinent as any other), would be

gets it, or when he gives notice of it to the trustee, and we apply to an equity of redemption of stock the allowed priority over it.

We shall not accept the challenge to discuss the * [See Orlebar v. Fletcher (1 P. Wms. 739) and Newland question of “honesty," which our correspondent, in (Id. 92).- ED.]

1 fact, gives up, in abandoning the support supposed to


be afforded to his construction by the sentence from With these rights I do not propose to interfere. All which Lord Campbell strove to exclude it. No one that I am anxious to effect is, to save the needless is concerned with that discussion but Lord Campbell expense of a trial in a superior court. himself.

The only objections urged against the plan which Our correspondent refers us to the reputed ownership have been brought under my notice are—first, that it is clauses in the Bankrupt Act, and to the stat. 13 Eliz. complicated; and next, that to empower the judge By doing so he gives up his case. It may or may not decide the question of venue on affidavits is impolitic

. be expedient to extend by statute the principle of those These objections appear to me to have no weight. I enactments to the case under consideration: in the deny that the plan is complicated; for what can be meantime it is not within them, and the circumstance more simple than to require the mere transmission of that it was found necessary expressly to enact the re- an affidavit? The reasons why I propose that the affimedy they provide shews that it is not deducible inde- davit should be sent through the foreign court are threependently from the principles of law and equity, and fold :therefore is not to be extended to cases which the enact- First, it will often be more convenient for the defendments do not reach. It would be as reasonable to hold, ant to transmit it in this mode. that because the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances Secondly, any formal defect may be pointed out on (27 Eliz..c. 4) avoids a voluntary settlement of land in the spot, and a remedy applied before it be too late. favour of a subsequent purchaser for value, even with Thirdly, the due transmission of the document will notice, such a settlement is to be set aside in favour of be secured, and all questions avoided as to whether or a judgment creditor under the notion of his being a not it was either sent at all, or sent in proper time. purchaser for value. In the meantime, Whitworth v. I conceive that there is no impolicy in allowing the Gaugain tells us the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, makes the judge to decide the question on affidavits. judgment creditor a purchaser of nothing more than In the superior courts important questions are daily such beneficial interests as the debtor had at the date decided in this manner. of the judgment, not also of such interests in others In equity, affidavits furnish the usual mode of proof. as the debtor might possibly by some hocus pocus be In the county courts themselves the analogous applienabled to cheat them of.

cations for leave to sue defendants out of their district Our correspondent will excuse us for taking the ad- are based on ex parte affidavits. vantage of the last word, since he has, if not ten legions, For such a purpose as this, affidavits are, in my the Court of Queen's Bench at his back.-E..] opinion, preferable to viva voce testimony, as perjury

on paper is far more dangerous to the deponent than


Mode of remunerating High Bailiff.)–With respect

to the mode of remunerating high bailiffs, the Report, (Continued from p. 324).

after recommending “ the discontinuance of the bailiff's

mileage fee, both on serving and executing process, and OBSERVATIONS BY MR. TAYLOR (Continued). on conveying defaulting parties to prison," proposes, first, In order to give ample opportunity to the defendant distance travelled by him in serving or executing pro

that “the bailiff should be paid in proportion to the of making this application, I propose that the summons should be served personally on him at least fourteen cess, or conveying committed parties, out of the fund clear days before the day of trial, and that it should which the remaining fees produce,” (see ante, p. 288); contain a distinct notice that any application he may ment, receive a certain graduated salary," which should

and, secondly, that he should, in addition to this pay, make to change the place of trial will be entertained by only be one-fourth

of the amount to which the clerk is the court without his personal attendance, or the attendance of any counsel, attorney, or agent on his entitled,” (Id. 298). behalf, provided that within seven days from the time based are thus stated, (Id. 297);

The reasons on which these recommendations are of service he transmits to the county court of the district in which he lives an affidavit stating that he has office are of so peculiar a description, and the efficient

“In the case of the high bailiff, the duties of his a defence on the merits, and that either his material witnesses reside in the district to which he wishes the discharge of them so little under the immediate control cause to be removed, or that some other good cause, to of the judge, that we think a strong interest in the be specified, exists for the removal.

complete performance of his duties ought to exist. As soon as this affidavit is received by the clerk of We think, therefore, that besides his salary he should the court in which the defendant dwells, it must be be allowed such remuneration in respect of mileage and transmitted to the court out of which the summons

executions as, with reference to the circumstances of issues; and notice must forth with be given by the clerk each district, the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's of this last-named court to the plaintiff, in order to pro

Treasury may from time to time direct.” tect him from incurring the needless expense of bringing dially concur with the other commissioners, for this fee

Now, in proposing to abolish the mileage fee, I corup his witnesses.

On the day originally fixed for trial, the judge will is alike unjust in principle and vexatious in practice. weigh the merits of the application, and contrast the withstanding the abolition of the mileage fee, the high defendant's affidavit with the affidavit of the plaintiff. bailiffs should be remunerated partly by salaries and He will then decide upon the point of venue, and either direct the proceedings to be transmitted to the court partly by payments varying in proportion to the disnamed by the defendant, or appoint the day on which tances travelled by them. the trial is to be heard in his own court. Notice of

This seems to me to be a faulty system. It is an this appointment, like an ordinary notice of adjourn- attempt to unite the two antagonistic plans of payment ment, will be sent to the defendant.

by the day and payment by the piece. It in fact comIt will be observed that this planı does not vary the bines the evils of both plans, and the advantages of rights of the parties as now existing by law. The neither. It imposes upon the bailiffs the necessity of plaintiff, in the cases contemplated, is dominus litis. keeping long and complicated accounts; and unless He may bring his action in whatever county he thinks counter-checks are introduced of a costly and elaborate fit. The defendant is allowed to change the venue on

nature, it inevitably opens the door to much fraud. good grounds. The service of the process is personal.

(To be continued).

WILLIAM FEAR and WILLIAM FEAR the younger, shire, draper. - Alfred Cheadle and Frederick Cheadle, Stone,

Bristol, dealers and chapmen, Aug. 28 and Sept. 25 at 11, Staffordshire, drapers.
Bristol: Off. Ass. Acraman; Sols. Abbot & Lucas, Bristol ;

Wells, Founder's-ball, St. Swithin's-lane.Pet. f. Aug. 3.
LOUIS AHLBORN, Liverpool, toy dealer, Aug. 27 and

Wm. Morse Crowdy, Alfred Southby Crowdy, and James Sept. 27 at 11, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Morgan ; Sois. Neal & Copleston Townsend, Swindon, Wiltshire, attornies and soli. Martin, Liverpool. - Pet. f. Aug. 9.

citors. WILLIAM BACKHOUSE, Latham, Lancashire, timber

dealer, Aug. 27 and Sept. 27 at 11, Liverpool: Of. Ass. The Right Hon. Sir John Jervis, Knt., Lord Chief Morgan; Sols. Harvey & Co., Liverpool.-Pet. f. Aug. 9. Justice of her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas at JOHN RUSHTON, Carlisle, dealer and chapman, Aug. 28 Westminster, has appointed the following Gentlemen

and Oct. 2 at 11, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Off. Ass, Baker; to be Perpetual Commissioners for taking the acknowSols. Hoyle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne ; Bendle & Sons, Car- ledgments of deeds to be executed by married women:

lisle ; Grey & Co., 9, Staple-inn.-Pet. f. Aug. 6. JOHN AUGUSTUS NOEL, South Shields, wine merchant, and for the county of Montgomery; and Thomas Hills,

George Matthews, of Newtown, Montgomeryshire, in Ang. 24 and Oct. 5 at 12, Newcastle-upon-Tyne : Off. Ass. of Milton-next-Sittingbourne, Kent, in and for the Baker; Sols. Watson, Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Shield & Harwood, 10, Clement's-lane, Lombard-street. – Pet. f. county of Kent. Aug. 13. MEETINGS.


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Recently published, in royal 8vo., price 21s. cloth, Sept. 6 at 11, Liverpool.-Joseph Prescott, Liverpool, tea BOWYER'S COMMENTARIES ON UNIVERSAL dealer, Sept. 6 at 11, Liverpool.--Edmund Lloyd Owen,


Author of "Commentaries on the Constitutional Law of England," Tettenball-road, near Wolverhampton, mineral merchant,

4. Commentaries on the Modern Civil Law," &e. Nov. 15 at half-past 10, Birmingham.-John Rollason and Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn; James Ridgway, 169, Jacob Stanley Lister, Moxley Ironworks, near Bilston, Staf. Piccadilly. fordshire, ironmasters, Sept. 10 at half-past 11, Birmingham.


In 12mo., price 4s. 6d, boards, To be granted, unless an appeal be duly entered.

A SUMMARY of the LAW as applied to the RATING of William Nehemiah Parsson, Gravel-lane, Southwark, mill

RAILWAYS and other Undertakings, extending through several wright. — Patrick Fenn, Brecknock-place, Camden-town, and South-coast; the South-eastern; and the Midland Railway Com

Parishes, with the Judgments in the cases of the London, Brighton, linendraper.-James Martyr, Union-street, Southwark, iron. panies, delivered February 22, 1851. And Notes of all the Cases monger.-George Nock, Frith-street, Soho, goldsmith.-T. hitherto decided by the Court of Queen's Bench on the subject of John, Aberdare, Glamorganshire, butcher. - Thomas Hake, Railway Rating, and some Observations on the Practical Mode of Exeter, furrier. - Peter Ward, Harrington, Cumberland, coln's-inn, Barrister at Law, Recorder of Ludlow.

assessing a Railway. By HENRY JOHN HODGSON, Esq., of Linalkali manufacturer.-Wm. Beardsall, Manchester, plumber. "To shareholders and ratepayers, as well as to lawyers, the work before

Wm. Hancock, Talk-o'-the-Hill, Staffordshire, builder. - us will be found to be useful, and we can recommend it as being an exRobert Wheeble Bennett, West Bromwich, Staffordshire, tremely clear and accurate statement of the subject on which it professes

to treat."-Jurist, No. 750, May 24, 1851. brewer. - Charles James William Morris, Bilston, Stafford

Stevens & Norton, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn.

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