lessee. The principles of universal justice are here applied, notwithstanding the weight of monarchical and hereditary influence which prevails; and the rules of equity and right, which are considered applicable to ordinary cases of debtor and creditor, govern the relationship existing between landlord and tenant. By the laws of France and Spain, if the crops of the tenant partially or entirely fail, whether occasioned by war, civil commotion, or an unfavorable season, the landlord is bound to remit a proportionate quantity of the rent; and in these countries, if premises are rented, and the tenant, without any fault on his part, is deprived of their unrestricted enjoyment, the law compels the landlord to remit an equitable proportion of the rent originally reserved; and in Spain, it is doubtful whether beasts of the plough, and implements of husbandry, which are absolutely necessary to enable the tenant to prosecute his farming operations, can be distrained. These laws of the countries we have mentioned, are highly beneficial to the interests of the tenant, and cannot in the least prejudice the just rights of the landlord. They are founded upon the broad principles of natural justice, and are governed by sound and equitable rules. But in this republican land of boasted equality, the laws, in this respect, are based upon a very different foundation: it is here entirely immaterial whether the crops of the tenant are abundant, and rich returns are given for his toil, or whether they are blasted and his golden prospects entirely annihilated and destroyed, for he is still bound to pay his rent to the uttermost farthing. The law, in this case, makes him no allowance of equity, but compels him to bear alone a calamity which it was beyond his power to avert-and which would have fallen with equal severity upon the landlord, if he had been in possession of the soil, instead of his unfortunate tenant. If a person hires a building, and it subsequently becomes dilapidated, and out of repair, so as to prevent him from its beneficial use and enjoyment, he must, notwithstanding he has received little if any benefit from its possession, pay the full rent; and where the landlord, in the lease, covenants to repair the demised premises, and put them in perfect order, and the tenant, upon the faith of such agreement, enters into possession, he cannot resist payment of the rent when it becomes due, on the ground that the landlord has not performed his covenant; and although by this want of good faith on the part of the landlord, the tenant may have been deprived of almost every benefit which the enjoyment of the premises would otherwise have conferred upon him, yet the landlord may distrain for the entire rent due, and the goods of the tenant can be taken, and his property sacrificed, for purposes of arbitrary injustice and palpable wrong. If the law will permit the landlord to resort to a distress for the collection of his rent, it should at least place some checks upon his using this extraordinary power to the gross injury of his tenant; and when the landlord, by neglecting to perform an agreement on his part, deprives the tenant of the beneficial use of premises which he ought to be permitted to enjoy, the principles of stern justice imperatively demand that the right of distress should be taken from him, and his facilities for the recovery of the amount to which he is entitled, placed upon the same foundation with those enjoyed by any other creditor. But no provision of this kind exists, and the landlord may collect his rent by this summary mode, although the damage sustained by the tenant, on account of the landlord's neglect to repair, should be more than commensurate with the amount due. In this case, the tenant can only sue the landlord upon his covenant by the ordinary slow course of law; no extraordinary privileges are conferred upon him, and no peculiar facilities are afforded him,

but he is left unprotected, while his goods are seized and sold to glut the rapacity of a landlord, under circumstances which outrage every principle of common justice. We recollect a case which occurred in this city not long since, under circumstances similar to those we have mentioned. A poor tenant had hired a small store, for the purpose of carrying on his ordinary business, and as it was much out of repair, the landlord entered into an agreement to put it in good order, and for this purpose to bestow upon it every necessary expense. The tenant relying upon this agreement, proceeding as it did from a man of immense wealth, and believing that the landlord would honorably perform every stipulation on his part, removed his goods into the store before the necessary repairs were expended. He subsequently made repeated application to the landlord, for the purpose of inducing him to comply with the terms of his agreement, but without success; and as the building was in a state of too much dilapidation to be used for the purpose which the tenant originally intended, he was of course deprived of every pecuniary advantage, which under other circumstances his business would have afforded him. When the rent for the first quarter became due, the landlord demanded it, and was informed by the tenant that as he had not performed his agreement in repairing the premises, and as no benefit had been derived from their occupation, the rent ought not to be paid. The landlord coolly replied, that if he had violated his covenant, the law was open, and the remedy of the tenant plain; but that unless every farthing of rent was voluntarily paid, a distress would immediately effect its collection. The tenant, upon ascertaining by legal advice that the rent could in this manner be extorted from him, and that the landlord's conduct could not be set up as a defence against its recovery, was compelled to pay the full amount claimed. And being fearful that if he attempted to obtain redress, by prosecuting the landlord upon his agreement, the ends of justice would be substantially defeated by the superior wealth and influence which his adversary could command, he abandoned the thought of securing his just and equitable rights, and paid to his grasping landlord the full rent of the premises for the entire year, of enjoying which he had been thus unjustly deprived.

This is but one of the numerous instances in which the laws, by affording peculiar remedies to the landlord, and in clothing him with extraordinary facilities for the purpose of obtaining his rent, enables him at once to secure every right he may choose to claim, and in this manner to outrage the principles of common justice, and trample upon the equitable rights of his unfortunate tenant. If there are subsisting unliquidated accounts existing between the landlord and tenant, upon a settlement of which, the former would be found justly indebted to the latter, the right of distress still exists, and the goods of the tenant may be distrained and sold, without affording him the least opportunity to offset his claims in satisfaction of the demand for which they are seized. It is impossible to examine the laws we are considering, without at once perceiving that their sole tendency and effect, is the security and advantage of the landlord. The rights, the interests, and the welfare of the tenant, are forgotten; and in this branch of our jurisprudence, more than any other, do we discover gross and palpable defects, and the most glaring injustice.

There is yet another extraordinary feature in the laws of this state, guarantying to the landlord an exclusive and important right, which is more remarkable for its abuse of justice than any we have mentioned. It is the 62

VOL. I. NO. VI.

priority he enjoys over any other creditor of his tenant's, in securing his full rent for the preceding year; and he is entitled to this amount, if in obtaining it the last article of property belonging to his tenant is sold, and other creditors deprived of the least participation in the proceeds. If the claim of the landlord is fraught with the most gross injustice, and the right of the creditor is founded upon the purest principles of equity, the prerogative of the former prevails, and he grasps in security his entire demand, while the unfortunate creditor is left without a farthing. It is almost impossible to conceive the vast amount of oppression and foul wrong which flows from this inequitable provision of our laws. If a debtor is sued by his creditor, and judgment is recovered against him, and the officer who levies the execution is enabled to reach property which the debtor had concealed, or removed, and placed beyond the landlord's power, the latter, by making a simple affidavit that rent is due him, is entitled to receive from the officer a sum sufficient to satisfy his entire claim, although it should be for the whole of the preceding year; and the creditor, after having expended large sums in obtaining his judgment, and in his subsequent proceedings to gain possession of the debtor's property, is suddenly deprived, by this intervention of the landlord, of every benefit which he would otherwise derive; and the former deliberately grasps what he never could have acquired by a warrant of distress, and in pocketing his legalized plunder, commits an act in violation of the plainest rules of morality and justice. How often do we see the merchant, after trusting his debtor for large quantities of goods, relying upon their ultimate advantageous sale for his reimbursement, disappointed in his reasonable anticipations of payment, by this exercise of a landlord's tyrannical prerogative. He has perhaps received nothing whatever from his debtor, and the very property with which he has trusted him goes in satisfying the last farthing of a landlord's claim; no remedy is allowed him, and even the poor right of enjoying a portion of that which is morally and equitably his own is denied. The demand of another is suffered to prevail over the strong considerations of justice which support his claim, and he is stripped of the property which his care, and toil, and persevering industry, have acquired, that it may go to enrich the favored landholder. How much of wrong and oppression are embodied in this branch of our jurisprudence, and what acts of harsh injustice does it tolerate and legalize; and yet it is permitted to remain a dark blot upon our statute books, and no efforts are made to annihilate this last solitary curse, which had its birth in the dark ages of feudal power. The laws of most states in the union, are much milder upon the subject than our own, and many of the more odious provisions existing in favor of the landlord, have been swept away; and in Connecticut, the right of distress has been taken from him. But in this state, where an immense portion of the wealth of our citizens consists in personal property, and where a large part of our community is composed of merchants, whose wealth, intelligence, and influence, deservedly entitle them to an equal proportion of the beneficial rights and privileges which result from liberal and enlightened legislation, we discover no ameliorating change in this department of our jurisprudence. Not only is the common law, as it formerly existed, still continued in force, and its stern, technical rules perpetuated, but every successive act of our legislature has tended still farther to increase the unjust powers and privileges of the landlord, and to deprive the tenant of some of the few equitable and natural rights which he formerly enjoyed. A few years since, and the only distinctive remedy

which marked the landlord's superior power in collecting his rent, over that possessed by any other creditor, was the instrument of distress, and it was left to modern legislation to introduce the oppressive priority he now enjoys. New rights have been conferred upon him, which he formerly could not claim; and the arbitrary manner in which they are used, shows with irresistible force how unwise, impolitic, and unjust, was their introduction. Every citizen who is desirous of securing the general welfare of society, by the introduction of a wise, salutary, and just system of laws, cannot fail to be impressed with the important necessity which exists for at once destroying the odious distinction prevailing throughout our jurisprudence in favor of the landholder, whose rights, remedies, and liabilities, should be governed by the same rules of universal justice which control those of every other member of community.

INSURANCE.

ART. V. RATES OF PREMIUM FOR MARINE INSURANCE.

HITHERTO the computation of premiums of insurance on marine risks. has been made on no systematic or regular principles, but on the loose, general, and indefinite impressions of those who make the contracts-impressions often founded on a very limited experience, as a merchant, a shipmaster, or as an insurer.

Contracts for insurance on lives are made from tables formed on the results of experience-from bills of mortality for long periods of time. From these documents, it is ascertained that a certain proportion or rate per cent. of a community in a certain location, have died in a year. That this proportion is subject to certain degrees of variation at the different periods of life. That it is also liable to be affected by the various occupations and course of life of individuals. And as it has been found, that the results of one period have been like the results of another period, in times past, it is inferred that they will continue to be so in future time.

In like manner, the business of marine insurance is susceptible of analysis and systematic arrangement. But it is to be regretted, that no records of facts have been kept to furnish a basis for the construction of tables; unfortunately, there are no bills of mortality for ships, and there exists no data from which the value of a risk for a given voyage can be computed. Premiums are, of necessity, fixed as the experience or inexperience of the contracting parties may dictate, without any standard by which to test their accuracy. Hence we find them fluctuating and various, for the same voyages, differing one half, and often more, without any good reason. Some voyages are charged at too high rates, and others at too low rates; but which class of risks it is, that is charged too high, and which too low, is unknown, and opinions on the subject would be very different. If, on the whole, the insurer get sufficient to cover his losses, and leave him a fair remuneration for his risk and trouble, he does not concern himself, to know on which class he gained, nor on which he lost his money; and the insured rests satisfied in like ignorance.

When a government imposes a tax on a community, the attention of its

members is immediately directed to the matter, to know if it bears equally, and on all in due proportion.

The premium of insurance is no less a tax on the consumers than an impost duty; and the community is equally interested to see that it bears equally and alike on the several branches of commerce.

If arrangements could be made by insurers to class their risks, and keep each class separate, so as to obtain the results of experience for a long period of years, much would be done towards the attainment of the object in view; and although there would still, and must always remain, much for the judgment to decide, there would be fewer chances of error than there are now. The field of knowledge would be enlarged-the field of conjecture would be diminished. The consequence would be, that the investments of capital in insurance stocks would be safer, the profits more uniform, and the gradations of premium more just and equal.

In no business of the same magnitude, have those who conduct it so little of the benefits and advantages of experience to aid them. No record of the experience of their predecessors is to be found, or if they exist, they exist only in a crude, undigested, unavailable form. The transactions of all past time are to them almost as if they had never been; a loose, indefinite history or tradition is all that remains of them.

Impressed with these views, and with the importance of the subject, the insurance companies of Boston have established an office under the charge of Charles Pierson, Esq., a gentleman every way qualified for the purpose, to collect such facts as shall tend to the attainment of the data requisite for the formation of tables of premiums on more certain and satisfactory principles than the mercantile community now have; and it is proposed to publish, from time to time, such of the results of his labors as may be deemed useful to the merchant and insurer, in the formation of tariffs of premium for risks against the perils of the seas and fire. Those of capture must of necessity be decided by the judgment of the parties.

It must be kept in view, that the results of a short period, or a small amount of business, would not furnish data on which it would be safe to act, or to form opinions. The experience of a course of years, and a large number and amount of transactions, are necessary to form a basis on which it would be safe to make contracts. The office has been established but a few months, but in order to give some idea of the course of procedure, and in the hope that others who have the means may be induced to co-operate in the labor, which is very great, of obtaining the facts necessary to be known, the following statements are now given to the public. It will be perceived that they include insurance on vessels only; that they are divided into three classesships, brigs, and schooners; that they include only vessels insured on time; no vessels insured for specific voyages being included. The result shows that on fourteen millions and upwards of risks, the insurers lost upwards of one hundred and forty-four thousand dollars over and above the amount of premiums received.