convenience to him, and was so permitted by the plaintiff in error and its predecessors. The evidence falls far short of giving rise to a presumption of a grant.

But counsel for defendant in error base their argument in support of the decree on the alleged agreement of the company and Munsell made in 1884, and upon the acts of the parties under it, whereby it is claimed a farm crossing, under the statute, was established for Munsell's benefit, and an easement in such crossing created which plaintiff in error cannot destroy. His testimony was to the effect that he asked the company, through its local attorney, to move in its cross-fence so that he might make an underground crossing for wagons, and that afterward the attorney gave him a letter, which he had lost, from some officer of the company, (the general manager, as he believed,) to the effect that the section boss should move the fence in and give him (Munsell) room enough to make an underground wagon-crossing; that the section boss did move the fence, and that he (Munsell) filled in with dirt and made a good crossing; that since then he has used this crossing through which to haul wood and other things not too bulky, like a load of hay, from one side of the railroad to the other. Defendant in error has continued to use the grade farm crossing near by, kept up and maintained by plaintiff in error. It appears from the evidence that plaintiff in error regarded the wooden railroad bridge as unsafe for use, because it was so situated that it could not be seen by trainmen in sufficient time to stop the train before reaching it in case it should be on fire, and that it was necessary to remove it and substitute a solid embankment in its place. It is not contended that the railroad company failed in its duty to construct and maintain a farm crossing, with gates on each side, for Munsell's use, but only that by agreement another (an underground) crossing was established and made which the company cannot close, whatever the exigencies may be in the operation of its road with safety.

We cannot conclude, from the evidence in the record, that there was any contract between the parties, or that either of them understood that there was, that a farm crossing should be or was established under the bridge or road in question which the statute would convert into an easement in favor of the defendant in error. A farm crossing, as required by the statute, had been constructed and has since been maintained and used, and the evidence establishes nothing more than a license from the company to Munsell to use the passage under the bridge. at the pleasure of the company.

The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

GEORGANNA PETERS

v.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO.

Opinion filed October 24, 1901.

1. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-all details of work need not be stated in the description. While an improvement ordinance must comply substantially with the requirements of the statute concerning the description, yet it is not essential that all the details of the work should be stated.

2. SAME when description of size and manner of constructing sewer is sufficient. An ordinance providing for a sewer which shall be "cylindrical in shape, shall be two feet internal diameter and constructed with a single ring of sewer brick laid edgewise," is sufficiently certain in its description of the thickness of the sewer wall, the manner of laying the bricks and their size and quality.

WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. RUSSELL P. GOODWIN, Judge, presiding.

MORSE IVES, for plaintiff in error.

CHARLES M. WALKER, Corporation Counsel, and WILLIAM M. PINDELL, for defendant in error.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE WILKIN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the county court of Cook county to reverse a judgment affirming a special assessment for construction of a sewer in the city of Chicago.

The only ground of reversal urged is, that the ordinance fails to set out the nature, character, locality and description of the proposed improvement, its language in that regard being as follows: "Said sewer in Railroad avenue shall be cylindrical in shape, shall be two feet internal diameter and constructed with a single ring of sewer brick laid edgewise. Said sewer in North Fortyseventh avenue shall be cylindrical in shape, shall be two feet internal diameter and constructed with a single ring of sewer brick laid edgewise from its connection with said sewer in Railroad avenue to the center line of West Sunnyside avenue, and the remainder of said sewer shall be constructed of vitrified tile pipe of twelve inches internal diameter." The objection is, that it fails to state how thick the wall of the sewer shall be and how the bricks are to be laid, or what their size or quality shall be, the only description being, "a single ring of sewer brick laid edge wise."

We have many times decided that while an ordinance for a local improvement must conform to the statute as to a description of the improvement, a substantial compliance with the statutory provision is all that is necessary. It is not essential that the details and all the particulars of the work should be stated. The object of the statute is to enable the parties to intelligently estimate the cost of the work, and also to afford parties interested the opportunity of judging whether the improvement is made according to the requirements of the ordinance. We need not go to a lexicographer to ascertain the generally accepted meaning of the word "brick." Among builders and mechanics a brick is understood to be eight inches in length, four inches in width and two

inches in thickness, and where an ordinance simply describes the material out of which an improvement shall be made, as of brick, paving brick or sewer brick, every one will understand it means brick of the ordinary dimensions and of the best quality for that particular structure.

The contention that the manner in which the ring of the sewer shall be laid is uncertain, we think is hypercritical. No two mechanics, or even persons of ordinary observation, could have different understandings as to how a "single ring of sewer brick laid edge wise" should be placed to form the walls of a cylindrical sewer of two feet internal diameter. It clearly means that the brick are to be laid edgewise in a ring or circle, and can, unexplained, mean nothing else.

We think the ordinance free from the objections urged. The judgment of the county court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

GEORGE B. ABBOTT

v.

CORA BELLE ABBOTT.

Opinion filed October 24, 1901.

1. DIVORCE when condonation of offense of cruelty will be avoided. Condonation of the offense of cruelty is avoided where the forgiven party is subsequently guilty of such conduct as to lead the condoning party to believe that the offense will be repeated.

2. SAME-what evidence does not establish avoidance of condonation. Condonation of the husband's act of cruelty is shown by proof that the wife continued to live with him for three years after the last act of violence without in any way attempting to enforce her right to a divorce; nor is such condonation avoided by evidence that the morning before the wife left the husband he had told her if she did not sign a certain deed she might "leave and take a divorce," and that he was very "cool and deliberate" in his statement.

3. SAME-divorces cannot be granted for sentimental reasons. The duty of parents to their children and to society demands that they should not be divorced except for statutory reasons.

Abbott v. Abbott, 95 Ill. App. 52, reversed.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. M. W. SCHAEFER, Judge, presiding.

HAMILL & BORDERS, FORMAN & BROWNING, and TURNER & HOLDER, for appellant.

DILL & WILDERMAN, and B. O. DAVIDSON, for appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE WILKIN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District to reverse a judgment of that court affirming a decree of the circuit court of St. Clair county granting a divorce to the appellee, Cora Belle Abbott, from her husband, the appellant. The bill charged extreme and repeated cruelty. The answer denied the acts of cruelty alleged, and denied that defendant at any time, in any manner, abused or ill-treated complainant.

The parties were married in the State of Kansas, October 10, 1880. He was at that time a school teacher, and neither he nor his wife had any considerable amount of property. They lived in that State until about ten years prior to the filing of this bill, during which time he acquired the title to a considerable amount of real estate. While living there, there were born to them two daughters and a son, the latter having died at about the age of seven years. Upon leaving Kansas they moved to East St. Louis, where he engaged in the coal business, and accumulated additional property of the value of several thousand dollars, which, together with most of his Kansas lands, he deeded to his children. A considerable part of this property has been deeded to the wife by one of the daughters. He is therefore left without property, except, perhaps, eighty acres of Kansas land. Upon the hearing the complainant testified that about six years prior to that time he struck her twice in anger, and that