Central Railroad Co. v. City of Champaign, 163 id. 524; Rich v. City of Chicago, 187 id. 396.

It is, however, insisted by appellant that section 56 of the Local Improvement act of 1897 (Laws of 1897, p. 121,) confers such power. That section is as follows: "The judgments of the court shall be final as to all the issues involved, and the proceedings in said cause shall be subject to review by appeal or writ of error as hereinafter provided, and not otherwise: Provided, however, that by mutual consent the same may be vacated or modified at a subsequent term, except as hereinafter provided. Such judgments shall have the effect of several judgments as to each tract or parcel of land assessed, and no appeal from any such judgment or writ of error shall invalidate or delay the judgments, except as to the property concerning which the appeal or writ of error is taken. Such judgments shall be a lien upon the property assessed from the date thereof, to the same extent and of equal force and validity as a lien for the general taxes, for a period of five years, if such assessment is payable in a single sum; if payable by installments, then until five years after the last installment comes due. Nothing in this section contained shall interfere with the right of a petitioner to dismiss its proceedings, and for that purpose to vacate such judgment at its election at any time. before commencing the actual collection of such assessment: Provided, that after the contract for the work shall have been entered into, or the bonds mentioned in this act issued, no judgment shall be vacated or modified or any petition dismissed at a term subsequent to that at which the judgment was rendered, nor the collection of the assessment be in any way stayed or delayed by the council or board of trustees or board of local improvements, or any officer of the municipality, without the consent of the contractor and bondholder."

In McChesney v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 423, we held that "the true construction of these provisions of the section

is, that the judgments confirming assessments of benefits are final unless reversed on appeal or by writ of error, or vacated or modified by mutual consent of the parties thereto, or the petitioner shall determine to abandon the construction of the proposed improvement and dismiss the proceedings under the ordinance, in which latter event the petitioner may procure such judgments to be vacated." The only evidence of an abandonment of the scheme to pave with wooden blocks was the passage of the new ordinance and the institution of the new proceeding to pave with asphalt and the vacation of the former judgment after the rendition of the new one. Whether such evidence would be sufficient to authorize the second proceedings where both were had under the act of 1897 we need not inquire, for the reason that the proceedings and judgment referred to in section 56 are clearly such as are had and taken under such act and not under the former statute. Section 56 does not purport to confer power to vacate a judgment not rendered under the act of 1897. In the case at bar the former proceedings and judgment attempted to be set aside were had and taken under the former statute, under which, as we have uniformly held, the court lost jurisdiction, and the judgment became final and conclusive after the term at which it was rendered. The same was true in Rich v. City of Chicago, supra. While the judgments attempted to be vacated may have been rendered after the act of 1897 came in force, still, the proceedings having been begun prior thereto, the former act continued to apply by virtue of the express provision of section 99 of said act of 1897. It does not appear that said section 56 was adverted to by court or counsel in the Rich case, but had it been, the result must have been the same, for the reasons stated.

We are of the opinion that the former judgment was a bar, and the court below committed no error in so deciding. The judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

GEORGE DURDEN

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Opinion filed October 24, 1901.

1. COURTS-one judge cannot delegate judicial authority to another. The fact that circuit judges may hold court for each other and perform each other's duties does not authorize one judge to allow another to finish the performance of a duty already entered upon by the former, where such duty involves the exercise of judicial deliberation upon facts known to the former and not to the latter.

2. CRIMINAL LAW-permitting another judge to hear arguments and give instructions is reversible error. A prisoner on trial for his life is entitled to the judgment of the judge who has heard the evidence and conducted the trial, and it is reversible error for the judge who has heard the evidence and part of the argument to leave the bench and permit another judge of the same circuit who has not heard the evidence to hear the remaining arguments, give the instructions and receive the verdict.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Pulaski county; the Hon. A. K. VICKERS, Judge, presiding.

This is an indictment, returned at the October term, A. D. 1900, of the circuit court of Pulaski county by a grand jury, chosen, selected and sworn in and for that county, against the plaintiff in error, George Durden, for the murder of one Marshall Hileman on the 26th day of June, A. D. 1900. The case was tried at the January term, 1901, of said court. The jury returned a verdict finding plaintiff in error guilty as charged in the indictment, and fixing his punishment at death. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and on February 25, 1901, the court entered judgment upon the verdict of the jury, and passed sentence upon plaintiff in error pursuant to said verdict, and entered an order that he be executed on Friday, the 12th day of April, A. D. 1901. This court, at its April term, 1901, ordered that a writ of error be issued, and that the same be made a supersedeas.

H. A. MASON, L. G. CARTER, and H. G. CARTER, for plaintiff in error.

H. J. HAMLIN, Attorney General, and GEORGE E. MARTIN, State's Attorney, (B. D. MONROE, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE MAGRUDER delivered the opinion of the court:

Many errors are assigned upon this record, but we deem it necessary to consider only one.

The trial of the case commenced on January 21, 1901, before the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts, one of the judges of the first judicial circuit of the State of Illinois, who heard all the evidence in the case, and the opening argument for the prosecution, and a portion of the arguments of counsel for plaintiff in error, and presided at the trial and conducted the same up to and until the close of the 30th day of January, 1901. On the 30th day of January, 1901, the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts vacated the bench as presiding judge, and left the county of Pulaski; and thereafter took no part in the trial of the cause, nor in any of the other proceedings therein, until the hearing of the motion for a new trial on February 25, 1901, which he overruled. This vacation of the bench was without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff in error or his counsel, or either of them.

On January 31, 1901, the Hon. A. K. Vickers, another one of the judges of the first judicial circuit of the State, took the place of the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts on the bench, and thereafter acted as the presiding judge in the case against the protest of the plaintiff in error. Hon. A. K. Vickers thereafter heard the closing argument of one of the counsel for plaintiff in error, and the closing argument of the prosecution, and gave all the instructions to the jury which were given, and refused certain

instructions offered by the plaintiff in error. He also received the verdict of the jury, and adjourned court until February 4, 1901.

There are two bills of exceptions in the cause, one signed by the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts, showing the proceedings taken before him, including the evidence and the overruling of the motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. Another bill of exceptions is signed by the Hon. A. K. Vickers, showing the proceedings taken before him, including the instructions given to the jury and the instructions refused, and also the return of the verdict by the jury.

The bill of exceptions signed by the Hon. A. K. Vickers shows, among other things, the following proceedings, to-wit:

"Be it remembered that, during the progress of this trial and on the 31st day of January, A. D. 1901, the Hon. A. K. Vickers, judge, takes the place of the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts on the bench, said exchange of judges occurring during the closing argument on behalf of the defendant, and said Hon. A. K. Vickers, judge, so presiding, made the following rulings, during the progress of said trial, that is to say: * * *Now, on this day, 31st day of January, A. D. 1901, being the tenth day since the commencement of the trial of this case, comes the defendant and objects to the action of the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts this day, without the consent of this defendant or any notice to him, vacating the bench at this stage of the proceedings and placing thereon another judge to preside in his place; and he also objects to the court reporter absenting himself with his notes of the evidence. in this case without the knowledge or consent of this defendant; and exception is hereby taken by George Durden, defendant in this case."

The bill of exceptions shows the order of court overruling defendant's objections, as above made, and exceptions thereto. It then recites that the trial proceeded