and 100 New York State Reporter the 14th day of March, 1873, the legislature passed an act validating and confirming the attempted reincorporation of the village and all the proceedings had for that purpose, the election of the village officers pursuant thereto, and all the acts and proceedings of the board of trustees and other officers so elected. This act, it must be conceded, effectually remedied all irregularities in the election of June 25th, provided there was nothing in the act itself which was violative of the fundamental law of the land. It is insisted, however, that the act embraces subjects other than the one expressed in its title, and that for that reason it is repugnant to section 16 of article 3 of the state constitution, which declares that "no private or local bill, which may be passed by the legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." But what these different subjects are is not made entirely clear, nor are we able to discover, upon careful examination of the various provisions of the act, any foundation for the respondent's contention. The act is entitled "An act in relation to the village of Brockport" and it contains seven sections. The first two relate to the election, compensation, and duties of the assessors of the village; the third authorizes the trustees, under certain restrictions and limitations, to raise and expend a highway tax; the fourth empowers the trustees to license, regulate, and prevent the public use of, or keeping for public use or hire, billiard tables or ball alleys within the village; the fifth, as has already been stated, confirms and validates the special election; the sixth provides for the election of a police justice, and defines the jurisdiction and power of that official; and the seventh declares that the act shall take effect immediately. Thus it will be seen that each separate provision of the act does relate to the village of Brockport, and consequently the act in its entirety is one which fully justifies and is correctly defined by its caption or title. It is no part of the duty of courts to scrutinize too closely the details of a bill, in order to discover therein some constitutional infirmity. On the contrary, they should indulge every presumption in favor of the validity of legislative acts, and endeavor to uphold them until convinced that there is a substantial departure from the organic law; and where, as in this case, the title of a local bill expresses a general purpose or object, all matters fairly and reasonably connected therewith, and all measures which will or may facilitate the accomplishment of such purpose or object, are properly incorporated into the act, and are germane to the title. In short, it is not necessary that the title should specify each particular subject, if the general object as declared is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the various provisions of such a bill. People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 N. Y. 557. We are of the opinion that the subject of an act as expressed in the title, "An act in relation to the village of Brockport," properly relates to and embraces the various objects accomplished by the act in question, because each and every one of those objects is quite germane to the general subject; and, if this be so, it necessarily follows that the act does not violate either the letter or the spirit of the constitution in the respect claimed. Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 N. Y. 50, 27 N. E. 973. Some question is also raised as to the right and power of the legis lature to create local magistrates and to confer upon them criminal jurisdiction, but that the legislature does possess such power is too well settled to justify any discussion of the subject. Curtin v. Bartin, 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093; People v. Whitney, 32 App. Div. 144, 52 N. Y. Supp. 695. And we therefore proceed to the consideration of the only remaining question, and the one which is not altogether free from embarrassment. It is contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that, even admitting the entire validity of the relator's claim, and that it was the duty of the respondents to audit and allow the same, a review of their proceedings cannot be accomplished by certiorari, for the reason that when the writ herein was issued the town board had adjourned, and consequently had lost jurisdiction of the proceedings; and, in so far as the writ seeks to review the action of the respondents in auditing and rejecting so much of the relator's claim as relates to the bills of the police justice and policemen of the village of Brockport presented for audit in the year 1899, we think this contention is well founded; for, as to those accounts, it appears that the respondents. have in all respects complied with the requirements of section 170 of the town law (Laws 1890, c. 569), which provides that: "Boards of town auditors, shall annually make brief abstracts of the names of all persons who have presented to them accounts to be audited, the amounts claimed by each of such persons, and the amounts finally audited by them respectively, and shall deliver such abstracts to the clerk of the board of supervisors, and the clerk shall cause the same to be printed with the statements required to be printed by him." And, having done this, the board thereby lost all control over and jurisdiction of the matter. In discussing this precise question it was said by the court of appeals in a somewhat recent case, that not only is the issuing of such a writ discretionary, "but, to be effectual, it must be prosecuted while the board of audit has jurisdiction of the proceedings. Its jurisdiction of accounts presented for audit terminates with the delivery to the supervisor of the schedule of audited accounts, and after that has been done a certiorari directed to the board would be fruitless. * The remedy by certiorari therefore must be * 營 taken, if at all, before the delivery of the certificate of audited accounts to the supervisor. Opinion of Andrews, J., in Osterhoudt * 營 v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 230. It is true that this expression of opinion was incidental to the real question at issue in the case just cited, and that since the decision of that case the appellate division of the Third department, by a divided court, has applied a different rule. People v. Board of Auditors of Town of Champlain, 33 App. Div. 277, 53 N. Y. Supp. 739. The weight of authority, however, seems to be decidedly in accord with the doctrine enunciated by Judge Andrews in the Osterhoudt Case. People v. Auditors of Town of Delhi, 5 Hun, 617; People v. Auditors of Town of Hannibal, 65 Hun, 414, 20 N. Y. Supp. 165; People v. Town of Pelham, 74 Hun, 83, 26 N. Y. Supp. 122; People v. Board of Auditors of Town of Hempstead, 49 App. Div. 4, 63 N. Y. Supp. 114. But as respects the bills presented to the town board in 1898 the case is somewhat different. It is not pretended that any abstract of these bills was ever delivered to the board of and 100 New York State Reporter supervisors. A schedule of claims audited by the town board that year was presented to the board of supervisors, it is true, but it contained no mention of or references to those here in dispute. Now, the statute requires that the town board shall annually make and deliver to the clerk of the board of supervisors abstracts of the names of all persons who have presented claims to be audited, the amounts claimed by each of such persons, and the amounts finally audited by them, respectively; and it is conceded that the bills of the police justice and policemen of the village of Brockport for 1897 and 1898 were presented to the town board for audit, and that they were examined and disallowed. They were, therefore, audited, within the meaning of that term. People v. Barnes, 114 N. Y. 317, 20 N. E. 609, 21 N. E. 739. And the fact of their audit and rejection should have been reported to the board of supervisors. Having failed to comply with the requirements of the statute in this respect, it seems to us that, within the rule laid down in the Osterhoudt Case, the respondents' jurisdiction as to this portion of the relator's claim has not terminated, and consequently that their action is to that extent subject to review and correction by certiorari. Our conclusion, therefore, is that as to the portion of the relator's claim last referred to the determination of the board of town auditors should be reversed, and the claim, to that extent, allowed, with costs, and that as to the remaining portion of the claim the writ should be dismissed. Determination of the board of town auditors rejecting that portion of relator's claim presented for audit in 1898 reversed, and the same adjusted and allowed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and as to that portion of relator's claim presented in 1899 the writ is dismissed. MCLENNAN and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. SPRING, J. (dissenting). I do not believe the relator is remediless because the town board happened to adjourn. I think section 2125 of the Code is applicable, and the reversal should relate to the claims of both years. LAUGHLIN, J., concurs. (52 App. Div. 625.) MURGATROYD v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. (two cases). (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department. June 22, 1900.) AGENCY-EVIDENCE OF AUTHORITY. The fact that a gas company authorized a collector to connect a meter with its service was some evidence of his authority to put a meter in the premises of plaintiff's neighbor, notwithstanding his denial of such authority; and therefore the question whether he acted within the scope of his authority was properly submitted to the jury, in an action for damages caused by leakage from the meter into plaintiff's apartments. Motion for reargument. Denied. For former opinions, see 64 N. Y. Supp. 1144. Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and BARTLETT, WOODWARD, HIRSCHBERG, and JENKS, JJ. PER CURIAM. The motion for a reargument in these cases is based upon suppositions which have no foundation in fact. The record and briefs, with the cases cited, were carefully examined and considered. The evidence showed that gas manufactured by the defendant leaked into the plaintiffs' apartments from a meter put into a neighbor's premises by one of the defendant's collectors. We were of the opinion that the fact that the company had placed it in the collector's power to connect a meter with their service was some evidence of his authority to do what he did, notwithstanding his denial that he had any such authority, and that hence the question whether he acted within the scope of his employment was properly left to the jury by Mr. Justice Gaynor. Motion for reargument denied. (31 Misc. Rep. 674.) MCNULTY v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO. (Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County. June, 1900.) 1. STREET RAILROADS-FARES-AMOUNT CHARGEABLE. Laws 1884, c. 252, § 13, as amended by Laws 1897, c. 688, § 101, provides that no corporation constructing and operating a railroad under such act shall charge any more than five cents fare on any line owned or operated by it within the limits of any incorporated city. Held, that a street-railway company organized under such act could not charge more than a five-cent fare within the city limits, whether it operated its own lines, or leased other lines, whose owners had a right to charge a higher rate. 2. SAME-PARTIES-PRIVATE CITIZEN-RIGHT TO REPRESENT PUBLIC. A private citizen may not maintain an action to enjoin a street-car company from charging an excessive fare, since he suffers no injury not in common with the whole people; the remedy being by Code Civ. Proc. § 1798, in an action by the attorney general to vacate its charter. Action by Peter H. McNulty against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. Motion for injunction. Denied. Ward & Baldwin, for plaintiff. Sheehan & Collin, for defendant. DICKEY, J. The claim of the plaintiff that the defendant, a street surface railroad corporation, incorporated in 1887, is not entitled to charge more than five cents fare for one continuous ride within the limits of the city of New York from any one point on its road, or on any road, line, or branch operated by it or under its control, to any other point thereof, seems to me to be well founded, and the charging of a ten-cent fare over parts of the line of road operated by it is an illegal act, and without warrant in law, and contrary to the prohibition of the law under which it was organized and under which it is being operated. The defendant company was incorporated under chapter 252 of the Laws of 1884,-the general surface railroad act. Its very existence, and all its rights and privileges as a public carrier, are regulated and restrained by that act and subse and 100 New York State Reporter quent amendments thereto. Section 13 of that act regulates fares to be charged. Amendments were made by chapter 565, § 101, Laws 1890; by chapter 676, § 101, Laws 1892; and by chapter 688, § 101, Laws 1897; and the provisions of the railroad law, as now in force, regulating rate of fares to be charged by this defendant, read as follows: "Sec. 101. Rate of Fare. No corporation constructing and operating a railroad under the provisions of this article, or of chapter two hundred and fiftytwo of the Laws of Eighteen Hundred and Eighty-Four, shall charge any passenger more than five cents for one continuous ride from any point on its road, or on any road, line or branch operated by it, or under its control, to any other point thereof, or any connecting branch thereof, within the limits of any incorporated city or village. Not more than one fare shall be charged within the limits of any such city or village, for passage over the main line of road and any branch or extension thereof if the right to construct such branch or extension shall have been acquired under the provisions of such chapter or of this article; except that in any city of the third class, or incorporated village, it shall be lawful for such corporation to charge and collect as a maximum rate of fare for each passenger ten cents, where said passenger is carried in a car which overcomes an elevation of at least four hundred and fifty feet within a distance of one and a half miles. This section shall not apply to any part of any road constructed prior to May six, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, and then in operation, unless the corporation owning the same shall have acquired the right to extend such road, or to construct branches thereof under such chapter, or shall acquire such right under the provisions of this article, in which event its rate of fare shall not exceed its authorized rate prior to such extension. The legislature expressly reserves the right to regulate and reduce the rate of fare on any railroad constructed and operated wholly or in part under such chapter or under the provisions of this article." As this surface railroad act confers many rights and privileges on corporations formed under its provisions, so it contains a few restrictions; and the burdens of these limitations go with the benefits conferred, and belong to the operation of the road,-the part limiting the rate of fare to be charged, just as much as the valuable rights given to the corporation by the act. To my mind, it is the clear intent of the street surface railroad law to limit fare to five cents for a continuous ride from any one point of a city to any other point in the same city, without regard to whether in the operation of the road the company confines its operations to its own line, or operates leased lines in addition to its own in that territory. The statute has to do with the operated road or roads within the territory by any one company, and is not concerned with present or former ownership or name of the corporation, or act under which the corporation was formed. The exception in the act from limitations to fivecent fares of roads constructed prior to May 6, 1884, is plainly applicable only to such roads as were in existence then, and are now operated by their owners, and does not apply to lessees, such as this defendant, which is in business under its own charter, with all the benefits thereof, and subject as well to the limitations thereof, including the five-cent fare. The fact that some of the leased lines were formerly operated by others, who had rights because of the incorporation of the companies under a different legislative act, does not permit this defendant, which is governed by the street surface railroad act in its operations, to disregard the mandate of the act under which it was created,-that it must not charge more than a five |