discretion and wisdom of the state a wide latitude as far as interference by this court is concerned. . . The rule, therefore, is not a substitute for municipal law; it only prescribes that that law have the attribute of equality of operation, and equality of operation does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to their relation. In some circumstances it may not tax A more than B, but if A be of a different trade or profession than B, it may. And in matters not of taxation, if A be a different kind of corporation than B, it may subject A to a different rule of responsibility to servants than B. . . . . In other words, the state may distinguish, select, and classify objects of legislation,

objects for taxation, leaving other classes exempt or taxed at a different rate or in a different manner, is unquestionable. Such power has been exercised by all governments from the earliest times. It is subject, however, to the qualification that the classification must not be so purely arbitrary as to have no reason, not even an insufficient or merely plausible reason, to justify it": Estate of Keeney, 194 N. Y. 281, 87 N. E. 428, affirmed, Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 56 L. Ed. Sup. Ct. Rep. 105.

32

To the same effect, see the able presentation of the subject in Estate of McKennan (S. D.), 130 N. W. 33; Estate of Fox, 154 Mich. 5, 117 N. W. 558.

To quote from the Colorado court: "A careful investigation will disclose that, with few exceptions, where similar questions have been raised in other states and in the supreme court of the United States, an inheritance or succession tax has been held not to come within the purview of the uniformity and equality clause of state constitutions, and that the power to impose the same is to be found in the sovereign power of taxa tion which the state possesses to the fullest degree, except as limited in its organic act. In these decisions substantially every objection as to the lack of uniformity and equality, and the alleged arbitrary and unjust discriminations which these provisions are said to exhibit, and that they contravene various sections of our bill of rights affecting the property rights of citizens, have been considered and decided adversely to the contention of counsel for plaintiff in error": Estate of Magnes, 32 Colo. 527, 77 Pac. 853.

"Since the tax is imposed upon the privilege of receiving or taking property," said the Montana court, "and not upon the property itself, and since the privilege is itself not a natural right, but a creature of

and necessarily this power must have a wide range of discretion. It is not without limitation, of course.

"Two principles, therefore, must be reconciled in the Illinois inheritance law if it is to be sustained, the equality of protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and the power of the state to classify persons and property. The latter principle needs further consideration. What test is there of the reasonableness of a classification-of one based upon 'some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selection'? Legislation special in character is not forbidden by it, as we have seen. . . . There is therefore no precise application of the rule of law, it follows as a corollary that, except so far as it is clearly restricted by the constitution, the legislature may impose such burdens upon it as it may see fit. The legislature is not restricted in this regard by the provision of the constitution requiring equality and uniformity in the levy of ordinary taxes upon property, nor for the same reason is its power restricted by the provision prescribing a maximum rate for state taxation; nor, again, by the provision invoked here, fixing the valuation of a certain class of property or those providing for exemptions. In Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 44 L. Ed. 998, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829, it was held that a legacy of United States bonds is not exempt from the inheritance tax imposed by the laws of the state of New York, though the bonds are themselves exempt from taxation in any form for ordinary purposes by or under authority of any state. This conclusion was arrived at after a review of the decisions from many of the states. To the same effect are the decisions of the states generally. If specific exemptions from taxation for ordinary revenue purposes do not, under the theory of these cases, apply, it must necessarily follow that an arbitrary method of valuation provided for in the constitution with reference to a certain class of property for ordinary purposes does not include the privilege to take by will, succession, or testamentary grant": Estate of Tuohy, 35 Mont. 431, 90 Pac. 170.

In State v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, 65 Am. St. Rep. 653, 40 L. R. A. 280, 45 S. W. 245, and Estate of Cope, 191 Pa. 1, 71 Am. St. Rep. 749, 45 L. R. A. 316, 43 Atl. 79, statutes imposing inheritance taxes were held unconstitutional for want of uniformity as to persons or properties belonging to the same class.

In Minnesota the constitutional provision requiring equality of taxation applies to inheritance taxes exactly as it does to taxes on property,

reasonableness of classification, and the rule of equality permits many practical inequalities. And necessarily so. In a classification for governmental purposes there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things. Bearing these considerations in mind we can solve the question in controversy. There are three main classes in the Illinois statute, the first and second being based, respectively, on lineal and collateral relationship to the testator or intestate, and the third being composed of strangers to his blood and distant relatives. The latter is again divided into four subclasses dependent upon the amount of the estate received. The first two classes, therefore, depend on substantial differences, differences which may distinguish them from each other and them or either of them from the other class-differences, therefore, which 'bear a just and proper relation to the attempted classification.' . . . . And if the constituents of each class are affected alike, the rule of equality prescribed by the cases is satisfied. In other words, the law operates 'equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances.'

"Nor do the exemptions of the statute render its operation unequal within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. . . . . The provisions of the statute in regard to the tax on legacies to strangers to the

except as therein otherwise expressly provided, and statutes providing for such taxes, to be valid, must include all inheritances, devises, bequests of every description, including those of both real and personal property, and they must be uniform and apply equally to all persons, whether collateral or lineal descendants: Drew v. Tifft, 79 Minn. 175, 79 Am. St. Rep. 446, 47 L. R. A. 525, 81 N. W. 839; State v. Bazille, 87 Minn. 500, 94 Am. St. Rep. 718, 92 N. W. 415. In this last case the statute of Minnesota is held unconstitutional because it operates unequally between collateral, and also as between collateral and lineal, descendants, transfers to the former being taxed to the full value, when such value exceeds five thousand dollars, whereas as to lineal descendants the tax is imposed only upon the excess over and above a fixed valuation of five thousand dollars.

blood of an intestate need further comment. There are four classes created, and manifestly there is equality between the members of each class. Inequality is only found by comparing the members of one class with those of another. It is illustrated by appellant as follows: One who receives a legacy of $10,000 pays three per cent, or $300, thus receiving $9,700 net, while one receiving a legacy of $10,001 pays four per cent on the whole amount, or $400.04, thus receiving $9,600.96, or $99.04 less than the one whose legacy was actually one dollar less valuable. . . . . If there is unsoundness it must be in the classification. The members of each class are treated alike; that is to say, all who inherit $10,000 are treated alike—all. who inherit any other sum are treated alike. There is equality, therefore, within the classes. If there is inequality it must be because the members of a class are arbitrarily made such and burdened as such upon no distinctions justifying it. . . . . But neither case can be said to be contrary to the rule of equality of the fourteenth amendment. That rule does not require, as we have seen, exact equality of taxation. It only requires that the law imposing it shall operate on all alike under the same circumstances. The tax is not on money; it is on the right to inherit, and hence a condition of inheritance, and it may be graded according to the value of that inheritance. The condition is not arbitrary because it is determined by that value; it is not unequal in operation because it does not levy the same percentage on every dollar; does not fail to treat all alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.''' 18

13 Magoun v. Illinois Trust etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. Ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594.

And in Billings v. Illinois," it was assigned as error that the Illinois "statute is in contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States of America, in that the classification of life tenants is arbitrary and unreasonable, and denies to the plaintiffs in error, as life tenants, the equal protection of the laws; because the statute, as interpreted and enforced by the state courts, taxes life estates where the remainder is to lineals, but does not tax, and expressly exempts, similar life estates where the remainder is to collaterals or to strangers in blood. If there had been a proper classification there could not have been the denial of the equal protection of the laws, and we, therefore, expressed (in Magoun v. Illinois Bank) and illustrated the principle upon which it should be based. We said it was established by cases that classification must be based on some reasonable ground. It could not be a 'mere arbitrary selection.' But what is the test of an arbitrary selection? It is difficult to exhibit it precisely in a general rule. Classification is essentially the same in law as it is in other departments of knowledge or practice. It is the grouping of things in speculation or practice, because they 'agree with one another in certain particulars and differ from other things in those same particulars.' Things may have very diverse qualities and yet be united in a class. They may have very similar qualities and yet be cast in different classes. . . . . If the purpose is within the legal powers of the legislature, and the classification made has relation to that purpose (excludes no persons or objects that are affected by the purpose, includes all that are), logically speaking, it will be appropriate; legally speaking, a law based upon it will

14 Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. Ed. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep.