that of the Court, or only additional to that power. The act of 1848 gives powers to the Court to allow, increase, or diminish &c. the salary or remuneration of the official manager, and gives no such powers to the Master. The power now given to the Master is, "notwithstanding the provision in the said act," to exercise the powers given by it. This is an instance of the involved style, which, stating nothing positively, but something by reference to something else, opens, of course, the door to much doubt. Now, is it not an extraordinary style of language to say, (referring to an act which gives certain powers to A. and none to B.), "notwithstanding the powers given to A., B. may exercise the same powers?" If it is meant to abrogate the powers given to A., is it not a most cir-guage of the Vice-Chancellor, that his Honor meant to cuitous and infelicitous mode of doing so? If it is not, what is there in the exercise of the powers by B. inconsistent with or notwithstanding the provision giving the powers to A.? If the present act had said, "The Master may fix the salaries, subject to the approbation of the Court"-if that was meant, or independently of such approbation if that was meant, the thing would have been clear. As it is, the "for and notwithstanding" style has introduced perfectly uncalled-for obscurity. Next, as to the second cause of obscurity: to this it is that Lord Brougham's remedy addresses itself. We say Lord Brougham's remedy, because his Lordship is now powerfully urging its adoption. But we need not say, that, for years, the necessity of having bills originally prepared and finally settled by a few persons of legal knowledge and skill, has been familiar to the Profession, and has been pointed out in this Journal, as well as, we believe, in many others. On this branch of the subject we shall not here say much. It is too evident, both on principle and from the result of observation, that such documents as acts of Parliament ought to be settled so that all their clauses should be in harmony with each other, and all as precisely expressed as possible, and as nearly as possible in a uniform style of language. That this result can be obtained under the present practice, of every one enforcing such alterations in the passage of the bill through Parliament as he desires and can enforce, not only by striking out and adding clauses, but by altering the wording of clauses, and then, without any final revision of the mutilated bill, of presenting it to Parliament to be passed, is out of all question. A practicable remedy is that so often suggested, and now enforced by the eloquence of Lord Brougham; and if the country paid 5000l. a year for a competent revision of bills before they became acts, we verily believe, that, in two or three years, it would save, in the shape of preventing unnecessary law expense, the capital that would produce 5000l. a year. CASES UPON THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES WINDING-UP ACT, 11 & 12 VICT. c. 45. (Continued from p. 246*). Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery against Creditors of a Company.]-A very important question was raised on the construction of this act in the case of The India and *The Editor, in inserting this and the two preceding papers on this subject, does not, of course, profess to give more to the readers of THE JURIST than a classification of the cases, and a short statement of their results. But this, he believes, will be found convenient to those whose practice leads them into the Master's office under the Winding-up Act. Australia Mail Steam-packet Company, (13 Jur., part 1, p. 689). A winding-up order had been made against the company, previously to which proceedings had been taken by a creditor of the company in the Lord Mayor's Court, the result of which was, that by a certain day the creditor would be able to seize the funds of the company in the hands of their bankers. The directors thereupon filed a bill, and obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the creditor from proceeding. On a motion to dissolve this injunction, the Court was of opinion, that, by the 58th clause, it was precluded from interfering generally against the rights of creditors before the appointment of an official manager, and that there was nothing in the special circumstance of the proceedings being in the Lord Mayor's Court which entitled it to interfere. It would seem, from the lanintimate, that, after the appointment of a manager, it would be different. The clause which affects the latter question is the 73rd, but by that clause it does not seem that the act intends to limit the effect of the 58th, beyond this, that a creditor shall not proceed in any Master, as prescribed by the act; but, having once so action until he shall have proved his debt before the proved his debt, there seems nothing in the act to prevent him from commencing or proceeding in any action. And if we recollect that the act has been repeatedly held to be intended to regulate the liabilities as between contributories, not to determine anything as between to follow that the Court should not interfere to prevent company, or shareholders, and third parties, it seems creditors pursuing such remedies as they might have pursued before the act, except in so far as the act itself tion, only forbidding a creditor to proceed at law until prescribes or permits interference. Now, the 73rd seche has proved his debt before the Master, by implica tion, intends him to be at liberty to use any of his Moreover, the 73rd section points out a specific remedy remedies after he shall have proved before the Master. against the creditor, by giving power to the judge of the court where the action is commenced, not to the Court of Chancery, to stay proceedings; and though, unquestionably, such a special remedy does not oust the general jurisdiction of Chancery, yet it may be anticipated that the Court of Chancery would not stay an action by injunction, under the 73rd section of the Winding-up Act, unless it appeared that the court of law either would not or could not interfere, so as to do complete justice. The latter part of the 16th section of the Winding-up Amendment Act, 1849, seems intended to have some bearing on this question; but it is so obscurely worded, that we confess ourselves unable to un the derstand what it does mean. Practice.]-Where a party was put on the list of contributories, and duly received notice to attend en settling the list, but did not, and allowed the time for appealing, under the 78th section, to pass, although he was not allowed strictly to appeal, he was permitted to read evidence to explain why he had not attended; and, such evidence being satisfactory, he was allowed to go in before the Master to dispute his liability to be on the list. (Ex parte Ashburner, re The Liverpool_and Manchester Saw-mills and Timber Company, 13 JUL, part 1, p. 691; Ex parte Holt, re the same Company). Power of Master to order Delivery of Papers to the Official Manager.]-In The Oxford and Worcester Eztension and Chester Junction Railway, &c. Company, (13 Jur., part 1, p. 691), it was contended, that the Power of the Master extends, under the 28th and 66th sections, to ordering the solicitor of a company to deliver up papers in his hands to the official manager, although he claims a lien upon them for a bill of costs not disputed; but the Court held, that there was nothing in the act to deprive the solicitors of their lien. Parbury), which contained much the same elements, viz. an allotment of shares upon conditions which were never fulfilled, his Honor held the allottee a contributory, carefully avoiding to decide whether he had or had not been deceived by certain members of the company, or whether he had not a remedy against those who deceived him. The result of these cases, and of the case of Ex parte Morgan, referred to in the judgment in Ex parte Parbury, is, we apprehend, that, in determining whether a party is a contributory, the Court inquires whether a contract exists between the alleged contributory and other persons, under which he may be co-liable with any of such persons; and, if it finds that there is such a contract, holds him a contributory, although there may be an equity between him individu As to Trustees being Contributories.]-A widow was entitled, as residuary legatee of a will of which she was executrix, to shares in a banking company. She received the dividends for several years by her agent, Hall. She re-married, but previously dealt with her shares as in her own right, by assigning them to Hall, as a trustee for her on the trusts of her marriage settlement. Notice of the trust-deed was given to the bank. The bank never returned Hall as registered owner to the Stamp-office; and Hall continued to receive the dividends, as agent for the widow, by the widow's name; and, in fact, did not comply with the requirements of the company's deed. The question was, whether Hall was a contributory; and it was held, that he was, but liable only from the date of the assignment to him. (Ex parte Hall, re The North of England Joint-ally and some of the parties to the contract, and, perstock Banking Company, 13 Jur., part 1, p. 691). What Companies are within the Statute.]—Where a company had been dissolved, and its business transferred to another company, but there remained a sum of money in the hands of trustees for the benefit of the members of the dissolved company, it was held clearly within the act. (In re The London and Westminstre Mutual Life Assurance Company, 13 Jur., part 1, p. 721). Generally what constitutes Parties Contributories.]The case of Ex parte Davidson, re The Marylebone Joint-stock Banking Company, (13 Jur., part 1, p. 722), decides, that, if the managers of a company use the name of a party as that of a shareholder for the proved or implied purpose of holding out his accession as an inducement to the public to join the company, and he permits his name so to be used, under an indemnity from the managers of the company, but without the knowledge of the general shareholders, he is liable as a contributory, although he has never acted as a shareholder, either by paying calls, or receiving dividends, or otherwise. The ground of the decision is the participation in, or active sanction of, the intention to deceive; and it appears from the judgment, that, in such a case, it is not necessary to shew that any persons have been actually deceived; the intention to deceive, and the fact proved or assumed that persons became shareholders after the transaction, being sufficient. On this subject it is material to observe, that a person may be a contributory under the Winding-up Act, although he may be, as between himself and certain members of the company, or as between himself and creditors of the company suing him separately, entitled to say he is not liable. This distinction is alluded to by Knight Bruce, V. C., in Ex parte Parbury, re The Direct London and Exeter Railway Company, (13 Jur., part 1, 725), and would seem proper to be kept in view in reference to the case of Ex parte Sharpus, re The Universal Salvage Company, (13 Jur., part 1, 723). In the case last mentioned, Mr. Sharpus applied for and had allotted to him shares in the company, on which he paid the deposit, and received the scrip certificates, but he did nothing more. The certificates referred to certain conditions, some of the most material of which, particularly the conditions that a certain number of shares should be allotted, and a certain capital should be subscribed, were not fulfilled. The question was, whether Sharpus was a contributor or not. The Master referred to the cases of Walstab v. Spottiswoode (15 Mee. & W. 501) and Wontner v. Shairp (11 Jur., part 1, 373), and earlier cases, as shewing, that, as against creditors, or as between subscribers, a party, situated as Sharpus was, might have said that the company, in respect of which he was sued, was not the company which he agreed to join and become a member of; but, on appeal, Knight Bruce, V. C., reversed the decision. His Honor did not, in that case, give his reasons; at least, none are reported. But in the other case mentioned, (Ex parte haps, (though this is not so clearly involved in the decision), between him and the public, entitling him to say, that, as between him and such persons, the contract cannot be enforced. Where, by the deed of settlement of a company, no shareholders, such a sale to the company is invalid; power is reserved to the company to buy the shares of and as a consequence, if a shareholder transfers his shares to another person, with notice that that person only purchased for the company, (the company having no power so to purchase), and then dies, the executors of the deceased shareholder, and not the nominal purchaser, will be placed on the list of contributories. (Ex parte Morgan, re The Vale of Neath Brewery, 1 Hall & T. 320, and Ex parte Richmond's Executors, re The Vale of Neath Brewery, 13 Jur., part 1, p. 727). Where a person agreed to purchase the shares of another in a company, and paid for them, and the vendors gave the proper notice to the company, who assented to the transfer, and made out new certificates in the name of the purchaser, but no legal transfer was ever executed, and the purchaser never did anything beyond the contract and payment, he was held, nevertheless, a contributory, but liable only from the day of his contract. (Ex parte Sanderson, re The North of England Joint-stock Banking Company, 13 Jur., part 1, p. 740). PUBLIC GENERAL STATUTES. An Act for granting Relief against Defects in Leases made Sect. 1. Interpretation of Terms. 2. Leases invalid, owing to Deviation from Terms of 3. Acceptance of Rent to be deemed a Confirmation. 5. What shall be deemed an intended Exercise of a 6. Saving the Rights of the Lessees under Covenants for Title and for quiet Enjoyment, and the Lessor's Right of Re-entry for Breach of Covenant, &c. 7. Act not to extend to certain Leases. Pending Suits 8. Act not to extend to Scotland. Whereas, through mistake or inadvertence on the part of persons granting leases, and through ignorance on the part of lessees of the titles of persons from whom leases are accepted, leases granted by persons having valid powers of leasing are frequently invalid, as against the successors in estate of such persons, by reason of the non-observance or omission of some condition or restriction, or by reason of some other deviation from the terms of such powers: and whereas leases granted in the intended exercise of such powers are sometimes invalid, as against the successors in estate of the persons granting the same, by reason that, at the time of granting the same, the person granting the lease could not lawfully grant such lease, although at a subsequent time, and during the continuance of his estate in the hereditaments comprised in such lease, he might have granted the same in the lawful exercise of such power: and whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for granting relief in the cases aforesaid, in manner after mentioned: be it enacted, &c., that, in construing this act, words importing the singular number shall include the plural number, and words importing the plural number shall include the singular number, and words importing males shall extend to females, and the word "person" shall include corporations aggregate or sole, unless, in any of the cases aforesaid, there be something in the context repugnant to such construction. dice or take away any right of re-entry or other right or re- 8. That this act shall not extend to Scotland. 9. That this act may be amended or repealed by any act to be passed in this session of Parliament. CAP. XXVII. An Act to remove Doubts concerning the Transportation of CAP. XXVIII. An Act to enable the Commissioners of Greenwich Hospital to 2. That where, in the intended exercise of any such power of leasing as aforesaid, whether derived under an act of Parliament or under any instrument lawfully creating such power, a lease has been or shall hereafter be granted, which is, by reason of the non-observance or omission of some condition or restriction, or by reason of any other deviation from the terms of such power, invalid as against the person entitled, after the determination of the interest of the person granting such lease, to the reversion, or against other the person who, subject to any lease lawfully granted under such power, would have been entitled to the hereditaments comprised in such lease, such lease, in case the same have been made bonâ fide, and the lessee named therein, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, (as the case may require), have entered thereunder, shall be considered in equity as a contract for a grant, at the request of the lessee, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, (as the case may require), of a valid lease under such power, to the like purport and effect as such invalid lease as aforesaid, save so far as any variation may be necessary in order to comply with the terms of such power; and all persons who would have been bound by a lease lawfully granted under such power shall be bound in equity by such contract: pro-nuary, 1850-8 & 9 Vict. c. 88; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 89, ss. 3, 5, 7, vided always, that no lessee under any such invalid lease as aforesaid, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, shall be entitled, by virtue of any such equitable contract as aforesaid, to obtain any variation of such lease, where the persons who would have been bound by such contract are willing to confirm such lease without variation. 3. That the acceptance of rent under any such invalid lease as aforesaid shall, as against the person so accepting the same, be deemed a confirmation of such lease. 4. That where a lease, granted in the intended exercise of any such power of leasing as aforesaid, is invalid by reason, that, at the time of the granting thereof, the person granting the same could not lawfully grant such lease, but the estate of such person in the hereditaments comprised in such lease shall have continued after the time when such or the like lease might have been granted by him in the lawful exercise of such power, then and in every such case such lease shall take effect, and be as valid as if the same had been granted at such last-mentioned time, and all the provisions herein contained shall apply to every such lease. 5. That when a valid power of leasing is vested in or may be exercised by a person granting a lease, and such lease (by reason of the determination of the estate or interest of such person or otherwise) cannot have effect and continuance according to the terms thereof, independently of such power, such lease shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed to be granted in the intended exercise of such power, although such power be not referred to in such lease. 6. Provided always, and be it enacted, that nothing in this act contained shall extend or be construed to prejudice or take away any right of action or other right or remedy to which, but for the passing of this act, the lessee named in any such lease as aforesaid, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, would or might have been entitled, under or by virtue of any covenant for title or quiet enjoyment contained in such lease on the part of the person granting the same, or to preju CAP. XXIX. An Act to amend the Laws in force for the Encouragement of 9; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 93, ss. 2, 4, 44; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 86, s. 63; î Coasting Trade. An Act to continue to the 1st Day of October, 1850, and to the End of the then next Session of Parliament, an Act to amend the Laws relating to Loan Societies. [13th July, 1849.] Whereas an act was passed in the 3 & 4 Vict. [c. 110], intituled "An Act to amend the Laws relating to Loan Societies," which act has been continued by sundry acts until the 1st October, 1849, and to the end of the then next session of Parliament, and it is expedient that the same should be further continued: be it enacted, &c., that the said act shall be further continued to the 1st October, 1850, and to the end of the then next session of Parliament. CAP. XLIII. An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion of Officers and Soldiers in the Service of the East India Company, and for regulating in such Service the Payment of Regimental Debts and the Distribution of the Effects of Officers and Soldiers dying in the Service. [28th July, 1849.] CAP. XLIV. An Act to apply the Sum of Three Millions out of the Consolidated Fund to the Service of the Year 1849. [28th July, 1849.] CAP. XLV. An Act to amend the Procedure in Courts of General and Quarter Sessions of the Peace in England and Wales, and for the better Advancement of Justice in Cases within the Jurisdiction of those Courts. [28th July, 1849.] Sect. 1. Uniformity of Time for Notice of Appeal. Notice of Appeal to be in Writing, and signed. Grounds of Appeal to be stated. 2. Act not to affect Notices of Appeal against Orders of Removal, Orders of Bastardy, &c. 3. Defects in Statement of Grounds of Appeal. Amendment of Grounds of Appeal. 4. Frivolous Grounds of Appeal. 5. Sessions to have a general Power to give Costs in all Cases of Appeal. 6. Frivolous Appeals. 7. Amendment of Orders or Judgments of Justices on Appeal or Return to Certiorari. Rule for Certiorari to state Objections. 8. Amendment of Recognisances. 9. Decisions of Sessions, when final. 10. Amendment of Indictment. 11. Power to state a special Case without going to the Sessions previously. 12. References to Arbitration. 13. References by Order of Court of Sessions. 14. Where Reference abortive, Queen's Bench may order Sessions to hear the Appeal. 15. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, to be applicable to References under this Act. Arbitrators to have Power of Amendment. 16. Recognisances for Prosecution and Trial of Appeal. 17. Levying and Recovery of Fines, Issues, and Amerciaments. 18. Enforcing Orders of Sessions. 19. Not to extend to Scotland or Ireland. 20. Commencement of Act. 21. Act may be amended, &c. Whereas, in cases of appeal to courts of general or quarter sessions of the peace, it is expedient that the law should be more uniform: be it therefore enacted, &c., that in every case of appeal (except as hereinafter mentioned) to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace fourteen clear days' notice of appeal at least shall be given, and such shall be sufficient notice, any act or acts, or any rule or practice of any court or courts, to the contrary notwithstanding; and such notice of appeal shall be in writing, signed by the person or persons giving the same, or by his, her, or their attorney on his, her, or their behalf, and the grounds of appeal shall be specified in every such notice: provided always, that it shall not be lawful for the appellant or appellants, on the trial of any such appeal, to go into or give evidence of any other ground of appeal besides those set forth in such notice. 2. That none of the provisions hereinbefore contained relating to notices of appeal shall be construed to affect or alter the law as to notice of appeal against a summary conviction, or against an order of removal, or against an order under any statute relating to pauper lunatics, or against an order in bastardy, or against any proceeding under or by virtue of any of the statutes relating to her Majesty's revenue of excise or customs, stamps, taxes, or post-office, but the law with regard to notices of all such appeals shall be deemed and taken to be the same as if the provisions hereinbefore contained had not been enacted. 3. And whereas a statement of the grounds of appeal, when required by this or any other statute, is for the purpose of enabling the party receiving it to inquire into the subject of such statement, and, if need be, to prepare for trial: be it therefore enacted, that upon the hearing of any appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace no objection on account of any defect in the form of setting forth any ground of appeal shall be allowed, and no objection to the reception of legal evidence offered in support of any ground of appeal shall prevail, unless the court shall be of opinion that such ground of appeal is so imperfectly or incorrectly set forth as to be insufficient to enable the party receiving the same to inquire into the subject of such statement, and to prepare for trial provided always, that in all cases where the court shall be of opinion that any objection to any ground of appeal, or to the reception of evidence in support thereof, ought to prevail, it shall be lawful for such court, if it shall so think fit, to cause any such ground of appeal to be forthwith amended by some officer of the court, or otherwise, on such terms as to payment of costs to the other party, or postponing the trial to another day in the same sessions or to the next subsequent sessions, or both payment of costs and postponement, as to such court shall appear just and reasonable." 4. That if in any notice of appeal the appellant or appellants shall have included any ground or grounds of appeal which shall in the opinion of the court determining the appeal be frivolous or vexatious, such appellant or appellants shall be liable, if the court shall so think fit, to pay the whole or any part of the costs incurred by the respondent or respondents in disputing any such ground or grounds of appeal, such costs to be recoverable in the manner hereinafter directed as to the other costs incurred by reason of such appeal. 5. That, upon any appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace, the court before whom the same shall be brought may, if it think fit, order and direct the party or parties against whom the same shall be decided to pay to the 1 other party or parties such costs and charges as may to such court appear just and reasonable, such costs to be recoverable in the manner provided for the recovery of costs upon an appeal against an order or conviction by an act passed in the 11 & 12 Vict. [c. 43], intituled “ An Act to facilitate the Performance of the Duties of Justices of the Peace out of Sessions within England and Wales, with respect to summary Convictions and Orders." 6. And for the more effectual prevention of frivolous appeals, be it enacted, that any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace, upon proof of notice of any appeal to the same court having been given to the party or parties entitled to receive the same, though such appeal was not afterwards prosecuted or entered, may, if it so think fit, at the same sessions for which such notice was given, order to the party or parties receiving the same such costs and charges as by the said court shall be thought reasonable and just to be paid by the party or parties giving such notice, such costs to be recoverable in the manner last aforesaid. 7. And whereas in many cases, where justices of the peace are by law empowered to make orders or to give judgments great expense and frequent failures of justice have been occasioned by reason that such orders or judgments have, on appeal to the general or quarter sessions of the peace, or on removal by certiorari into the Court of Queen's Bench, been quashed or set aside upon exceptions or objections to the form of the order or judgment, irrespective of the truth and merits of the matters in question: for remedy thereof be it enacted, that if, upon the trial of any appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace against any order or judgment made or given by any justice or justices of the peace, or if, upon the return to any writ of certiorari, any objection shall be made on account of any omission or mistake in the drawing up of such order or judgment, and it shall be shewn, to the satisfaction of the court, that sufficient grounds were in proof before the justice or justices making such order or giving such judgment to have authorised the drawing up thereof, free from the said omission or mistake, it shall be lawful for the court, upon such terms, as to payment of costs, as it shall think fit, to amend such order or judgment, and to adjudicate thereupon, as if no such omission or mistake had existed: provided always, that no objection on account of any omission or mistake in any such order or judgment brought up upon a return to a writ of certiorari shall be allowed, unless such omission or mistake shall have been specified in the rule for issuing such certiorari. 8. And whereas the statutes giving a right of appeal against orders or summary convictions frequently require a recognisance or recognisances to be entered into as a condition of such appeal, and appellants are liable to be prevented from trying their appeals upon the merits in consequence of imperfections in the taking of such recognisances: be it enacted, that where any recognisance or recognisances which shall have been entered into within the time by law required, before any justice or justices, for the purpose of complying with any such condition of appeal, shall appear to the court before which such appeal is brought to have been insufficiently entered into, or to be otherwise defective or invalid, it shall be lawful for such court, if it shall so think fit, to permit the substitution of a new and sufficient recognisance, or new and sufficient recognisances, to be entered into before such court, in the place of such insufficient, defective, or invalid recognisance or recognisances, and for that purpose to allow such time, and make such examination, and impose such terms, as to pay. ment of costs, to the respondent or respondents, as to such court shall appear just and reasonable; and such substituted to all intents and purposes, as if the same had been duly enrecognisance or recognisances shall be as valid and effectual, tered into at any earlier time or times, as required by any statute or statutes for that purpose. 9. That the decisions of the court of general or quarter sessions of the peace upon the hearing of any appeal, as to the sufficiency of the statement of any ground or grounds of appeal, and as to the amending or refusing to amend any order or judgment of a justice or justices appealed against, or the statestitution of any new recognisance or recognisances as aforesaid, ment of any ground or grounds of appeal, and as to the subshall be final, and shall not be liable to be reviewed in any court, by means of a writ of certiorari or mandamus, or otherwise. 10. That every court of general or quarter sessions of the peace, on the trial of any offence within its jurisdiction, whenever any variance or variances shall appear between any matter in writing or in print produced in evidence and the recital or setting forth thereof in the indictment, shall have the same power in all respects to cause the indictment to be amended which is given to courts of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery with regard to offences tried before such last-mentioned courts by virtue of an act of the 11 & 12 Vict. [c. 46], intituled "An Act for the Removal of Defects in the Admi nistration of Criminal Justice;" and after such amendment the trial shall proceed in the same manner in all respects, both with regard to the liability of witnesses to be indicted for petjury and otherwise, as if no such variance or variances had ap peared. 11. That at any time after notice given of appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace against any judgment, order, rate, or other matter, (except an order in bastardy, or a proceeding under or by virtue of any of the sta tutes relating to her Majesty's revenue of excise or customs, stamps, taxes, or post-office), for which the remedy is by such appeal, it shall be lawful for the parties, by consent, and by order of any judge of one of the superior courts of common law at Westminster, to state the facts of the case in the form of a special case for the opinion of such superior court, and to agree that a judgment in conformity with the decision of such court, and for such costs as such court shall adjudge, may be entered on motion by either party at the sessions next or next bat one after such decision shall have been given; and such judgment shall and may be entered accordingly, and shall be of the same effect in all respects as if the same had been given by the court of general or quarter sessions upon an appeal duly entered and continued. 12. And whereas by a statute passed in the 9 & 10 Will. 3, [c. 15], intituled "An Act for determining Differences by Arbitration," provision was made for rendering more effectual the awards of arbitrators in the case of controversies and dis putes for which there is no other remedy but by personal action or by suit in equity: and whereas it is expedient in like manner to facilitate and render more effectual references to arbitration of controversies and disputes for which the remedy is by appeal to a court of general or quarter sessions of the peace: be it enacted, that at any time after notice given of appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace against any order, rate, or other matter, (except a summary convic ! |