heads taken off, to reduce them to a standard too much below their general level. The relative rights and interests of all must therefore be consulted; and the proper combination and adjustment of these rights ' and interests form the principal difficulty in determining the specific qualifications for the right of suffrage.

It would seem to be a just rule or principle, that each member of the community should have an influence in the management of public affairs, proportionate to his interest in the community. This is the rule usually recognized by individuals associated together for their individual benefit; and is dictated by the common sentiment of equity prevailing among mankind. Thus, in joint stock companies, the stock is usually divided into shares; and each stockholder has a right to give one vote, for each share of his stock. But however equitable this principle may be, it cannot be reduced to practice, except in a very partial manner, in the exercise of political rights; because, in the case under consideration, no fraction of a vote can be given, and one vote must be counted as of the same value as another. Indeed no definite standard can be adopted, in practice, by which each man's interest in the political community, of which he is a member, can be precisely estimated. The best that can be done is, so to arrange and combine the various interests of community, as to form general rules, for practical purposes, approximating as near as possible to the standard of correct principles. And this ought to be done, that all classes of people may feel that their rights are equally protected; and that a general sentiment may prevail that equal justice is done to all;

and that all may rest quiet and satisfied under the regulations that shall be established on the important subject in question; and to strengthen and rivet the affections of the people to our form of government.

Montesquieu says, in treating of the constitution of England, that "all the inhabitants of the several districts ought to have a right of voting, at the election of a representative, except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own. He made this remark with reference to the English government. In that government, the executive officer, the king, and the upper branch of the legislature, the house of lords, are hereditary; and a friend of liberal government might well claim a liberal extension of the right of suffrage, in the election of the house of commons, the only elective branch of the English legislature, as a counterbalance to the aristocratic tendency, and privileged interests and influence of the two other hereditary branches of the government. But in our government we have, happily, no hereditary privileges or interests to be counteracted. With us the whole influence in the government is popular; and the object is to extend that influence so far as it is salutary and patriotic and directed by patriotism and wisdom; and to suppress all other influences. We want to combine the whole

* Sp. Laws, book ii., ch. 6.

+ The author would not be understood, by these remarks, to express an opinion that the rule quoted from Montesquieu is correct as applied to the English government; because he is not satisfied that it is so. It wholly leaves out of view the relative rights

of individuals.

virtue and intelligence and wisdom of the nation, so as to bring the greatest possible amount of correct moral force to bear upon our elections and public affairs. The right of suffrage ought, therefore, to be confined to those persons only, whose condition in society furnishes a guaranty that their whole influence shall be such. Otherwise the elections may be carried contrary to the wishes of those whose influence ought to be paramount. And it ought to be kept in mind, that the vote of every unfit voter, is like so much base metal mixed, in the crucible, with pure gold; it deteriorates the purity and intrinsic value of the mass. The principle quoted from Montesquieu, was not stated with reference to our government or to one organized as ours is; and is not applicable to it. The true governing principle with us is, so to regulate the right of suffrage as to keep it under the guidance of virtue, intelligence and wisdom, and so as to give to all the legitimate interests of the people their appropriate share of influence, that all may be satisfied, as far as possible, that their rights and interests are equally protected. And if this shall be done, individual interests will all conspire to promote the best interests of the country; and we may rest, satisfied and happy, with a proud and consoling conviction that our government will be perpetual; and that our posterity will derive from it the same, and even greater blessings, than we have, as yet, enjoyed.

The foundation of the right, which an individual has to give his vote in elections and in public affairs, has reference principally

1. To his personal rights, sometimes called the rights of persons.

2. To his right and interest in property, sometimes called the rights of things.

3. To the duties which the nation or government requires or may require of him.

These, with some other things, will be the subject of distinct consideration in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II.

Of Personal Rights.

These are principally

1. The right of personal security. 2. The right of personal liberty.

1. "The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation."*

2. The right of "personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or of moving one's person to whatever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." To which may be added the right of forming and expressing and exercising one's own opinion, in all cases, in which his interest is concerned, in such a manner as he shall judge right; provided he does not thereby injure

* 1 Black. Com., 131.

† 1 Black. Com., 137.

others, or interfere with their rights or with those of

the public.

Every one's person is his own. These personal rights are possessed by all, and common to all; and the defence and protection of them constitute one of the principal objects and duties of civil government. The possession and protection of these rights are essential to the enjoyment of life; and it is the imperative duty of all governments to protect its citizens or subjects in the full enjoyment of them. Without

such protection, all other enjoyments, and even life itself, become of little value. Hence every member of society has a deep interest in the good administration of the government under which he lives; and in the preservation of the government from any influence which will tend to destroy or weaken the protection which it may give him in the full enjoyment of these rights. And if these were the only rights possessed by individuals to be protected and fostered and defended by the government, they would furnish a strong argument, but not a conclusive one, in favor of universal suffrage. But there are other rights possessed by individuals and duties to be performed by them to be taken into the account. The personal rights are, comparatively, few and simple, and generally well defined; and the laws that regulate them, are general and bear alike upon the legislators who enact them; the judges who expound them; the executive officers who execute them, and all other classes of the people. Hence, as a general rule, those who take no part in the election of public officers and legislators, or in making, expounding or ex