some, according to the number of free white male inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years; in some, according to the number of taxable inhabitants; in some, according to the number of voters; and in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the senators are apportioned according to the amount of public taxes paid in their respective districts.*

There is no general American principle prevailing, on this subject, in the several States. But it would seem, from the nature of the subject, that it admits of being reduced to principles, such as ought to meet the general approbation of the American people.

The principle, on which senators are apportioned in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, is designed to give an influence to property, in that branch of the legislature. If property is to have an influence, as it should have, the influence ought to be in the hands of the owners, according to the principles adopted in the foregoing chapters. But the rule for the apportionment of senators in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, operates to enhance the influence of the electors in the wealthy districts, whether they own little or much property.

Thus, in two districts having an equal number of electors, one district may possess twice the amount of taxable property, and pay twice the amount of taxes as the other; and in that case it will be entitled to elect twice as many senators; so that the senatorial electors, in the latter case, will have double the influ

* See note A at the end of the volume.

† Part II., ch. 1, 3, & 4.

ence of those in the former, in the election of senators. But, in the latter case, the property may be in the hands of a very few persons; and most of the electors may have but little property; and then the ir franchise is doubled, in influence and value, by the mere fact of living among rich neighbors. It surely is no good reason why a man's vote should be doubled, in its influence, that he has rich neighbors; nor is it a good reason why it should be reduced in value, that he has no rich neighbors. The principle itself is a violation of that political equality, which it is one of the objects of this treatise to explain and inculcate.

The rule does not effectuate the object designed by it; that of protecting the rights of property. There is no considerable district of country where the rich and poor are not, more or less, mingled together; and it is commonly the fact that, in those districts where the largest number of great estates are accumulated, there is the largest number of poor people.And it can give no additional security to the rights of property, to throw an extraordinary influence into the hands of these people. A comparison of their own poverty with the extraordinary, and as it may seem to them useless, wealth of others, will not be likely to make them less covetous of the property of others, or more scrupulous in protecting the rights of property.

So far as this mode of apportionment gives an additional influence, in elections, to the owners of property, it may be supposed to answer the object for which it was designed. But even, in this view of the case, if we suppose half of the electors to be destitute of property, the increased influence of the rich will be,

as to their own districts, exactly counteracted by an equally increased influence of the poor. So that this

mode of apportionment does not accomplish the object for which it was designed; while it produces an unjust inequality in the rights of the electors, and among the districts.

A senator or representative in the legislature of a State, is a legislator, not merely for the inhabitants of his own district, but for all the inhabitants of the State. He is, in fact, the representative of all the members of the State. And the inhabitants of other districts, and the minority in his own district, are as much and as rightfully bound by his acts, as those by whose votes he was elected. And he is as strictly and legally the representative of the women and children, and all those members of the State, who have no direct voice in the election, as he is of the electors themselves.

So a senator or representative in Congress, is a legislator for the whole people of the United States; and they are all equally bound by his acts.

These considerations suggest the true rule or principle, by which senators and representatives ought to be apportioned. They ought to be so apportioned that all the members of the State shall be equally represented. This can only be done by apportioning them according to population, including all classes of people who are rightfully considered as members of the State, both male and female, of every age; but excluding Indians and foreigners not naturalized.Provision will be made, according to the circumstances and policy of the State, for the admission or ex

clusion of persons of color, in making the enumeration.

This rule of apportionment is simple and plain, in its application; and, if adopted, will operate more equally than any other. The other rules of apportionment all assume an erroneous basis of representation. The rule that senators and representatives shall be apportioned according to the number of free white male inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years; or according to the number of taxable inhabitants; or according to the number of voters, assumes the ground that senators and representatives are the representatives of only these classes of the people; whereas they are, in fact, the representatives of all the members of the State or nation; and are authorized to bind them by their legislation and lawful acts.

CHAPTER XVI.

A Synopsis of the Leading Principles regulating the Right of Suffrage; and of the Conclusions and Rules resulting from them, as established in this Treatise.

The design of this chapter is, to bring into a short and connected view, the leading principles and rules more immediately applicable to the subject of this treatise. It must necessarily be a repetition of what goes before; and the reasoning and illustrations will be wholly omitted.

Part I., ch. 1. Government arises from the ne

cessity of establishing some power to control and regulate the imperfections, deficiencies, selfishness and evil passions and propensities of mankind; and to remedy and redress the evils resulting from them. Legislators and public officers, and those who elect or appoint them, should be as free as possible from these imperfections, bad passions and propensities; otherwise they will exercise their powers so as to increase the evil, and not to carry into effect the true objects of government.

Part I., ch. 2. Universal suffrage does not result from the true principles of liberty; but it is a violation of them. The public good must determine what qualifications one must possess to entitle him to the right of suffrage; and the limitations prescribed by it, are not an abridgement of his liberty. If he exercises that right, without possessing the prescribed qualifications; by so doing he violates the general liberty, and impairs those principles by which his own liberty and that of his posterity are sustained.

Part I., ch. 3. The right of suffrage, or the elective franchise, is the moving power and first principle which puts our governments into motion, and sustains them in their operation, and gives direction and character to their measures. This consideration shows the very high importance of establishing that right upon sound and correct principles.

Part I., ch. 4. The right of suffrage should be established on principles founded in the true and just relations of persons and things, so as to have a just bearing upon all the members and interests of society; and so as to tend, in its exercise, to the general good