telligence and honesty to prove that their possessor will exercise that privilege so as to promote the public good. It ought not to be left to accident or chance. The public liberties and interests are too valuable to be made the sport of accident or chance.

The burthen of proof is on the party applying to be admitted to the right of suffrage, to show his qualifications; and not on the public to prove that he is destitute of the suitable qualifications. When the qualifications are established and known, the party can always prove that he possesses them, if such is the fact. He is always surrounded by his acquaintances, upon whom he can call to give all necessary information; and in all doubtful cases, it is reasonable, and is no hardship, for the applicant to furnish the necessary evidence.

In this chapter I have been speaking, and in general terms only, of the intellectual and moral qualifications for the right of suffrage. Of the particular things which ought to be required, by the constitution, as evidence that a person possesses these qualifications; and of the relative rights and interests of individuals, having a bearing upon this question, I propose to treat in the second part.

CHAPTER IX.

That the Right of Suffrage ought to be regulated with a paramount regard to the public good.

The public good is the great and leading object of civil government. As the public is made up of the individuals who compose it, that system or form of government which produces the greatest amount of individual good, will generally produce the greatest public good. But cases sometimes occur, as it often happens in time of war, when the public interests require the sacrifice of some individual right. When such a sacrifice is made the public is under obligations to remunerate the suffering individual for the injury he has sustained. But, as the public benefit is the great and leading object of all just political and civil institutions, whatever the public good requires ought to be allowed; and whatever is inconsistent with the public good, ought to be forbidden and suppressed. It is one of the first duties of a government to protect itself. And it is emphatically so in the United States, where the general and state governments have been voluntarily formed by the people, and emanated from their own will. Hence, in those governments especially, it is the duty of the people and of each individual to do and to suffer nothing that shall impair the full operation of these governments according to their original design. And it is especially the duty of those who are appointed to administer the government, in its various departments, to suppress and avoid every thing incon

sistent with its true principles. Constitutions of government, as well as the laws that are adopted in any state or nation, whether such constitutions be written and adopted by the express act of the people, as in the United States; or are adopted by common usage and tacit consent, must necessarily consist more or less of general rules and principles, established for the regulation and direction both of the rulers and citizens. And it is impossible to prevent some inequalities in their operation; because they must operate by general rules and maxims, upon individuals in very different circumstances from each other. But no person can justly claim, as his right, any thing inconsistent with the public good. These principles apply to the exercise of the right of suffrage, as well as to other rights. If it can be established that it would be for the public advantage to exclude any class of people from the right of suffrage; that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to extend that right to any class of people destitute of suitable qualifications; they ought to be excluded and they cannot justly complain of any violation of their private right by such exclusion. Their proper and only just remedy is, to acquire the requisite qualifications, and then to claim the right by virtue of those qualifications. It may be safely stated as a sound principle, that no class of people ought to be admitted to the right of suffrage, whose influence, by the exercise of that right, would endanger either the purity or the stability of the government. The right to debar an individual from the exercise of this privilege, in such a case, depends much upon the same principle with the right of punishment. The laws deprive a per

son of his life, by a capital punishment; or of his liberty, by imprisonment; or of his property by way of fine, for the violation of the laws. These punishments are not inflicted by way of revenge upon the individual; but because the public good requires that the authors of crimes should be punished, that the commission of crimes may be prevented. How much greater the reason then, that the fundamental principles of the government should exclude those from the exercise of the right of suffrage, who, by the exercise of it, would endanger the purity or stability of the government; and this, not as a punishment of an offence; but because of the unfitness of the persons excluded for the exercise of the right; or, in other words, for the public good.

The happiness and prosperity of all require that the purity of the government should be preserved. This purity is violated whenever the electors give their votes for a person for any other reason than his fitness for the station to which he is proposed to be elected; and whenever any person exercises the powers and influence of his office, for any other purposes than those for which the office was established. If there is any class of men among us, who, from any cause, whether it be ignorance or vice, or degradation arising from an unfortunate condition in life, whose character and standing in society are such that they would be likely to give their votes in an election for any other reason than the fitness of the candidate voted for, then the public good requires that they should not be allowed to vote in the election of public officers. Such men are usually made the instruments of unprincipled and designing men.

That there are such men in com

munity, is but too evident. Such men are influenced by an appeal to their appetites, their passions, or some supposed private interest or party association. That such appeals are made, almost continually, for the purpose of influencing our elections, is a notorious fact. To one class of electors intoxicating liquors and other entertainments suited to their appetites, have been given to another class appeals are made, designed to excite their passions; and appeals are made to the absurd and unreasonable prejudices of others. And in general this kind of influence is exerted, and always will be exerted, to promote the selfish views of corrupt men and demagogues; the very class of men least entitled to the suffrages of an enlightened and patriotic people. And all this has a direct and necessary tendency to render the government and the administration of it corrupt and impure.

So no class of persons ought to be admitted to the right of suffrage, whose influence, by the exercise of that right, would endanger the safety of our form and principles of government. Every thing that tends to corrupt the government, tends also to its destruction. But there is a class of people who have, or seem to feel, no common tie to bind them to our government or its institutions; and whose influence in elections is exerted by violence and by getting up violent combinations to support some partizan candidate and to deter others from supporting opposing candidates. And it is to be feared that worthy, upright, intelligent and patriotic citizens, and especially the aged, have not unfrequently been prevented from taking part in our elections, by this class of men. Now the people,