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Liability of Mail-Contractors.

to the Auditor, as required by the 11th section of the act of Congress to change the organization of the Post-Office Department,' &c., approved July 2, 1836, it became necessary, before making the Auditor acquainted with the new service, to withdraw or render nugatory the former contract; and this was done by an order, duly recorded, in this form: 'Annul contract of Henry C. Foster from July 1, 1870, he having failed to perform service.'

"By subsequent orders Foster was made chargeable with the difference between the rate of pay under his contracts and the increased amount paid and to be paid to other parties. The effect of these orders is to offset the pay accruing to this contractor for services actually rendered, and in order to remove this difficulty the attorney contends, that the annulment of the contract from July 1, 1870, releases the contactor and his sureties from all liability on account of said routes', and he asks that he be allowed to settle his accounts with the Department for service on other routes on their respect ive merits.'

"The order to annul was to render inoperative contracts officially in the hands of the Auditor, and which could not be literally withdrawn, and with no intention to release the contractor and his sureties from their legal liabilities; but, if such is the technical effect of orders so drawn, it may be useful, for the guidance of the Department in its future action, that the fact should be authoritatively known. The power to annul the contract for repeated failures is reserved to the Postmaster-General in all contracts for mail-service."

I find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion, upon this statement, that the contractor is not discharged from his obligations under the contracts by the above-described indorsements made upon them. Those indorsements take their effect from the intent with which they were made. They were not put upon the contracts, as it appears, to affect any claim of the United States against the contractor, but for the convenience of the Department, and by way of direction to one of its officers in the transaction of business. The circumstances explain the acts.

My opinion, therefore, is that the contractor and his sureties are not released from any claim that the United States would

Applications for Pardon.

otherwise have upon said contracts, by the marginal indorsement placed thereon by the Department.

I make no decision as to whether or not the Post-Office Department has a legal right to offset the claims of the United States upon the contracts not fulfilled against the claim of the contractor for services rendered in the performance of the other contracts.

Very respectfully,

Hon. JNO. A. J. CRESWELL,

GEO. H. WILLIAMS.

Postmaster-General.

APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON.

Applications for pardon are addressed to the President, who may act on them upon his own examination simply, or, before acting thereon, may refer them to any of the Executive Departments for advice. An application having been, with that view, referred by the President to the Secretary of War, and the latter having afterward submitted the same to the Attorney-General for his opinion thereon, the Attorney-General declined to give an opinion, on the ground that to do so would be merely to advise the Secretary as to what he should advise the President.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
March 23, 1872.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, transmitting, with accompanying papers, the application of Richard Reynolds, a prisoner confined in the penitentiary at Jefferson City, Missouri, for a pardon.

I herewith respectfully return the papers, and have to say that applications for pardon are addressed to the President of the United States, who may decide upon an application of that kind upon his own examination, and may refer the papers to any of the Departments for advice upon the subject. With this view it seems he has referred the papers in the case of Reynolds to the War Department. I do not recognize the right of that Department to call upon me for an opinion upon the merit of the application, as that would be simply advising

Duty of Attorney-General.

the Secretary of War as to what he should advise the Presi dent.

Moreover, the application for pardon presents altogether a question of fact, upon which the Attorney-General is not authorized to give official opinions to any of the other Departments. This has been repeatedly decided by my predecessors, (5 Opin., 626; 7 Opin., 491; 10 Opin., 267; 12 Opin., 206.)

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. WILLIAMS.

Hon. WM. W. BELKNAP,

Secretary of War.

DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

The act of June 22, 1870, chap. 150, establishing the Department of Justice, made no change in the law as to the duty of the Attorney-General in giving official opinions, according to which, as it has been repeatedly held, he is authorized to give an opinion upon a question of law only on the submission thereof by the President or by the head of an Executive Department.

The Assistant Attorney-General attached to the Interior Department having prepared an opinion upon a case previously referred to him by the Secretary of the Interior for examination, and having submitted the same to the Attorney-General for approval: Held that the approval or disapproval of the said opinion by the Attorney-General would in effect be giving his official opinion where it is not called for by the President or by the head of a Department, and, therefore, where it is not authorized by law to be given.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
March 26, 1872.

SIR: I have received your three letters dated, respectively, January 31, February 9, and March 15, 1872, inclosing three opinions, one touching the claim of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company for indemnity-lands; one in the case of Hans Scheevrin against the Western Pacific Railroad Company; and the other relating to the Creek orphans, which I herewith return without any action thereon by me.

I find that my predecessors in office have made numerous decisions to the effect that the Attorney General is only authorized to give his official opinion upon a question of law

Military Jurisdiction.

submitted to him for that purpose by the President or the head of one of the Executive Departments. I do not think that the act "to establish the Department of Justice" (16 Stat., 162) changes his rights or duties in respect to his official opinions. I cannot approve or disapprove the inclosed opinions without adjudicating the questions of fact in the cases upon which you seem to have passed, as well as the questions of law, and without giving an official opinion where it is not called for by the President or head of any Department, or indeed by any one outside of the Department of Justice.

You will, therefore, as to any matters referred to you by the Secretary of the Interior, report your action thereon directly to him; and if, in his judgment, in such or any other cases, the official opinion of the Attorney-General is desired upon any question of law, it will be cheerfully given upon his request therefor, accompanied by a statement of the facts. out of which the legal question arises.

Very respectfully,

WALTER H. SMITH, Esq.,

Assistant Attorney-General.

GEO. H. WILLIAMS.

MILITARY JURISDICTION.

Civilian employés serving with the Army, in the Indian country, during offensive or defensive operations against the Indians, are subject to military jurisdiction and trial by court-martial, under the provisions of the 60th Article of War, (2 Stat., 366.)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
April 1, 1872.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, in which you propound for my official opinion the following inquiry: "Are civil employés of the War Department, serving with the military forces of the United States in the Indian country under the circumstances described in the accompanying communication of the commanding officer of Fort Hays, Kansas, in view of the 60th

Military Jurisdiction.

Article of War, amenable to military jurisdiction and trial by court-martial ?”

Substantially the following are the circumstances referred to: Serving with troops in the Indian country, at posts and camps in Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and the Indian Territory, where, as at Camp Supply and Fort Sill, defensive earthworks are deemed necessary and have been built by the troops; where within twelve months several soldiers have been killed by hostile Indians; where lookouts are kept posted at all times, and other precautions are constantly deemed necessary; at Fort Larned, where within the past two months soldiers near the fort were killed or wounded by hostile Indians; and at Fort Hays, where some seven picketguard stations are kept upon the neighboring line of the Kansas Pacific Railway to protect it from Indians, and where Indians are believed at all times to be in a semi-hostile attitude, as they are all over the interior country occupied by troops, between the Mississippi Valley and the Pacific Ocean.

Article 60 referred to is as follows: "All sutlers and retainers to the camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with the armies of the United States in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war," (2 Stat., 366.)

To determine when an army is "in the field," is to decide the question raised. These words imply military operations with a view to an enemy. Hostilities with Indians seem to be as much within their meaning as any other kind of warfare. To enable the officers of an army to preserve good order and discipline is the object of this article, and these may be as necessary in the face of hostile savages as in front of any other enemy. When an army is engaged in offensive or defensive operations, I think it safe to say that it is an army "in the field."

To decide exactly where the boundary-line runs between civil and military jurisdiction, as to the civilians attached to an army, is difficult; but it is quite evident that they are within military jurisdiction, as provided for in said article, when their treachery, defection, or insubordination might endanger or embarrass the army to which they belong in its operations against what is known in military phrase as "an

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