Congressional Employés. in the context, it will be presumed that this "pay" means back pay. So far from there being anything "to the contrary" that is substantial, it seems to me that the context bears out the presumption. The persons spoken of are the "present employés," "and who shall actually be employed at the passage of this act." This language excludes persons subsequently employed. The pay given is a percentage upon the amount "actually received and payable" to the party applying, "from the beginning of the present Congress, or from the date of their appointment during the present Congress." That the amount so given should be graduated (within certain limits) to the length of time the employé had been in the service, shows that it is a bounty, personal to the applicant, and given once for all. If the applicant were employed after the 3d of March, 1873, the amount actually received and payable to him from the beginning of the Forty-second Congress during such Congress is naught; and 15 per cent. upon that is no more. As appears above, in my view, the increase of pay mentioned in this clause is only pro hac vice, and not continuing. It seems that, by its provisions, the occupant of a two-thousand-dollar office, who had held it from the beginning of the Forty-second Congress, receives an increase of $600, while another occupant of an office of the same grade, who had held it for only one month, receives an increase of only $25. It is hardly to be supposed that Congress designed that a change of this sort, arising out of a mere accident, should be continuing. Such legislation might be whimsical; while if confined to a single occasion, and to the then occupant, it would be reasonable. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Claims for refunding Internal-Revenue Taxes. CLAIMS FOR REFUNDING INTERNAL-REVENUE TAXES. An application filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the refunding of taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed and collected, though informal or defective, may nevertheless be regarded as a "claim" within the meaning of section 44 of the act of June 6, 1872, chap. 315, so far, at least, as to be the foundation for an amendment Where the application is delivered to a collector or other local internalrevenue officer, it is not a presentation of the claim to the Commissioner such as is contemplated in the first proviso of that section. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, July 15, 1873. SIR: In reply to yours of the 7th instant, inclosing a communication of the 2d instant to yourself from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, I submit the following opinion: Whenever a bona-fide litigant or claimant brings his cause before a tribunal having jurisdiction, I apprehend that such proceeding, even when "fatally" informal, is usually held to be an action or claim, so far at least as to be a foundation for an amendment, and thus to be capable of becoming perfect by relation to its original institution, and so of defeating a plea of "limitation" (say) which, otherwise, might avail the defendant. I think that this principle applies here to the first question put by the Commissioner; and, therefore, that such applications are "claims;" it remaining, nevertheless, matter of discretion with the Commissioner whether he will dismiss such claims because of gross informality; or will notify the claimant of the defect, and require amendment, within a reasonable time, upon pain of its dismission; or will take any other course authorized by the practice of his Department. I answer the second question by saying that such delivery to "a collector or other local officer" is not a presentation to the Commissioner. These local officers are not invested by law with the power of representing therein the Commissioner. If the claimant transmit his claim through them he does so at his own option, and they therein become his agents. Of Printing. course any delay or neglect thereabouts by them is his delay or neglect. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, Secretary of the Treasury. Hon. WM. A. RICHARDSON, Approved July 16, 1873: Solicitor-General. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. PRINTING. Section 10 (third proviso) of the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 167, does not require "printing" ordered by Executive Departments to be performed at such newspaper-offices only as are designated by the Clerk of the House of Representatives under section 7 of the same act. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, July 24, 1873. SIR: In yours of the 19th instant you ask whether the 10th section of the act of March 2, 1867, (14 Stat., 467,) qualifies the 7th section of the same act, so that "job-printing executed at the instance of officers of the Army, and by authority of the War Department, in the Southern States, must be performed only at such newspaper-offices as the Clerk of the House designated under section 7.” I think not. Section 7 includes only "advertisements" ordered for publication in said districts, i. e., ordered to be published within said districts. It intends no more than to specify, in cases where advertising has been or may be ordered to be made in some newspaper within a State, which that newspaper shall be. Section 10 (3d proviso) applies to all "printing." It means that no printing "ordered," &c., shall be done otherwise than by the Government Printer, unless it be impracticable to have it done by him. No printing "ordered by the Executive Departments" can, under this proviso, read in connection with the 7th section, legally be executed by any one excepting the Government Printer, unless it be shown to have been impracticable for the latter to do it; provided that the adver South and North Alabama Railroad Company. tisements specified in section 7, when ordered to be published in some newspaper within one of the States named, shall be made in the newspaper selected by the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WM. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. Solicitor-General. Approved July 24, 1873: GEO. H. WILLIAMS. SOUTH AND NORTH ALABAMA RAILROAD COMPANY. The rights derived by the South and North Alabama Railroad Company under the act of March 3, 1871, chap. 123, reviving the land-grant act of June 3, 1856, chap. 41, in favor of that company, are subject to all vested interests which had already intervened in favor of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company under the act of April 10, 1869, chap. 24, reviving the same land-grant act in favor of the latter company. Such a vested interest, at the date of the act of March 3, 1871, had already DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Circumstances beyond my control delayed a reply to yours of the 13th of November last, (in relation to a petition by the South and North Alabama Railroad Company,) addressed to the Attorney-General, and by him, at that time, referred to me. The statement of facts in your communication is, briefly, that by an act passed in 1856 (11 Stat., 16) certain lands were given by the United States to the State of Alabama for South and North Alabama Railroad Company. the purpose of aiding in the construction of several railroads therein named, among them the petitioner and another company which, for brevity, I will call the Chattanooga Company. By its terms, in a certain event the grant was to fail, and the lands were to revert to the United States. It is conceded that such event happened and that thereupon the lands reverted. Afterward the act of 1869 (16 Stat., 45) revived so much of the grant of 1856 as concerned the Chattanooga Company, which thereupon performed all the conditions necessary to render its rights indefeasible; and subsequently to this action an act of 1871 (16 Stat., 580) revived so much of the grant of 1856 as concerned the petitioner. As the lines of the above road intersect, and this event must have been contemplated by Congress, questions have arisen as to their respective interests in the grant as to lands lying about the point of interference. Upon this matter, you submit two questions as to the respective rights of the companies named above: 1. Whether either, and which of them, is to be preferred; 2. Supposing they are both entitled, how the distribution is to be made. The view which I take of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the second question. However it may have been at one time, the respective claims of these companies have not at any time since their revival depended upon cotemporaneous legislation. When the act of 1869 conferred a new and inchoate right upon the Chattanooga Company, and also until that company by its subsequent action had converted that inchoate right into one that was indefeasible, there were in existence no rights, inchoate or other, in the petitioner. It is true that the act of 1869 referred to the previous act of 1856 for the details of what it gave, and revived for the Chattanooga Company only so much as had been given previously. "So much" as the act of 1856 had given was such and such sections of land, qualified further by the fact that the petitioner had a contingent interest in the same grant, that upon certain action by it would collide with that of the Chattanooga Company, and so would modify it. In 1869 the petitioner's interest had ceased, and so this qual |