Dinner by Local Bar to ex-Chief Justice Brown. one can hardly understand how they could have been what they once Truly, tempora mutantur nos et in illis mutamur. were. In the times to which I have briefly referred the volume of legal business was, here and elsewhere, greater than it is now, but there is still plenty for the lawyer to do, and to him who is willing to do it, it will come. Organized society cannot exist without its courts of justice, and they in turn cannot perform their functions without the helping hands of lawyers held up to judges in seeking to protect the lives, liberty and rights of the people. Professionally equipped for the performance of professional duties, no lawyer devoted to his profession need be concerned lest the temporary diminution in the volume of legal business means diminution of his prospect for success. If he devotes himself to the law with singleness of purpose, reward will follow his devotion. He counts but lightly on the chances of a successful professional career who rests confident of success upon mere adequacy of equipment, natural or acquired. The first exaction made upon the lawyer who seeks the highest end of professional exertion is singleness of devotion to the law. She is a jealous mistress, tolerant of love for no other, and he who strives for what she has to give must give himself wholly up to her. Frowns come to the suitor for her smiles and favors who, under her watchful eye, is caught coquetting with another; but she gives every lover a chance upon the one condition that he worthily love her alone, and, with no sentiment, reminds him: The man who seeks one thing in life, and but one, But he who seeks all things wherever he goes, A harvest of barren regrets. I could not, my dear brethren, if I were to detain you longer, adequately express my grateful appreciation of your kindly disposition. I am most happy to be with you this evening, and repeat the hope that I may see much of you all. To my beloved former associates and to the distinguished successor of our dear Brother Stewart, I am also most grateful for coming to this family reunion. The bar of this county has ever regarded the highest court in the Commonwealth with profound respect, and never in its history has that tribunal been more worthy than now of the unmeasured confidence of the bar and people of the State. My brethren, again I thank you with all my heart for your cordial and splendid greeting. Chief Justice Robert Von Moschzisker said that the Bar of Lancaster County is recognized as a leader in Pennsylvania, and that the Pennsylvania Bar is recognized as one of the leading Bars in the United States. In answer to an inquiry, upon one occasion, as to why it was true that the Pennsylvania Bar was so prominent in the United States, he gave as his reason that the lawyers of Pennsylvania are trained to perform their business with despatch, and when presenting their arguments Dinner by Local Bar to ex Chief Justice Brown. to the Court are so well prepared that they are able to present them in full, briefly and concisely. He thought that this briefness and conciseness of argument have been brought about by what is known as “the half-hour rule" in arguments before the Supreme Court. He referred to the remark made by United States Senator Philander C. Knox when asked the reason for his ability in thus presenting matters in such brief and concise form. Knox made reply, "I was trained as a lawyer in the State of Pennsylvania." Justice William I. Schaffner was exceptionally eloquent in his praise of Lancaster County. He said that Lancaster County gave a great Chief Justice to the bench in the person of former Chief Justice Brown; that Lancaster County gave the greatest common-law lawyer in the United States to the State in the person of Attorney General W. U. Hensel; that Lancaster County gave one of the greatest constructive statesmen to the United States when in the critical period of the Civil War Thaddeus Stevens held sway in the House of Representatives at Washington, and that Lancaster County gave Pennsylvania's only President of the United States, James Buchanan, to the nation. He also paid a glowing tribute to Governor William C. Sproul for doing one of the finest things a lawyer could do, in recently using his own money to restore the oldest court house in Pennsylvania-that of Delaware County. Judge William H. Keller said that he was not responding as a member of the Superior Court, but as a member of the Lancaster Bar, a distinction which he prized equally with his membership in the Superior Court. In his younger days as a lawyer he felt that he was greatly indebted to Justice Brown for the encouragement, advice and help given to him. He declared that Justice Brown's opinions during his term of office were as virile and strong as those of any Justice in the history of the State, and that they would for all time adorn the pages of legal history. Justice Emory A. Walling said that ex-Chief Justice Brown was not only one of the greatest lawyers, but one of the greatest judges in the United States, but that independent of that and more important than that also was his tenacious adherence to the highest ideals of life, ever present in all his activities. He declared that ex-Chief Justice Brown would under no circumstances willingly do a wrong in anything. Justice Robert S. Frazer expressed great pleasure at being present and a high appreciation of ex-Chief Justice Brown. He said that he had known Judge Brown many years, being with him in the State convention where he and Judge Brown were both delegates-Mr. Brown supporting Judge Agnew for a position on the Bench and Mr. Frazer supporting Judge Sterrett for the same position. He said that the vote was very close and that while Agnew lost, the masterful speech by Mr. Brown in his favor almost swept the convention for his candidate, as he still recalled quite vividly. Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County L. H. Grammes & Sons v. Landis Brothers. Sale-Passing of title-Unavoidable delay in shipment-Destruction of goods by fire-Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543. Where a vendee agreed to buy a gasoline engine at a certain price f. o. b. cars at the home of the vendor, and paid in advance the purchase price agreed upon, but owing to inability to obtain a car promptly shipment was delayed and the engine was destroyed by fire on the vendor's premises before it was placed on a car for shipment, the title to the property never passed but remained in the vendor, and the vendee is entitled to recover the purchase money paid. Rule for judgment for defendants n. o. v. Willis G. Kendig, for rule. Oliver S. Schaeffer, contra. December 31, 1920. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J. The plaintiffs live in Allentown, Pennsylvania, and the defendants are located at Rheims, in this county. The defendants were the owners of a gasoline engine, which they desired to sell. In some way, the plaintiffs learned of this, and Howard L. Walter, their agent, called upon the defendants and inspected the engine. It was then in good condition. Thereupon the agent, by direction of the plaintiffs, on December 4, 1919, wrote to the defendants the following letter: "Referring to the writer's visit to your place, the other day, to inspect the 15 H. P. Columbus engine, will say we would not pay more than $275.00 cash for that engine, f. o. b. cars your place, engine placed on cars and wheels taken off, so as to effect a low freight rate, or wheels left on if agent there agrees to accept at same rate as if shipped knocked down. At any rate, engine would have to be shipped at local low rate. If this is agreeable to you, send us your invoice by return mail, so the writer can pass it for payment, when check would be mailed you and you can then ship engine." Upon receipt of this letter, the defendants sent the invoice, and on December 8, 1919, the plaintiffs returned the same with their check accompanying for $275.00, on which the defendants got the money. But the engine was never shipped by the defendants. The reason for the non-shipment was that on the night of December 15, a fire completely destroyed the defendants' shops and contents, and included in the latter was the gasoline engine. According to the statement contained in a letter of the defendants to the plaintiffs: "On account of not being able to get a car promptly, the shipment was delayed." Under this state of facts, the plaintiffs demanded the return of their money, and because of the defendants' refusal, have brought this suit. A verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants now ask for judgment non obstante veredicto. By the Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543, section 8, it is provided: "First. Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, and subsequently, but before the risk passes to the buyer, without any fault on the part of the seller or the buyer, the goods wholly perish, the VOL. XXXVII, No. 63 L. F. Grammes & Sons v. Landis Brothers. contract is thereby avoided. Second. Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, and subsequently, but before the risk passes to the buyer, without any fault of the seller or the buyer, part of the goods perish or the whole or a material part of the goods so deteriorate in quality as to be substantially changed in character, the buyer may at his option treat the contract: (a) As avoided, or (b) as binding the seller to transfer the property in all of the existing goods or in so much thereof as have not deteriorated, and as binding the buyer to pay the full agreed price if the contract was indivisible, or to pay the agreed price for so much of the goods as the seller, by the buyer's option, is bound to transfer if the contract was divisible." Section 18 declares: "First. Where there is a contract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred," and section 19, Rule 2, that: "Where there is a contract to sell specific goods and the seller is bound to do something to the goods for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the property does not pass until such thing is done." Rule 5 of the same section provides: "If the contract to sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular place, or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the buyer, or to a particular place, the property does not pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or reached the place agreed upon." Several cases decided in the lower Courts appear on some of the provisions of the Act of 1915. While not binding upon us, nevertheless they are entitled to due consideration, and, if their conclusions are persuasive, will be followed by other Courts. Thus, in Smith Company, Limited, v. Marano, 28 Dist. Rep. 848, it was held that, "under a C. I. F. contract, that is, a contract to sell goods at a price which includes cost of goods and freight to a given point and insurance in transit, the property in the goods passes to the buyer on delivery to the carrier." In Frick v. Gruver, 28 Dist. Rep. 896, it appeared that a verbal contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the defendant engaged to sell and deliver at the residence of the plaintiff seven steers and one bull, at a price, which the plaintiff then paid. One of the steers became sick in transit, and as the plaintiff refused to accept it, the defendant left it with the plaintiff to be cared for. It subsequently died. It was held by the Court that, under section 19, Rule 5, of the Sales Act, the contract was executory, and the property did not pass to the plaintiff until the defendant had performed his part of the contract, which was to deliver the cattle in sound condition at the plaintiff's residence. Outside, however, of the specific conditions in the Act, the general principles have been determined by our Courts. Thus, in Sneathen et al. v. Grubbs et al., 88 Pa. 147, it appears that Grubbs & Co. agreed in writing to deliver to the plaintiffs at their landing in Pittsburgh two barges of coal, "price to be 42 cents per bushel, Cincinnati or Louisville guage. Terms cash when delivered in Pittsburgh free of all charges." The plaintiffs furnished the barges and the coal was placed in them by the defendants; but, owing to the low water in the river, L. F. Grammes & Sons v. Landis Brothers. they could not be taken to Pittsburgh. While lying at their works, the coal was levied upon by the defendants' creditors, and the plaintiffs brought an action of replevin. It was held that, as the delivery of the coal had not taken place and the terms of the contract had not been performed, no title to the coal passed which could be enforced by the purchasers. Again, in Miller v. Seaman, 176 Pa. 291, the facts were, that The Dent Lumber Company sold eleven piles of hemlock lumber for a lump sum to A. Z. Miller. Miller took possession, and at once caused each pile to be distinctly marked with his initials. Subsequently, he made a contract of sale with the defendants, whereby the lumber in these same piles was sold to them at $8.25 per thousand feet. The quantity was to be ascertained by actual measurement, and as the lumber was loaded, it was to be measured and inspected by Mr. Sam. Amand. The seller was to deliver it f. o. b. cars at Williamsport, and the price was to be paid on the quantity contained in each shipment within thirty days after shipment, and shipments were to be made as ordered until June 1, 1894. At that time, the lumber remaining, which belonged to these eleven piles, was to be inspected and measured or estimated by Mr. S. V. Van Fleet, and paid for in cash at $8.00 a thousand. Some shipments were made and paid for, but before June 1, 1894, a flood came, whereby the lumber was lost. It was held that the title to the lumber did not pass out of Miller until it was measured, inspected and loaded at the expense of the seller and delivered f. o. b. cars at Williamsport to the purchaser. In Dannemiller v. Kirkpatrick, 201 Pa. 218, the Court said: "It will be conceded that, if there was no delivery of the coffee to the defendants, the loss of the goods must fall upon the plaintiffs, who still retained the title. If a vendor agrees to deliver at a certain place, the property is at his risk until it is so delivered." See, also, Dentzel v. Island Park Association, 229 Pa. 403; Star Brewing Company's license, 43 Sup. 577. If the plaintiffs had done nothing to retard the delivery, and there was no act to be performed by them in relation thereto, there are cases in which, under such circumstances, it has been held that the goods passed to the purchaser. Thus, in Fee v. Emporium Lumber Co., 50 Sup. 557, the written contract provided that the plaintiffs would sell to the defendant at a certain rate per 1000 feet all the logs on certain lands which the plaintiffs "may see fit to deliver " at a railroad named. The logs were to be scaled by two men appointed by the plaintiffs and by one appointed by the defendant, or, if the defendant failed to send a scaler, the plaintiffs were to scale and mark the number of feet on the end of each log scaled, and make report to the defendant. The defendant never furnished a scaler. Certain logs were delivered at the railroad, which were burned before they were scaled and marked. It was held that the title to the logs passed to the defendant, when they were delivered at the railroad, and that the fact that they were never scaled nor measured was immaterial as affecting the title. That, however, is not the case. Here, the defendants were to deliver the gasoline engine f. o. b. cars, engine placed on cars, &c. Owing to their inability to obtain a |