dent no other man has been named. Whence then the necessity of precautionary measures where there was no danger? Had there been a division on this point among the republicans, there might be some plausibility in the suggestion; but in a case, where perfect harmony prevails; where no man is even dreamt of but Mr Jefferson, it is absurd to ascribe the least influence to personal attachment to him. The absurdity of such motive will more conclusively appear from the following analysis of electo

ral votes.

At the ensuing election it is impossible for the federalists to obtain more than 42 votes, viz. from New Hampshire 7, Connecticut 9, Massachusetts 19, Delaware. 3, Maryland 3, and North Carolina 1. The probability is that they will fall short of this number at least ten. But allow them: 42. The whole number of votes is 175: from which deduct 42, and there remains one hundred and thirty three, the number of the republican votes.

Suppose no amendment made to the constitution All these votes would in such event go to Mr. Jefferson.

To prevent the individual, contemplated, for vice-president, from becoming president, by receiving the federal votes, it would be necessary to withdraw from him forty-three republican votes. This would leave him ninety which, with the forty-two federal votes would make a number less than the number given to Mr. Jefferson. But, in or der to guard against all unexpected contingencies, it would be perfectly safe to withhold ninety votes; as there would still remain forty-three, one more than the entire number of federal votes. In this way, a republican vice-president, as well as president would be secured, as the constitution provides that "in every case, after the choice of the president, the person having the greatest number of the electors, shall be the vice president."

We shall now proceed to consider the measures of the administration under the divisions flowing from the distribution of powers among the departments of finance, war, navy and state.

The control of financial operations has been seen to be an object of great importance. In modern times its consequence has greatly increased; and there is probably no nation of the civilised world to which it is more important than to the United States; as in the event of any serious external or internal danger, our reliance will be, not on large existing military establishments, but on our ability promptly to call forth the strength of the country.

On a subject of so much importance, the President appears to have been sensible of the propriety of avowing his opinions with explicitness.

Having called to the head of the treasury a man of uncommon clearness of perception, of great industry, and of irreproachable morals, worthy of the confidence of the whole nation and eminently possessed of that of the republicans, he communicated the principles on which the executive contemplated to act, and recommended various measures to Congress.

After a critical scrutiny into the national expences and resources, with that confidence which flows from a conviction of accurate information, he proposed the abolition of the internal taxes, and. a more rapid discharge of the public debt. Το justify these steps a general retrenchment of unnecessary expences was recommended, so far as. depended upon law, and pursued so far as depended upon the executive.

The abolition of the internal taxes has been declared an unwise measure by the opponents of the administration, and effects, the most pernicious, predicted as likely to flow from it. A large por

tion of these predictions, having been falsified by experience, require at present no notice. The remaining resources have proved not only equal to every existing engagement of the government, but likewise to a more rapid discharge of the public debt than that for which the national faith was pledged. The extraordinary expences incurred by the purchase of Louisiana, and the defence of the Mediterranean trade, are not overlooked. subsequent part of this view, it will be made distinctly to appear, that the former is one of those vast and extraordinary events that justifies the use of extraordinary means, and that the latter is a measure likely to be of but short duration, and consequently not requiring permanent revenues.

In a

Assuming it then as an indisputable fact, that the revenue derived from the internal revenues could be spared, our enquiry, as to the expediency of their repeal, is narrowed into a consideration whether it was expedient to repeal them, or to diminish the duties on imported articles.

Every one acquainted with the history of the United States knows, that after the revolutionary war, it was a general, not to say universal impres sion, that the great power of taxation, vested in the general government, should be over imported commodities. This impression arose undoubtedly from the legitimate relationship between the nature of a government federal in its structure, and a tax whose equal operation could only be secured by the general government. Under this impression, and the most importunate intreaties of Congress, twelve states, a short time before the adoption of the constitution, had agreed to vest Congress with the power of laying a duty of five per cent. on imported articles. Rhode-Island, not then constituting more than a sixtieth part of the union, alone resisted this measure. But for her resistance, the

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power would have been conferred, and the new constitution would probably never have been framed. When framed, it gave Congress absolute and exclusive power over duties on foreign commodities, thereby adding another, to the numerous existing proofs that this was considered as the appropriate resource of the general government. It gave, at the same time, a concurrent power, with the states, over every other source of revenue, with the express view of enabling a government, charged with the national defence, on any great emergency to call into activity the undivided resources of the community. This was the only reason, perhaps a falacious one, on which this sweeping power of taxation was confided. Accordingly Congress, in the first instance, confined themselves to the imposition of duties on external commerce. At a subsequent period the internal taxes were resorted to, under an alleged want of revenue. The same cause gave rise to a direct tax on lands, houses and slaves. This cause ceasing, was it not proper to re-possess the states of these resources? This alone, abstracted from all other considerations, would have been a sufficient justification of the measure.

But in addition to these there were other cogent

reasons.

The internal revenues fostered a system of extensive patronage dangerous to a republican government. Five hundred officers were employed in their collection, and two hundred thousand dollars annually expended, amounting to twenty per cent. while the expence of collecting the external duties amounted to only five per cent. without producing any diminution in the aggregate expence by a decrease of duties. Here then is an annual saving of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. It is not practicable to estimate with

precision the public injury arising from the existence of five hundred useless officers. It is within bounds, however, to say that their labor or ingenuity, if in a small degree productive, would exceed a hundred thousand dollars.

Some respect unquestionably was due by the representatives of a free people to the established impression that an excise is hostile to liberty. In a state of society, differing in one respect from that of all other nations, in protecting the unmolested exercise of industry in channels chosen by itself, it is certainly of importance little short of infinite to resist the establishment of a system which gives to governments the control and direction of every branch of internal manufacture; enabling them thereby to depress or elevate, according to the measure of taxation applied, the condition of every class of citizens; a power, so nearly approximated to despotism, as to have become hateful in every nation not degraded to the lowest condition.

It has been said that the repeal of these taxes operated to the local injury of a part of the union, and tended to oppress the poor.

To exhibit the local effects of the repeal, we have drawn out the following table. The first column exhibits the number of representatives to which each state is entitled; the second specifies the sums paid in each state in the year one thousand eight hundred and one; the third shews, without descending to fractions, the quota of the whole tax, which, for that year, each state would have paid had it been assessed in the ratio of numbers; the fourth exhibits the gain, and the last the loss of each state, on that principle, arising from the repeal.