Art. 487. Power of cities to levy taxes.... 259 Sanborn & Berryman's Annotated Statutes. § 1693a. Judgment in fraud of assignment 573 Foreign building and loan associations. Foreign building and loan associations. Washington. 2014a. Constitution. 2014b. Art. 1, § 22. Right of accused in criminal prosecutions. 824 12, 7. Transaction of business by 550 ... Wyoming. Constitution. 565 565 109 ... 1, § 1761. Appropriation of water for irrigation. 109 1, § 1774. Appropriation of water for irrigation. 109 2, 158. Venue of action........... 2, 159. Venue of action.......... 2, 161. Venue of action...... Code of Procedure. $108. Common law doctrine... West Virginia. Code. Chap. 61, § 7. Compensation for recovery 83 taxation. 1890-91, p. 163. When taxes are payable.. 597 1895, chap. 44. School money in county treasury. 597 605 83 1895, chap. 61. Taxing live stock. 597 act taxing live stock.. 598 of property. 499 83, § 12. Lands of persons under 3817. Omitted property added to tax list. 597 ... disability. 294 83, 14. Lands of persons under 3821. Duty of county board to direct treasurer to refund erroneous disability.. 294 ... tax. 605 3833. Redemption to purchaser at tax sale when unlawful. 605 3845. Assessment of personal property. 597 3846. Assessment of personal property. 602 3847. Collector may detain property 602 about to be removed. 3849. Assessment of personal property.. 602 LAWYERS' REPORTS ANNOTATED. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. Elizabeth G. HUGHES, Appt., v. COUNTY OF MONROE, Respt. (147 N. Y. 49.) 1. A county is not liable for injuries received by an employee from a defective machine in an asylum which was maintained by the county in discharge of its duty as a political division of the state to care for its insane. 2. The maintenance of a county asylum NOTE.-Liabilities of counties in actions for torts and negligence. I. Injuries to travelers and vehicles. does not become a private business such that the county is liable for injuries received by employees, by reason of the fact that some revenue is incidentally derived by the county from the sale of surplus farm products and from payments made by those liable for the support of insane persons kept in the asylum. (October 8, 1895.) APPEAL by plaintiff from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court, Fifth a voluntary corporation; that it is a subordinate political division of a state; that its action is legislative; that neither the state nor its counties could a. By bridges and approaches being out of be sued for trespass of its officers; that counties repair. 1. Implied liability. 2. Where statute imposes liability. b. From defective roads and highways. c. Where the injury was caused by the fright d. By negligence of employee. II. Injuries to other persons. a. From condition of buildings. 2. On account of escape from prison. III. Injuries to real property from public improve ments. a. Generally. are instrumentalities of government; that counties partake of the immunities of states; that they should not be liable on the ground of ancient precedent and public policy. The cases which hold that there is an implied liability against a county maintain this on various grounds, some of which are as follows: Electing to act under a power granted imposes a duty rendering it liable; there is a liability for acts done in the discharge of a self-imposed duty not enjoined by law; compensation must be made for taking property without compensation; where the statute creates a duty to repair the liability is the same as that of a city. The leading case on this question is Russell v. Devon County, 2 T. R. 661, which has been made b. By construction and operation of bridges. more or less the foundation of all the cases denyc. By roads. d. By ditches, canals, and dams. e. By buildings. ing a liability, although it can hardly be said that the counties in this country at the present time stand on the same footing as quasi corporations in IV. Other wrongful and negligent acts affecting England in 1789. persons or property. a. Generally. b. Affecting property. V. Infringement of patents. VI. Damages by defaulting officer. VII. By misapplication, conversion, or taking property. VIII. Presentation of claims before county board as a condition precedent to suit. IX. Summary. I. Injuries to travelers and vehicles. a. By bridges and approaches being out of repair. 1. Implied liability. In JASPER COUNTY COMRS. v. ALLMAN it was held that, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2887, Rev. Stat. 1894, § 3277 (§ 3), providing that the board of county commissioners shall receive and appropriate donations for the erection and repair of bridges and aid the same when of general importance, providing, however, that it the board of comWith but few exceptions counties are not liable missioners shall not deem any such bridge of suffifor torts or negligence in the condition, use, and cient importance to make an appropriation from management of public institutions. The cases the county treasury for the erection or repairs frequently admit that the distinction between lia- thereof, the trustees of any township may approbilities of counties and cities is one without a dif-priate any part of the road-tax fund for that purference, but nevertheless adhere to the rule. The reasons in the several cases endeavoring to apply or evolve the principle are various, among which are the following: That there is no corporation fund out of which satisfaction could be made; that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should sustain an inconvenience; that it is not a body corporate; that it is See also 47 L. R. A. 480. pose if they deem it right and expedient, the board of commissioners have no power to appropriate county funds to the repair of a bridge unless they deem it of sufficient importance, and therefore the county was not liable for injuries caused to a traveler by a defective approach to a bridge. It was further held that the board could only cause bridges to be repaired when the road district was Department, granting a new trial after verdict The facts are stated in the opinion. At the time of the accident in question, the statutes of this state prescribed that each county might sue and be sued in the manner prescribed by law. 1 Birdseye's Rev. Stat. p. 730, § 1. not able to do it by its road work and tax. This case follows the late Indiana cases overruling the former cases, which held there was an implied liability on counties for injuries caused from defective bridges. This decision is in accord with the weight of authority. In the absence of a statute it is generally beld that counties are not liable in an action for damages for injuries caused by bridges being out of repair, although in Iowa, Maryland, and Pennsylvania a contrary rule prevails, as formerly in Indiana, and in some states a provision is made therefor by statute. The cases holding there is no implied liability are as follows: The leading case on liability of counties for negligence and tort held that the inhabitants of a county were not liable for an injury done to a wagon in consequence of a bridge being out of repair, which ought to have been repaired by the county. It held that no recovery could be had in the absence of a statute imposing liability, distinguishing the cases where a recovery was had under the statute of hue and cry, because in those cases there was a statutory remedy. It was further held that there could be no liability because there was no corporation fund out of which satisfaction could be made; also that the principle of law that where an individual sustains injury by neglect or default of another the law gives him remedy, must give way to the principle that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should sustain an inconvenience. Russell v. Devon County, 2 T. R. 667. Police duties are always held to be pub lic duties, performed for the benefit of the whole state, and neither counties nor munici palities, existing under special charters, are liable for acts of omission or commission in the matter of preserving order or confining offenders against the law. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 974. (772); Shearm. & Redf. Neg. § 260; Beach, Pub. Corp. § 745. Counties, and cities in states which recog nize no distinction between the two are liable to action for private nuisance. Michel v. Monroe County Supers. 39 Hun, 47; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, 31 Am. Dec. 157; Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio, 229, 51 Am. Dec. 453; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, though in truth "we believe there are none." It was also said: "It was much pressed that unless the words in question were allowed to have the operation contended for by the plaintiff, it was impossible to give them any at all. The court below felt the pressure of this argument, and attempted to meet it by one or two suppositions which do not entirely satisfy us. But this difficulty, even if it were greater than it appears to us, would not warrant us in giving such effect to these words as the plaintiff requires, creating a new liability clearly without the intention of the legislature, and working injustice at the same time. The judgment of the court below, therefore, will be affirmed." Makinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 457, affirming 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 509. In Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan, 340, it was said that "if a man have particular damage by a foundrous way, he is generally without remedy though the nuisance is to be punished by the King. The reason is, because a foundrous way, a decayed bridge, or the like, are commonly to be repaired by some township, vill, hamlet, or a county who are not corporate, and therefore no action lies against them for a particular damage, but their neglects are to be presented, and they punished by fine to the King. But if a particular person or body corporate be to repair a certain highway, or portion of it, or a bridge, and a man is endamaged parti cularly by the foundrousness of the way, or decay of the bridge, be may have his action against the person or body corporate, who ought to repair for his damage, because he can bring his action against them; but where there is no person against whom to bring his action, it is as if a man be damaged by one that cannot be known." So, a county was held not liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge on a public highway where there was no statute imposing liability, in Granger v. Pulaski County, 26 Ark. 37; Barnett v. Contra Costa County, 67 Cal. 77; White v. Bond County, 58 Ill. 297, 11 Am. Rep. 65; Hedges v. Madi 704; Carter v. Wilds, 8 Houst. (Del.) 14; Brabham v. In an action against the inhabitants of a county for injuries caused by a defective bridge, naming the county surveyor as defendant, under 43 Geo. III., chap. 59, § 4, providing that the inhabitants of counties sball and may sue for any damages done to bridges and other works, and repair at the expense of such counties respectively, and for the "recovering" of any property belonging to such counties in the name of their surveyor, "and also shall and may be sued in the name of such survey-son County, 6 Ill. 567; Wheatly v. Mercer, 9 Bush, or,... but the surveyor for the time being shall be deemed the plaintiff or defendant in such action provided always, that every such surveyor shall always be reimbursed and paid out of the moneys in the hands of the treasurer of the public stock of such county... all such costs and charges as he shall be put unto," which statute was passed fifteen years after the decision of Russell v. Devon County, 2 T. R. 687,-it was held at first that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, but the judgment was arrested on the ground that the words "costs and charges” did not give a liability against the county by an action against the surveyor. It was said that it may be reasonably considered that the legislature supposed there were some cases where the county was liable at common law, and might have execution against it for the damages, In Clark v. Adair County, 79 Mo. 536, Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313, was distinguished, as in that case the county was the owner and proprietor of the property it was improving. And in Wood v. Tipton County, 7 Baxt. 112, 32 Am. Rep. 561, it was held that a county was not liable for failure to keep a county bridge in repair where there was no statute imposing such liability. It was said that a county was declared by statute to be a corporation, but this only meant in regard to contracts and the power to sue and be sued. And a county was not liable for injuries caused by a detective bridge. It was said that counties |