it was utterly impracticable to divide the employees so that those engaged in interstate commerce should be confined to that commerce exclusively. As Congress could limit the hours of labor of those engaged in interstate transportation, it necessarily followed that its will could not be frustrated by the commingling of duties relating to intrastate operations.

THE COMMODITIES CLAUSE.

Act of June 29, 1906.

AN ACT to regulate commerce.

From and after May first, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport from any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or commodity, other than timber and the manufactured products thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by it, or under its authority, or which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect, except such articles or commodities as may be necessary and intended for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier.

THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

Act of Congress of April 22, 1908, and Amendment of April 5, 1910.

AN ACT relating to the liability of common carriers by railroads to their employees in certain cases.

Be it enacted, etc., That every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

SEC. 2. That every common carrier by railroad in the Territories, the District of Columbia, the Panama canal zone, or other possessions of the United States, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in any of said jurisdictions, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if

none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any neglect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

SEC. 3. That in all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.

SEC. 4. That in any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act to recover damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.

SEC. 5. That any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this act, shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act, such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought.

SEC. 6. That no action shall be maintained under this Act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.

SEC. 7. That the term "common carrier" as used in this Act shall include the receiver or receivers or other persons or corporations charged with the duty of the management and operation of the business of a common carrier. SEC. 8. That nothing in this Act shall be held to limit the duty or liability of common carriers, or to impair the rights of their employees under any other Act or Acts of Congress.

AMENDMENT OF 1910 TO EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

AN ACT to amend an Act entitled, “An Act relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases," approved April twenty-second, nineteen hundred and eight.

Be it enacted, etc., That an Act entitled "An Act relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases," ap

proved April twenty-second, nineteen hundred and eight, be amended in section six so that said section shall read:

SEC. 6. That no action shall be maintained under this Act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.

"Under this Act an action may be brought in a circuit court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this Act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States, and no case arising under this Act and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States."

SEC. 2. That said Act be further amended by adding the following section as section nine of said Act:

"SEC. 9. That any right of action given by this Act to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee; but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury."

Approved, April 5, 1910.

WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT.

Act of June 25, 1910, known as the Mann Act.

Be it enacted, etc., That the term "interstate commerce" as used in this Act, shall include transportation from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and the term "foreign commerce," as used in this Act, shall include transportation from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to any foreign country and from any foreign country to any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.

SEC. 2. That any person shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the

intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

SEC. 3. That any person who shall knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, or cause to be persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced, or aid or assist in persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose on the part of such person that such woman or girl shall engage in the practice of prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whether with or without her consent, and who shall thereby knowingly cause or aid or assist in causing such woman or girl to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers in interstate or foreign commerce, or any Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

SEC. 4. That any person who shall knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any woman or girl under the age of eighteen years from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia, with the purpose and intent to induce or coerce her, or that she shall be induced or coerced to engage in prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, and shall in furtherance of such purpose knowingly induce or cause her to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger in interstate commerce upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Note. In the cases of Diggs v. United States, and Caminetti v. United States, 220 Fed. 545, which were heard and decided together on April 8th, 1915, Diggs and Caminetti were charged with violating the White Slave Traffic Act in that they each transported a woman from Sacramento, California, to Reno, Nevada, for the purpose of debauchery and for an immoral purpose. The defendants were found guilty in the lower court of the crime charged and appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. One of their contentions was that the Court in its instructions to the jury gave to the words "concubine" and "mistress" too wide and inclusive a meaning. They argued that by transporting the women for the purpose of making them their concubines and mistresses they were not guilty of the offense defined in the Act; that the words "prostitution and debauchery, or any other immoral practice," do not include concubinage, but that the

immorality denounced by the White Slave Traffic Act is only commercialized vice. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal decisions were against these contentions, citing Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308; Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U. S. 326; United States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393. The defendants then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on June 4, 1915, and afterwards, upon a petition for rehearing, was granted on June 21, 1915. The matter is now pending in the Supreme Court.

In United States v. Bitty, supra, the defendant was indicted with the offense of having imported into the United States from England an alien woman for an immoral purpose, viz., that she should live with him as his concubine or mistress, in violation of the immigration laws. The defendant maintained that his purpose in importing the woman was not immoral within the meaning of the statute, in that the statute referred to the bringing of such women into this country for the purpose of prostitution. The Supreme Court held that the act of the defendant was within the meaning of the statute. In Athanasaw v. United States, supra, the defendant employed a woman at Atlanta, Ga., as a chorus girl and paid her railroad fare to Tampa, Fla., where she was to appear in a musical show. He then led her to surroundings such as tended to induce her to give herself up to a condition of debauchery. The Supreme Court held that the language of the White Slave Traffic Act is directed against the transportation of any woman for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intention and purpose to induce, entice or compel a woman to become a prostitute, or give herself up to debauchery, or engage in any other immoral practice; that the term debauchery as used in the statute has an idea of sexual immorality, and that the act of the defendant was within the meaning of the statute. In Hoke et al. v. United States, supra, one of the defendants induced a woman to go from New Orleans, La., to Beaumont, Texas, for the purpose of prostitution. The defendants claimed that it was the right and privilege of a person to move between the States, and that such being the right, another cannot be made guilty of a crime of inducing or aiding in the exercise of it; that the motive or intention of the passenger is not a matter of interstate commerce; that the States are the proper parties to control the morals of their citizens and to define prostitution as a crime. The Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the defendants, stating that "It is misleading to say that men and women have rights; their rights cannot fortify or sanction their wrongs, and if they employ interstate transportation as a facility of their wrongs, it may be forbidden to them to the extent of the Act of July 25, 1910, and we need go no further in the present case."

WEBB ACT.

AN ACT divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain

cases.

Passed over the President's veto by the Senate February 28, 1913, and by the House of Representatives March 1, 1913.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the shipment or transporta