were stationed? or could he be fined or taxed for doing so? We have not yet heard these questions answered in the affirmative." In more recent days the principle was applied when the governor of a soldier's home was convicted for disregard of a state law concerning the use of oleomargarine, while furnishing it to the inmates of the home as part of their rations. It was said that the federal officer was not "subject to the jurisdiction of the State in regard to those very matters of administration which are thus approved by Federal authority." Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 283. It seems to us that the foregoing decisions establish the law governing this

case.

Of course an employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment. That was decided long ago by Mr. Justice Washington in United States v. Hart, Pet. C. C. 390. 5 Ops. Atty. Gen. 554. It very well may be that, when the United States has not spoken, the subjection to local law would extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the employment—as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets. Commonwealth v. Classon, 229 Mass. 329. This might stand on much the same footing as liability under the common law of a state to a person injured by the driver's negligence. But even the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the laws of the United States. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1.

It seems to us that the immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them and pay a fee for permission to go on. Such a requirement does not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the Government has pronounced sufficient. It is the duty of the Department to employ persons competent for their work and that duty it must be presumed has been performed. Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice PITNEY and Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS dissent.

SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION of, and the Rules of CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE TO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES

GIBBONS v. OGDEN (1824)

22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187, 188, 189; 6 L. Ed. 23.

The Constitution must be construed so as to give full effect to all the powers enumerated.

Part of opinion; the full opinion in this case will be found in Sec. 1, Chap. II, past.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL: As preliminary to the very able discussions of the constitution, which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situation of these States, anterior to its formation. It has been said, that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear, underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.

This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they

contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the Government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent: then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee, but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred.

PRIGG v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

(1842)

41 U. S. (16 Peter.) 539, 608, 610; 10 L. Ed. 1060.

The objects in view by the framers of the Constitution must be considered in the light of contemporary history.

Mr. Justice STORY: This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, brought under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, for the purpose of revising the judgment of that Court, in a case involving the construction of the Constitution and laws of the United States. *

[The Court here states the facts which briefly are that Prigg, a resident of Maryland, seized and carried away a fugitive slave woman found in Pennsylvania and returned her to her owner in Maryland contrary to a Pennsylvania statute. Prigg was indicted and convicted. He claimed that the statute of Pennsylvania was in conflict with the Constitution of the United States especially the second paragraph of Section 2, Article 4 which reads: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim to the party to whom such service or labor may be due." The Court, upon consideration of the causes leading to the adoption of the clause above quoted, held the Pennsylvania act unconstitutional.]

Few questions which have ever come before this Court involve more delicate and important considerations; and few upon which the public at large may be presumed to feel a more profound and pervading interest. We have accordingly given them our most deliberate examination; and it has become my duty to state the result to which we have arrived, and the reasoning by which it is supported.

Before, however, we proceed to the points more immediately before us, it may be well-in order to clear the case of difficultyto say, that in the exposition of this part of the Constitution, we shall limit ourselves to those considerations which appropriately and exclusively belong to it, without laying down any rules of interpretation of a more general nature. It will, indeed, probably, be found, when we look to the character of the Constitution itself,

the objects which it seeks to attain, the powers which it confers, the duties which it enjoins, and the rights which it secures, as well as the known historical fact that many of its provisions were matters of compromise of opposing interests and opinions, that no uniform rule of interpretation can be applied to it, which may not allow, even if it does not positively demand, many modifications in its actual application to particular clauses. And, perhaps, the safest rule of interpretation after all will be found to be to look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights, with all the lights and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of each just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed. *

THE COLLECTOR v. DAY (1870)

78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 113, 122; 20 L. Ed. 122.

Considering the relation of the Federal and State governments, the Federal government may not tax the governmental agencies of the States, nor may the States tax the agencies of the Federal government.

Mr. Justice NELSON: The case presents the question whether or not it is competent for Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, to impose a tax upon the salaries of a judicial officer of a State?

In Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Peters, 435, it was decided that it was not competent for the legislature of a State to levy a tax upon the salary or emoluments of an officer of the United States. The decision was placed mainly upon the ground that the officer was a means or instrumentality employed for carrying into effect some of the legitimate powers of the government, which could not be interfered with by taxation or otherwise by the States, and that the salary or compensation for the service of the officer was inseparably connected with the office; that if the officer, as such, was exempt, the salary assigned for his support or maintenance while holding the office was also, for like reasons, equally exempt.

The cases of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, and Weston v. Charleston, 2 Peters, 449, were referred to as settling the principle that governed the case, namely, "that the State governments cannot lay a tax upon the constitutional means employed