Under this bill, the Attorney General is given absolute and the uncontrolled power, upon application by any person affected or any parent of such person, to bring a suit for desegregation of schools. The provisions of the bill giving the Attorney General the power to bring suits for the desegregation of schools is contained in the same title which gives the Federal Commissioner of Education the power to make grants or loans for the correction of what the bill calls "racially imbalanced schools." Since these provisions are in the same title and must be construed together, it necessarily follows that the Attorney General is vested with the power to bring suits to desegregate schools through the application of the "racially imbalanced school" theory.

All of the powers vested in the Attorney General by title III are discretionary in nature. By this it is meant that his action is to be governed by his own whim or caprice or at best by his good intentions. Under title III, the Attorney General can bring one suit for the benefit of one person and refuse to bring a suit for the benefit of another person in exactly the same situation. He can bring a suit against one school board and refuse to bring a suit against another school board under exactly the same circumstances.

In other words, the bill makes the power to bring desegregation suits the personal power of the occupant of the office of Attorney General of the United States. He is the only individual out of 180 million people residing in this country who can make any decision as to whether or not a suit is to be brought, and he can base that decision solely upon his caprice or his whim. Consequently, he can use this uncontrolled and uncontrollable power to play politics if he so wills.

In my judgment, this is a power which ought not to be vested in the Attorney General. In the old days, the political adviser to each administration was the Postmaster General, who had little to do other than to read the postal cards. During recent years, however, it has been customary for the Attorney General to be the chief political adviser to the administration in power regardless of whether such administration is Democratic or Republican.

The duty and the power to prosecute people either in criminal cases or in civil actions for violating Federal laws ought to be divorced entirely from politics both for the sake of the administration of justice and also for the sake of securing the confidence of the people in the Department of Justice. Certainly such power ought not to be made discretionary at the caprice or whim of the chief political adviser to an administration.

I wish to point out some further objections to the provisions of the bill empowering the Attorney General to bring suits to desegregate schools. Under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, any individual person having a legal interest in the matter can bring a private suit to desegregate a public school. Such person does not necessarily have to rely solely upon his own resources because the Attorney General virtually always intervenes in a private desegregation suit as amicus curiae. I have only heard of one Federal judge who ever denied the Attorney General the privilege of going into a private desegregation suit as a friend of the court. Consequently, it is wholly unnecessary to give the Attorney General the power to bring school desegregation suits as set out in subsections (a) and (b) of section 307 or the absolute power to intervene in private desegregation suits as

set out in subsection (c) of section 307. In my opinion, the proponents of this bill wish to vest these powers in the Attorney General in order to deprive the defendants in desegregation suits of some substantial legal rights which they enjoy under sections 402 and 3691 of title 18 of the United States Code. Under these statutes, any person charged with contempt based on an act which is also a criminal offense under the laws of the United States or of any State has an absolute right to trial by jury and cannot be punished by a fine exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment exceeding 6 months unless the alleged contemptuous act was committed in disobedience to some order entered in a suit "brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States."

If the Attorney General were to bring a school desegregation suit or were to intervene in a private desegregation suit brought by an individual as he would be authorized to do by title III of this bill, he would thereby rob any defendant who might be charged with a contemptuous act arising out of disobedience to any desegregation order in such suit of his right to a trial by jury upon such contempt charge and likewise of his right to the limited punishments described in sections 402 and 3691 of title 18 of the United States Code.

Instead of having the right to be tried by a jury, he would be tried by a judge, who ordinarily would be the judge whose order he had allegedly disobeyed. Instead of having the benefit of limited punishment specified by these statutes, he would be subject to any punishment by way of fine or imprisonment which the judge might impose upon him so long as such punishment does not exceed the nebulous limit of amendment 8 of the Constitution which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed and cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.

What I have said on this point is sustained by Brown v. Lederer, 140 F. (2d) 136, and United States v. Greene, 140 F. Supp. 117.

The fact that there is no known limit on the punishment which a judge can visit on a person convicted of contempt under these circumstances is well illustrated by the case of United States v. Thompson, 214 F. (2d) 545, which upheld the legality of imprisonment for 4 years in such an instance. It is to be remembered in this connection that under section 242 of title 18 of the United States Code, any willful disobedience to any desegregation order would constitute a crime.

The veneration of the Founding Fathers for the right of trial by jury is shown in many ways. I shall cite only one of them. Among the reasons which the Declaration of Independence gives to justify the severance of the bands of the Colonies to the mother country was the fact that England had denied the colonists the right to trial by jury in many cases and strange to say, England denied the colonists the right to trial by jury in a way quite similar to that in which defendants in desegregation suits charged with contempt are to be denied such right by this bill. England denied the colonists the right to trial by jury by extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court which functioned without a jury. This bill undertakes to deprive defendants charged with contempt in desegregation cases of the right to trial by jury by giving the courts of equity jurisdiction of desegregation suits prosecuted either initially or by intervention by the Attorney General. The right to trial by jury does not exist in equity courts or under the statutes mentioned in suits prosecuted by the United States.

I respectfully submit that Congress ought not to vote for a law which is based upon the premise that children should be denied the right to attend schools with their playmates and friends in their neighborhood, and hauled to distant points in other school districts merely to mix up the races in the schools.

And Congress ought not to pass a law which would deny persons charged with contempts, which are also crimes under Federal or State law, the right to trial by jury and the right to limited punishments as fixed by Congress rather than the arbitrary discretion of a Federal judge.

I am not going to talk long about the provisions dealing with the creation of the Community Services, or the extension of the life of the Civil Rights Commission and the expansion of its powers.

Since January 1, 1957, Congress has created two agencies of the Federal Government to deal with this general field. One of them is the Civil Rights Commission. From my observation, the principal function that the Civil Rights Commission has been serving has been agitating. The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice aggravates.

And now the administration makes a third proposal that Congress create another agency, a Community Relations Service, for the purpose of conciliating. It might be well for the Federal Government to conciliate after it agitates and aggravates. At the same time, however, I cannot vote to establish a Community Relations Service unless I have some reason to believe that such Service will be different from every Federal agency created between the time our Republic was established and the present moment. When Congress creates a Federal agency for one purpose, the agency comes before Congress at its next session and asks for vastly increased powers.

The validity of this observation is illustrated in the Civil Rights Commission itself. It was created to investigate and recommend. Now it wants to have additional powers to act as a clearinghouse and to give advice as to the solutions to all of these problems.

I wouldn't have any objection to the Community Relations Service if I didn't know that all past history teaches that the Community Relations Service will not be satisfied to conciliate, but will be back here next session or the next session after that, asking for power to coerce instead or in addition to the power to concilate.

I want to talk about title VI, nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs. I will read this whole section, because this shows, to my mind, that this bill was drawn in extreme haste.

Please listen carefully to it:

Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any law of the United States, providing or authorizing direct or indirect financial assistance for or in connection with any program or activity by way of grant, contract, loan, insurance, guarantee, or otherwise, no such law shall be interpreted as requiring that such financial assistance shall be furnished in circumstances under which individuals participating in or benefiting from the program or activity are discriminated against on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, or are denied participation or benefits therein on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. All contracts made in connection with any such program or activity shall contain such conditions as the President may prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall be no discrimination in employment by any contractor or subcontractor on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. Title VI authorizes the cutting off or denial of Federal assistance on either one of two alternative grounds.

I will read the last ground first, because it is rather clear. It says if people

are denied participation or benefits therein on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

That is somewhat specific. It defines when the denial is going to

occur.

But the alternative ground says that this power can be exercised by somebody-it doesn't even tell who or how-that it can be exercised in circumstances under which individuals

participating in or benefiting from the program or activity are discriminated against on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

This alternative ground lacks any definition of conditions under which the power to deny Federal grants or benefits is to be exercised. Indeed it leaves the decision of the crucial question of what constitutes racial segregation to the absolute discretion of some official or officials who are not named. By inference such official would be the President since the President is charged with the duty of executing the laws. As a practical matter, the President would delegate the absolute discretion to make a decision as to what constitutes racial discrimination under this alternative ground to various officials in various executive branches of the Government. In many cases, the very identity of such officials would be concealed from those upon whom they visit economic punishment for reasons not defined in the bill.

It is impossible to describe the vast sweep of title VI dealing with so-called nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs. Under the second sentence contained in this title, the President is authorized to insert in all contracts made in connection with any federally assisted program or activity and that takes in all Federal programs and activities such conditions—

as the President may prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall be no discrimination in employment by any contractor or subcontractor on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

I respectfully submit that this second sentence constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of the Congress to the President.

Congress certainly does not have the power to vest in the President the absolute discretion to define by contract what acts or omissions shall constitute racial discrimination or what economic or other punishment would be inflicted upon persons and businesses committing such offenses. I respectfully submit that Congress ought never to pass any bill conveying such absolute and general and vague powers upon the President even apart from the constitutional question.

People ought to have their legal rights written in lawbooks. They ought not to have their rights and responsibilities to depend upon the notions of an administrator or the regulations established by an administrator. Congress ought to spell out those powers.

And no dictator could ask for more power than title VI confers on the President.

I am not charging the President with being a dictator. But there is an old expression of Lord Acton's which history proves to be true beyond any doubt. That is the statement that—

power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

I would not vote to give this vast power to any human being who has been born. I don't think any man is capable of exercising wisely or justly such wide powers as this title would vest in the President.

Under this title, the President—or any person to whom he delegated his power-could deny any bank or savings and loan league the benefit of deposit insurance if it did not conform to the wishes of the administration in respect to racial matters. And those wishes are not defined in this law, with any degree of certainty, under the first alternative.

Senator JOHNSTON. Your objection, then, is that we are delegating not only to the President but maybe any little head of any department a right to legislate which the Constitution gives only to the Congress of the United States?

Senator ERVIN. The Senator is exactly correct. The Senator is familiar with the old fable of Aesop about the lion in which he invited another animal into his den to pay him a visit. The animal said, "I am not coming. I notice that all of the tracks of those who have accepted your invitations in times past lead into your den and none of them come out."

The Federal Government never surrenders powers once given it. When Congress gives powers of this kind to the President, the President delegates them to various officials in the agencies of Government. Consequently, the rights and liberties of citizens and their very economic existence-under title VI would be determined by some faceless man in some agency or bureau or department who could not be identified and who could not be held responsible to anybody for the consequences of his actions.

Title VI would give the President approximately $80 billion every year to be used by him as a club or a carrot to compel virtually all businesses in the United States to conform to his wishes or the wishes of some of his underlings in the executive branch of the Government in respect to racial matters.

Under this title a man who owns a house, a dwelling house, which he acquires by a loan from the Veterans' Administration or under a loan guarantee of the Veterans' Administration can be deprived of the right to select the person to whom he may sell his house. The choice of a purchaser could be dictated by the Federal Government in order to enforce some of the ideas of the Federal Government in respect to racial matters.

Not only that, but under this title, the Federal Government could dictate how hospitals benefited by the Hill-Burton Act or grants from the Federal Government should assign patients to wards, or who should constitute the medical staffs of those hospitals in order to make them conform to the notions of the administration in respect to racial

matters.

It is impossible for anyone to describe the full sweep of title VI of this bill. It virtually gives the President the arbitrary power, and I say it is arbitrary because it is not controlled by any standards, or any definitions in this act-it gives him the arbitrary power to determine the economic life and death of many businesses, and of many communities. There has never been a man born who ought to be entrusted with such vast powers.

Senator HRUSKA. Would the Senator yield?