candidates for office of public trust, and if they are within the limits of a fair and honest criticism, and are not inspired by actual malice, they are privileged by the occasion, and are therefore not libelous. Folkard's Starkie, Slander & Libel, 4th ed. p. 311, § 256; King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113, 21 Am. Dec. 102. The only limit to the privilege is that the comments shall be within the limits of a fair and honest criticism, and without actual malice. Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427, 7 Am. Rep. 360. The existence of the privilege does not depend upon the truth of the statements made. King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113, 21 Am. Dec. 102. The question of malice is exclusively for the jury whenever express malice, not legal malice, must be proved. Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427, 7 Am. Rep. 360. The occasion that makes a communication privileged is when one has an interest in a matter or a duty in regard to it, or there is a propriety in utterance, and he makes a statement in good faith to another who has a like interest or duty, or to whom a like propriety attaches to hear the utterance. Van Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190; Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 431, 7 Am. Rep. 360; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 191, 7 Am. Rep. 322. Rep. 307, 26 N. W. 671; Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla. 431, 58 Am. Rep. 676; Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 35; Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 Car. & P. 222; Bourreseau v. Detroit Evening Journal Co. 63 Mich. 425, 30 N. W. 376; Upton v. Hume, 24 Or. 420, 21 L. R. A. 493, 33 Pac. 810; Smith v. Tribune Co. 4 Biss. 477, Fed. Cas. No. 13,118; Smith v. Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, 13 L. R. A. 63, 16 S. W. 881; Com. v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212; Wheaton v. Beecher, 66 Mich. 307, 33 N. W. 503; Brewer v. Weakley, 2 Overt. 99, 5 Am. Dec. 656; Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 183, 31 Am. Rep. 757; Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77; Com. v. Wardwell, 136 Mass. 164; Usher v. Severance, 20 Me. 9, 37 Am. Dec. 33; Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 6 Am. Rep. 314; Reid v. McLendon, 44 Ga. 156; Benton v. State, 56 N. J. L. 551, 36 Atl. 1041; Townshend, Slander & Libel, 255, p. 486; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 30 Am. Rep. 367; McDonald v. Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244, Fed. Cas. No. 8,770; Staub v. Van Benthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467, 17 Rep. 588; 18 Cent. L. J..p. 418; 22 Cent. L. J. p. 422, notes; 21 Cent. L. J. p. 86, notes; Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 33 Am. Rep. 403; Cooley, Torts, 201. Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant is the editor and publisher of a newspaper printed in the county of Buena Vista, one of the counties composing the fourteenth judicial district of this state. The article upon which this prosecution is founded was written by one Bruce, and pub In an action for libel it is for the court to determine whether the alleged libel was a privileged communication; but the questions of good faith, belief in the truth of the state-lished by defendant in his paper, at a time ment, and the existence of actual malice remain for the jury. Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Bays v. Hunt, 60 Iowa, 251, 14 N. W. 785. A privileged communication is not confined to some certain limit or territory. The communication becomes privileged because published on a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and upon reasonable or probable cause and a belief of its truth. Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404, 56 Am. Rep. 274, 2 Atl. 513; Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145, 2 Atl. 568. Messrs. Milton Remley, Attorney General, Charles A. Van Vleck, and Carr & Parker, for appellee: In a criminal case on a plea of justification, practically the defendant is acquitted if he can prove that there exist probable grounds to believe the publication true, for this is sufficient to generate a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 367; Coffee v. State, 3 Yerg. 283, 24 Am. Dec. 570. A candidate for office, when he becomes such, does not thereby surrender his private rights, nor is he without the pale of the protection of the law. Where the defendant publishes an article accusing a candidate of a crime, and the article purports to state facts, the defendant cannot excuse himself without proving the truth of the charge. Bronson v. Bruce, 59 Mich. 467, 60 Am. when one F. H. Helsell was a candidate for the office of judge of the district court in and for said district. The article charged Helsell with fraudulently altering a public record. No claim is here made that the charge was true. It is, however, insisted by defendant that if he published the article in good faith, believing it to be true, and actuated by justifiable motives, he cannot properly be convicted. A determination of the question thus presented will dispose of several of the assignments of error. In order to make plain our reasons for the conclusion at which we have arrived, it will be necessary to consider, to some extent, the common law relating to this subject. First, let us say there have always been some material distinctions preserved between civil actions, in which damages were sought for this offense, and criminal proceedings. In a crminal proceeding at common law, the defenses were but two,-a denial and a plea of privileged communication. The truth of the matter charged could not be given in evidence by a defendant. It was a maxim that "the greater the truth the greater the libel." A prosecution for this offense was founded on the thought that a publication of a libel was likely to provoke a breach of the peace, and the fact that it was true tended rather to increase the probabilities of such a result. 1 Kent, Com. 621. But, in a private action for pecuniary recompense, the truth of the charge could always be shown in justifica. tion or in mitigation of damages, since, as it is said, a man is entitled to no better reputation than his actual character would warrant. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 421; J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 986, note. In course of time, the rule was adopted in many of the states of the Union allowing the truth of the charge to be shown as a defense. In our own state this principle is embodied in the Constitution. Article 1, § 7. But with us it is qualified. The truth can be shown only when the publication is made "with good motives and for justifiable ends." Except as thus modified, the common law relating to libel governs in this state. Without the constitutional provision mentioned, the truth itself would be no defense. There is no little uncertainty in the books on the question of what constitutes a privileged communication, or rather what publications are protected as such. There are cases which hold that a charge of crime made against one who is a candidate for public office may be the subject of privilege. Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404, 56 Am. Rep. 274, 2 Atl. 513. The contrary is held by many courts of high standing. See Bronson v. Bruce, 59 Mich. 467, 60 Am. Rep. 307, 26 N. W. 671, and cases cited. We need not determine between these conflicting authorities, for reasons which will presently appear. An absolute privilege is a complete defense. No legal complaint can be founded upon words spoken or written under its protection. Of this nature are proceedings in legislative assemblies, and generally in judicial tribunals. A qualified privilege is where the communcation is made in the discharge of some duty, social, legal, or moral. Such a defense may be rebutted by a showing of actual malice. To establish a qualified privilege, it must be shown that defendant believed the charge to be true, and published it in the discharge of some duty, and we may assume that it was a duty on his part to make known to the electors of the fourteenth judicial district the true character of a candidate for the office of district judge. But, if this duty was in any way transcended, the good faith of defendant ceased to be material. Evidence of good faith is admissible, not as a defense in itself, but only as an element going to make up the defense of qualified privilege. It appeared in this case, from defendant's own testimony, that he voluntarily published the charge, not only outside the fourteenth judicial district, but outside the state; thus making it known to persons who were in no way interested in the judicial election. We have been cited to no case, and know of no principle of law, that would sustain the claim of privilege, under these circumstances. In Buckstaff v. Hicks, 94 Wis. 34, 68 N. W. 403, on a state of facts quite similar to those here involved, the court said: "The evidence showed that the newspaper in question circulated in adjoining counties and cities outside of the county of Winnebago, and outside of the plaintiff's senatorial district. To claim that there was any duty, public or private, resting on the defendant to publish such a charge against the plaintiff in these localities is to demonstrate the absurdity of the claim. There was not only no duty, but there was certain. ly no tangible interest in the subject-matter on the part of the people outside of the plaintiff's district. Thus, it is very plainly seen that the publication, even if it could be considered as privileged when made to a citizen of Oshkosh, who might be said to be interested in the subject-matter, could not be made broadcast to the world, and preserve its privileged character. The publication is excessive. It must be confined to people to whom defendant owes a duty to speak, or who have an interest with the defendant in the subject-matter." See also Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321, 48 N. W. 555. We have, then, this question, somewhat narrower than discussed by appellant's counsel, presented: Where the publication of libelous matter is shielded by no privilege, can a defendant in a criminal proceeding exonerate himself by showing a belief on his part in the truth of the charge? We know of no authority in support of the affirmative of this proposition. In all the cases where evidence of the good faith of the defendant has been admitted, it was not as a direct de fense, but only as tending to establish one essential element of a qualified privilege. Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa, 533, Bays v. Hunt, 60 Iowa, 251, 14 N. W. 785, and State v. Conable, 81 Iowa, 60, 46 N. W. 759, relied For the reasons stated, we think the evion by defendant, go no further than this. dence of defendant's good faith was inadmis sible. We cates, also, our reasons for holding that the What we have said sufficiently indicourt properly refused the instructions asked by defendant. The charge as given we regard as a concise, clear, and correct exposition of the law governing the case. think, too, that the ground has already been stated upon which we sustain the trial court's action in striking out the testimony upon which exceptions were reserved, and which is discussed in the third division of the argument for defendant, and also the matter complained of in the fifth division thereof. The various questions there raised rest upon defendant's right to show his good faith as a defense. 2. An original book of records from Pocahontas county was introduced in evidence on a certain point. It is claimed there was no authority for bringing an original record from another county; that the proof should have been made by certified copy. If defendant's position is correct, we can see no just ground of complaint on his part. He certainly suffered no prejudice. 3. A witness was allowed to say what person was county auditor at a certain time. It is argued that this was a conclusion, and inadmissible. All that was sought was to show who was acting as county auditor. This could be done without producing his commission. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 83. What the witness stated was a fact, and not a conclu sion. No other matters not covered by what we have already said are presented. Some question is made by appellee as to the sufficiency of the exceptions to raise some of the matters passed upon. We have not investi. gated this claim, but, for reasons that seemed to us sufficient, have passed upon the Robinson, Ch. J., taking no part. Granger, J., not sitting. 1. NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT. James Hopkins SMITH et al., บ. Henry H. FURBISH. (........N. H.........) A right of flowage, which a deed by the proprietor of lands on both sides of a river, conveying one side of it, reserves as part of a mill privilege for the benefit of a mill to be operated by water to be raised by a dam, is to be deemed appurtenant to the land of which the mill and dam will be a part, and not merely an easement in gross. The bed of the river between the middle of the stream and the abutting land belongs to the owner of the latter, under an exception in a deed of a piece of land fronting on a river, "12 rods in length on the bank of said river, and extending back far enough, same width, to comprise 1 acre of land." 8. The right of location belongs to the grantor under a deed of land on one side of a river, from which he reserves the right to build a dam at any point against the land, with the right of flowage resulting therefrom, and also reserving or excepting an acre of land fronting on the river in the immediate vicinity of the dam. The uncertainty of a reservation or exception of the right to build a dam at any point against lands conveyed, with the right of flowage and also 1 acre of land in the Immediate vicinity of the end of the dam, does not render the provision void, as the exercise of a right of election by the grantor will remove the uncertainty. 5. A forfeiture of a right to timber on land given by a deed does not result from a neglect to remove the timber for an unreasonable time. 7. A forfeiture of a grantor's rights in land excepted from a deed, but not distinctly located, does not result from his fail ure to exercise his power of selection in a reasonable time, where the other party has not been damnified by the delay. A tenancy in common is created by acre of land in the immediate vicinity of the dam, as the effect of the provision does not depend upon the choice of the particular word, but upon the nature and effect of the provision itself. 9. The law does not resort to fictions without a motive, or for any other purpose than a compliance with the requirements of justice. 10. 11. 12. The use of the word "heirs" is not necessary to create a title in fee, in New Hampshire, when there is an unqualified grant or reservation of land. The estate reserved to a grantor is not a life estate only, where in a deed of land on one side of a river he reserves the right to build a dam against it, with the accompanying right of flowage, and also to an acre of land in the immediate vicinity of the end of the dam, although his language is "reserving to myself," without using any words of inheritance. A right of election belonging to a grantor who has reserved or excepted out of his grant a piece of land and the right to build a dam and the accompanying right of flowage, without defining the location by the deed, does not terminate by his failure to exercise it during his own life, but continues to his heirs. (Chase, J., dissents.) (July 27, 1894.) ACTION to enforce title to a portion of a of land which complainants' grantor had conveyed to defendant's grantor with a reservation of the portion sought to be recovered in this action. Judgment for plaintiffs. Moses T. Cross, being in possession of lot 4, in the tenth range of lots in Berlin, conveyed to defendant's grantor, Wilson, a portion thereof described as follows: "A certain piece of land, being all that part of lot numbered 4 lying on the east side of the Androscoggin river; reserving to myself the right of building a dam across said river at any point against said land, together with the right of flowage of said land at any and all times caused by said dam when constructed; also, reserving a piece of land 8. An exception, and not merely a res-fronting on said river in the immediate viervation, is created by a deed of land on one side of a river, "reserving" to the grantor the right to build a dam across the river at any point against the land, with the right a deed in which the grantor makes an ex ception of a part not distinctly located, and continues until he exercises his right of election. of flowage caused by the dam, and also an NOTE. As to exceptions and reservations of easements, see Hagerty v. Lee (N. J. L.) 20 L. R. A. 631, and note. As to easements in gross and the right to assign or transmit them, see Fisher v. Fair (S. C.) 14 L. R. A. 333. cinity of the east end of said dam, 12 rods in length on the bank of said river, and extending back far enough, same width, to comprise 1 acre of land; said Wilson to have the timber on said acre of land." Plaintiffs claimed under the reservation in said deed. Further facts appear in the opinion. The reservation of the right to build a dam and flow is not confined to the life of the grantor, Cross, but operates for the benefit of his heirs and assigns in fee. Emerson v. Mooney, 50 N. H. 315; Cole v. Lake Co. 54 N. H. 242; Wilcox v. Wheeler, 47 N. H. 488; Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Smith v. Ladd, 41 Me. 314. Mr. William L. Foster also for plaintiffs. Messrs. Ladd & Fletcher, for defendant: The clause contained in the deed is clearly a reservation, and not an exception. Tiedeman, Real Prop. § 843; Bouvier, Law Dict. title Reservation; Gay v. Walker, 36 Me. 54, 58 Am. Dec. 734; State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Moulton v. Faught, 41 Me. 298; Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315; Ives v. Van Auken, 34 Barb. 566. A reservation must contain words of limitation to enable it to extend beyond the life of the grantor. Kister v. Reeser, 98 Pa. 1, 42 Am. Rep. 608; 1 Devlin, Deeds, § 222, and authorities cited; Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 229, 3 N. E. 206; Curtis v. Gardner, 13 Met. 457; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 5th ed. p. 465, *641; Green's Appeal (Pa.) 12 Cent. Rep. 559, 13 Atl. 972. In the case at bar the reservation is "reserving to myself." A reservation thus restricted and qualified has been held to be a reservation for the life of the grantor only. Barnes v. Burt, 38 Conn. 541; Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 229, 3 N. E. 206; Ashcroft v. Eastern R. Co. 126 Mass. 196, 30 Am. Rep. 672. Wherever there is any ambiguity in the language of a deed the construction is to be, always, most favorable to the grantee. Darling v. Crowell, 6 N. H. 421; Leavitt v. Towle, 8 N. H. 96; Cocheco Mfg. Co. v. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305. Every exception or reservation in deeds of conveyance is to be construed most strictly against the grantor, and most beneficially for the grantee. Wyman v. Farrar, 35 Me. 64. The reservation of the land is so general, uncertain, and indefinite that the court must hold it void for uncertainty. 1 Devlin, Deeds, § 222; Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. Pendergast, 24 N. H. 54; Darling v. Crowell, 6 N. H. 421; Bailey v. White, 41 N. H. 337; Massey v. Belisle, 24 N. C. (2 Ired. L.) 170; Andrews v. Todd, 50 N. H. 565; Morse v. Stockman, 73 Wis. 89, 40 N. W. 679; Gaston v. Weir, 84 Ala. 193, 4 So. 258; Coker v. Roberts, 71 Tex. 597, 9 S. W. 665; Butcher v. Creel, 9 Gratt. 201. The purpose of the clause in the deed from Cross to Wilson, "reserving to myself the right of building a dam across said river," was to give the grantor the easement of maintaining a dam and flowing the land. But "an easement cannot be created by way of exception from a grant of land, because an easement, not being any specific part of the subject of grant, like timber or minerals, is not properly a subject of exception." Leake, Land Laws, part iii., p. 265; Durham & S. R. Co. v. Walker, 2 Q. B. 940. Whether an estate of inheritance has been created in the easement depends upon whether the technical word "heirs" has been used, or, if not, whether the court is able to say that "the intention of the grantor to convey a fee simple is clearly shown by other words in the deed." Cole v. Lake Co. 54 N. H. 242. The intention of the grantor, the ascertainment of which will constitute the interpretation of the clause in question, is, in the nature of the case, not his real, unexpressed intention, but his intention as expressed in the deed. Hawkins, Construction of Wills, p. 1; Wigram, Construction of Wills, § 9; Rice v. Boston Port & Seaman's Aid Soc. 56 N. H. 191; Cram v. Cram, 63 N. H. 31. Doe, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: Lot 4 of range 10 in Berlin is under and on both sides of the Androscoggin river, which flows in a southerly direction. Between these claimants of water power, it is a matter of importance that the bed of the river is a part of the lot, and that every acre, bounded easterly or westerly by the river, extends to the center of the stream. While the portion of the lot on the east side may be conveniently called the east section, and the other portion the west section, the thread of the river is in this case an immaterial line, except at the points where it has become a boundary of adjoining owners. Where both banks and the bed belong to the plaintiffs, no light is thrown on their rights by dividing the bed into two parts, or drawing a line between it and the bank on each side. Their channel and their adjoining upland are one tract. Their right to build a dam on it and flow their own territory is an element of their title. Their right to flow the defendant's part of lot 4 is presumed to be an appurtenance of their land. "Though an easement may be created by grant in gross, as it is called, or attached to the person of the grantee, this is never presumed when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant to some other estate." Washb. Easem. *28; Spensley v. Valentine, 34 Wis. 154, 160; Kuecken v. Voltz, 110 Ill. 264, 268, 269; McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288, It is a natural inference of fact that the plaintiffs' right of flowage, expressly reserved by deed, was intended to be attached deed the dam was to be built. "The right of to the soil on which by the terms of the same constructed" was evidently reserved as a flowage caused by said dam when part of a mill privilege, for the benefit of a mili to be operated by water to be raised by the dam, and is fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of which the mill and dam will be a part. Cross, being the owner of lot 4, conveyed a part of the east section to Wilson. The deed is clear, full, and precise. The grant is of "a certain piece of land, being all that part of lot numbered 4, in the 10 range of lots in said Berlin, lying 291. on the east side of the Androscoggin river; reserving to myself the right of building a dam across said river at any point against said land, together with the right of flowage of said land at any and all times caused by said dam when constructed; also, reserving a piece of land fronting on said river in the immediate vicinity of the east end of said dam 12 rods in length on the bank of said river, and extending back far enough same width, to comprise I acre of land; said Wilson to have the timber on said acre of land." This conveyance was made in 1865. In 1888, Cross being dead, the plaintiffs, as his successors in title, surveyed an acre according to the description given in the reservation, marked it on the ground, informed the defendant, the successor of Wilson, that they intended "to locate a dam there," and requested him to remove the timber. This suit is a writ of entry for that acre. The defendant contends that the reservation of an acre was void for uncertainty, and that in "the right of building a dam" and "the right of flowage" Cross reserved only a life estate. that such terms as those used in Cross's reservation do not prove an intent to sever the channel of the river from the riparian estate of which it is presumed to be a part. If a Manchester lot, abutting on Merrimack river and Elm street, were described in a deed as extending northerly from a given line far enough to comprise 25 acres, or 25,000 square feet, the quantity of measured land would be less than the area of the granted premises. Whether the price were a lump sum, or $1,000 an acre, or $10 a foot the east half of the river and the west half of the street would not be included in the measurement. The law takes notice of the fact that the bank of the Merrimack is a more convenient place for monuments than the center of the stream. Gouverneur v. National Ice Co. 134 N. Y. 355, 365, 18 L. R. A. 695, 31 N. E. 865. In material elements of utility and value, the river and street differ from ordinary land in which the owner has a right of exclusive occupation. Lord v. Sydney Comrs. 12 Moore, P. C. C. 473, 497; Woodman v. Spencer, 54 N. H. 507, 513. The usage and understanding of the community (judicially noticed as evidence of the meaning of a deed), and the character of the use generally made of a river and street, would show that the half of each which passes by a conveyance of an abutting lot is not within the specified dimensions. Gouverneur v. National Ice Co. 134 N. Y. 355, 365, 18 L. R. A. 695, 31 N. E. 865; Holbert v. Edens, 5 Lea, 204, 40 Am. Rep. 26; Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 308; St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 286, 287, 19 L. ed. 74, 78; Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co. 134 U. S. 178, 196, 33 L. ed. 872, 878, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 380, 381, 35 L. ed. 428, 432, 433, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838, and cases there cited; Salisbury v. Great Northern R. Co. 5 C. B. N. S. 174, 209; Berridge v. Ward, 10 C. B. N. S. 400, 402, 408, 411, 414, 415; Pryor v. Petre [1894] 2 Ch. 11. The erroneous rule, that a line described as running "on the bank" of a river disproves an intent to make the river the boundary, is supposed to have been adopted in the unreported case of Alcock v. Little, decided in 1815, and was recognized as sound in a dictum in Rix v. Johnson, 5 N. H. 520, 523, 524, 22 Am. Dec. 472. In Daniels v. Ches 1. A deed of a lot of land in Manchester, describing it as "fronting westerly on Merrimack river and easterly on Elm street, 12 rods in length on the bank of said river and 12 rods on said street," would convey the grantor's title from the middle of the river to the middle of the street. An intent that the soil in the river and street shall be owned by a person who does not own the abutting land is so improbable that it would require an express exception in the grant, or some clear and unequivocal declaration, or certain and immemorial usage to limit the title of the grantee to the edge of the street and the edge of the river. 3 Kent, Com. 428; Wallace's note in Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 4th Am. ed. 189; dissenting opinion of Redfield, J., in Buck v. Squiers, 22 Vt. 484, 494; Norcross v. Griffiths, 65 Wis. 599, 56 Am. Rep. 642, 27 Ń. W. 606; Proprietors of Claremont v. Carlton, 2 N. H. 369, 371; State v. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461, 463; Greenleaf v. Kilton, 11 N. H. 530, 533; State v. Canterbury, 28 N. H. 195, 216; Woodman v. Spencer, 54 N. H. 507, 512, 514, 516; Sleeper v. Laconia, 60 N. H. 201, 202, 49 Am. Rep. 311; Taylor v. Blake, 64 N. H. 392, 10 Atl. 698; Kent v. Taylor, 64 N. H. 489, 490, 13 Atl. 419; Ca-hire R. Co. 20 N. H. 85, 88, a deed from the pron v. Kingman, 64 N. H. 571, 14 Atl. 868. Such a limitation in the case of a street would be contrary to universal practice (3 Kent, Com. 433), and the presumed intent is the same whether the boundary is a street or a fresh-water river. On the question of fact whether certain phrases or circumstances are sufficient evidence of a different intent (Gould v. Eastern R. Co. 142 Mass. 85, 89, 7 N. E. 543; Gaylord v. King, 142 Mass. 495, 503, 8 N. E. 596; Holloway v. South-acre, except so much thereof as is highway." mayd, 139 N. Y. 390, 401, 412, 34 N. E. 1047, The suit was assumpsit for the agreed price. 1052; Tiedeman, Real Prop. §§ 833, 837), It was held that the deed conveyed the bed there has not been a unanimity of opinion of Cold river, and that the grantees were not in all jurisdictions, but the presumption is bound to pay the agreed price per acre for regarded as an established rule; and in this the bed of either of the rivers. It was state it is settled (in cases before cited) wrongly held that the deed conveyed no part plaintiff to the defendants named the bank |