3860. Mortgage of personal property. 3864. Filing of chattel mortgage. .... 405 3144. property Employment of additional counsel . 549 551 1889-90, p. 226, chap. 244, § 64. Defining Wisconsin. Constitution, 1848. Prohibiting special legislation 442 General laws to be uniform.. 443 Formation of corporations... 494 Amendments of 1871. "commercial broker' 585 Art. 4, § 31, subsec. 7. Granting corporate Defining "lawful fence". 590 State institution for in 945. 1893-94, p. 397. 945. 948. 1895-96, p. 466. 1896, Jan. 23. sane..... Defining "lawful fence".. Fence law. Boundary lines declared lawful fence. Authority of rectors of university to secure loan by deed of trust 285 578 590 590 1864, March 1. 1866, May 25. 1874, chap. 184. powers except to cities, forbidden.... 494 Art. 4, § 31. 32. 11, § 1. 925-177. Express of keeping streets in 444 repair.... 446 Chap. 40b, § 926. Adoption of general char ter..... 444 § 1977. Defining "agent" 457 Wyoming. law. 444 1339. Damages from insufficient high way. 693 2882. Defining "judgment". 695 on appeal from justices' court.. 4192. Proof of signing of instrument... 696 4971, subdiv. 19. Signature by mark.... 696 Revised Statutes, 1898. Chap. 40a. General city charter law...... 443 1891, p 157. 47 L. R. A. $11. 13. 1890, March 14, chap. 80. Election law... 854 Statutory law re-enacted... 854 LAWYERS' REPORTS ANNOTATED. 1. NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT. W. A. BENTON v. Ruffin V. COLLINS, Appt. (........N. C.........) A grant of a new trial on one or more of several issues is in the sound discretion of the court, where the matter involved is entirely distinct and separable from the matters involved in the other issues. 2. A new trial on the single issue of the amount of damages may be allowed, although this cuts off some evidence which, if introduced on other issues, might mitigate damages, where all such evidence is admissible on the issue as to damages. 3. Inadequacy of damages may be the ground of setting aside a verdict and ordering a new trial. 4. The discretion of the court in setting aside a verdict for inadequacy of damages is not reviewable on appeal. 5. 6. 7. An allotment of a homestead, and a sale of the excess of the owner's lands by a commissioner, may be ordered by a court of equity when it has control of the lands and all the parties interested are before the court. The appointment of commissioners to set off a homestead may be made by the clerk when instructed by the court, as the clerk is but the hand of the court in the matter. The fact that lands are situated in two counties does not prevent the court from making an order for setting off a homestead and selling the lands which are in excess of the homestead to satisfy a judgment against the owner. (October 24, 1899.) NOTE.-Inadequacy of damages as a ground for | verdict will not be disturbed for inadequacy, clr setting aside a verdict. 1. Power and duty of the court as to. II. Rule in contract actions. cumstances may exist under which the court would be called upon to act. The court has power to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial on the ground of inadequacy III. Rule in actions with relation to property where the ends of justice seem to require it, as and property rights. IV. Rule in actions for personal injuries. a. Generally. b. Actions for libel and slander. d. Actions for assault and battery and e. Actions for personal injuries caused by negligence. 1. General rules as to. 2. What sufficient to show bias or omission of duty-instances. 1. Statutory provisions as to smallness of damages for personal injury. V. Effect of uncertainty as to cause of injury. VI. Who entitled to relief. VII. Matters of procedure. VIII. Increase of verdict by court. I. Power and duty of the court as to. The power and duty of the court with reference to setting aside verdicts for inadequacy would seem to depend to a large extent upon the measurability of the injury suffered according to some legal standard. If the injury can be thus measured, and the verdict is inadequate, it is not only within the power, but the imperative duty, of the court to set it aside. The rule is different, however, where there is no legal standard of measurement of the injury. But even In such case it will be seen that while usually a well as and upon the same principle as on the ground of excessiveness. Platz v. Cohoes, 8 Abb. N. C. 392; Mariana v. Dougherty, 46 Cal. 26; Hackett v. Pratt, 52 Ill. App. 346. A verdict for a grossly inadequate amount stands upon no higher ground in legal principle, nor in the rules of law, than a verdict for an excessive or extravagant amount, and a new trial may be granted upon the one ground as well as upon the other. McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551. And see BENTON V. COLLINS. And when value is a material question the rule with reference to setting a verdict aside is the same where the verdict for a party is for too small a sum, as it is where the verdict is against a party for too large a sum. Hall v. The Emily Banning, 33 Cal. 522. And the court may grant a new trial where the damages are inadequate, as well as where they are excessive, if the case is such as clearly to indicate that the jury had acted under the influence of partiality, bias, or a perverted judgment. Richards v. Sandford, 2 E. D. Smith, 349. So, it is within the province of an appellate court to revise and set aside a verdict for insufficiency as well as for excessiveness of damages. Paul v. Leyenberger, 17 Ill. App. 167. But see BENTON V. COLLINS, and Jung v. Keuffel, 144 N. Y. 381, 39 N. E. 340, infra, VII. And while the estimation of damages is peculiarly within the province of the jury where there is no legal measure and the damages are |