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55; Brown v. Morris, 20 N. G. (4 Dev, & B. L.) 429; Quincey v. Perkins, 76 N. C. 295.

Granting that the trial judge, in the exercise of a sound discretion, could have set aside the verdict as to damages, yet when he refuses to exercise a discretion, and attemps to assign a reason, and gives a wrong or illegal one, such ruling is reviewable error. Clark's Code, § 274, cases cited under caption Want of Power, ¶ 230; Beck v. Bellamy, 93 N. C. 129; Gilchrist v. Kitchen, 86 N. C. 20; Hudgins v. White, 65 N. C. 393. A new trial will not be granted on the ground that the damages found are inadequate.

16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 589; Pritchard v. Hewitt, 91 Mo. 547, 60 Am. Rep. 265, 4 S. W. 437; 4 Minor, Inst. 758; Gray v. Second Ave. R. Co. 65 N. Y. 561; Taylor v. Davis (Tex.) 13 S. W. 642; Price v. Bailey,

Young v. Hairston, 14 N. C. (3 Dev. L.) unliquidated or where vindictive or exemplary | 15, it was said that it is the province of the jury damages are authorized, where actual damages are shown with such definiteness as to furnish a reasonably certain measure, the court may look into the circumstances proved, and grant a new trial if the amount awarded by the verdict Is manifestly inadequate. Hackett v. Pratt, 52 Ill. App. 346.

And where the law itself prescribes the rule of damages to which alone a party is entitled if he recovers at all, an award of a sum not warranted by the rule is such evidence of passion, prejudice, mistake, or misapprehension that the verdict ought not to be permitted to stand. McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551.

So, where the amount to which a party to an action was entitled is susceptible of adjustment and ascertainment by fair and not very difficult computation, and the figures to form the basis of the calculation are presented in an intelligent and tangible form, and a verdict is rendered lower than the lowest estimate, it should be set aside as clearly contrary to the evidence. Fawcett v. Woods, 5 Iowa, 400.

And a verdict for nominal damages when the plaintiff is entitled to more will be set aside and a new trial awarded, though given under the

recommendation of the court. Duff v. Hutson,

2 Bail. L. 215.

And a judgment will be reversed on appeal where a prima facie case was made entitling the plaintiff to recover a much larger sum than that allowed, and no contradictory evidence was offered to disprove the prima facile case. State ex rel. Scott County Comrs. v. Wilson, 90 Ind. 114. So, in Tutton v. Andrews, Barnes' Notes, 488, It was held that notwithstanding the notion which had prevailed that where damages are excessive a new trial may be granted, but not where they are less than they ought to be, an Inquisition will be set aside and plaintiff given leave to execute a new writ of inquiry, where the sheriff permitted Improper evidence to be given by the defendant whereby the damages were lessened.

And in Collins v. Albany & S. R. Co. 12 Barb. 492, and Clapp v. Hudson River R. Co. 19 Barb. 461, the rule was laid down that when the damages found by the jury are either so large or so small as to force upon the mind of every man familiar with the circumstances of the case the conviction that by some means the jury have acted under the influence of a perverted judgment, it is the duty of the court, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to grant a new trial; but both were cases of excessive damages. And in Mobile & M. R Co. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala.

to see that justice is done, but when the assessment is manifestly unjust, whether too small or too excessive, a new trial should be granted; but this was also a case of excessive, and not inadequate, damages.

And in Meyer v. Fiegel, 38 How. Pr. 424, the court named as a ground upon which a new trial will be granted damages which are palpably insufficient; but the motion was for a new trial on newly discovered evidence.

And in Robb v. Carnegie Broя. 145 Pa. 324, 14 L. R. A. 329, 22 Atl. 649, it was said that where the amount of a verdict shows that it must have been arrived at by the adoption of an erroneous measure of damages or a mistake in computation, the trial judge should not hesitate to set it aside; but the case was not one of inadequate damages.

So, in Peterborough v. Sadler, 12 Mod. 347, a new trial was granted where a former verdict had been rendered and set aside as excessive because of the great difference between the two verdicts.

But where there is no standard for measuring damages, and no certain rule can be prescribed for the guidance of the jury, the court will not

ordinarily grant a new trial though the damages awarded him be manifestly small, unless the inadequacy was plainly produced by prejudice or Moseley v. Jamison, 68 Miss. 336, 8 So. 744. passion or other improper motives.

The court is justified in interfering with and setting aside a verdict of a jury for inadequacy only in those cases where It appears that the udice, passion, and partiality or corruption, or jury in fixing the amount were actuated by prej. failed to understand and apply the rule of dam. ages appertaining to the case, or where it can be clearly seen from the record that under all the circumstances of the case the amount awarded was unreasonable and unfair. Reger v. Rochester R. Co. 2 App. Div. 5, 37 N. Y. Supp. 520.

The power to set aside a verdict for inadequacy is only rarely exercised, especially in actions for personal wrongs, such as slanders, batteries, and the like; but where the foundation of the action is a breach of contract, and the damages are capable of estimation, if there is a glaring deficiency justice requires that the case shall be revised. Taunton Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 9 Pick. 11.

And in the consideration of the question of setting aside a verdict for inadequacy the court on appeal will assume that the jury found every fact going to mitigate or reduce the damages which they could properly find from the proof. Robinson v. Waupaca, 77 Wis. 544, 46 N. W. 809.

66 Ill. 48; Young v. Rossi, 30 Fed. Rep. 231; Henderson v. McReynolds, 38 N. Y. S. R. 734, 14 N. Y. Supp. 351; 1 Graham & Waterman's New Trials, p. 447; Gregory v. Chambers, 78 Mo. 297; Hayward v. Newton, 2 Strange, 940; Barker v. Dixie, 2 Strange, 1051; Benjamin v. Stewart, 61 Cal. 608; Merony v. McIntyre, 82 N. C. 103.

Mr. C. M. Cooke for appellee.

Montgomery, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

part of the verdict on the ground that the damages assessed were inadequate, and let the others stand. On appeal from that ruling, this court declared the appeal prema ture; and upon a second trial the defendant, Ruffin Collins, renewed his exception to the order on the first trial setting aside that part of the verdict as to damages, and the granting of a new trial on that issue alone. The two issues which were eliminated from the second trial, and which were found by the jury for the plaintiff on the first trial, to wit, the first and third issues, were in these words: (1) "Did the defendant, R. V. Col

In the first trial of this action,-an action for damages growing out of an assault and battery committed by defendant, Ruffin Collins, wrongfully damage the plaintiff, as allins, upon the plaintiff,-all of the issues were found for the plaintiff. In response to the issue as to the amount of damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the jury answered $350, and his honor set aside that

leged in the complaint?" (3) "Was the deed of trust executed by R. V. Collins and wife to S. E. Eure with the fraudulent intent to hinder and delay and defraud said R. V. Collins's creditors?" Upon the second trial, the

870.

So, in Fogg v. Stinson (Me.) 4 New Eng. Rep. | Conrad v. Dobmeler, 57 Minn. 147, 58 N. W. 146, 8 Atl. 459, it was held that a new trial will not be granted when it does not appear that the verdict is unreasonable in amount, but there was nothing in the case to show whether the verdict was complained of as inadequate or excessive.

Nor will a new trial be granted for Inadequacy of damages where the only dispute was as to the allowance of a certain offset, and the evidence was conflicting, and the difference between the verdict and the amount which should have been found, if anything, is so trifling as to bring the case within the maxim De minimis non curat les. Engel v. Fischer, 44 Ill. App. 362, and see also Nichol v. Bestwick, 28 L. J. Eq. N. 8. 4, infra, II.

But the difference between a verdict for $37.90 and $75.81, which was the amount due, is not too small to justify a new trial, and the fact that it would cost the county for another trial more than the difference amounted to is of no effect. Galloway v. Weber, 55 Ill. App. 366.

II. Rule in contract actions.

It is within the power of the court in an action for breach of contract to set aside a verdict upon the ground that the damages are too small. Taunton Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 9 Pick. 11. The rule that verdicts will not be set aside on account of their smallness does not apply to actions on contract. Woodford V. Eades, Strange, 425; Colyer v. Huff, 3 Bibb, 34.

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As a general rule in cases of breach of contract, there are fixed standards of value with reference to the injury dore, capable of estimation by direct proof, and if a glaring deficiency appears in the amount of the verdict, justice demands a revision. Watson v. Harmon, 85 Mo. 443.

And a verdict for a much less sum in an action on contract in which the plaintiff was entitled to recover his whole claim or nothing will be deemed to show that the jury in determining the case either wholly disregarded the evidence or misapprehended its effect, or overlooked some Important fact, or necessarily found some fact in favor of the defendant which was wholly inconsistent with a verdict for any amount in favor of the plaintiff, and may therefore be set aside. Powers v. Gouraud, 19 Misc. 268, 44 N. Y. Supp. 249.

So, setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial in an action for breach of contract is not an abuse of discretion where the finding in favor of the plaintiff entitles him to substantial damages, but only nominal damages are awarded.

And such a verdict may be set aside as against evidence. Gartner v. Saxon, 19 R. I. 461, 36 Atl. 1132.

And a motion for a new trial in an action of assumpsit should be granted where the verdict was for a less sum than the party was entitled to. Hallberg v. Brosseau, 64 Ill. App. 520. And a verdict in an action upon an account stated will not be sustained where it is for a sum greatly less than the damages suffered as shown by the evidence in writing, which was practically undisputed. Porter V. Sherman County Bkg. Co. 36 Neb. 271, 54 N. W. 424.

Thus, a verdict for $25 in an action for serv ices rendered will be set aside and a new trial granted where by the uncontradicted evidence they were worth $150 or $200. Hood v. Ware, 34 Ga. 328.

And a judgment in an action for services for $16 is erroneous where the only evidence on the issue was that it took thirteen days' labor to do the work which was worth $2 a day. Fagan v. Whitcomb (Tex. App.) 14 S. W. 1018.

And a verdict for the plaintiff for $125 in an action brought by him for his services as an attorney will be set aside as contrary to the evidence, and a new trial granted, where the proof of the value of the services rendered justified fixing the amount at not less than $250, and there was no evidence warranting the finding of the less amount. Shropshire v. Doxey, 25 Tex. 127.

So, a verdict will be set aside and a new trial ordered in an action for wages quantum meruit where the amount found was less than that fixed by any witness in the case as the value of the services rendered. Howe v. Lincoln, 23 Kan. 468.

And a finding upon an inquest of one penny damages for the plaintiff in an action on a debt of £333 for an apothecary's bill will be set aside for smallness, and a new writ of inquiry issued. Markham v. Middleton, 2 Strange, 1259.

And a verdict for $100 for the plaintiff in an action for the contract price of drilling a well and furnishing casings, etc., in which the amount earned was established without dispute at $249.80, and there was an undisputed offset of $25, in which the court charged the jury that If the contract was found to be as alleged the plaintiff was entitled to $224.84, is properly set aside as inadequate, and as in direct contravention of the instructions of the court. Bigelow v. Garwitz, 40 N. Y. S. R. 580, 15 N. Y. Supp. 940.

jury, in response to the single issue as to damages, answered $600. His honor gave judgment for the plaintiff, and against the defendant, R. V. Collins, for that amount, and after reciting that the conveyance by the defendant, R. V. Collins, and his wife, of his lands lying in Nash and Franklin counties, had been conveyed in fraud of his creditors, ordered that, subject to the homestead exemption of defendant, R. V. Collins, the lands so fraudulently conveyed be sold to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment, and the clerk was instructed to appoint three commissioners to appraise and allot to the defendant, R. V. Collins, his homestead therein, who should report their proceedings to the next term of Franklin superior court; and it was further ordered that the excess over the homestead should be sold by a commissioner then named by the court, and that his re

So, the presiding judge in an action for damages for breach of contract in neglecting to receive and pay for property sold, may, upon a motion made upon his minutes, set aside a verdict for a sum far less than the amount of the damages, and award a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the verdict, though upon the evidence a verdict for the defendant would not have been disturbed. McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551.

And the fact that stock purchased upon false representations as to its value afterwards became worthless will not prevent setting aside a verdict for 6 cents rendered in an action brought by the purchaser for such false representations, as it does not necessarily follow that the purchaser would have retained the stock until its value was gone. Cowles v. Watson, 14 Hun, 41.

And in Woodford v. Eades, 1 Strange, 425, a verdict of one cent damages for the plaintiff In an action on contract for stock between the plaintiff and another, each of whom deposited $200 in the hands of the defendant for the recovery of the money on the failure of the other to perform his agreement, was set aside, and a new trial granted.

So, a verdict for the plaintiff in an action upon a bond for only one fourth of the principal and interest due thereon will be set aside as against evidence and in violation of law, and a new trial ordered, where no evidence was given by the defendant. Carwile v. Harvey, 15 Rich. L. 314.

And see State er rel. Scott County Comrs. v. Wilson, 90 Ind. 114, supra, I., for a similar holding with reference to a verdict on a county clerk's bond.

And a verdict for $50 for the plaintiff, In an action on a note for $100 in which it was alleged that the note was passed for a loan of $50 under a verbal stipulation that if the bearer would repay the $50 the note should be given up, otherwise it should be forfeited, will be set aside and a new trial granted, as the note would be usurious if such agreement was found to exist, and therefore void, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the whole amount if the agreement did not exist. Fowler v. Word, Harp. L. 372.

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port should be returned to the next term of that court.

The case is before us on two exceptions,— one to the ruling of his honor in the first trial setting aside the verdict for inadequacy of damages, and the ordering of a new trial on that one issue alone; and the other to the judgment, as to its form and substance, as to the allotment of the homestead, and the sale of the excess. Both points raised on the appeal are important as matters of court practice and procedure, and as matters affecting the substantial property rights of the defendant.

On the question as to the power of the su perior courts to grant new trials on one or more of several issues, and to let the others stand, and the practice of this court to order new trials on particular or restricted issues, the authorities are numerous, and cover a

And in Russel v. Ball, Barnes' Notes, 455, it was held that where a demand is certain, as by promissory note, the court will set aside a verdict for too small damages, but not where the damages are uncertain, as in a case for damages for curing a wound.

So, a verdict in an action upon a fire-insurance policy under which the plaintiff made affidavit of damage to the extent of £1,085 rendered in his favor for £500, will be set aside and new trial granted, where the policy contained a condition that the plaintiff should forfeit all benefit under the policy If there was any fraud or false swearing in the claim he made. Levy v. Baillie, 7 Bing. 349, 5 Moore & P. 208, 9 L. J. C. P. 108.

But proof that a verdict in an action upon an Insurance policy was for a less sum than the estimation of the loss by the plaintiff does not establish fraud and false swearing, or authorize the court to say that the jury was under such improper influence that their verdict should be disturbed. Moore v. Protection Ins. Co. 29 Me. 97, 48 Am. Dec. 514.

So, a finding of the jury in executing a writ of inquiry in an action on a covenant for nonpayment of rent reserved on a lease, for less than the rent in arrear, will be quashed, and a new writ of inquiry granted on payment of the costs. Parr v. Purbeck, 8 Mod. 196, and see also Wolf v. Goodhue F. Ins. Co. 43 Barb. 400, infra, VII.

Nor will the court refuse a new trial in an action of covenant by a lessor against a lessee upon a lease reserving an increased rent for every acre of certain lands converted into tillage, where the jury gave damages for the actual injury sustained instead of the increased rent, on the ground that the verdict was consistent with justice. Farrant v. Olmius, 3 Barn. & Ald. 692.

And a verdict for $100 in an action for use and occupation, in which the uncontradicted evidence as to value fixed it at $475, will be set aside as against the weight of evidence. Hoe v. Hoey, 39 N. Y. S. R. 221, 15 N. Y. Supp. 105.

And asking a question of a witness in an action for rent, which suggested the plaintiff's wealth and the defendant's poverty, to which an objection was overruled, will be deemed to have occasioned passion or prejudice, and to warrant a new trial, where, by the verdict, the rent of an agreed amount of $275 was practically reduced to $60. Fonda v. Lape, 29 N. Y. S.

And a verdict in an action upon a promissory note given for the purchase price of lands, the title to part of which failed, allowing the defendant about one half of the lowest estimate placed upon such part by the witnesses, will be set aside as against evidence, and a new trial | R. 327, 8 N. Y. Supp. 792. granted. Fawcett v. Woods, 5 Iowa, 400.

And where a tenant under a lease containing

long series of years. The following are some|mington & W. R. Co. 84 N. C. 192; Merony of them: Strother v. Aberdeen & A. R. Co. v. McIntyre, 82 N. C. 103; Holmes v. Godwin, 71 N. C. 306; Key v. Allen, 7 N. C. (3 Murph.) 523; Barnes v. Brown, 69 N. C. 439.

123 N. C. 197, 31 S. E. 386; Silver Valley Min. Co. v. North Carolina Smelting Co. 122 N. C. 542, 29 S. E. 940; Rittenhouse v. Wilmington Street R. Co. 120 N. C. 544, 26 S. E. 922; Nathan v. Charlotte Street R. Co. 118 N. C. 1066, 24 S. E. 511; Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. 117 N. C. 616, 30 L. R. A. 257, 23 S. E. 264; Blackburn v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 116 N. C. 821, 21 S. E. 922; Tillett v. Lynchburg & D. R. Co. 115 N. C. 662, 20 S. E. 480; Jones v. Swepson, 94 N. C. 700; Boing v. Raleigh & G. R. Co. 91 N. C. 199; Price v. Deal, 90 N. C. 290; Jones v. Mial, 89 N. C. 89; Lindley v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 88 N. C. 547; Crawford v. Geiser Mfg. Co. 88 N. C. 554; Roberts v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 88 N. C. 560; Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91, 40 Am. Rep. 444; Burton v. Wila covenant to repair underlets the premises to one who enters into a similar covenant, and the lessor brings action on the covenant in the first lease against his tenant and recovers, the damages and costs recovered in that action, and also the costs of defending it, may be recovered as special damages in an action by the tenant against the under-tenant for breach of his covenant to repair, and if the jury assess the damages at the sum recovered in the former action for breach of covenant to repair only, the inquisition will be set aside and a new writ of inquiry issued. Neale v. Wyllle, 3 Barn. & C. 533, 5 Dowl. & R. 442, 27 Revised Rep. 418.

As to what degree of inadequacy will warrant the court in acting in rent cases, see Galloway .Weber, 55 Ill. App. 366, supra, I.

So, a verdict for the plaintiff for nominal damages only in an action on an implied warranty of the soundness of a negro will be set aside as against evidence, and a new trial ordered, where the unsoundness of the slave at the time of the sale was conclusively estab lished, and it appears that a full price was paid. Verdier v. Trowell, 6 Rich. L. 166.

Or where the testimony as to the diseased condition of the slave was uncontradicted, and it appears that he was injured from 25 to 30 per cent upon the purchase price. Wallace V. Frazier, 2 Nott & M'C. 516.

And a verdict for one cent in an action for damages for deceit and breach of warranty of soundness of a horse sold, will be set aside as Inadequate where the evidence shows that the horse was of no value, and that in the condition he was represented to be in he would have been worth at least $200. Traylor v. Evertson (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S. W. 637.

A party deceived by fraudulent misrepresentations has the right, in an action for damages because of the fraud, to be placed in the pecuniary position which the representations entitled him to believe he was securing by means of the transaction, and a verdict adopting his theory of the case, but limiting his recovery to 6 cents, where the damages were many thousand dollars, will be set aside as inadequate, as the jury had no discretion on the subject, but were under a legal duty to recompense him for the entire amount of his loss. Cowles v. Watson, 14 Hun, 41.

And where, in an action for the contract price and extra work of supplying and placing a heating apparatus, the defendant alleges breach of warranty, and claims that $500 apparently paid thereon was really a loan made by him to the plaintiff, and the court charges

Before such partial new trials, however, are granted, it should clearly appear that the matter involved is entirely distinct and separable from the matters involved in the other issues, and that the new trial can be had without danger of complications with other matters. Such partial trials are not of strict legal right, but of sound legal discretion. There was no violation of the limitation in such matters in the case before us. The issues were clearly separable, and each one could have been answered without dependence or complication upon the others. The contention of the defendant is that on the second trial various matters favorable the jury to find for the plaintiff unless the breach of warranty was established, in which case they would have to find a verdict for the defendant for the $500, and a verdict for the defendant is found without allowing him the $500, it is a proper exercise of discretion for the trial justice to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. H. B. Smith Co. v. Chapin, 38 N. Y. S. R. 463, 13 N. Y. Supp. 799.

So, a judgment upon a verdict in an action upon contract not allowing interest to the plaintiff to which he was entitled is erroneous, and should be reversed. Winn v. Young, 1 J. J. Marsh. 51, 19 Am. Dec. 52.

And a judgment and verdict in an action in which the answer admits an indebtedness to the plaintiff of a larger amount will be reversed on appeal, and the cause remanded with direc tions to the court below to render judgment for the admitted sum. Coffman v. Brown, 7 Colo. 147, 2 l'ac. 905.

But the fact that the jury found a verdict for a less sum than that fixed by any of the witnesses as the amount of damages in an action for breach of contract to erect and complete a bridge, is not a ground for a new trial where the amount of damages was merely a matter of opinion. Brewer v. Tyringham, 12 Pick. 547. But see Howe v. Lincoln, 23 Kan. 468, supra.

And in actions on contract in which the damages may be more or less a matter of calculation, although the plaintiff may be prima facie entitled to a full measure of damages, where the actual amount of damages has been in any degree affected by the conduct of the plaintif or his agent, that is a legitimate element of consideration, and the jury are at liberty to diminish the damages on that account, but if they do so unreasonably and arbitrarily the court can grant a new trial as for a verdict against evidence. Wilson v. Hicks, 26 L. J. Exch. N. S. 242.

And a verdict for the plaintiff for merely nominal damages in an action for breach of contract will not be set aside for inadequacy when the damages were not a mere matter of computation, and there were views upon which the jury might not unreasonably consider that there was no substantial damage, especially when the matter in dispute amounted to but a small sum. Nichol v. Bestwick, 28 L. J. Exch. N. S. 4.

So, while a verdict would not be sustained If it were established that the jury had lessened the damages with a view to reducing them below $20 in order to affect the amount of costs to which the plaintiff would be entitled, it will not be disturbed where there was no proof that

to the defendant on the issue as to the amount of damages might have been cut off, which would have been relevant and competent on the first trial under the first issue, and that, therefore, the defendant might have suffered by the manner in which the case was tried on the second trial. The argument of the defendant's counsel is that upon the first issue as submitted in the first trial, "Did the defendant, R. V. Collins, wrongfully damage the plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint?" all the circumstances attending the assault are drawn out. there be anything to repel malice, to mitigate the damages, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff provoking the assault, as foul language or insulting words, it comes out in the investigation of the evidence on the first issue, and the same jury hears the evidence as to the extent of the wound, the loss

of time, pain, and permanence and effect of injury; and the jury which hears the whole could judge more impartially all of the issues than another jury could, hearing only the testimony on the issue as to damages. The answer to that argument is that whatever evidence could have been introduced on the first trial upon the first issue, in mitigation of damages,-such matters as the defendant's counsel urged in his argument,could be, as a matter of law, gone into on the second trial upon the issue as to damages. If If no attempt was made by the plaintiff in the second trial to show malice in the defendant in making the battery upon the plaintiff, then the damages could have been only actual damages. If malice or aggravation was at tempted to be proved to recover punitive damages, then it was permissible for the defendant to show the conduct of the plaintiff bad character and was stealing potatoes at the time, the character and act of the slave going only in mitigation of damages. Richardson v. Dukes, 4 McCord, L. 156.

they so reduced it other than the verdict itself. Brewer v. Tyringham, 12 Pick. 547.

See also Scott v. Baldwicke, 2 Mill, Const. 410; Anonymous, 2 Salk. 647; Wilson v. Hicks, 26 L. J. Exch. N. S. 242,-infra, V.; and Whitwell v. Atkinson, 6 Mass. 272, infra, VII. III. Rule in actions with relation to property and property rights.

Actions to recover for injuries to property, or to recover property, or secure property rights, like actions upon contract, usually have fixed standards of value which are capable of estimation by direct proof, and in such cases when a glaring deficiency in the amount of the verdict appears, justice demands a revision. Watson v. Harmon, 85 Mo. 443.

Thus, a verdict for $1 In an action for conversion must be set aside and a new trial granted where the minimum valuation of the property converted, fixed by the witnesses, was $3,300. Ibid.

And a refusal to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial in an action in trover is error where the jury found the defendant guilty of a conversion of the goods, but assessed the damages at a sum much less than their real value. Bernstein v. Walker, 25 Ill. App. 224.

So, a bailor of property which is lost by the bailee, If he is entitled to recover at all against the bailee is entitled to have the value of the property lost, and a verdict in an action therefor assessing the value of the property at much less than its true value will be set aside and a new trial granted. Wise v. Freshley, 3 McCord, L. 547.

And setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial are not an abuse of discretion in an action for the value of the contents of a lost trunk, where the verdict does not accord in any reasonable manner with the evidence, though the testimony as to damages was conflicting. Hall v. The Emily Banning, 33 Cal. 522.

So, a verdict for $5 in an action against a city for the value of property destroyed by order of the city authorities, will be set aside as Inadequate, and a new trial awarded, where It appears by the uncontradicted evidence that the property was worth $1,378.14. Bishop v. Macon, 7 Ga. 200, 50 Am. Dec. 400.

And the jury in an action for injury to or destruction of property are not at liberty, directly contrary to the evidence, to award an arbitrary sum below its real value, and a nominal verdict in an action for shooting and killing the plaintiff's slave will be set aside and a new trial granted, though it appears that he was of

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Nor is setting aside a verdict in a statutory proceeding to assess damages claimed by a landowner against a railroad company for appropriating his land and constructing a railroad over it for the value of the land actually taken and used an abuse of discretion, where there was evidence of other and additional damages to his land besides the value of the land so taken and used. Georgia Southern & F. R. Co. v. Jones, 90 Ga. 292, 15 S. E. 824.

And the supreme court on appeal may correct a judgment in an action for damages for the appropriation of land under the right of eminent domain, where It appears that interest had not been allowed in the court below where it should have been, without reversing and remanding the Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 8 L. R. A. 123, 13 S. W. 123.

case.

But a verdict in a proceeding by a railroad company to condemn lands in which a turnpike company had an easement required by the railroad to cross the turnpike, for $25 for land taken and $275 for consequential damages, will not be set aside as too small. Shelbyville & E. Turnp. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 548, 51 S. W. 805.

So, a judgment for $2.121⁄2 in an action against a common carrier for negligence in carrying horses, causing their injury, will be reversed as against evidence, and the cause remanded, where it appears by the evidence that some of the injuries were of a permanent character, and the damages were assessed by the witnesses at from $10 to $75 each on six horses, and but one witness testified that the horses were not injured, and his testimony was of an inconclusive character. Eggleston v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex. App.) 18 S. W. 137.

And a verdict for the plaintiff for nominal damages only, in an action brought by the owner of property against a lessee for cutting down a grove of large trees surrounding the buildings, will be set aside, and a new trial granted. where the evidence shows that the injury was serious. English v. Clerry, 3 Hill, L. 279.

And a verdict in an action for damages to the rental value of plaintiff's house because of the building and operating of a railroad along its side, finding that he had suffered six cents damage in four years, is totally inadequate, and will be set aside and a new trial granted, where there was uncontradicted testimony as to the

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