of United States, § 271; Cooley, Const. | L. ed. 1115; Butchers' Union 8. H. & L. S. L. Lim. 5th ed. p. 208; Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 Co. v. Clinton County Comrs. 1 Ohio St. U. S. 759, 28 L. ed. 591, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Parker v. Com. 6 Pa. 511; People ex rel. 652; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; Rathbone L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Mugler v. v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459, 34 L. R. A. 408, 45 Kansas, 123 U. S. 663, 31 L. ed. 221, 8 Sup. N. E. 15; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Ct. Rep. 273; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 People ex rel. Townsend v. Porter, 90 N. Y. U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75; People ex rel.Dunn v. Detroit Super. Ct. 992, 1257; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Judge, 29 Mich. 228; State v. Constantine, Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 42 Ohio St. 437, 51 Am. Rep. 833; West Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Marchant v. PennsylvaPoint Water Power & Land Improv. Co. v. nia R. Co. 153 U. S. 390, 38 L. ed. 756, 14 State ex rel. Moodie, 49 Neb. 218, 66 N. W. Sup. Ct. Rep. 894; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 293, 42 L. ed. 1042, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, sub nom. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 29 L. ed.

6.

The Colorado eight-hour act violates the essential individual rights secured to the people of this state by the provisions of the bill of rights in undertaking to place restrictions upon persons sui juris to enter into contracts of employment for the prose-414, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Hayes v. Missouri, cution of a lawful business.

120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 Ú. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 Pac. 470; Re Lowrie, 8 Colo. 505, 9 Pac. 489; Cooley, Const. Lim. 432 et seq. The right of contract with reference to business which is in itself lawful and propis beyond legislative control, whether under the guise of the exercise of police power or otherwise.

Tiedeman, Pol. Power, p. 233; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. p. 745; 2 Hare, Am. Const. Law, p. 779; Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 508; McCarthy v. New York, 96 N. Y. 5, 48 Am. Rep. 601.

The Colorado eight-hour act is not applicable where the contract of hiring fixes the unit or period of employment on some other basis than by the day, i. e., an express contract of hiring by the hour, week, month, or year is not within its purview.

Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 314; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 22 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. | 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 86; Waters v. Wolf, 162 Pa. 153, 29 Atl. 646; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; John Spry Lumber Co. v. Sault Sav. Bank, Loan & T. Co. 77 Mich. 199, 6 L. R. A. 204, 43 N. W. 778; State v. Good-er will, 33 W. Va. 183, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 29 L. R. A. 257, 31 S. W. 781; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 32 L. R. A. 445, 43 N. E. 624; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 N. E. 631; Re Grice, 79 Fed. Rep. 627; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 25 S. W. 75; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 35 N. E. 62; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of City Prison, 157 N. Y. 116, 51 N. E. 1006; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 5 L. R. A. 559, 22 N. E. 670, 682; State v. Fire Creek Coal & C. Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 10 S. E. 288; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389; Tacoma v. Krech, 15 Wash. 296, 34 L.. R. A. 68, 46 Pac. 255; Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 32 L. R. A. 664, 44 Pac. 803; Keim v. Chicago, 46 Ill. App. 445; Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604; State v. Granneman, 132 Mo. 326, 33 S. W. 784; Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 32 L. R. A. 659, 43 N. E. 1108; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 9 L. R. A. 482, 24 Pac. 737; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 486; Re Eight Hours Bill, 21 Colo. 32, 39 Pac. 328.

A given legislative act may not be violative of any personal rights of the citizen, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, while at the same time the same act would unquestionably be adjudged void by the state judiciary as contravening the bill of rights of the state Constitution where the law was enacted.

Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24

Helphenstine v. Hartig, 5 Ind. App. 172; Bartlett v. Grand Rapids Street R. Co. 82 Mich. 658, 46 N. W. 1034.

Messrs. David M. Campbell, Attorney General, Booth M. Malone, Daniel Prescott, Calvin E. Reed, Dan B. Carey, Thomas M. Patterson, and John H. Murphy for respondent.

Campbell, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The petitioner challenges the validity of the statute, as inhibited by the foregoing clauses of the organic law. The position of the attorney general is that it was passed as a health regulation, and may be vindicated as coming within the range of the police powers of the state. Four years before it became an act, this court, to an inquiry of the house of representatives of the tenth general assembly as to the constitutionality of a bill reading, "Eight hours shall constitute a legal day's work for all classes of mechanics, workingmen, and laborers employed in any mine, factory, or smelter of any kind whatsoever in the state of Colorado," replied that it was "not competent for the legislature to single out the mining,

manufacturing, and smelting industries of the state, and impose upon them restrictions with reference to the hours of their employees from which other employers of labor are exempt." And it was further said that the section "violates the right of parties to make their own contracts, a right guaranteed by our bill of rights." Re Eight Hours Bill, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328. The twelfth general assembly must have been aware of this, and another decision concerning the power of the legislature to pass what is called a "coal-screening bill," the opinion being reported in 21 Colo. 27, and 39 Pac. 431 (Re House Bill No. 203)-in which this species of legislation was condemned as hostile to the Constitution. But, wholly disregarding these decisions, binding alike on all departments of government, it proceeded to enact the measure now before us. Though it affords no justification for such legislative action in defiance of and against the solemn decision of this court, we presume the excuse that might be offered therefor is that, after these decisions were handed down, in a sister state an act in the same language was passed and approved by its highest court, and, as is claimed, sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States. Following the rule of stare decisis, we might content ourselves with a mere affirmance of our previous announcements, made, as they were, upon full consideration; but, in view of the importance of the questions involved, we have thought it best fully to discuss the principles by which this act must be tested.

ours shows that the latter probably contains more restrictions upon the power of the legislature than are to be found in any other instrument; and whether measured by the decisions of the courts of that state, or as the result of our own construction, we think it clear that the general court of Massachu setts has, in the field of legislation under review, much wider latitude, and is hampered by fewer restrictions, than is our general assembly.

The extent and meaning of the act in question are not difficult of ascertainment, though it is not a model of statutory com. position. That it operates as a limitation both upon the employer and the employee seems clear. It forbids a certain kind of employment. There can be no employment without the concurring acts of him who contracts for employment and of him who contracts to be employed. Both are within the inhibitions of the enactment, and, if it is valid, each is liable to the penalty for making the forbidden contract. The petitioner, therefore, as a laboring man, is prohibited from entering into a contract to work in a smelter more than eight hours in any one day. If, in our Constitution, there was, as there seems to be in that of Utah, a specific affirmative provision enjoining upon the general assembly the enactment of laws to protect the health of the classes of workingmen therein enumerated, it might be that acts reasonably appropriate to that end would not be obnoxious to that provision of our Constitution forbidding class legislation; for it could hardly be said that a The question presented for our determina- classification made by the Constitution tion is, Does the act under which the peti- itself was arbitrary or unfair, or that it tioner is being prosecuted violate any con- clashed with another provision of the same stitutional provision? In this resolution instrument inhibiting class legislation. The the provisions of our own Constitution must two provisions should be construed together, govern. Decisions of other jurisdictions, so as to harmonize, if that be possible under defining the limits of legislation under their sound canons of construction, and the genConstitutions, are not always to be followed eral clause forbidding class legislation elsewhere, upon the supposition that the might be regarded as qualified by the spesame limitations everywhere prevail. This cial one which authorizes such legislation in is illustrated in the answer of the judges of respect to the enumerated classes. Article the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts 16 of our Constitution is devoted to mining in response to an inquiry by the house of and irrigation, and § 2 directs that "the representatives as to the validity of a pro- general assembly shall provide by law for posed bill. In the course of the opinion, aft- the proper ventilation of mines, the coner referring to the fact that legislation simi-struction of escapement shafts, and such lar to that proposed had been held by the courts in some states unconstitutional on different grounds, and without expressing an opinion as to the correctness of those decisions tested by the respective constitutions, the honorable judges said: "The legislative power granted to the general court by the Constitution of Massachusetts is perhaps more comprehensive than that found in the Constitutions of some of the other states." Opinion of Justices in House Bill No. 1,230, 163 Mass. 590, 28 L. R. A. 344, 40 N. E. 713. A similar observation was made by the supreme court of Illinois in Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454. It is peculiarly appropriate, we think, to our organic act. A comparison of many other Constitutions with

other appliances as may be necessary to protect the health and secure the safety of the workmen therein." These regulations manifestly embrace only such reasonably necessary mechanical appliances as will secure the end in view, and do not include other kinds of health regulations. Whether this command, addressed to the legislature, to protect the health of these workmen by requir ing the mines to be furnished with the appliances specified, does not restrict the lawmaking power to the things named, on the principle that when authority to do a particular thing is given, and the mode of doing it is prescribed, all other modes are excluded, might be a material inquiry, where the validity of the act was challenged by a minor; but as that question relates to work

men in mines, and not in smelters, we pre- | to the paramount and sovereign right of the fer to put our decision upon impregnable state to exercise its police power to protect grounds that cover both cases. Be that as the public health; and to this, the principal it may, we have no constitutional provision question in this proceeding, we now address which authorizes the legislature to single ourselves. out workingmen in underground mines and The protection of the public health is smelters, and impose upon them restrictions mentioned neither in the body of the act as to the number of hours they shall work nor in its title, as is usually the case in simat these industries, from which workingmenilar acts of other states. When it is clearin all other departments of industry are ex-ly perceived from the terms of an act that empt. To this effect is our decision in Re the thing prohibited necessarily affects the Eight Hours Bill, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328; public health, it may not be necessary exand we have heard no argument in the case pressly to declare therein what the object at bar, nor have we been cited to any au- of the act is; but, where the result is doubtthority, that leads us to a different conclu- | ful, the object of the act ought, somewhere sion. and somehow, to be stated, and, in accordThe act is equally obnoxious to the provi-ance with some decisions, must be thus prosions of our bill of rights, set out in the claimed, else the act will be held invalid on statement, which guarantee to all persons the ground that it is deceptive in not extheir natural and inalienable right to per-pressing its real object. Possibly such decsonal liberty, and the right of acquiring, laration would not be conclusive that its possessing, and protecting property. Liber-real character is what it is expressed to be, ty means something more than mere free any more than the absence of a declaration dom from physical restraint. It includes would be that such was not its true nature. the privilege of choosing any lawful occu-Where there is a mandatory requirement in pation for the exercise of one's physical and the Constitution (Colo. Const. art. 5, § 21) mental faculties which is not injurious to that no bill except the general appropriation others. The right to acquire and possess bill shall contain more than one subject, property includes the right to contract for which shall be clearly expressed in the title, one's labor. The latter is essentially a the title of this act is at least questionable. property right. The arbitrary classification Certainly, unless "regulating the hours of of rights into rights of persons and rights employment" is synonymous with or equivaof things, made by Blackstone and other ju- lent to "protecting the public health," the rists for purposes of convenience in treat- title would seem to be dubiously stated. ment, has been the occasion for hostile criti- But, as counsel have not made this point, cism by those favoring socialistic or pater-we pause only to mention, but not to decide, nal legislation. Employing the argumen-it. It is upon the hypothesis, however, that tum ad hominem, they say that those decisions in which courts have carefully guarded rights of property put property above the man. A moment's calm reflection will show the falsity of this charge. Property, as such, has no claim upon the protection of the law. When a property right is spoken of, the right of some person over or concerning the property is meant. All rights recognized by the law pertain to persons, natural or artificial. The absolute rights are commonly designated as personal rights. They are such as are annexed to the person, like life and reputation, while property rights are those unconnected with the person, but which none the less belong to some person. All rights, both those spoken of as personal and those denominated as property rights, belong to the individual citizen; and, when it is said that property rights must not be infringed, what is meant is merely that the right of some person to or concerning prop-it erty must not be interfered with. That this act infringes both the right to enjoy liberty and to acquire and possess property seems too clear for argument. While not conceding that this limitation is not permissible, counsel for respondent, as we understand them, recognize the fact (but, if they do not, the same is only too apparent) that these natural rights are violated by the provisions of the act. The limitation is claimed to be warranted on the ground that these and all other constitutional guaranties must yield

it is the duty of the judiciary to sustain every act of the legislative department, if it can be done on any conceivable rational constitutional ground, that, for the present purpose, we assume with counsel for respondent that the object of the legislature was the enactment of a health measure, and that in effectuating the same it has complied with the clause of the Constitution just referred to.

Starting, then, with the premise, which is practically admitted to be true, that this act contravenes the constitutional provisions quoted in the statement, let us see if, notwithstanding this conflict, it can be justified as a valid exercise of the police power. It is difficult to define, or with precision to describe, the police power. It has rarely been attempted by the courts, and the attempt has never been attended with complete success. Following the authorities, we may say that

extends to the protection of the public health. It is upon the specific ground that limiting the time a workingman may labor in a smelter to eight hours a day conduces to and preserves the health of the laborer himself that this act is sought to be upheld. With sincere respect for the ability of the courts in whose opinions the remarks are found, but with a profound conviction of their erroneous conception of the nature and limits of the police power, we submit that much loose reasoning has been indulged in, and some decisions rendered that cannot be

defended upon principle. As we understand | cised, and the reasonableness of that exerit, the "police power" is the name given to cise. Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 3; People that function of government by which is en- v. Jackson & M. Pl. Road Co. 9 Mich. 285; forced the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. 70 III. non lædas. In Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 191, 22 Am. Rep. 71; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. 710, we read that this maxim "is that which Law, 746 et seq.; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. lies at the foundation of the power." Prof. 389, 17 N. E. 343. In that great repository Tiedeman, in his work on the Limitations of of constitutional learning, Cooley, Const. Police Power, in § 1, says: "The object of Lim., Judge Cooley, at page 208, 6th ed. well government is to impose that degree of re- says: "The maxims of Magna Charta and straint upon human actions which is nec- the common law are the interpreters of conessary to the uniform and reasonable con- stitutional grants of power, and those acts servation and enjoyment of private rights. which by those maxims the several depart. . . The conservation of private rights ments of government are forbidden to do canis attained by the imposition of a wholesome not be considered within any grant or apporrestraint upon their exercise, such a re- tionment of power which the people in genstraint as will prevent the infliction of in- eral terms have made to those departments." jury upon others in the enjoyment of them." This observation, as we take it, is as pertiHe further quotes with approval the lan- nent to the general police power vested in, guage of Judge Redfield in the case of though not expressly conferred upon, the Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, 62 legislature under written constitutions, as Am. Dec. 625: "This police power of the it is to some express power therein delegated. state extends to the protection of the lives, At page 711 of the same work is quoted with limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all per- approval the following language of Judge sons, and the protection of all property with- Christiancy, found in his able opinion in in the state. According to the maxim, Sic People v. Jackson & M. Pl. Road Co. 9 Mich. utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, which being 285: "Powers, the exercise of which can of universal application, it must, of course, only be justified on this specific ground [that be within the range of legislative action to they are police regulations], and which define the mode and manner in which every would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the one may so use his own as not to injure oth- Constitution, can be such only as are so ers." And Prof. Tiedeman immediately fol- clearly necessary to the safety, comfort, or lows this quotation with the statement that well-being of society, or so imperatively re"any law which goes beyond that principle- quired by the public necessity, as to lead to which undertakes to abolish rights, the exer- the rational and satisfactory conclusion cise of which does not involve an infringe-that the framers of the Constitution could ment of the rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general security-cannot be included in the police power of the government." It thus appears that, in proceeding under this power, the legislature must choose proper subjects for its exercise, and must observe constitutional limitations just as closely as when it enacts laws pertaining to the public revenue, or provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In our form of government, unlimited power does not exist in any department (Prentice, Pol. Powers, 267; Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 455), and whenever the constitutionality of an act of any department is challenged the judicial departing ment is the final arbiter.

Notwithstanding this general rule, we are here met with the argument, and the assertion is baldly made, that in the exercise of its police power the legislature is subject to no restriction except its own unbridled discretion as to what subjects it may select for regulation, and the kind of regulation it may prescribe. We cannot assent to this doctrine. It may find apparent sanction in unguarded expressions of text writers or in judicial opinions, but it is contrary to every well-considered decision. It is for the legislature to determine the exigency (that is, the occasion) for the exercise of the power; but it is clearly within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine what are the subjects upon which the power is to be exer

not. as men of ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of the prohibition would otherwise include it." The opinion in Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313, discusses the nature of the police power. Reserv ing opinion as to the correctness of the determination of the court in that case with reference to the law before it, which has been repudiated in Jones v. Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. 58 U. S. App. 397, 86 Fed. Rep. 370, 30 C. C. A. 108, its remarks in discussing one phase of the general subject, meet with our approval. In reply to the argument of counsel, who claimed the most sweeping power of the legislature in restrict

the right of contract when the general good requires it, the court said: "It may be restrained only in so far as it is necessary for the common welfare and the equal protection and benefit of the people. That such restraint of the right and liberty of contract is for the common public welfare, and equal protection and benefit of the people, must appear, not only to the general assembly, by force of popular clamor or the pressure of the lobby, but also to the courts; and it must be so clear that a court of justice, in the calm deliberation of its judgment, may be able to see that such restraint is for the common welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people." To the same effect, see John Spry Lumber Co. v. Sault Sav. Bank, Loan & T. Co. 77 Mich. 199, 6 L. R. A. 204, 43 N. W. 778.

welfare of less than the entire people. Our bill of rights expressly says that government is instituted solely for the good of the whole. In this we must not be understood as limiting the legislature, where the facts justify apparent discrimination, in passing health laws affecting only certain classes. Indeed, laws having for their object the protection of small portions of a community have been upheld, as in Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036, where a nuisance, obnoxious probably only to part of a village, was abated; but what we mean to decide is that in a purely private, lawful business, in which no special privilege or license has been granted by the state, and the carrying on of which is attended by no injury to the general public, it is beyond the power of the legislature, under the guise of the police power, to prohibit an adult man who desires to work thereat from working more than eight hours a day, on the ground that working longer may, or probably will, injure his own health. Ah Lim v. Territory,

In the light of these principles every act of this character must be tested. While invoking as a warrant for this act that phase of the police power extending to the public health, its supporters do not claim that its real and primary object is to protect the public health, or the health of that portion of the community in the immediate vicinity, or affected by the operation, of smelters. If that purpose is present at all, it is only so inferentially, and the means employed to se、 cure it are neither adequate nor appropriate. The smelting of ores is a continuous process, night and day, the year through. It is not claimed that the business is injurious to public health. It would be absurd to argue that, while the process itself is continuous, limiting the hours of those laboring in a smelter in any wise conduces to preserve the health of any portion of the public. That is to say, three shifts of laborers, working eight hours each, would affect the public health to the same extent, if at all, as would two shifts at twelve hours each. It is not contended that the business of smelting is unlawful;1 Wash. 156, 9 L. R. A. 395, 24 Pac. 588, nor is it claimed that the act was passed to held valid an act of the territory providing prevent employers from perpetrating fraud that any person who smoked or inhaled opiupon employees, or to protect the latter from um was guilty of a misdemeanor, notwithtrespasses. Indeed, the only object that can standing the object, or at least one object, of rationally be claimed for it is the preserva- the act was to protect the smoker or inhaler tion of the health of those working in the himself from the effect of his own act. This smelters. Were the object of the act to pro- regulation was thought by three of the five tect the public health, and its provisions judges to be warranted by a provision of the reasonably appropriate to that end, it might organic act of the territory (no question of be sustained; for in such a case even the conflict with a state Constitution being in isconstitutional right of contract may be sue) extending, as they said, "the power of reasonably limited. But the act before us is the territorial legislature to all rightful subnot of that character. In selecting a subject jects of legislation; and, when once we confor the exercise of the police power the legis- cede the rightfulness of the subject, the exlature must keep within its true scope. The tent and character of the legislation on that reason for the existence of the power rests subject cannot be called in question by the upon the theory that one must so use his own courts." Possibly some courts would uphold as not to injure others, and so as not to in- such legislation, if confined to appropriate terfere with or injure the public health, cases, on the ground that smoking or inhalsafety, morals, or general welfare. How can ing opium was necessarily demoralizing to one be said injuriously to affect others, or society, degrading to public morals, and ininterfere with these great objects, by doing jurious to the general welfare. But the poan act which confessedly visits its conse- sition taken by the Washington tribunal, quences on himself alone? And how can an that courts cannot inquire into the character alleged law, that purports to be the result of an act, or question legislation, finds no of an exercise of the police power, be such in sanction in any well-considered case or standreality, when it has for its only object, not ard text-book. In the dissenting opinion the the protection of others, or the public health, true doctrine is recognized. In some of the safety, morals, or general welfare, but the other cases are found such expressions welfare of him whose act is prohibited, (dicta, it is true) as that the state has such when, if committed, it will injure him who an interest in each citizen that it may procommits it, and him only? The maxim does tect him against the consequences of his own not read, "So use your own right or prop-rashness, and, upon the theory that the state erty as not to injure yourself or your own property." Perceiving the inconsistency that must follow an attempt to vindicate a law on the principle that underlies the police power, counsel adroitly invoke the maxim, Salus populi suprema est lex. So far as we can ascertain, no commentator and no judge has ever sought to borrow this wholesome maxim and use it as a prop to uphold a law whose object is to protect a man against himself. The welfare of the people is indeed the supreme law, but this maxim cannot be twist-zen ed to sustain a law violating private rights, which contemplates the promotion of the

is made up of the sum of all its parts, it may, for each individual, and for his supposed good, prescribe any regulations that are appropriate and suitable for the whole. In other words, this theory is based upon the proposition that each part making up the whole includes the whole itself, in the same sense that the whole includes each part. This, in principle, is the same as the theory that would authorize the state to prescribe any regulations it saw fit for keeping a citi

out of its jails, hospitals, or poor-houses, because it is a legitimate function of government to levy and collect taxes to build such