The judgments of the District Court and the Court of Appeals will be affirmed. Doster, Ch. J., concurs. Johnston, J., concurring specially: to the employees at the legal rate of weights | ees. We think this assumption is unwarfixed by law. Of the intent of the legisla- ranted, and that, in so far as the arguments ture in enacting the statute, it is hardly nec- of counsel rest upon it, the arguments upon essary to inquire. We can see, however, a that contention are irrelevant to the quesuseful purpose to be accomplished. In the tions which properly arise in the case." The exercise of the police power, the legislature law is devoted to other purposes than an inmay pass such laws as in its judgment are terference with or a regulation of contracts. necessary, regulating the measuring or It merely prohibits the screening of coal weighing of commodities. In Tiedeman, mined at ton or quantity rates before the Lim. p. 509, it is said: "By virtue of the same is weighed. This is a legitimate expolice power, regulations have been imposed ercise of the police power, coming properly on the practice of the law, medicine, and den- within the sphere of legislative action, upon tistry, as well as upon bakers, millers, and the grounds above stated. wharfingers; and it has been accepted as a proper exercise of the police power to regulate pawnshops, junkshops, and loan offices. Inspection laws and those regulating the weighing of articles offered for sale are generally regarded as suitable and valid regulations of police." The utility of the act (if I think the judgment should be affirmed, we have the right to enter upon such an in- and only desire, in a few words, to add anquiry) can be defended for the reason that other to the well-stated reasons already givthe weighing of the gross output from the en for affirmance. All the authorities unite mine gives information to the miner, whose in sustaining a statute requiring the weighlabor has separated it from the general massing of a commodity, like coal, intended to be of the vein, concerning the result of his ef- sold, and there is no contention here that fort. He is thus advised how much in this is not a proper exercise of the police weight of all grades of this fuel he has ex- power of the state. The contention is that tracted from the earth in a day, a month, or the statute goes further, and interferes with a year; enabling him, when armed with this and infringes upon the right to contract; knowledge, to make contracts in the future and, if it did, I would readily agree with my based upon actual information of the bene- Brother Smith, as well as the court of apfits the employer has in the past derived peals, that the act would be invalid. I think from his labor. Thus informed he may act the act requires but little interpretation. intelligently, resting his demand for pay up- In plain terms, it requires the weighing of on the actual value of his labor as shown by the output of coal before it is disposed of, the calculated results of what he has there- provides how it shall be done, and prescribes tofore accomplished. On the other side, the punishment for any evasion or failure to obemployer may also have this knowledge beserve its requirements. Nothing in the lanfore his eyes when contracting with the min- guage of the act expressly prohibits or interers for their services, enabling him to make feres with the freedom of contract, and such an adjustment of wages based upon known a meaning can only be found in far-fetched facts. By this system of weighing, decep- implications or remote inferences. The leg tion as to the amount of coal mined is ren- islative intent of an act can best be learned dered impossible, and fraud prevented. from its words, and when the meaning is Standing in the light of such knowledge clear no interpretation is necessary or allowgained from established data, the miner may able. While contemporary history and wellmake a claim of right to wages he knows he known facts may sometimes be considered in can earn, fortifying his demand by reference determining the legislative purpose of an act to what he has done, as found recorded in the weighmaster's books. Further, it is im a court is never warranted in departing from the obvious import of unambiguous lanportant that the public should have within guage, and entering the field of conjecture reach data sufficient to furnish information and speculation in search of a legislative regarding the amount of coal produced from purpose, or in learning it from newspaper the mines within the state. A compliance statements, or the gossip in the corridors of with this law provides means for the compi- the state house, when the act was passed. lation of statistics showing the entire out- A still more important consideration is that, put of coal. The dissemination of knowl- if the meaning sought to be imported into edge concerning the wealth and material re- this act is given, it would, in my judgment, sources of a state is a laudable employment, destroy its validity. If it be conceded that and legislation which tends to accomplish or the statute is ambiguous and open to two inin any wise assist in such work ought to be terpretations, which should be adopted,upheld and encouraged. For this object the one that upholds, or the one that dealone the act in question is useful, and, being feats? The presumption, so far as it can so, we cannot say that the legislature did not obtain, is that the legislature did not inhave such purpose in view when the same tend to do a vain thing, or to enact a statwas enacted. We agree with the court of ute that was ineffectual and invalid. Every appeals in saying [7 Kan. App. 431, 53 presumption is in favor of the validity of the Pac. 372]: "Counsel throughout their law, and, if there is room for two construcwhole argument assume that the object of tions, the court must, in deference to the legthis act is to regulate the rate of wages to islature, assume that it did not intend to be paid by mine operators to their employ- violate the Constitution, and should there fore adopt the one which would uphold the | for the same at the legal rate of weights, validity of its act. In Sutherland, Stat. were intended as a basis for statistics mereConstr. § 332, it is said that "where one construction will make a statute void for conflict with the Constitution, and another would render it valid, the latter will be adopted, though the former at first view is otherwise the more natural interpretation of the language." 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 349. "It is no part of the duty of the court to be astute in order to invalidate a statute; it will, rather, strive to so interpret it as to sustain its validity, and give effect to the intention of the legislature." Ferguson v. Stamford, 60 Conn. 447, 22 Atl. 782. The title to the act, to which we may look as an aid to its construction, does not indicate a purpose on the part of the legislature to trench on the freedom of contract, nor to do anything else than to require the weighing of the output of the coal before it is disposed of, nor do I find in it any express provision or necessary implication compelling us to impute a purpose to the legislature that would overthrow the validity of the act. Smith, J., dissenting: The construction applied to this law by the majority of the court seems to me to be a perversion of legislative intent, and we need not go beyond the language of its several sections to ascertain that the obvious and sole purpose of the enactment was to control and restrict the right of contract. The title, "An Act to Regulate the Weighing of Coal at the Mine," conceals its true purpose as revealed in the body of the law. The title only partially indicates its object. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623-661, 31 L. ed. 205-210, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297, it is said: "The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority." "But the Constitution must be interpreted and effect given to it as the paramount law of the land, equally obligatory upon the legislature, as upon other departments of the government, and individual citizens, according to the spirit and intent of its framers, as indicated by its terms. An act violating the true intent and meaning of the instrument, although it may not be within the letter, is as much within the purview and effect of a prohibition as if within the strict letter." District Court Case, 34 Ohio St. 431-440. Analyzing the whole act, together, we find that the first section prohibits the passing of the output over any screen which shall take any part from the value thereof before the same shall have been weighed and duly credited to the employees and accounted for at the legal rate of weights fixed by the laws of Kansas. This latter clause, employing, as it does, words of well-known import in the commercial world, certainly conveys a meaning at variance with the idea that such crediting to employees of the gross weight of all the output of value, and the "accounting" tion? ly, or simply to enlighten the miner for his future guidance concerning the amount of coal mined by him. Section 5 provides: "Any provisions, contract, or agreement between mine owners or operators thereof and the miners employed therein, whereby the provisions of § 1 of this act are waived, modified, or annulled, shall be void and of no effect; and the coal sent to the surface shall be accepted or rejected, and if accepted shall be weighed in accordance with the provisions of this act; and right of action shall not be invalidated by reason of any contract or agreement." If the design of the act is as stated by my brethren, does it further the objects contended for in the opinion to declare, "and the coal sent to the surface shall be accepted or rejected, and if accepted shall be weighed in accordance with this act, and right of action shall not be invalidated, by reason of any contract or agreement." If to give knowledge to the miner of the amount of labor he had expended in digging out a ton of coal was the aim of the statute, why mention the subject of rejecting or accepting any part of the coal, or refer to rights of acThe language, "and right of action shall not be invalidated by reason of any contract or agreement," has reference to a remedy sought in the courts by someone having by contract bound himself to do something which this statute, coming in the way, says he cannot do. The obvious meaning is that if a miner contracts to take out coal for, say, $1 per ton for all screened coal mined by him, he must be paid $1 per ton for the mine run. That is the total weight of the substance extracted from the earth by him having a marketable value, and all contracts for determining the amount of his compensation on any other basis, when he works by ton or quantity rates, are invalidated. It means that, when the miner makes a contract to take out coal at so much per ton for screened coal, the bargain does not bind him; that when he sues his employer for wages the court must give him judgment, not on the contract, but, finding the weight of all coal he has taken out (both screenings and lump), the gross product is to be credited to him, and compensation given on the basis of its weight. Section 5 can certainly have no reference to a right of action brought by a miner to recover wages computed on the basis of screened coal, for he had such a right of action independent of the statute. But it was manifestly the purpose of the act to give the miner a right of action to recover his wages computed on the basis of coal weighed in accordance with the provisions of the law, that is, computed on the basis of coal weighed before screening, and that notwithstanding any contract to the contrary. This seems to me to be the plain, palpable, and obvious meaning of the statute. In determining legislative intent, we have the right to consider the nature of the demands upon the lawmakers which induced legislation for the remedy of an existing evil. As was said by Mr. Justice Valentine in To peka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431-437, 4 Pac. 804: "Courts may take judicial notice of the census returns, of the general history of the country, of what the members of the legislature ought to know when passing the statute which the courts are called upon to construe, and, indeed, of what all well-informed persons ought to know." We know that the demand for such legislation was based upon the claim that coal miners were not paid enough for their labor; that they were at the mercy of the operators, who, by screening the product, robbed them of a portion of the proceeds of their labor which should have been paid for. The object was to right this wrong, and to this end the statute under consideration was passed. To rule otherwise is a wresting of obvious language from its purpose. No clamor rang in the ears of the lawmakers from oppressed and starving miners demanding a law which would furnish them with statistics, when they were crying for bread. As we have the right judicially to know what the legislature ought to have known, for the purpose of arriving at their intent, can we say that it had the remotest design to make a statute for the purpose indicated in the majority opinion? If information to the general public (including the miner and operators) was the object sought, in order that statistics might be based thereon, the legislature was exceedingly magnanimous, under § 3, in affording to the miners the privilege of employing weighmen at their own expense if they so desired. The right vouchsafed to them of going down in their pockets and paying therefrom the expenses of check weighmen to determine the output of the mine for statistical purposes was certainly an exhibition of sincere generosity. Again, no account is required to be kept of coal taken from the mines unless the miners are to be paid at ton, bushel, or quantity rates. So the collection of information as to the amount produced depends on the continuance of a ton, bushel, or quantity rate method of paying wages. If this system of payment is abandoned, there is no preservation of statistics; suggesting the argument that, if the furnishing of exact knowledge to the miner and operator was one of the objects of the law, why does not the law require the weighing of coal mined under all circumstances, and under every plan of payment? If partial knowledge on this subject was a thing so desirable that a whole legislature was moved to furnish it, why was complete means of knowledge withheld, when ample power existed to obtain it? As against the remote probability that the act, as interpreted by the majority, will result in any benefit to the miner, is the certainty that the public at large will suffer by its enforcement, if the quantity or ton rate of payment prevails. The total output of coal in the state for the year 1898 was, in round numbers, 3.860,000 tons. It is estimated that about one third of the production is slack coal, which goes through the screens. The cost of this compulsory weighing must be added to the price of the fuel which the consumer (the public) is compelled to pay in order that it may be known with mathematical certainty how many tons the mines of the state have yielded. This tribute is exacted from consumers of Kansas coal to satisfy the contention that the law contemplates some other object than the regulation of wages. In justifying this legislation as a proper exercise of the police power, I think that power has been unwarrantably extended. Such power must have relation to the health, comfort, safety, or necessities of the people. This is asserted in all the books upon the subject. It cannot include matters which are connected merely with the convenience of the public. In Black, Constitutional Prohibitions, p. 82, it is said: "There is no possibility, upon any principle of logical deduction from the adjudged cases or the nature of the subject, of stretching the limits of the police power so as to make it include matters which are merely connected with the conven ience of the public. There are decisions which might seem, at first blush, to lend countenance to such a proposition, but an attentive consideration will show that they either used the term in its broad and general sense, or had reference to matters concerning the safety of the people, not their convenience." It is for the courts to define the limits of the police power, and confine same within constitutional bounds. It may be convenient for the miner and the public generally to have the means of knowing how much coal has been mined in the state, for the purposes mentioned in the opinion, but the necessity of such knowledge is not apparent. It would be interesting to know with accuracy the total yield of corn in Kansas during the present year. But the enactment of a law requiring the farmer to measure every bushel of his crop as soon as it is ready for market could hardly be justified, even though it might assist the persons who gathered it in determining the amount of profit the farmer would derive from their labor. General laws and city ordinances relating to the weighing of commodities before sale have been upheld as coming within the police power, for the reason that purchasers are protected. In the case of Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 N. E. 631636, the supreme court of Illinois passed upon the validity of an act quite similar to this, relating to the weighing of coal at the mines. In holding the law unconstitutional, as infringing upon the right to contract, the court answered the argument that the act might be defended on the ground that it required the keeping of a public record for the information of the public. Scholfield, J., says: "We recognize fully the right of the general assembly, subject to the paramount authority of Congress, to prescribe weights and measures, and to enforce their use, in proper cases, but we do not think that the general assembly has power to deny to persons in one kind of business the privilege to contract for labor, and to sell their products without regard to weight, while at the same time allowing to persons in all other kinds of business this privilege; there Messrs. A. A. Hurd, W. Littlefield, and O. J. Wood, for plaintiffs in error: Railroad property was not only to be left unprotected, but other property lying between the railroad right of way and the fire guards, which in no case should be nearer to the right of way than 1/4 of a mile, and might be located as far as 22 miles away, is left unprotected from fires orignating in the operation of the railroad. This being the case any levy of this fire tax against the railroads would be clearly unauthorized and void. If the act intended that railroads should be taxed for this purpose, then the act is in contravention of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution and laws of the state of Kansas, being an attempt to deprive persons of property without due process of law and without compensation, and denying to railroad companies the equal protection of the laws. being nothing in the business itself to distinguish it in this respect from any other kind of business. And we deny that the burden can be imposed on any corporation or individual, not acting under a license or by virtue of a franchise, of buying property and hiring labor merely to furnish public statistics, unless upon due compensation to be made therefor." It would be a mere affectation of industry to collate here the great number of decisions which denounce legislation of this kind, infringing upon the right to contract by persons sui juris, like the miners employed by the appellant, who, according to the agreed facts, "are of full age, sound mind, and of full and legal capacity to contract and be contracted with." The court of appeals had no doubt of its invalidity if its provisions related to the regulation of wages. That court said [7 Kan. App. 434, 53 Pac. 373]: "As we have already stated, we should hold this law to be invalid if it in terms expressed such purpose [the regulation of wages], but that neither the title of the act nor the act itself directly or indirectly purports to relate to the matter of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42. L. ed. wages. In my judgment, the design of the 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Covington & L. framers has been misconstrued and pervert- Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, ed. A law thought by them to be endowed 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Gulf, C. with strength and virility, aiming at the & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L, correction of abuses in the field of labor, has ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Santa Clara been disfigured by its interpreters, its true County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, purpose denied. Strained and imaginary 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Pembina reasons are put forward as excuses for its Consol. Silver Min. & Mill Co. v. Pennsylexistence, and explanations made of its util-vania, 125 U. S. 181, 189, 31 L. ed. 653, 8 ity which are highly fanciful and speculaBy a process of refined construction its original identity has been effectively destroyed, until recognition by its creators is now impossible. tive. ATCHISON, TOPEKA, & SANTA FÉ RAIL- v. S. G. CLARK et al. (60 Kan. 826.) Corporations are persons, within the meaning of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 391, 35 L. ed. 1051, 1053, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255. This act did not provide for the levy of a tax for general revenue purposes, but it was strictly in the nature of a local assessment, to be collected from the property benefited. Cooley, Taxn. p. 418; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599; Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Dec. 63; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383, 46 Am. Dec. 630; 2 Desty, Taxn. pp. 1237, 1238. If it was a general tax it must have been levied upon all of the property in the county at a uniform and equal rate. Chapter 263 of the Laws of 1895 (Gen. Stat. 1897, chap. 170), providing for the levy of a fire tax, and which excludes the property of railroad companies on which such tax is levied from the benefit and protec-781; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146, tion which the law should afford, is invalid. Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 3 Am. Rep. 615; Tide-Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 90 Am. Dec. 634; Dyar v. Farmington, 70 Me. 515. Property outside of the district cannot be taxed for the benefit of the district. Cooley, Taxn. 104-106; Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122, 11 m. Rep. 440; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160; Ham v. Sawyer, 38 Me. 37; Ritchie v. Mulvane, 39 Kan. 241; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649-657, 39 L. ed. 567-570, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484. While there is no provision in the Constitution of the state of Kansas, which provides v. Ellison (Utah) 43 L. R. A. 81, the latter of which is overruled by Kimball v. Grantsville City (Utah) 45 L. R. A. 628. that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation, yet the courts have universally held that, in the absence of any such provision of the state Constitution, any act of the legislature not recognizing this right would be void. Mills, Em. Dom. § 1, p. 81; 2 Desty, Taxn. p. 1238. Messrs. A. A. Godard, Attorney General, A. C. Dyer, and F. Dumont Smith, for defendants in error: A general tax is an ad valorem percentage levied upon all property in the state, or some civil division thereof. 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 17, and notes. Such tax must be uniform, but only uniform throughout the particular taxing district, whether state, county, township, or school district. Marion & M. R. Co. v. Champlin, 37 Kan. 682, 16 Pac. 222; Ottawa County Comrs. v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 237, 27 Am. Rep. 101. The fire tax is such a tax. The state may provide by general taxation for the prevention of calamities, such as fires, floods, contagious diseases, and the like. Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. p. 134. Johnston, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This was a proceeding to enjoin the collection of a special fire tax levied by the county commissioners of Edwards county upon railroad property located in three townships of that county. In two of the townships a levy of two mills was made, and in the other the levy was one mill, on the dollar. The contention of the railway company is that chapter 263 of the Laws of 1895 (Gen. Stat. 1897, chap. 170) discriminates against railroad companies by excluding their property from the benefits provided; that the tax is not equal and uniform, as the Constitution requires; that the enforcement of the tax is an attempt to deprive them of property without due process of law; that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, and is therefore void. The act provides that the county commissioners may levy a fire tax on the property of the county, and in addition thereto may levy a like tax in each or any of the townships of the county. The township trustee is required to make a map of his township, and subdivide it into suitable and convenient fire districts; and, if there is a railroad in the district, he is to divide his township, where it is possible, so that the line of the district shall come to the line of the right of way, but shall not cross the railroad. The road overseers are made fire overseers, and on them is devolved the duty of breaking, plowing, mowing, or burning fire breaks. The law appears to prescribe two methods for protection against fire: One, where there is no railroad, as provided in § 5, where at a certain time the overseer is required to plow strips on the outside lines of his district, 6 rods apart, where there is open prairie, and also in fenced pastures, where the owners' consent can be obtained, and to burn the grass between the strips of breaking. The other, which is provided in § 6, where there is a line of railroad; and it is there made the duty of the overseer "to cause to be plowed two strips of at least three furrows each, at least 6 rods apart, on all open prairie or fenced pasture, with the owner's consent, along the section lines running the nearest parallel with said railway, not nearer than 4 of a mile to nor more than 21⁄2 miles from said railroad, making said strips continuous by running at right angles when necessary to keep within the distance above mentioned, and cause the grass to be carefully burned off between said strips; provided, that where there is open and unoccupied prairie, the road overseer may plow and burn said strips running parallel with said railway, not closer than 1/4 of a mile to the said railroad." As will be observed, the act is somewhat crude and inconsistent in its provisions. Aside from the manifest purpose to exclude railroad property from fire districts to be created, the provision relating to where the fire guards shall be made is in conflict. First, the act requires fire guards to be plowed and burnt on all exterior lines in the district. In a later provision, however, it provides that, where there is a railroad, like fire guards are to be made on section lines running nearest parallel with the railroad, but which are not to be closer than 4 of a mile to the railroad, nor more than 22 miles distant therefrom. In order to place fire guards within the limits mentioned, and make them continuous, they are to run, when necessary, at right angles on section lines, but there is an express provision that in no instance are they to be made closer than of a mile of a railroad. The exterior limits of a fire district which extend to and run parallel with the right of way would ordinarily be only 50 feet distant from the railroad, and according to one provision there would be a fire guard thereon, but by the other provision it would be 4 of a mile away, and might be 22 miles. Then, again, no provision is made for placing the tax upon the tax books, nor that it shall become a lien at any time upon the property taxed. Neither does it provide that it shall be collected the same as other taxes are collected. No provision is made for the collection of this tax in money, but persons residing in the district may work out the tax under the direction of the road overseer, at specified rates of compensation. How far these omissions might affect the validity of the law in the absence of other defects, we need not determine. It appears, however, from the provisions referred to, that railroad property is excluded from districts organized for fire protection, and that the fire guards are so remote as to afford the company but little, if any, protection from fire. Much of the property of the company is of such a nature as may be injured or consumed by fire, and what protection would a fire guard located 22 miles from the property afford? Or even if it was but 1/4 of a mile away, which is as near as it may be made? It is well known that fires are sometimes started |