manner, and in accordance with the terms | tions with reference to the placing of its of the statute, certain poles in said city for the purpose of connecting with its central office the premises of persons who had subscribed for telephone service. August 3, 1897, the common council passed a resolution declaring said poles and wires a nuisance, and instructed the street commissioner to forthwith remove them; and they adopted a resolution providing that if complainant thereafter should place any telephone poles in any streets or alleys of the city without first having obtained permission, said commissioner should forthwith remove them. The commissioner did remove the poles and wires so erected. After this action taken complainant, on August 10 and 18, presented two petitions to the common council, asking permission to erect poles in certain specified streets and alleys. The council refused to grant permission, and permitted a rival company, known as the Twin City Telephone Company, engaged in the same business, to set up poles and string its wires in the streets and alleys of the city. Complainant was willing and anxious to conform to all reasonable and valid regula- | was Thus, New Orleans, S. Fort & Lake R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501, 29 L. ed. 244, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009, holds that a provision of the statute authorizing railroad companies to mortgage their property and franchises implies power to transfer a right of way through streets granted by city ordinance, and that, in view of such provision, the franchise passed to an assignee in bankruptcy of the company. Smith v. Reading Pass. R. Co. 2 Pa. Dist. R. 490, holds that the express power conferred by statute upon traction companies to take leases of property of passenger railway companies implies power in the latter companies to make the leases. It was urged against this position that only leases from companies already empowered to make them were intended by the act. The court, however, in reply to the objection, stated that under existing statutes only two passenger rallway companies had such power at the time of the act. Threadgill v. Pumphrey, 87 Tex. 573, 30 S. W. 356, holds that a provision of the Revised Statutes empowering all corporations organized under the provisions of a certain title to mortgage their property, empowers a quasi-public corporation such as an electric light and power company, to mortgage its property including its franchise. A statute authorizing every corporation to mortgage such real and personal property as its purpose may require is held in Hovelman v. Kansas City Horse R. Co. 79 Mo. 632, to authorize a street-railway company to mortgage its right of way. Africa v. Knoxville, 70 Fed. Rep. 729, holds that a provision of a statute declaring that a corporation formed by the consolidation of street-railway companies shall have all the privileges and franchises of the constituent companies, conferred upon a consolidated corporation the franchise of a constituent corporation to operate its road and occupy the street for that purpose. People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L. R. A. 255, 18 N. E. 692, holds that under the statutes of New York the franchise of a street-railway company to occupy the streets is transferable Independently of the life of the corporation; that the franchise and a mortgage thereon sur poles and stringing of its wires, and so stated in said petitions. The erection of these poles and wires is essential to enable complainant to do its business and meet the requirements of its subscribers. There is ample space on the streets, and no public necessity justifies the refusal. Under the act authorizing its incorporation, complainant has power to construct and maintain lines of wire, with the necessary erections and fixtures for use in transmitting messages, along, over, across, or under any public places, streets, and highways in the state. Alleges its duties to receive and transmit messages without discrimination, and to furnish service without unreasonable delay. By the acceptance of the resolution of 1881, and the construction and maintenance of its telephone system, and by the granting of special rates and privileges to the city, a valid contract has been created between the parties, by virtue of which the city is estopped from denying the complainant's right to maintain and use existing poles and wires, and to continue to set poles and string wires over, on, and in the streets vived the dissolution of the corporation, and that an act providing for the extinguishment of the franchise upon the dissolution of the corporation was invalid. Wright v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. 95 Wis. 29, 36 L. R. A. 47, 69 N. W. 791, holds that the Wisconsin statutes have conferred power to alienate franchises of street-railway companies to occupy the streets. And a similar decision in respect to the franchise of electriclight companies is made in State ex rel. Badger Illuminating Co. v. Anderson, 97 Wis. 114, 72 N. W. 386. A provision in the charter of a telegraph company authorizing it to lease "lines, fixtures, and apparatus," is held in Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 11 Phila. 327, not to empower the company to lease its franchise in respect to streets not already occupied, although it necessarily implies that the lessee shall have the privllege of operating the lines already constructed, and, perhaps, of repairing or rebuilding them. Fanning v. D. M. Osborne & Co. 102 N. Y. 441, 7 N. E. 307, denies the right of a street-railway company to transfer its franchise to an individual to enable him to use the road for his own private purposes. It will be observed that the cases cited have solved the question as to the allenability of the privilege when vested in a corporation by refer ence to the powers of the corporation rather than the nature of the privilege, considered independently of its relation to the corporation as one of the franchises essential to the discharge of the latter's duties to the public. The point is illustrated by the distinction made in Evans v. Boston Heating Co. 157 Mass. 37, 31 N. E. 698, supra, between that case and the case of Richardson v. Sibley, 11 Allen, 65, 87 Am. Dec. 700. The privileges, considered by themselves, were essentially the same in both cases. The distinction lay in the fact that in the latter case the privilege was granted to a quasi-public corporation which owed a duty to the public at large, and in the former, to a corporation which the court held, under the stat utes, to be not a quasi-public corporation, but merely a manufacturing corporation which had not been invested with any duty to the general public. G. H. P. which justifies the issuance of an injunction in this case. The grant of permission confers a vested right, and not a mere license; and the acceptance of it and action in reliance upon it give rise to a contract within the contract clause of the Constitutions. Detroit v. Mutual Gas Co. 43 Mich. 594, 5 N. W. 1039; Grand Rapids v. Grand RapHydraulic Co. 66 Mich. 615, 33 N. W. 749; City R. Co. v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Saginaw v. Swift Electric Light Co. 113 Mich. 660, 72 N. W. 6; Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co. v. Baltimore, 64 Fed. Rep. 159; Africa v. Knoxville, 70 Fed. Rep. 729; Arcata v. Arcata & M. River R. Co. 92 Cal. 639, 28 Pac. 676; East Louisiana R. Co. v. New Orleans, 46 La. Ann. 526, 15 So. 157; New Orleans v. Great Southern Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 40 La. Ann. 41, 3 So. 533; Quincy Bull, 106 Ill. 337; State, Hudson Teleph. Co. Prosecutor, v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303, 8 Atl. 123. The form of the grant in question is suffi cient. Saginaw v. Swift Electric Light Co. 113 Mich. 660, 72 N. W. 6. The rights given to the grantee under the contract are assignable and have passed to the complainant. and alleys of the city. It alleges that the action of the council (1). deprives complainant of its vested rights; (2) impairs the obligation of a contract; (3) deprives it of property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws; (4) operates as a regulation of commerce among the states; (5) will produce irreparable injury. The relief asked is an injunction to restrain defendant from remov-ids ing or interfering with complainant's poles and wires, and from interfering with the replacing of the poles already removed and with the erection of new ones. The answer denies some of the allegations of the bill and sets up new matter in defense. It does not, however, dispute the substantial and material allegations of the bill. It admits the removal of the poles, and the refusal to act upon the petitions of August 10 and 16. It defends under an ordinance passed June 8, 1897, by which it was enacted that "no tele-v. graph or telephone poles shall be located or erected on any street, alley, or public place, in said city, and any such pole now erected shall not be taken up and again erected, without the consent of the city council." It sets up the ordinance granting a franchise to the Twin City Telephone Company, and states "that it has no doubt whatever that, if the complainant should ask for a similar franchise at the hands of the city council the same would be granted." Issue was duly framed, and the case heard in open court. September 21, 1898, the court made an order holding that the common council had the right to provide reasonable rules and regulations by which the complainant should be governed in the extension of its lines; that the council had no authority to arbitrarily prohibit complainant from erecting poles and wires upon the streets and alleys; that the reasonableness of such rules or regula- timore, 64 Fed. Rep. 159; Central Trust Co. tions was subject to the review of the court; v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 80 Fed. Rep. 218, that, unless said council should within 82 Fed. Rep. 1; City R. Co. v. Citizens' Street thirty days pass and enact rules and regula- R. Co. 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 1114, 17 Sup. tions by which complainant was to be gov-Ct. Rep. 653; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Auserned in the extension of its lines, the writ of injunction should issue, prohibiting the defendant from interfering with the complainant in erecting its poles or placing its wires. The order further required that, before extending its lines, complainant should present to the court a statement of the manner in which it proposed to proceed with such extension, and prohibited complainant from proceeding except under such reasonable rules and regulations as the court shall deem necessary for the public safety and convenience. On November 11 following a formal decree was entered substantially the same as the order above recited. From this decree both parties appeal. Complainant attacks only so much of the decree as provides that the court shall establish the reasonable rules and regulations. The defendant at tacks the decree in its entirety. Mr. N. A. Hamilton, with Messrs. Wells, Angell, Boynton, & McMillan, for complainant: A contract exists between the parties, Joy v. Jackson & M. Pl. Road Co. 11 Mich. 155; People ex rel. Maybury v. Mutual Gaslight Co. 38 Mich. 154; Detroit v. Mutual Gas Co. 43 Mich. 597, 5 N. W. 1039; 3 How. Stat. § 4904e. Impairment of the obligation of a contract, whether by a state law or by a city clause of the Constitutions. ordinance, is repugnant to the contract Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co. v. Bal tin, 168 U. S. 694, 42 L. ed. 630, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327, 12 L. ed. 458. The court ought not to have required complainant to act under its regulation in establishing its lines before enjoining interference by defendant. Duties nonjudicial in character cannot be imposed upon courts. Houseman v. Montgomery, 58 Mich. 364, 25 N. W. 369; Manistee v. Harley, 79 Mich. 238, 44 N. W. 603; Norwalk Street R. Co.'s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 39 L. R. A. 794, 37 Atl. 1080, 38 Atl. 708; Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, sub nom. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Southern Exp. Co. 29 L. ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542, 628; State ex rel. Board of Transportation v. Sioux City, O. & W. R. Co. 46 Neb. 682, 31 L. R. A. 47, 65 N. W. 766; Nebraska Teleph. Co. v. State ex rel. Yeiser, 55 Neb. 627, 45 L. R. A. 113, 76 N. W. 171; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 400, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1024, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047. Messrs. Lawrence C. Fyfe and O'Hara & O'Hara, for defendant: In 1834 the village of St. Joseph was incorporated. By the act of incorporation the council was empowered to make by-laws relative to its streets and highways. 3 Territorial Laws, 1280. This power has been continued in quent charters and amendments. Laws 1859, p. 276; Act 267, Laws 1873, § 31; Local Act 323, Laws 1883; Local Act 348, Laws 1891; Act 215, Public Acts 1895, chap. 32, § 1. The grant of a franchise, public in nature, like that of a telegraph company, is personal to the grantee, and cannot be alienated except by consent of the granting power. 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 751; Croswell, Electricity, § 158. Grant, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: 1. It is conceded by the learned counsel for both parties that that part of the decree by which the court assumed the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations is void. This is a legislative or administrative function, and not a judicial one. The court has power to put the proper authorities in the defendant city in motion to adopt reasonable rules and regulations, and to pass upon the validity of such action when taken. This is the extent of its authority. Houseman v. Montgomery, 58 Mich. 364, 25 N. W. 369; Manistee v. Harley, 79 Mich. 238, 44 N. W. 603. Other courts recognize the same rule. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Norwalk Street R. Co.'s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 39 L. R. A. 794, 37 Atl. 1080, and 38 Atl. 708; Nebraska Teleph. Co. v. State ex rel. Yeiser, 55 Neb. 627, 45 L. R. A. 113, 76 N. W. 171. state government, and an agreement to transfer such privileges is ultra vires and void." The compiler cites, to sustain the text, United States v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 50 Fed. Rep. 28, and Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Union P. R. Co. 1 McCrary, 581, 3 Fed. Rep. 721. The general power of aliensubse-ation was not discussed in the former case, nor was it raised. The conclusion reached was based upon the language of the act of Congress authorizing the construction of the original Union Pacific Railroad. The company sought to transfer its telegraph line, and to avoid its duty to maintain it. It was noted as a significant fact that the words "railroad and telegraph" were used in connection thirty-eight times in the act. The railroad company was not seeking to transfer all its property, rights, and privileges to a successor who would be obligated to perform all the duties imposed by the act of Congress, but was seeking to carve up its franchise and transfer a part of it to another corporation. The duty of the railroad company to maintain a telegraph was held to be personal. The same principle was approved in Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Union P. R. Co. We are also cited to Croswell, Electricity, § 158, which reads as follows: "A grant to a telephone, telegraph, electric light, or railway company of the power to use the streets, highways, and post roads for the stringing of its wires and the setting of its poles contains so much of an element of personal obligation, that such a grant is not assignable unless such a power of assignment is expressed in the language of the grant, or in some general legislation affecting the subject." The same authorities are there cited to sustain the proposition as were cited in the encyclopædia, and in addition Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Union P. R. Co. 1 Fed. Rep. 745. That case involved the same act as the others. The last clause of the above section reads, "If the grant is in terms to X., his successors and assigns, or similar language, it is assignable," and cites Atkinson v. Asheville Street R. Co. 113 N. C. 581, 18 S. E. 254; Toledo Consol. Street R. Co. v. Toledo Electric Street R. Co. 6 Ohio C. C. 362; California State Tcleg. Co. v. Alta Teleg. Co. 22 Cal. 398; Newman v. Avondale, 31 Ohio L. J. 123. In Atkinson v. Asheville Street R. Co. the question is not raised or discussed. The case was disposed of upon a demurrer to the bill of complaint which set up that complainant had obtained a license from the city to build a street railway; that he had assigned it in escrow to one M., who, in breach of the trust reposed in him, assigned it to the defendant corporation. The right of sale and transfer of all the property of the corporation is not alluded to in the decision. In the Ohio case the contest was between two street railways, the question being as to the right of one company to use the tracks of another. I do not find that the power to sell and transfer is even referred to in the case. In the California case the question is neither raised nor discussed. The sale there made was opposed upon other grounds. Page 428. The case of Newman 2. It is urged that the permission granted to the Telephone & Telegraph Construction Company was personal to that company, and could not be alienated without the consent of the city. That company was organized under a general law of the state, and derived its powers and obligations from that law. The only power which a city could have exercised over it was that of regulation. This is also true of the complainant. The transfer was made August 31, 1895, was recognized as valid by the city, and has been acted upon by both the city and the complainant since that time; the latter having expended large sums of money upon its business and improvements. Whether the city is now in position to question the validity of this transfer is at least debatable, but, as it is not argued by counsel, we refrain from discussing it. Counsel for the defendant cite in support of their contention 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 751, where it is stated "that the grant of a franchise, public in nature, like that of a telegraph company, is personal to the grantee and cannot be alienated except by consent of the granting power. Therefore a telegraph company has no power, in the absence of special authority, to alienate the privileges granted to it by the Federal or v. Avondale I have been unable to find. If | Co. 40 La. Ann. 41, 3 So. 533; Quincy v. Bull, defendant's contention be true, a mortgage of | 106 Ill. 337; State, Hudson Teleph. Co. Prosthe property and franchise of these corpora-ecutor, v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303, 8 Atl. tions would be void. The mortgage and 123; Arcata v. Arcata & M. River R. Co. 92 bonds would be valueless unless there was a Cal. 639, 28 Pac. 676. Since the argument, right to foreclose, sell, and convey to an- counsel for defendant have called our attenother party a valid title to the property. In tion to the recent case of Richmond v. SouthDetroit v. Mutual Gas Co. 43 Mich. 594, 5, ern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 174 U. S. 761, N. W. 1039, the grant was to the corpora- 43 L. ed. 1162, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778. The tion, or rather to the corporators or their company in that case was acting under a assigns, who were to organize a corporation. law of Congress, and claimed the right under The ordinance was silent upon the right of the act of Congress to use the streets without alienation, yet the sale of its entire property interference by the city authorities. The was held valid. It is immaterial that the circuit court of appeals held that the rights construction company was not organized un- and privileges granted by the act of Congress der the same act as was the complainant. were subject to the lawful exercise of the poIt was organized under another act, empow-lice power belonging to the state or its muering such companies to carry on the like nicipalities. This holding was affirmed by business; and one of its objects declared in the supreme court. That case is no authorits articles of association was the purpose of ity for the action of the common council in erecting and operating telegraph lines, etc., the case before us. The city of Richmond in the cities and towns of the state. The had, through its common council, adopted public was not concerned in the transfer to an ordinance prescribing the terms under another corporation. It suffered no injury. which the telephone company might use its The assignee was subject to the same control streets. The reasonableness of that order and obligated to the same duties as was its was not questioned. The question is not, as assignor. Justice Christiancy, in Joy v. counsel for the defendant state, the right to Jackson & M. Pl. Road Co. 11 Mich. 164, as-regulate the use of its public streets. This serted the right of corporations to dispose right is conceded by the complainant, and in of their property by absolute sale or mort- the petitions it presented to its common coungage in payment of their debts, unless such cil. The action of the council is practically right is limited by some express provision or prohibitive of the use of the streets. The just implication of a statute, or by the gen- defendant city by its act of incorporation oberal policy of the state, to be deduced from tained no other or greater rights or control its legislation. In this opinion Chief Justice over the complainant than the village had Martin concurred. The other justices held over it and its assignor. Both, under the the mortgage in that case valid under the police power inherent in municipalities, posstatute, but reserved their opinions as to the sessed the right of reasonable regulation. general power of such corporations to mort- The city succeeded to the rights of the vilgage. But, whatever may be the common-law lage of St. Joseph, and was in fact the same rule, the statute puts the question at rest, body politic. Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids and expressly authorizes corporations to al- Hydraulic Co. 66 Mich. 606, 33 N. W. 749. ienate their property. 3 How. Anno. Stat. § 4904e. The sale, therefore, to the complainant was valid. 3. When the construction company and the complainant accepted the privileges granted to them by the laws of the state, and the municipality had duly given its permission, and the corporations had expended their money in valuable improvements, contracts were entered into which neither the state nor the municipality could impair or destroy, in the absence of power to do so being reserved in the grant itself, or in the Constitution, which becomes a part of all such contracts. The Constitution and the statute clothe municipalities with power to control their streets and alleys and protect them from things injurious and dangerous to the public; hence they have the power to make all reasonable rules and regulations for the erection and maintenance of poles and wires for telegraph and telephone companies. Here its power in the matter ceases. Detroit v. Mutual Gaslight Co. 43 Mich. 594, 5 N. W. 1039; Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co. 66 Mich. 606, 33 N. W. 749; Saginaw v. Swift Electric Light Co. 113 Mich. 660, 72 N. W. 6; Baltimore Trust & Guaran tee Co. v. Baltimore, 64 Fed. Rep. 159; New Orleans v. Great Southern Teleph. & Teleg. In reason and authority, it was the clear duty of the defendant to act upon the petitions presented to its common council by the complainant, and to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the erection of poles and the stretching of wires. The decrec in this respect is affirmed. Decree will be entered in this court in accordance with this opinion, and the defendant given thirty days after service upon its mayor of a certified copy of the decree to adopt rules and regulations in accordance therewith. Complainant will recover the costs of both courts. The other Justices concur. UO WARRANTO to State ex rel. Off v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497; State v. Murray, 28 Wis. 96, 9 Am. Rep. 489; Wilson v. Newton, 87 Mich. 495, 49 N. W. 869; Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376, 41 Am. Rep. 239; Atchison v. Lucas, 83 Ky. 451; People ex rel. Tilden v. Welsh, 70 III. App. 644. Merrie H. per Qmine by what right respondent occupied song and Messe Abbott in propria pek the office of prosecuting attorney for Ogemaw county. Judgment of ouster. The facts are stated in the opinions. Mr. Horace M. Oren, Attorney General, for relator: A woman cannot hold a general public office, in the absence of express constitutional or statutory authority conferring upon her such right. In order to be eligible to the office of prosecuting attorney one should be twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States, a resident and elector of the county. and John C. Weadock, for respondent: The Constitution does not require that a prosecuting attorney shall be an elector. The provision relating to that office in the Constitution of 1850 is: "In each organized county there shall be a prosecuting attorney, chosen by the electors thereof." Art. 10, § 3. At the common law there were no prosecuting attorneys, and under the common law women might and did hold office. 3 Campbell, Lives of Chief Justices, 107, 108; Olive v. Ingram, Strange, 1114. Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Lim one not an elector cannot hold office, in the absence of written law on the subject, is possibly open to question." Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 15 Am. Dec. 322. People ex rel. Hughes v. May, 3 Mich. 598. The people of this state having placed a construction upon the Constitution with ref-itations, says (note 1, p. 748): "Whether erence to the eligibility to hold the office of prosecuting attorney, to the effect that said office can only be held by a male of proper age and qualifications, which has been the established and unquestioned rule for over sixty years, it is now, and for years has been, the law in this state, and as effective as though it was the express enactment of the people of the state of Michigan; and until such time as the legislature may see fit to grant such political right to females, the respondent, being a female, is precluded from, and cannot lawfully hold, such office. Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113, 83 Am. Dec. 728; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299, 2 L. ed. 115; Atty. Gen. v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94, 20 N. W. 806; The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 29 L. ed. 147, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; People ex rel. Platt v. Oakland County Bank, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 282; People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Bank of Pontiac, 12 Mich. 527; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; Swartwout v. Michigan Air Line R. Co. 24 Mich. 389; Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co. 66 Mich. 611, 33 N. W. 749; State v. Flint & P. M. R. Co. 89 Mich. 481, 51 N. W. 103. Mechem on Public Officers, § 73, concludes: "It is, of course, competent for the people, by their state Constitutions or by their legisla tures, where no constitutional prohibition intervenes, to remove these disabilities, and such is the constant tendency." Huff v. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639; Schuchardt v. People ex rel. Hall, 99 Ill. 501, 39 Am. Rep. 34; Throop, Pub. Off. § 69. The respondent's competency having been certified by the Constitution, the fitness of women for so many occupations, and their excellence in many, being matters of common knowledge, the precise question raised in this case has been decided in woman's favor very recently in the state of Missouri. State ex rel. Crow v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636, 38 L. R. A. 208, 39 S. W. 270. Long, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The office of prosecuting attorney is a conMerrie H. Abbott, the respondent, a stitutional office, created by the Constitu- woman of the age of twenty-one years and tion of this state, which expressly provides upwards, was elected to the office of prosecutthat such official shall be chosen by the electing attorney of Ogemaw county at the genors of the respective counties; and such eral election held on the 8th day of Novemelectors have no authority under the Constitution and laws of this state to elect other than one of their own number to such office. Throop, Pub. Off. § 72; Cooley, Const. Law, 2d ed. p. 268. The right of suffrage is not a natural right, but a political privilege, which does not attach to citizenship as a matter of right; and when that privilege is conferred upon males, it does not include and confer the same privilege upon females, though citizens of the United States. Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. ber, 1898. She duly qualified, and is now in the discharge of the duties of that office. An information in the nature of a quo warranto is filed in this court by the attorney general, in which it is claimed that the respondent unlawfully holds and exercises the duties of that office. The only question raised is whether a woman is eligible under the Constitution and laws of this state to hold such office. Section 3, art. 10, of the Constitution of this state, reads as follows: "In each organized county, there shall be a sheriff, a county clerk, a county treasurer, a register of deeds, and a prosecuting attorney, chosen by the electors thereof, once in two years, and as often as vacancies shall happen, |