there for the professed purpose of taking up her residence, and with the declared intention of not returning to him.

That in October, 1845, four months or more after she left as aforesaid, she returned to the house where he was living with his mother, in Newark, late at night; that his mother prepared supper for her, of which she partook; that she immediately declared she had not returned for the purpose of staying, that her brother had been informed he had made himself liable to a prosecution for taking her away, and that her object in returning was to save him from it; that she desired an omnibus might be sent for, to take her to Mr. Durie's, where she intended to go; that his mother invited her to stay, and remonstrated with her against going out at so late an hour, and after considerable persuasion she consented to stay all night and did so; that, the next morning, between six and seven o'clock, she left the house, and, as he has been informed and believes, went to Mr. Durie's. That after she arose in the morning, his mother requested her to stay to breakfast, but she declined, and went away, using opprobrious language both with respect to him and his mother. That he received no notice from her of her intention to return to Newark, previous to her returning as aforesaid; that, after what she had said and done as aforesaid he was much surprised, and hardly knew what her object was, and it may be that he made no reply when she accosted him; but he denies that she said any thing to him by which she expressed any desire to live with him again or claiming from him any protection as her husband.

He says he was not present at any conversation between his mother and the complainant, in, which his mother used the language to the complainant stated in the bill, nor does he know whether such language was used; and he denies that any such language was used by his request, advice or direction. He admits that the house in which he lived when complainant returned to Newark had been rented by him, from April 1st, then last past, for one year; but says that the furniture in the house belonged to his mother, and that she and two of her grandchildren lived in the house with him, and that she had the charge and direction of the affairs of the family. That from the time complainant returned to the filing of the bill, she did not, either

herself or through any other person, make any overture or application to him to be received by him, or to live with him again as his wife; but he admits he was applied to several times on her behalf to make a provision for her maintenance; and he says he offered to make a provision for the support of the child which he believed and was advised was liberal and more than necessary for that purpose; that, through his counsel, he offered to pay one hundred dollars a year, and give security therefor, on security being given to indemnify him against any further charges; that he understood she was willing to receive that sum, and supposed the matter would be amicably settled; but that, while negotiations were pending, the complainant suddenly filed her bill. Admits that application was made to him. by Durie for the payment of complainant's board; that he referred Durie to his counsel, Mr. Whitehead, and he is informed and believes that Durie called on Mr. W., and that Mr. W. suggested to him that, as negotiations were pending for an arrangement, it would be better to let it remain till the negotiations were concluded; and that if they resulted in a settlement, there would be no difficulty in his bill being satisfactorily adjusted; in which suggestion he is informed and believes Mr. Durie acquiesced.

He says he is informed and believes that Mr. W. said nothing touching the defendant's paying or being liable to pay said bill, other than as before stated. That he is a jeweller, employed by Isaac Baldwin & Co.; that his wages at first were seven dollars a week; that for eighteen months past, or thereabouts, they have amounted to fifteen dollars a week; that the business is subject to depressions, and that depression is now apprehended; that complainant is a mantuamaker, and, as far as he knows and believes, is now in good health, and able to pursue her business and provide for herself; that he is willing, eithe to take charge of the child and provide for it, or, for the present, to let it remain with the complainant and make her a liberal compensation for her care of it and its maintenance. He says the child has an ordinary good constitution, and, as far as he knows and believes, has usually been in good health. That he has no estate except his ordinary wearing apparel and a few articles of furniture, of small value, and a small sum, not ex

ceding $110, due him from his employers; and that he is solely dependent for his support on his daily labor. He says that one of the propositions made by complainant, through one of her friends, to his counsel, was, that he should pay her $100 a year for five years, and that she would take care of herself and the child; that his counsel agreed to the proposal, with the qualification that the money should be considered as paid for the support of the child, the complainant, however, to have the disposition thereof, and the defendant to give security for the payment, on condition that she would indemnify him against any further claim on her account or that of the child; but that she refused or neglected to comply. That another proposition made by her was, that he should pay her down $500, and that she would take care of herself and the child; but that she offered no adequate security for his indemnity, and he declined the proposition as well because he considered it unjust and unreasonable as that he was unable to comply with it by paying the money, and that no adequate security was offered for his indemnity.

The complainant filed a petition for a proper allowance until the final termination of the suit, and for an order directing the defendant to pay a proper sum for counsel fees, and to defray the costs and expenses of the suit; and by her counsel moved for an order accordingly. The motion was resisted. Affidavits were read in opposition to the motion.

Wm. M. Scudder, for the motion. He cited 8 Wend. 367, 368; 2 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 246; 2 Paige, 115, 621; 1 John. Chan. Rep. 108; 1 Edw. Ch. Rep. 382; Ibid, 62.

91.

A. Whitehead, contra. He cited 1 John. Ch. 604; 6 Ibid,

. THE CHANCELLOR. The question which will be involved in this case, if it proceeds to a hearing on the merits, will be, whether the defendant has abandoned his wife or separated himself from her and refused or neglected to maintain and provide for her: Rev. Stat. 924, sec. 10. The bill contains no charge that he has neglected or refused to provide for her in his

own house; nor does it show any sincere desire on her part to go back to his house and live with him as a wife and be maintained and supported by him there; nor is there any sufficient reason offered in the bill why she again left her husband's house the morning after she returned from the state of New York. It is her duty to live with her husband unless there be some sufficient reason for leaving his house; and if she has left it without sufficient reason, it is her duty to return.

The nature of the case made by the bill may be considered on an application for alimony pending the suit. In this case an order will be made for a weekly allowance of two dollars and fifty cents, for or towards the support of the child of the complainant while she keeps the child, until the further order of the court. The other branch of the motion is denied. Order accordingly.

The ADMINISTRATOR of EDWARD S. BELL V. JOHN H. HALL and HENRY B. STOLL.

A. and B., partners, dissolved partnership; and by the articles of dissolution A. took the property of the partnership, and agreed to pay the debts of the partnership, and to relieve B. therefrom, and to pay B. the balance due him of the capital invested by him, and the further sum of $1600 for his share of the stock and profits of the partnership. After the dissolution, a creditor of the partnership obtained a judgment against A. and B. for a debt of the firm, for $607 91, and issued execution thereon, which was levied on the personal and real estate of both A. and B. A.'s personal property so levied on, consisting of store goods and other personal property, was afterwards assigned to C., the father.in-law of A. A. afterwards sold to D. the stock of goods he then had on hand, and C. thereupon, by writing under seal, released to D. all his interest in the goods under and by virtue of the said execution, with full knowledge of the terms of the dissolution. Held, that the judgment could not be enforced against B.

THE facts of this case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the chancellor.

C. S. Leport and F. T. Frelinghuysen, for the complainant. They cited Montague on Part. 204; 17 John. Rep.

384; 13 Ibid, 174; 7 Ibid, 336; 10 Wend. 162; 1 M'Cord's Ch. 443; 1 Story's Eq., sec. 325, 326, 449, 499; 4 Harr. Rep. 167.

W. S. Johnson and D. Haines, for the defendants. They cited Theobald on Principal and Surety, 239, 240; I Law Lib. 84, 135, 142, 143; 2 Swanst. 185; 4 Vesey, 824; 1 Story's Eq., sec. 163, 676; 8 Wheat. 212; 1 Peters, 16; 6 Hals. 224; 2 South. 584.

THE CHANCELLOR. On the 16th March, 1810, Henry B. Stoll and Edward S. Bell entered into partnership as merchants in Stanhope, under the partnership name of Stoll & Bell; each furnishing an equal amount of capital. They purchased a stock of goods on the same day, from Andrew A. Smalley, for the purposes of their partnership, amounting to $3750; for which they gave Smalley their notes, in different sums, payable at different periods.

On the 11th March, 1841, the partnership was dissolved, by mutual consent, by agreement in writing and under seal. By this agreement Stoll took the stock of goods and merchandise then on hand belonging to the partnership, and all the books of account, notes, bonds, monies and effects of the partnership, and all debts due the partnership; Bell relinquishing all claim thereto; and Stoll agreed to pay all the debts of the partnership, and to relieve Bell therefrom, and to pay Bell the balance due him of the capital invested by him, and the further sum of $1600, for his share of the stock and profits of the partnership. One of the notes from Stoll and Bell to Smalley passed into the hands of Coursen & Woodruff, of New York: it was for $583 91. On the 23d May, 1943, Coursen & Woodruff recovered judgment on this note against Stoll & Bell, in the circuit court of Sussex, for $607 91 damages and $36 41 costs; and thereupon issued execution, returnable to the term of August, 1843, of that court; which was put into the hands of the sheriff on the 26th May, 1943. By virtue of this writ the sheriff levied on the personal and real estate of both Stoll & Bell. The property of Stoll levied on consisted of store