Where a sufficient memorandum was found in the possession of the vendor's representative, it was held. that it was invalid for lack of a delivery.5 And the same was held of an unauthorized delivery, and of a lease delivered after it was countermanded.7

In Massachusetts, however, a memorandum was held sufficient which was only a letter written by the party to his own agent; so an entry or record in his own books, on the ground that it is evidence of, but does not go to make the contract.8 So, where an agent of the defendant, the vendor, entered the plaintiff's order in his book and reported the sale by letter to the defendant, who wrote the plaintiff stating them, and giving but a qualified approval of the sale, the statute was held satisfied.9 Where one of the defendants wrote the memorandum, and the plaintiff, the purchaser, signed it, and one defendant wrote a letter to a codefendant, stating that the former had sold the lands to the plaintiff, this was held to satisfy the statute.10 So letters addressed to third parties has been held sufficient.11

Second. "The delivery of a deed as an escrow is said to be when one doth make and seal a deed and deliver it unto a stranger until certain conditions be performed, and then to be delivered to him to whom the deed is made to take effect as the deed." 12 "An escrow is a deed delivered to a third person upon a future condition to be performed by either party. It must be delivered to a stranger and the condition mentioned." 13 "It is essential to an escrow that it be delivered to a third person, to be by him delivered to the obligee or grantee upon the happening of some event or the performance of some condition, from which time it becomes an absolute deed." 14

It will be observed that these three definitions require a delivery to a third person. These follow the old authorities, for Coke says that "if a man deliver a writing sealed to the party to whom it is made as an escrow, this is an absolute delivery of the deed, being made to the party himself. * But it may be delivered to a stranger as an escrow." 15 In an early case 16 it was decided that "the delivery of a deed cannot be averred to be to the party himself as an escrow." In a recent English case 17 the question has been discussed at some length. In that case a reconveyance was executed by one of two trustee-mortgagees expressly as an escrow, conditioned on payment of the mortgage debt, and was left by him with his cotrustee. This cotrustee afterwards also executed the reconveyance expressly as an escrow "upon the faith

421; Stephens v. Buffalo R. Co., 20 Barb., p. 337; Snyder v. Neefus, 53 Barb., p. 66; Roper v. Tocum, 3 Mart. (La.), p. 444; Sancorn v. Sanborn, 7 Gray, p. 142; Skelton v. Cole, 1 DeG. & J., p. 595; Sutherland v. Parkins, 75 Ill., p. 340; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28; Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317.

5 Grant v. Levan, 4 Pa. St. 424.

6 McIntire v. Bowden, 61 Mal. 158.

7 Phillips v. Edwards, 33 Beav. 441.

8 Townsend v. Hargroves, 118 Mass., p. 332.

9 Ockley v. Masson, 8 Ont. App. Cas. 108; s. c., 1 Can. L. T. 203.

10 Campbell v. Dennistown, 23 U. C. C. P. 343.

11 Moore v. Hart, 1 Vern. 114; Ogden v. Ogden, 1 Bland, 287; Moss v. Atkinson, 44 Cal. 16; Moore v. Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 426.

12 Schoenberger v. Hackman, 37 Pa. St., p. 94.

13 Raymond v. Smith, 5 Conn., p. 559.

14 James v. Vanderheyden, 1 Paige Ch., p. 387.

15 Co. Litt. 36a. Such was the effect of the resolution

in Thoroughgood's Case, 5 Co., p. 137.

16 Whyddon's Case, Cro. Eliz. 520.

17 Watkins v. Nash, L. R. 20 Eq. 262.

of an undertaking that the business should be forthwith settled," and handed the reconveyance to the solicitor of the mortgagor. This was held to be a good delivery as an escrow. "It is said that the deed there executed could not be called an escrow, because it was not delivered to a stranger, and that is, no doubt, the way in which the rule is stated in some of the text-books-Shepherd's Touchstone (pp. 58, 59), for instance; but when those authorities are examined, it will be found that it is not merely a technical question as to whether or not the deed is delivered into the hands of A B, to be held conditionally, but when a delivery to a stranger is spoken of, what is meant is a delivery of a character negotiating it, being a delivery to the grantee or to the party who is to have the benefit of the instrument. You cannot deliver the deed to the grantee himself, it is said, because that would be inconsistent with its possessing the character of an escrow. But if, upon the whole of the transaction, it be clear that the delivery was not intended to be a delivery to the grantee at that time, but that it was to be something different, then you must not give effect to the delivery as being a complete delivery, that not being the intent of the persons who executed the instrument." As to the execution by the second cotrustee, the court found no difficulty in holding that it was a delivery to the solicitor, acting for the mortgagee; "it was a delivery to him as an agent for all parties for the purpose of that delivery." Previously it had been decided that a deed might be delivered as an escrow to a solicitor acting for all the parties to it.18

In the principal case the deed was attempted to be delivered in escrow to the agent of the grantor, who never released his control over it, and the possession was as much that of the grantor as he himself held it.19 There is a question akin to those discussed that is of much interest, and that is, whether a deed delivered in escrow is sufficient memorandum to take the transaction out of the statute?

Thus, in pursuance of an oral agreement for the sale of land to him by A, B paid a small part of the purchase money, and A executed a deed of the land running to B (in which the consideration was simply stated to be $3,100), and delivered it to C, with directions to deliver it to B, if the latter should, on the second day thereafter, deposit with C his two notes for a certain sum, secured by mortgage, and to pay to C, for A's use, the remainder of the price. Within the time limited, B offered to C said notes, mortgage and money, but C, by A's direction, refused to deliver to B the deed, and A at the same time tendered back to B the money already paid, and left it with C for B upon the latter's refusal to accept it. It was held that there was no execution or deposit with C of the mortgage from B, contemporaneously with the execution and deposit of A's deed, and as the latter's deed does not contain the whole contract alleged and relied upon by the plaintiff, there was no valid contract, and the deed was not an escrow.20 It will thus be perceived that all the contract relied upon had not been reduced to writing, namely, the execution of the notes and mortgage.

In passing upon the question involved on the re

18 Millership v. Brookes, 5 H. & N. 797.

19 Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644; Shirley v. Ayres, 14 Ohio, 317; Fitch v. Bunch,

30 Cal. 208; Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460; Berry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36.

20 Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437. See also Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. Y. 192.

hearing, Mr. Justice Lyon said: "The controlling question in the case is, whether it is essential to the plaintiff's right of action that there was a valid executory contract between the parties for the purchase and sale of the land described in the deed of the defendant deposited with Judge Hand. If this question be answered in the affirmative, the plaintiff cannot recover; for it is certain that no note or memorandum of the alleged agreement under which the plaintiff claims, expressing the consideration thereof, was reduced to writing and subscribed by the defendant.

"The learned counsel for the defendant for the plaintiff has met this question squarely, and in his elaborate and most able arguments on the motion for a rehearing, and on the rehearing of the cause has maintained the proposition that 'it is not true that a person must be under a previous binding executory contract to convey the lands described in the deed to the grantee, in order to place a deed thereof, delivered to a third person on condition for the grantee, beyond the control of the grantor.'

"Undoubtedly there is a class of cases in which this proposition is true. These are the cases where the deed has been delivered by the grantor to a third person, with instructions to deliver the same to the grantee on the happening of a future certain eventas the death of the grantor or some other person-and such conditional delivery is assented to by the grantee. In such a case, if the grantor reserves no control over the deed, he cannot after such delivery recall it, but the grantee is entitled to it upon the happening of the event, although there is no valid executory contract to support it. The reason of this is that the first delivery of the deed passes to the grantee the title to the land, and thus relieves him of the obligation to make title through any contract other than that expressed in the deed itself.

"But by all the authorities a deed so deposited with a third person, to be delivered to the grantee on the happening of some event in the future, which may or may not happen, does not pass title to the land described in it to the grantee until such event occurs, and then only from that time, or perhaps from the actual delivery of the deed to the grantee after the event has occurred. There may be exceptional cases, as when a man delivers his deed in escrow and dies before the conditions of the deposit are fulfilled. In such cases it has been said that from necessity after the conditions are fulfilled the deed must take effect by relation as of the time of the first delivery. This, however, is not one of the exceptional cases, and it must be conceded, we think, that the deposit of the deed with Judge Hand by the defendant with the assent of the plaintiff did not transfer title to the plaintiff.

"Because such deposit did not divest the plaintiff of his title to the land, there is no executed contract of sale; and hence, it seems almost too plain to be questioned or doubted that, before the plaintiff can obtain the delivery of the deed and the title to the land, after the defendant has recalled the deed and repudiated the whole transaction, he must show that the defendant has made a valid and binding agreement to sell and convey the land. And such an agreement can be evidenced only by a written note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration and subscribed to by the defendant.

"In many of the cases cited there was no valid executory contract for the sale of the land, but the grantor permitted the deed to be delivered by the depositary to the grantee upon performance of the parol condition of the deposit. Undoubtedly, the final de

livery to the grantee in such cases operated to pass the title, as it would be in the present case had defendant seen fit to allow his void parol agreement to be thus consummated. In other cases cited there was a compliance with the statute of frauds. But we have not discovered a single case in which it has been held that one who has deposited a deed of land with a third person, with directions to deliver it to the grantee on the happening of a given event, but who has made no valid executory contract to convey the land, may not revoke the direction to the depositary and recall the deed at any time before the condition of the deposit has been complied with, provided those conditions are such that the title does not pass at once to the grantee upon delivery of the deed to the depositary." 21

Where a wife wrote her husband and agent a letter, proposing to buy certain property, and offering to pay the price named upon the delivery of an abstract and deed, and the agent answered, accepting the proposition, and at the same time wrote to a third party, instructing him to procure an abstract of title for the wife and to forward an accurate description of the land, but no description was contained in any of the letters, and after these letters were written the vendor and her husband signed and acknowledged a deed, naming the wife, the purchaser as grantee, and sent it to this third party, with instructions to deliver it to the wife upon the payment of the agreed price, all of which facts one A had full knowledge, but, notwithstanding such knowledge, he procured the vendor to telegraph such third party not to deliver the deed, bought the property himself, and secured the destruction of the deed to the first purchaser, it was held that the wife, the purchaser, could not, after tendering the agreed price, demand a deed, for the reason that there was no valid executory contract. The court said: "The deed placed in Gavin's (the third party) hands was of no validity whatever until delivered. We cannot regard the placing of the instrument in his hands as a delivery to the agent of the appellant (the purchaser). It does not appear that he was the agent of any other persons than Mrs. Gray (the vendor) and her husband. In view of the facts disclosed by the record, it is impossible to treat Gavin as the agent of the appellant. The case made is that of a principal placing in the hands of his agent an instrument, in form a deed, and formally executed as such." "It affirmatively appears in the case under consideration that no delivery was ever made to the grantee, and that while the deed was in the hands of the depositary and before the performance of the conditions imposed by the grantors, it was, at their request, annulled and destroyed." "It is clear to our mind that a deed placed in the hands of a depositary, with directions to deliver it upon the performance of a designated condition by the grantee, may be recalled before performance. Until the grantee has in some manner assented to such deposit, there cannot be the semblance of a delivery, for every delivery implies an acceptance. Of course, if there is, back of the deposit of the deed, an enforcible contract, relief might be had, but in such a case the deposit of the deed would not supply the right of action; that would be supplied by the executory contract. In the case at bar the deed was recalled before the performance of the condition, and there was no enforcible executory contract. Without such a contract there is no cause of action." 22

Where a parol contract for the sale of land was made, and the vendee paid a portion of the purchase

21 Explaining Thomas v. Swords, 25 Wis. 631.

22 Freeland v. Charnley, 80 Ind. 132.

money, and thereupon the vendor executed and delivered a deed to the vendee's brother, upon the agreement that when the vendee paid the remainder his brother should deliver the deed to him, he agreeing to pay such remainder, it was held, in an action to recover the sum unpaid, that it was to enforce a parol contract for the sale of land, which was void, and the action could not be maintained.23 The Indiana and New York cases proceed upon the theory that a deed in escrow may be recalled or revoked at any time before delivery to the grantee, or at least before the condition upon which it was delivered has happened, and for that reason there is no binding contract, for want of delivery. These cases have plenty of authority to support them.24

If there has been a performance of a parol contract for the conveyance of land, a deed executed for that land to the vendee, but never delivered, is admissible to prove the contract, the same as oral admissions. "Not having been delivered, it conferred no title, and having been retained exclusively in the vendor's hands, it could not serve the purpose of averting the operation of the statute. But its execution was a fact bearing upon the question of the existence of the contract. It was a deliberate admission that the land had been sold and an explicit declaration of the terms of the sale, of the quantity and boundaries of the land and of the amount of the purchase money. Its production in evidence could have been enforced for the purpose to which it would extend; not to establish title, and not to avoid the statute, but to show a carefully considered acknowledgment and recognition by Carroll of Hart's contract rights. Can it be doubted that verbal testimony of declarations by the plaintiff, made in December, 1867, of the precise facts related in the deed would have been admissible in aid of the grounds on which the defense rested? And how, in view of such clear and definite evidence as would be thus afforded, would a chancellor find embararrassment in decreeing specific performance." 25

W. W. THORNTON.

23 Cagger v. Lansing, 43 N. Y. 550, reversing 57 Barb. 421. 24 Thomas v. Swords, 25 Wis. 681; Quick v. Milligan, 108 Ind. 419; Vaughan v. Godman, 103 Ind. 499; Sanborn v. Sanborn, 7 Gray, 142; Underwood v. Campbell, 14 N. H. 393; Redding v. Wilkes, 8 Bro. C. C. 401. See Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. St. 428, where both a deed was delivered in escrow and also a memorandum, and where the vendee was held to pay the purchase money. Delivery after death: Taft v. Taft, 26 N. W. Rep. 426; Owen v. Williams, 15 N. E. Rep. 678. In Massachusetts, it has been suggested that a deed never delivered is not a good memorandum: Sanborn v. Chamberlin, 101 Mass. p. 416. And in the same State it has been asked whether a deed executed and tendered upon certain conditions of payment was, upon the performance of those conditions, a sufficient memorandum: Potter v. Jacobs, 111 Mass., p. 36.

25 Hart v. Carroll, 85 Pa. St., p. 510. Other cases have gone so far as to hold an undelivered sufficient: See Bowles v. Woodson, 6 Gratt., p. 78; Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala., p. 356; Gillatley v. White, 18 Grant (Can.), 3; Parrill v. McKinley, 9 Grat. 6. In this case there were acts of a part performance.

1. Charitable Gift to Voluntary Association-Dissolution-Incorporation.-Where land was given to an unincorporated association for the purpose of establishing a school, and afterwards the association accepted a charter of incorporation from the State, which was not contemplated when the land was given, upon the dissolution of the corporation the land reverted, not to the original grantor, but to the members of the association.

2. Same-Valuable Consideration for ContractFailure to Execute Deed.-Such a gift to a voluntary association building upon the land is a contract for a valuable consideration, which may be enforced at law.

MCGOWAN, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

This action was for the recovery of real estate, a parcel of 37 acres, hereinafter more particularly described. Action was commenced February 20, 1886. It appears that in September, I847, more than 40 years ago, certain citizens of that part of Richland county known as "The Fork" met to devise means for the erection of an academy, to educate their children, in the neighborhood of Good Hope. Subscriptions were raised to the amount of $2,525. Among the subscribers was John Bates, who subscribed $500 in cash and 37 acres of land. Or December 2, 1847, an association or society was formed, under the name and style of the "Palmetto Society." Officers were elected, of whom John Bates was one, and the Palmetto Academy and Teachers' Home were built on the aforesaid parcel of land. On July 2, 1847, at a meeting of the society, a resolution was adopted, authorizing an application for a charter, which was afterwards obtained, to continue for 14 years, under the name of the "Palmetto Society in Columbia for the Dissemination of Learning," and was accepted July 28, 1849. The parcel of land known as the "Palmetto Academy Lot" (37 acres) was marked off by a blazed line, and the buildings erected thereon have been used and held as a school ever since. It seems that during the war the regular meetings of the society or incorporation were not held, but a school of some character was kept there all the while. After the war, the premises were used, for a time, as a public school under the general law; and in 1883 application was made, and the charter revived. John Bates, during his life, never claimed the academy lot, but respected the lines. He died soon after the war (December 25, 1866), and his executors, in running his lands, left out the academy parcel, running around the old lines. His lands were sold by order of the court (1885), and purchased by the plaintiff, and she now brings this action; alleging that the title to the said lot had reverted to John Bates in his life-time, and

passed to her under the purchase aforesaid. The Palmetto Society, Jesse H. Taylor, and C. W. Raevlinson answered-First, denying each and all of the allegations of the complaint; and second, alleging that neither the plaintiff nor her ancestor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within 10 years before the commencement of the suit, but that the defendants, and those under whom they claim, have been in adverse and exclusive possession for more than 10 years, etc. There was much testimony. The plaintiff made certain requests to charge, some of which were charged in modified form, and some were refused; but it will not be necessary to advert to any except those which will be referred to in the exceptions. Under the charge of the judge, which is in the brief, the jury found a verdict for the defendants; and the plaintiff appeals upon the following grounds: “(1) That his honor was requested to charge 'that under the laws of this State, at the expiration of a charter of the like character of the one involved in this action, the real estate held by said corporation immediately reverted to the grantor and his heirs,' which request his honor refused, and charged as follows: "This would be the law if given to the corporation, but it is not the law if contributed to an association not incorporated, for valuable consideration.' (2) That his honor was requested to charge: 'If the jury believe that the land sued for in this action was given by John Bates to the Palmetto Society as a gift, then, at the expiration of the charter in 1862, the land reverted to John Bates and his heirs.' Which request his honor refused, and charged as follows: "That would be so if given to a corporation, but would not be so if given to a society for a public purpose; no charter at the time being contemplated.' (3) That his honor erred in his charge that the defendant, the Palmetto Society, could hold the land in dispute as an unincorporated association, and that said society did not hold said land as an incorporation.' (4) That his honor erred in his charge 'that the land in dispute was given by John Bates to the Palmetto Society, not as a gift, but for a valuable consideration, and therefore the property did not revert, at the death of the corporation, to John Bates.' (5) That his honor erred in charging that, when the land in dispute was given to the defendant, the Palmetto Society, no charter was in contemplation, and said society took the land, not as a corporation, but as an unincorporated association.' (6) That his honor erred in charging 'that the land in dispute was given for a valuable consideration to an unincorporated association, and, that association being afterwards incorporated, the land was held in abeyance during the life of said corporation, and at the death of said corporation the land herein did not revert to the grantor, John Bates, but reverted to the unincorporated association.' (7) That his honor erred in charging 'that the written document entered into between the original members of the Palmetto Society was a mutual con

tract, for valuable consideration, for the constructing of a public work, and the unincorporated society held to the land.'"'

same.

The exceptions, in different forms, complain that the judge committed error in charging that, as matter of fact, the contribution of the land was made to an unincorporated society for a public purpose, without reference to the charter which that society afterwards obtained, and was allowed to expire amidst the coufusion of the of the war (1862); and that, proceeding upon this assumption, he committed further error of law in holding that the subscription was for a valuable consideration, and that the unincorporated society could accept and hold the land, either individually or as a body, without a charter, so as to divest the donor, John Bates, of title to the We do not understand that the judge assumed that, as matter of fact, the subscription of the land and money was made to the society without reference to the charter subsequently acquired, but that he left that question to the jury. He said: "Now, while I have charged you that if Mr. Bates had given that land to a corporation, with a charter existing at the time, or even proved to be in contemplation at the time he gave it, at the expiration of that charter, if they didn't have it renewed, the land would revert to him; but, until I get further light, I am bound to charge you, if, under that agreement, he contributed to an association or enterprise for the purpose of constructing a public work to be used as an academy; if he gave that land and money under these circumstances, and the association existed under these circumstances, and proceeded to build upon the property-their applying for and accepting a charter would neither destroy the association, nor the rights of the association. It would simply put the association in abeyance." Thus the fact was submitted to the jury. If they so found, then the law applicable was as stated. In this view, we concur with the judge.

4

We do not perceive how the subsequent acceptance of a charter, or its being allowed to expire, could absorb the association and work a radical change in the original relations and rights of the parties. Assuming, then, that the fact was so found by the jury, it is still further contended that it was error of law to hold that the written agreement of John Bates to give cash and this land "to Dr. D. W. Ray, for the purpose of building a male and female academy in the neighborhood of Good Hope," was a contract (not a gift) for valuable consideration, which had the effect of divesting the donor, John Bates of his title to the land, and transferring it to the members of the Palmetto Society. The view seems to be that the ruling was error, for the reason that no private advantage was intended for the members of the society individually, but only the use of the lands was given to the society as a body for certain specified purposes, leaving the title or right of reverter still in the donor. We cannot accept this view. We agree with the judge that it was a

mutual contract between the parties for valuable consideration, or in the nature of a dedication of the land and money for certain specified public purposes, and could have been enforced in law against John Bates in his life-time. See Treasurer v. Anderson, 1 McMul. 300. But, as we understand, it is still further contended that is was error of law to hold that the legal title ever passed out of John Bates; that the title must be somewhere; that Bates never formally conveyed it, and the individual members of the society could not take and hold it in succession, or execute the trusts declared and connected with it, without a charter, and therefore we must assume that the subscription or dedication of the land was only made with reference to the charter to be afterwards acquired; that it must be considered that the charter was in existence at the time it was made, and, therefore, upon the expiration of the charter, the land reverted to the original donor, John Bates. But the conclusive answer to this is that we have already seen that, under the charge of the judge, the jury found the fact that it was contributed to the society without reference to the prospective charter, and even before it was contemplated. Besides, we are not prepared to admit that the law will not afford the means of enforcing a trust, even where it is a simple gift, and reposed in an unincorporated voluntary association of individuals; more particularly where the object of the trust is charitable in its character, which, in the judicial sense, includes the establishment and maintenance of schools and colleges. See Gibson v. M'Call, 1 Rich. Law, 176; Attorney General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 100; and Vidal v. Girards' Ex'rs, 2 How. 127, especially as reported, with notes and authorities, in 3 Shars. & B. Lead. Cas. 257. In our own Case of Jolly, supra, Chancellor Harper, in delivering the unanimous judgment of the old court of errors, reversing his own judgment on the circuit, said: "But the whole subject was considered (Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs), and the opinion of the court was plainly intended to overrule the case of Association v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 7. * * I understand these principles to be settled by the decision referred to. If there be a bequest to a society by that name, the individuals composing it, who may be identified by evidence, take as natural persons, in the same maner as if each had been particularly named; and that, if it be upon a lawful trust, they will be compelled to execute it," etc.

*

The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.

NOTE.-Gift to Unincorporated Association.- In some States a gift to an unincorporated association for charitable uses is void. The defect is not rem

1 Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198; McKeon v. Kearney, 57 How. Pr. 249; Leonard v. Davenport, 58 How. Pr. 384; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366; Owens v. Missionary Society, 14 N. Y. 380; Betts v. Betts, 4 Abb. N. Cas. 317; Sherwood v. American Bible Society, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 227. See also Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293; Brewster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 294.

edied by a subsequent incorporation of the association not contemplated when the gift was made. But a gift to certain persons, with instructions to incorporate, becomes valid upon such incorporation.3

The better opinion would seem to be that a gift to an unincorporated society for charitable uses is valid.4 In a case where it was said that a gift for charitable uses could not be made directly to an unincorporated society, it was held that it could be made to a trustee for the society.5

In another case it was held that, although an unincorporated association could not take title by purchase, equity raised a promise on the part of the owner to convey to the persons making payment for the association, or to the corporation after the association had accepted a charter of incorporation, and it does not appear that any incorporation was contemplated when the purchase was made.6

Dissolution.-Upon the dissolution of a voluntary association the property goes to the members.7

Subscriptions Binding.-When work has been done or expense incurred, upon a reasonable dependence on a subscription to an educational or like purpose, the subscription becomes a contract for a valuable consideration, and is binding.8

Some cases hold that wherever there is a legal obligation on the part of the promisee to apply the fund, the promisor is bound by his subscription. Still, other cases maintain that the promises of the various subscribers are a sufficient consideration for each other.10 CHAS. A. ROBBINS.

2 White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144; State v. Warren, 28 Md. 339; Baptist Association v. Hart, 4 Wheat. 2.

3 Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254. See also Sander son v. White, 18 Pick. 336; Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303.

4 Hamblett v. Bennett, 6 Allen, 140; Evangelical Association's Appeal, 37 Pa. St. 316; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241; Gibson v. McCall, 1 Rich. 174; Shields v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 100; Cromie's Heirs v. Louisville Orphan Home Society, 3 Bush, 365; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465; Roshis' Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 462; Antones v. Eslava, 9 Port. (Ala.) 527; Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Met. 280; Cahill v. Bigger, 8 B. Mon. 211; American Bible Society v. Wetmore, 17 Conn. 181; Swasey v. Am. Bible Society, 57 Me. 523; Preachers' Aid Society v. Rich, 45 Me. 553. See also In re Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 43. 5 Goesele v. Brineler, 5 McLean, 223.

6 African M. E. Church v. Conover. 27 N. J. Eq. 157. 7 Boone on Corp. § 332; White v. Brownell, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 162.

8 Trustees v. Garvey, 53 Ill 401; Baptist Education Society v. Carter, 72 Ill. 247; Presbyterian Church v. Baird, 60 Iowa, 237; University of DesMoines v. Livingston, 57 Iowa, 307; White. v. Scott, 26 Kan. 476; Farmington Academy v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172; Wesleyan Seminary v. Fisher, 4 Mich. 524; Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 115; McAuley v. Billenger, 20 Johns. 89; Ryers v. Congrega. tion of Blossburg, 33 Pa. St. 114; Williams v. Rogan, 59 Tex. 438; Eycleshimer v. Van Antwerp, 13 Wis. 548.

9 Collier v. Baptist Educational Society, 8 B. Mon 68; Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 90; Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. 189. 10 Petty v. Trustees, 95 Ind. 278; McDonald v. Gray, 11 Iowa, 508; Twin Creek, etc. Turnpike, 79 Ky. 552; Comstock v. Hood, 15 Mich. 244; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537; Trustees v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506; Congregational Society v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; Stewart y. Trustees, 2 Denio, 403; Edinboro Academy v. Robinson, 37 Pa. St. 213; Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214.