178. TAXATION- Exemptions Charities. Under Georgia law, a poor house, when erected, is exempt from taxation, but detached property, from which its support is to be derived, is not exempt. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, S. C. Ga., Nov. 15, 1887; 7 S. E. Rep. 633. 179. TAXATION- Exemption Masonic Building. Conceding that the grand lodge of Georgia is a purely public charity, the most it can claim is that the part of its temple not used for profit shall be spared from taxation. Massenbury v. Grand Lodge, S. C. Ga., June 1, 1888; 7 S. E. Rep. 636.

180. TAXATION - Property of Deceased Persons. Under Michigan law, the personal property of an estate shall be assessed to the executor in the town where the deceased last resided, until notice be given that the estate is distributed. Avery v. Dewitt, S. C. Mich., Oct.

Brown v.

19, 1888; 40 N. W. Rep. 39. 181. TAXATION-Sales-Separate Tracts. A certifi cate of tax-sale construed as showing on its face that several distinct tracts of land were sold together for one gross sum and, therefore, held void. Setzer, S. C. Minn., Nov. 2, 1888; 40 N. W. Rep. 70. 182. TAXATION-Standing Timber.-— -Standing timber, owned separately from the land, is to be assessed, under Michigan laws, as realty. - Fletcher v. Town of Alcona, S. C. Mich., Oct. 19, 1888; 40 N. W. Rep. 36.

Circum

183. TRUST-Attorney and Client- Fees. stances stated under which it was held that, where an engagement is made with an attorney to transact the professional business of the plaintiff, and he does so for many years, attending to their affairs during complicated litigation, and discharging the duties of trustee under a trust deed involving the property in question, he is entitled to fees for his services during the whole series of transaction, and the liability of the plaintiff for h's fees was not interrupted or modified by the trust.Babcock v. Hubbard, S. C. E. Conn., June 26, 1888; 15 Atl. Rep. 791.

186. TRUST-Constructive Trust-Attorney and Client. An attorney, who in the course of his professional employment, discovers a flaw in his client's title to prop erty, and buys up the outstanding title, cannot maintain an action against his client, because he holds the title under a constructive trust for the benefit of his client. - Downard v. Hadley, S. C. Ind., Nov. 10, 1888; 18 N. E. Rep. 457.

187. TRUSTS-Grantee-Consideration.- A trust results in favor of one who pays the consideration for land, which is deeded to another, and his right to recover the title and possession is not dependant upon an express agreement of the latter to convey to him. Burns v. Ross, S. C. Tex., Oct. 23, 1888; 9 S. W. Rep. 468. 188. TRUSTS-Resulting-Bona Fide Purchasers.--In an action to establish a resulting trust in land sold for taxes, and to recover the land or its value, no relief can be had against a purchaser for value and without notice of plaintiff's claim from the sheriff's vendee.-Richardson v. Haney, S. C. Iowa, Oct. 29, 1888; 40 N. W. Rep. 115. 189. TRUST-Will-Construction-Estate.

A devise to trustees directing them to pay the income to the beneficiary, a widow, who has no apparent intention of

marriage, creates a mere passive trust, and if there is no limitation over, e titles the widow to an absolute conveyance.-Appeal of Rodrigue, S. C. Penn., Oct, 1, 1888; 15 Atl. Rep. 680.

Ponds.

The

190. WATER AND WATER COURSES "Colony Ordinance," 1641 47 (Ancient Charters and Laws, 148), providing that householders shall have free fishing and fowling in any great ponds, bay, etc., within the precincts of the town, and may pass and repass on foot through any man's land, so that they trespass not on corn or meadow land, and that no town shall appropriate any great pond to any particular person, establishes a rule of property throughout th› State of Massachusetts, vesting in it both the jus privatum and jus publicum, in the great ponds, and the legislature can appropriate their waters to public uses, without making compensation to owners of land on natural streams flowing therefrom. Watuppa, etc Co. v. City of Fall River, S J. C. Mass., Oct. 29, 1888; 18 N. E. Rep. 465. 191. WILL-Attestation-Execution The attesting witnesses of a will must sign the attestation clause in the presence of the testator, and must then see the testator's signature. It is not sufficient if they sign the clause without seeing the signature, although he tells them that the paper is his will. In re Mackay's Will, N. Y. Ct. App., Oct. 26, 1888; 18 N. E. Rep. 433.

192. WILL-Construction-Validity-Remoteness Where a testator bequeathed the rents and profits of an estate to N for life, and after her death to her children for life, and as her children should die the estate to go to the heirs at law of N, as each child shall die after the death of N his proportion shall go to his children, said N's grandchildren to take per stirpes: Held, that the limitation over to the grandchildren of N was not void for remoteness, but that the estate vested in the grandchildren who were living at the death of the testator, subject to the life interest of N, and that upon the death of any one of the grandchildren, after the testator's death and the death of N, his share should. be divided among his heirs at law. — Dorr v. Lovering, S. J. C. Mass., Oct. 22, 1888; 18 N. E. Rep. 412. 193. WILL-Divise-Shelley's Case. A devise to a daughter during her natural life, and after her death to the begotten heirs or heiresses of her body, creates an estate-tail, which, under North Carolina law, is a feesimple.-Leathers v. Gray, S. C. N. Car., Oct. 15, 1888; 7 S. E. Rep. 657.

194. WILL-Estate-Accumulation.-A will granting an estate to the testator's daughter and providing that the interest should be left to accumulate during the life of her husband, vests in her an absolute estate in the funds and its accumulations at the expiration of twenty-one years after the testator's death.-Appeal of Brubaker, S. C. Penn., Oct. 1, 1888; 15 Atl. Rep. 708.

195. WILLS-Execution - Witness. Under North Carolina law, an attesting witness, who is also an heir at law and propounder of the will, may testify in his own behalf as to its validity. · Collins v. Collins, S. C. N.. Car., Oct. 22, 1888; 7 S. E. Rep. 687.

196. WILL-Witness-"His Mark.". -Under the statute law of Arkansas (Mansf. Dig. § 6344), which authorizes the signature by mark of a witness to a will, who cannot write his name, the mark of an attesting witness is valid it proved by the person who wrote the signature to which the mark is attached, although such person has not signed his own name as witness of the fact that the attesting witness had made his mark. Daris

199. WRITS-Return- Impeachment.-The return of an officer of the service of a summons is not conclusive upon the defendant, but may be impeached by affidavit upon motion or other direct proceedings in the action to set aside the judgment or default. -Crosby v. Farmer, S. C. Minn., Nov. 2, 1888; 40 N. W. Rep. 71. 200. WRITS-Service Return. - Under Colorado laws, a return dated at the office of the sheriff of the county of defendant's residence, stating that the summons was served personally by delivering a copy to defendant, and signed by the sheriff by his deputy, is sufficient. Thomas v. Colorado N. Bank, S. C. Colo., Oct. 16, 1888; 19 Pac. Rep. 501.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]

QUERY NO. 15.

A and B agreed to run a horse race for $500 a side, the winner to take the whole. The race was run. A's horse won. After the race, but before the money was paid over by C (the stakeholder), B demanded his $500; C refused to pay to him, but paid the whole $1,000 to the winner, A. B brought suit against C, the stakeholder, to recover his $500. C answered, setting up the above facts, and alleged that B agreed to abide the decision of the judges of the race; that the race was won by A, and was so decided by said judges, and after said decision in A's favor, C held the money when B's demand was made, as the money of A. To this answer B demurred. The circuit court at Portland, Oreg., sustained the demurrer, holding "that, notwithstanding the statutes of Oregon are silent on the subject, the 'wager' is illegal, and contrary to public policy. That demand being made before the money was actually paid over, though after the event, B could recover." Please cite authorites holding: 1st. That in the absence of any statute to that effect, the. "wager" is not illegal or against public policy. 2d. That after the event (i. e., after the race was run and decided), it is loo late to rescind or recover the money staked and lost. On the second proposition New York, Texas and California have so held as to eleceion bets. N. H. B.

QUERIES ANSWERED.

QUERY NO. 13 [27 Cent. L. J. 564.]

A plaintiff in trespass introduced a land contract showing that he had an equitable title, and is to get a warranty deed upon making certain monthly payments aggregating $1,500. Subsequently on the trial he offered a warranty deed of the same property, between the same parties, but bearing date on a day subsequent to the commencement of the action. The form of the complaint in alleging title is the same as in ejectment cases, i. e., the plaintiff alleged himself to be the owner and entitled to the possession. It had appeared on the trial previous to this offer, that the land upon which the trespass was committed was a vacant lot. The warranty deed was objected to upon the ground that only facts which were in existence at the time of the commencement of the action were admissible. The court received the deed, stating that he did so with some hesitation, but because the contract already in evidence showed that the plaintiff had sufficient interest in the land to maintain the action, and the only

further question to consider was whether the owner of the legal title would have a remedy against the defendant in addition to the one the plaintiff claimed on this title; and that this deed conferring the whole title in the plaintiff was relevant and material. Was the court right? Cite authorities. R.

Answer. It was formerly held that an action of trespass could only be maintained in case the plaintiff was in actual possession of the land when the trespass was committed. Afterwards the owner of unoccupied land was considered to be in constructive possession, and was allowed to bring such a suit. But a cestui que trust or a bargainee, not in possession, cannot bring such a suit. Carrine v. Westerfield, 3 A. K. Marsh. 331; 1 Chitty Pl. 71; 6 Wait's Act. & Def. 6468. The plaintiff, not being in possession, nor the owner of the land when the suit was brought, cannot maintain his action. J. E. B.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

FEDERAL DECISIONS. Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States. Comprising the Opinions of those Courts from the Time of their Organization to the Present Date, together with Extracts from the Opinions of the Court of Claims and the AttorneysGeneral, and the Opinions of General Importance of the Territorial Courts. Arranged by William G. Myer, Author of an Index to the United States Supreme Court Reports; also Indexes to the Reports of Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Missouri and Tennessee, a Digest of the Texas Reports, and local works on Pleading and Practice. Vol. XXVII. Quantum Meruit-Swamp Lands. St. Louis, Mo.: The Gilbert Book Company. 1888.

We have now before us the twenty-seventh volume of "Federal Decisions," which in all respects is equal to any of its predecessors. We have so often commented on the successive volumes of this series that there is absolutely nothing new to say in commendation of the present issue. We can only repeat what we have so often said, that the collection is one of the most important and valuable that has ever been made; that the work upon it has been done in a style worthy of it, and that the legal profession ought to be under lasting obligations to the editor and publishers of so valuable a compendum of law.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

"PRISONER at the bar," remarked a judge to a forsaken criminal who was about to receive his death sentence, "is there anything you wish to say before sentence is passed upon you?" The prisoner cast a look at the half-open door as he said: "I would like to say 'Good-evening,' if it's agreeable to the company."

SOLICITOR CURRAN, the famous Irish advocate, was once examining a witness who persistently avoided direct answers. Livid with rage, the Irishman declared: "That'll do; that'll do. There's no use asking you questions, for I see the villian in your face." "Oh, do you, now, sir," tauntingly replied the witness. "Faix, I never knew before that my face was a looking-glass."

attacking foreign judgments, L. A. 591.

See contract, Justice v. Justice, ann. cas, 191. ATTORNEY'S LIEN.

an attorney's lien on the fund is paramount, the claims of all others interested, Justice v. Justice, ann. cas. 191.

ATTORNEY-SERVICE OF NOTICE ON.

See perpetuating testimony, L. A. 495. ATTORNEY-SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY.

rule as to the signature of attorneys to be appended to a summons. See summons, LA. 527. ATTORNEY-AUTHORITY TO APPEAR. See foreign judgment, L. A. 591.

ATTORNEY'S LIEN-FEES.

priority, errors, record, Justice v. Justice, ann. cas. 191.

See conflict of laws, In re Peck, ann. cas. 188. BANKRUPTCY-INSOLVENCY.

a conveyance of property by a bankrupt or insolvent is determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, not by the law of the domicile, In re Peck, ann, cas. 188.

BARGAINS TRANSFERRING CHATTELS.
See transaction resembling sales, L. A. 136.
BEACH, CHARLES FISK.

author of a manuel of the law of wills, R. P. 588. BENEFIT SOCIETIES-TREATISE ON.

Frederick H Bacon, review of, R. P. 540.

BREACH.

CAR-LOAD CASES.

comments on cases pending before the interstate commerce commission known as "car-load cases, and involving the right of a carrier to discriminate in their charges between large and small shipments of goods, C. E. 253.

CARRIER.

negligence; contributory negligence, R. D. 518. CARRIER PASSENGER.

a passenger on a car who is standing on a platform and is thrown down and injured by the starting of the car, is guilty of contributory negligence, he ought not to have been on the platform, and cannot recover damages, R. D. 518.

CARRIERS.

of passenger goods, law relating to such carriers. See railroads, L. A. 352. CASE STATED.

See trust, Weaver v. Akin, ann. cas. 357. CESTUI QUE TRUST.

See trust, Weaver v. Akin, ann. cas. 357. CESTUI QUE TRUST.

power. The cestui que trust has no power in Michigan to incumber the trust estate, nor has the trustee except as authorized by statute, although he holds the legal and equitable estate, Weaver v. Akin, ann.

cas. 357.

CHAMPERTY.

comments on the law of champerty and its application to conditional fees and other like contracts,

C. E. 373.

Conditional fees, C. E. 373, 445.

CHANCERY REPORTS.

of New York, edited by Robert Desty, review of, R. P. 324.

CHANEY, G. R.

author of Nebraska citations, R. P. 180.

CHANGE IN CHARACTER OF TRUST FUND.

action on executor's bond, misappropriations, interest, rate, Cranson v. Wilsey, ann. cas. 240,

CHARACTER.

bad. See libel, C. E. 109.

CHARITABLE GIFTS.

incorporation, dissolution, failure to execute deed, Bates v. Palmetto Society, ann. cas. 143. CHARTER.

See railroad company, Minneapolis v. Minneapolis etc. Co., ann. cas. 454.

CHIEF JUSTICE.

See Mr. Justice Fuller, C. E. 61. CHINESE.

See naturalization law, C. E. 325.

CHOICE OF ARBITRATOR BY LOT.

See arbitration and award, Brush v. Fisher, ann. cas. 332.

CHRISTMAS.

comes but once a year, C. E. 589.

CITY IMPROVEMENTS.

See assessment, R. D. 110.

CIVIL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS FOR MALPRAC

TICE,

L.A. 567.

CLAIRVOYANT.

See malpractice, Nelson v. Harrington, ann. cas. 548. clairvoyant physicians do not constitute a school of medicine as that term is used in legal proceedings, Nelson v. Harrington, ann. cas. 548.

See judgment, Shryock v. Buckman, ann. cas. 481. COMMERCIAL LAW.

what is reasonable time in commercial cases L. A. 377.

COMMERCIAL TRAVELER.

See innkeeper's lien, Covington v. Newberger, ann. cas. 263.

COMMISSION MERCHANTS.

factor and broker, principal and agent, instructions to principal, cause, proximate and remote, warehouse receipts, Lehman v. Pritchett, ann. cas. 380. COMPENSATION.

See eminent domain, Forney v. Fremont, ann. cas. 8. for services. sale or payment, see transaction resembling sale, L. A. 136.

COMPENSATORY.

See assault and battery, R. D. 303. CONCLUSIVENESS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. L. A. 591.

CONDITION.

escrow, title. The title to property by a deed in es crow does not pass to the gtantee until the condi tion is performed, Wier v. Batdorf, ann. cas 138. CONDITION IN POLICY.

See fire insurance, Sierra, etc. Co. v. Hartford etc. Co., ann. cas. 451.

CONDITION PRECEDENT.

See arbitration, Viney v. Bignold, ann. cas. 40.

See fraudulent conveyance, Fratherstone v. Dagnall, ann. cas. 544.

CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS.

See railroad company, Minneapolis v. Minneapolis etc. Co. ann, cas. 454.

CONSOLIDATION OF CAUSES.

where proceeding of a like character are pending against two railroad companies to compel them to bridge their respective tracks, it is not error to require that both causes should be heard together, Minneapolis v. Minneapolis, etc. Co. ann. cas. 454. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

swearing a judge off the bench, C. E. 58. special legislation, C. E. 81.

recent rulings on assessments for public improve. ments and the liability of abutting proprietors therefor, R. A. 110.

See assessment, R. D. 110.

taxation, a telegraph company which has accepted the act of congress of 1866, cannot be required by the State to pay a tax on messages sent by the gov ernment, or from one State to another, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, ann. cas. 119.

interstate commerce. No State can lay a tax on in terstate commerce in any form, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, ann. cas. 119.

See election and voters, R. D. 422.

suits against states, federal courts, jurisdiction, R. D. 494.

habeas corpus, interstate commerce, drummer's tax, R. D. 566.

See international law, R. D. 30.

where a contract does not specify the time of pay. ment a reasonable time will be implied, L. A. 108.

See religious societies, R. D. 135.

the essential elements of contract. See transaction resembling sales, L. A. 136.

a contract for building on lands granted to voluntary assoclation is a legal obligation which may be en forced at law, Bates v. Batdorf, ann, cas. 143.

attorney, judgment. An attorney's lien under a contract is prior to a judgment against his client, Justice v. Justice, ann. cas. 191.

See partnership, R, D. 206.

See equity, R. D. 278.

what is reasonable time in performing contracts, L. A. 378.

written contract, parol evidence to vary. Where there is a written contract to deliver lumber and a parol contract that the vendor shall be satisfied of the solvency of the vendee, the sale being upon credit, the written contract is varied by the parol con. tract, and it is held that the vendor must be satisfied of the solvency of the vendee before he can be held bound to perform his engagement, R. D. 471. between physician apd patient. What it implies. See malpractice, L. A. 567.

option, acceptance by mail, Wilcox v. Cline, ann. cas.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

574.

option, acceptance. Where an offer is made for the sale of land with an option of the purchaser to accept or reject within a limited time, an acceptance by mail received by the vendor within that time will render the contract absolute, Wilcox v. Cline, ann. cas. 574. telegraph

company, telegram, fictitious address, Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co. ann. cas. 577. CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE OF LAND.

See mines and minerals, Williams v. Gibson, ann. cas. 498.

CONTRACT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

physicians, practice, breach, same, time, French v. Parker, ann. cas. 527.

CONTRACT SALE OF CHATTELS.

See equity, R. D. 82.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

See negligence, R. D. 374.

See carrier, R. D. 518.

See municipal corporation, Burmingham v. McCary, ann cas. 598.

the question whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in falling at night into an unguarded, unlighted ditch is a question for the jury, Birmingham v. McCary, ann. cas. 598. CONVEYANCE.

See ejectment, R. D. 254. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. See wife beating, C. E. 157. CORPORATION.

See libel, R. D. 3.

private corporations, treatise on the law of, by Henry O. Taylor, R. P. 132.

dissolution. Upon the dissolution of a corporation which was formed by a voluntary association, property received by that association reverts to its members and not to the original donoer, Bates v. Palmetto Society, ann. cas. 143.

the corporation cannot become a party to "trust," unless specially authorized to do so by its charter, C. E. 205.

effect upon the property of a corporation of a judicial decree disolving it, R. D. 590.

dissolution, constitutional law, trust, directors, trustees, R. D. 590.

comments upon the law relating to corporations, and especially the election of officers of such corporations, C. E. 565.

CORRESPONDENCE.

letter relating to the decision of a case in which the party had murdered his next of kin and his right to inherit the property of the decased came into question, corr. 27.

special legislation, comments of a correspondent on our article relating to special legislation, corr. 252. CREDIBILITY.

of dying declarations, a question for the jury, L. A. 33. CRIME.

notable decrease of crime in England. See decrease of crime, C. E. 301.

CRIMINAL CASES.

argument to jury in, L. A. 82. CROSS-EXAMINATION.

of the party accused, L. A. 305.

for purposes of impeachment, L. A. 305.

questions affecting the credibility of the witness, L. A. 305.

American rule on strict examination, L. A. 305.

sifting, modifying, extending, explaining the direct examination, L. A. 305.

English rule on the whole case, L. A. 305.

how far subject to discretionary control, L. A. 305. objects of, L. A. 305.

L. A. 305.

CROSSING.

ruling as to railway crossing in Minnesota, construction of statute on that subject, all railway crossings need not be at grade, Minneapolis v. Minneapolis, etc. Co., ann cas. 454. COUNTERCLAIM,

See defense, L. A. 255. COUNTERS.

See equity, R. D. 2. COVENANT.

See deed, R. D. 279. CUSTOM.

See usage, L. A. 8.

See master and servant, Covington v. Newberger, ann. cas. 263.

DAMAGES.

mitigation of, see libel, C. E. 109.

one cannot recover damages for the breach of a cove