§ 59. Wood v. Ross, 8 U. C.-C. P. 299 (1858); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 U. C. Q. B. 27 (1859).

3. A note transferred after maturity is subject in Quebec to a money claim against any holder at or after maturity: Gibsone v. Lee, 1 Rev. de Leg. 347 (1814); Hayes v. David, 3 L. C. R. 112 (1852); Duguay v. Senecal, 1 L. C. L. J. 26 (1865); Amazon Ins. Co. v. Quebec & G. P. S. S. Co., 2 Q. L. R. 810 (1876).

4. The indorser may set up in compensation any money due or paid to the maker by the holder since its maturity: Quebec Bank v. Molson, 1 L. C. R. 116 (1851).

5. An account for goods sold and delivered may be set up in compensation of a promissory note: Angers v. Ermatinger, 2 L. C. L. J. 158 (1866); Quintal v. Aubin, M. L. R. 1 S. C. 397 (1883).

6. Compensation not allowed against a bill or note because claim not equally claire et liquide: Ryan v. Hunt, 10 L. C. R. 474 (1860); Parsons v. Graham, 15 L. C. J. 41 (1870); Perrault v. Herdman, 3 R. L. 440 (1871).

7. Claims arising after the insolvency of a company, or a judicial abandonment, cannot be set up in compensation against the liquidator or curator: Exchange Bank v. City & District Savings Bank, 14 R. L. 8 (1885); Exchange Bank v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, M. L. R. 2 Q. B. 476 (1886); Riddell v. Gould, ibid. 5 S. C. 170 (1889).

8. The maker of a note may set up in compensation against the holder the amount of a note of a third party which he gave him as collateral, and which the latter has disposed of: Lepage v. Hamel, 19 R. L. 439 (1889).

9. The indorsee of an overdue promissory note is liable, in an action against the maker, to all equities arising out of the note transaction itself, but not to a set-off in respect of a debt due from the indorser to the maker, arising out of collateral matters: Burrough v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558 (1830).

10. As to exchange of bills under a settlement at the clearing § 59. house, see Warwick v. Rogers, 5 M. & G. 340 (1843); Banque Nationale v. Merchants' Bank, M. L. R. 7. S. C. 336 (1891). . .

Prescription or the Statute of Limitations.-This is another subject as to which the law of Quebec differs from that of the other provinces, not only as to the length of time necessary to acquire the right, but also as to its nature, as to whether it merely bars the remedy on a bill or extinguishes the right of action.

5 years.

In Quebec the time required is 5 years, reckoning from In Quebec, maturity C. C. Art. 2260 (4). The debt is then absolutely extinguished, and no action can be maintained after the delay for prescription has expired; C. C. Art. 2267. This was also the law before the Code: Coté v. Morrison, 2 L. C. J. 206 (1858); Lavoie v. Crevier, 9 L. C. R. 418 (1859); Bardy v. Huot, 11 L. C. R. 200 (1861): Giard v. Giard, 15 L. C. R. 494 (1865); Bowker v. Fenn, 10 L. C. J. 120 (1865); Giard v. Lamoureux, 16 L. C. R. 201 (1865).

tion of pre

The Code also contains the following provisions regard- Interrup ing the interruption of prescription :-No indorsement on scription. a note or bill made by a person receiving payment will take it out of the operation of the law: Art. 1229. Where the amount exceeds $50, no promise or acknowledgment is sufficient, unless in writing and signed by the party making the promise: Art. 1235. Prescription cannot be renounced by anticipation, but time acquired may be renounced: Art. 2184. Renunciation by any person does not prejudice his co-debtors, his sureties, or third parties: Art. 2229.

runs.

Prescription runs against absentees: Art. 2232-also When it against married women, minors, idiots, madmen and insane persons, saving their recourse against those who legally represent them: Arts. 2234, 2269. It does not run with respect to debts depending on a condition until the condition hap

$ 59. pens: or debts with a term until the term has expired: Art. 2236. Any one or more of the following prescriptions may be invoked in Quebec :-(1) Any prescription entirely acquired under a foreign law, on a bill payable outside of Quebec, in favor of a person living abroad. (2) Any prescription entirely acquired in Quebec, reckoning from maturity, on a bill payable there, when the party was domiciled there at maturity, in other cases from the time he became domiciled there. (3) Any prescription resulting from the lapse of successive periods in the preceding cases, when the first period elapsed under the foreign law: Art. 2190. As to a conflict of these laws, see section 71 and notes thereon.

In other provinces.

In the other provinces the time required is 6 years. The English Statutes, 21 James I. c. 16, and 3 & 4 Anne c. 8, establishing this limitation as to bills and notes, were introduced into the other provinces as set out ante pp. 10-18; but were never law in Lower Canada: Butler v. MacDougall, 2 Rev. de Leg. 70 (1835); Russell v. Fisher, 4 L. C. R. 237 (1854); Langlois v. Johnston, ibid. 357 (1854). There has also been provincial legislation fixing this time in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick: R. S. N. S. c. 112; C. S. N. B. c. 85. Under these Acts a promise or acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the party chargeable, to take a case out of the statute. Payment may have such effect, but an indorsement on a bill or note by the party receiving or his agent, is not sufficient. No person is liable on account of the act or promise of his co-contractor or debtor, and one may be liable and may be sued without the other. Actions by or against minors, married women, or insane persons may be brought within six years from the removal of the disability. In New Brunswick, absentees are placed on the ' same footing; in Nova Scotia the provision applies only to actions to be brought against them. In Ontario there are two Acts-R. S. O. c. 60, relating to the Limitation of Actions, and c. 128, to Written Promises. The former

allows minors and persons non compos mentis six years after § 59. the removal of the impediment to bring an action; allows the same time after his return to the province, to sue an absentee; and provides that time shall run in favor of a joint debtor, although one or more joint debtors may be out of the province. Chapter 123 provides that a promise to take a case out of the Statute, must be in writing and signed by the party chargeable; that where there are joint contractors, or executors or administrators of any contractor, a promise or payment by one shall not bind the others; that no indorsement on a bill or note by the party receiving payment shall be sufficient; and that a ratification after majority, of a contract during infancy, must be in writing.

begins to

Ordinarily the statute begins to run when a bill matures When it or is dishonored. If it is payable on demand, it has been run. held in Quebec, that prescription runs from its date or its issue (illustration no. 17 post); and this was considered to have been the case in England: Byles, p. 56. It has, however, been considered latterly that bills payable on or after demand, or at sight, or a fixed period after sight. should be on the same footing as other bills, and the statute should only run from their dishonor or maturity. See re Boyse, 33 Ch. D. 612 (1886); re Bethell, 34 Ch. D. 561 (1887).

See section 57 (a) (2), where interest, as damages on a dishonored bill, runs from the time of presentment for payment, if the bill is payable on demand, and from the maturity of the bill in any other case. The principle there involved is somewhat analogous to that in the present question.

Chalmers (p. 289) lays down the following five rules as Law of embodying the law of England on the subject:

1. Subject to the case provided for by section 48 (1), and rule 5, no action on a bill can be maintained against any party

England.

§ 59. thereto after the expiration of six years from the time when a cause of action first accrued to the then holder against such party.

2. As regards the acceptor, time begins to run from the maturity of the bill, unless

(1) Presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the acceptor, in which case time (probably) runs from the date of such presentment; or

(2) The bill is accepted after its maturity, in which case time (probably) runs from the date of acceptance.

3. As regards the drawer or an indorser, time (generally) begins to run from date when notice of dishonor is received.

4. When an action is brought against a party to a bill to enforce an obligation collateral to the bill, though arising out of the bill transaction, the nature of the particular transaction determines the period from which the time begins to run.

5. Any circumstance which postpones or defeats the operation of the Statute of Limitations in the case of an ordinary contract postpones or defeats it in like manner in the case of a bill. No indorsement or memorandum of any payment written or made upon a bill by or on behalf of the party to whom such payment is made, is sufficient to defeat the operation of the statute.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

The following expressions have been held not sufficient to take the case out of the statute:

1. "The notes are genuine; that is, I think I made them, but I am under the impression they were paid, but I don't think I am called upon to have any further conversation with you about them"; Grantham v. Powell, 6 U. C. Q. B. 494 (1849).

2. "I am sorry to say I cannot do anything for you at present, but shall remember you as soon as possible": Gemmell v. Colton, 6.U. C. C. P. 57 (1856):