Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kelley. 77 Eq. by adequate repairs to the building or by the building being wholly torn down is at this time immaterial, but the danger must be removed at once. The conditions presented are clearly those of extreme necessity. As owner of the dangerous building, the primary duty of the removal of the danger falls on defendant Kelley. His refusal to remove the danger calls for the exercise by this court of its undoubted power to compel him to do so. It is well recognized that a building which, by reason of its inherent weakness or its dilapidated condition, is liable to fall into a highway and injure passers-by or persons lawfully thereon, is a public nuisance. Joyce Nui. § 238. Such a building is also a private nuisance where it is liable to fall and injure adjoining property. Timlin v. Standard Oil Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.) 44. Complainant is equally entitled to relief against the maintenance of the structure here in question whether it be viewed as a private nuisance or as a public nuisance from which complainant suffers private, direct and special injury. As the material facts are not in substantial dispute and the operation of complainant's railway cannot be continued with safety to the public or with safety to complainant's property without the immediate removal of the danger which is threatened by the continued maintenance of defendant's building in its present condition, I will advise an order for the issuance of a mandatory injunction directing defendant immediately to remove the building or immediately to repair the building in such manner that all danger of its falling on the tracks of complainant's railway may be removed. Should defendant assume to remove the danger by repairing the building, the adequacy of the repairs so made may be appropriately inquired into at any time. Under the circumstances presented, I think it appropriate to require complainant, before the writ issues, to execute a bond to defendants, in an amount to be ascertained at the time the order for the writ is signed, conditioned to pay to defendants such damages as may be sustained by them by reason of the issuance of the writ, in the event of its being ascertained at final hearing, or on appeal in the event of an appeal, that complainant was not entitled to the relief at this time awarded. 7 Buch. Schwartze v. Camden. CHARLES E. SCHWARTZE, executor, &c., V. THE CITY OF CAMDEN. [Submitted February 12th, 1910. Decided February 12th, 1910.] 1. In the absence of legislative authority, a municipal corporation cannot delegate its legislative functions, but it may delegate ministerial or administrative functions to subordinate agents. 2. The legislative body of a municipality may in some cases, without special authorization by the legislature, appoint agents to perform administrative or ministerial acts and clothe them with some degree of discretion, but where the legislature confers on the legislative body of a municipality a power of such quality or in such manner that the exercise of the power in accordance with the legislative intent may reasonably require the deliberate concerted judgment and discretion of the members of the body, there can be no delegation of the power. 3. 1 Gen. Stat. 1895 p. 506 ch. 231, empowering the council of any city owning water works to purchase, when expedient, such additional land as may be deemed advisable for the improvement and extension of the watersupply, confers powers on the council involving judgment and deliberation which the council may not delegate. 4. The council of a city appropriated a specified sum for the purchase of additional land for the use of the water works. The water committee of the city appointed a sub-committee to contract for the purchase of such lands as the committee thought best. The committee, through the subcommittee, purchased a tract, and reported the same to the council, which confirmed the transaction. The sub-committee made a contract for the purchase of other lands, but no report of such purchase had been made to the water committee or to the council.-Held, that the contract made by the sub-committee was not enforceable against the city. On bill for specific performance of contract for sale of land. Messrs. French & Richards, for the complainant. Mr. Edwin G. C. Bleakly and Mr. Wilfred B. Wolcott, for the defendant. 77 Eq. LEAMING, V. C. Schwartze v. Camden. The bill is filed to compel the city of Camden to specifically perform a certain alleged written contract in which that city is, alleged to have become bound to purchase from complainant certain real estate. The written agreement for the purchase of the land was made in the name of the city by a sub-committee of the water committee of the city. The city now defends upon the ground that the written instrument referred to is not the contract of the city for the reason that the sub-committee could not lawfully bind the city to purchase the land. The water which is supplied to the inhabitants of the city of Camden is procured by the city from artesian wells, which are sunk at various places on land which has been purchased by the city for that purpose. The evidence, though not entirely satisfactory, may be said to sufficiently disclose that the city council of the city of Camden deemed additional land necessary for the purpose named and by an ordinance made $25,000 available for the purpose of purchasing such additional land. The appropriating ordinance merely sets aside $25,000 "for the water department for improving and enlarging the water works system and supply," but the evidence is to the effect that the real purpose was for the purchase of additional land. The evidence does not disclose that any resolution was passed or other affirmative action taken by city council whereby the water committee was specifically given power to enter into any contract or contracts for the purchase of land for the purpose referred to. While the appropriation referred to appears to have been made without specific direction touching its expenditure, I think the evidence may be said to justify the conclusion that the city council assumed that the water committee of the city would take such appropriate steps as should be found necessary to enable the city to procure such land as should be needed for the purpose named. By resolution of June 6th, 1908, the water committee appointed the mayor, city comptroller, city solicitor and Mr. J. E. Hewitt as a committee to procure options on land for the purpose already referred to. Mr. Hewitt was also a member of the water committee. June 9th, 1908, this sub-committee reported to the water committee that they could not operate to advantage unless their powers were enlarged and they were given "power to act," and on that date the water committee, by resolution, authorized the sub-committee "to act," thereby, apparently, intending to extend to the sub-committee authority to contract for the purchase of such land as should, in the judgment of the subcommittee, be for the best interests of the city. The sub-committee thereupon consummated an agreement with one Hollingshead for certain land near the pumping station of the water works for $7,550, and made a written report to the water committee of the purchase so made. This report of the sub-committee was approved by the water committee, and on January 20th, 1909, the water committee made a written report to city council wherein the foregoing matters were set forth at length, and city council thereupon by an affirmative vote expressly confirmed that report and ratified the Hollingshead contract. This report of the Hollingshead purchase, and the manner in which the purchase was reported as having been made, is herein set forth at length because of the claim now made in behalf of complainant, that the action taken by city council in its approval of that report operated as a ratification of the contract for the enforcement of which the present suit is pending. The contract which complainant now seeks to enforce was made by the sub-committee in the name of the city September 15th, 1908, and $200 was on that day paid to complainant on account of the purchase price. The sub-committee has not at any time formally reported the purchase to the water committee, and no report of the purchase has at any time been made to city council. Suit for the enforcement of the contract has become necessary because the officers of the city will not supply to the sub-committee the balance of the purchase price. The $200, which was paid on account of the contract, appears to have been paid by a check drawn on the fund already referred to; but I find no evidence which justifies the conclusion that city council ever approved of that payment with knowledge that the payment had been made on account of the purchase price of land. The report of the water committee touching the Hollingshead purchase disclosed to city council that the water committee was making purchases of land for water works, and that in making the purchases, it was operating through a sub-committee which it had appointed and had clothed with power to make the purchases. It may therefore be assumed, for present purposes, that the approval of city council of that report gave complete sanction to the plan and was equivalent to an original authorization from city council to the water committee to proceed in that manner in making future purchases. The single question then presented is whether city council had power to delegate to its water committee authority to purchase land for the extension of its water works system. It is a well-established principle that, in the absence of express legislative authority for that purpose, a municipal corporation cannot delegate its legislative functions; but may delegate ministerial or administrative functions to subordinate officials or agents. In City of Burlington v. Dennison, 42 N. J. Law (13 Vr.) 165, 167, the text of Dill. Mun. Corp. is approved as follows: "The principle that municipal powers or discretion cannot be delegated, does not prevent a corporation from appointing agents and empowering them to make contracts, nor from appointing committees and investing them with duties of a ministerial or administrative character. The authorized body of a municipal corporation may bind it by an ordinance or resolution, or may, by vote, clothe its officers, agents or committee with. power to act for it, and a contract made by persons thus appointed by the corporation will bind it." The line between legislative powers which may not be delegated and administrative or ministerial powers which may be delegated, cannot be artificially defined with entire accuracy, for it is manifest that the proper exercise of any delegated administrative or ministerial function involves some degree of discretion in any action which may be taken by the agent. As stated in Edwards v. Watertown, 61 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 463, 488, an authorization to a janitor to purchase a broom to sweep the council chamber, involves the exercise of some degree of judgment and discretion upon the part of the janitor. Accordingly, in Burlington v. Dennison, supra, the power delegated to a com |